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Abstract 
Social media is an increasingly important platform for warning employed by 
statutory authorities in emergency situations. However, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that there are legal concerns surroundings its implementation. In light 
of these concerns, and in the knowledge that they may act as a barrier to 
implementation, this thesis poses two key questions. The first examines in 
what circumstances are statutory authorities within the Australian emergency 
management sector likely to be held legally accountable for warning generally, 
and warning through social media specifically? The investigation of this 
question involves an analysis of responsibilities for the dissemination of 
warning which are incorporated into the regulatory system. The corollary of 
responsibility is accountability. To answer the research question, the 
investigation focuses on legal accountability in the context of the law of 
negligence.  
The examination of social media falls within a broader research context of the 
role of risk communication and warning in emergencies. The provision of risk 
communication and warning to the community is only one aspect of 
emergency management in Australia. However, as identified within the 
National Strategy for Disaster Resilience, it is a key area for action.  Risk 
communication and warning is also a fundamental tool to mitigate and control 
risk. Supported by current theory and principles of good practice, the second 
research question examines the extent to which warning and risk 
communication are embedded into Australia’s regulatory system for 
emergency management.   
A theoretical narrative underpins the thesis. This narrative provides a 
normative platform from which to investigate the research questions. For 
example, the narrative incorporates social contract theory. Social contract 
theory explores ideals of the legitimate roles of government and citizens in 
society. It therefore provides a basis for ascertaining the share of responsibility 
each should take in the context of warning in emergencies. Social contract 
principles also provide a normative basis for the reasonable standard of 
behaviour that is expected of each party. It is noted in relation to the 
reasonable standard of behaviour embedded in the law, that government have 
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limited resources and are required to balance public and private interests. 
Concessions are therefore afforded to government which, when coupled with 
statutory immunities, make it less likely that they will be held legally 
accountable for warning. Consequently, the thesis questions whether further 
accountability mechanisms are required to meet policy objectives of disaster 
risk reduction and resilience.   
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Thesis objectives 
This research focuses on warning in the emergency management context. It 
has two key objectives. The first is to address a specific question of the 
circumstances in which statutory authorities within Australia’s emergency 
management sector are likely to be held legally accountable for acts and 
omissions in warning. The focus is on warning through social media, an 
emerging channel. This examination of legal accountability addresses 
anecdotal concerns and uncertainties as to how the law will be applied to 
emerging technologies. Unless addressed, these uncertainties may act as a 
barrier to implementation, or lead to a sub-optimal incorporation of social 
media, a potentially relevant modality for warning.  
Dissemination of timely and effective warning to the community is fundamental 
to a citizen’s ability to protect their own interests. Protecting their own interests 
means that citizens can take a share of responsibility for disasters and 
emergencies. Risk communication and warning, as a critical driver for shared 
responsibility between citizens and the state, ought to be firmly embedded in 
the regulatory system. To do so would create a strong institutional foundation. 
Consequently, the second, broader objective of the research is to determine 
the extent to which risk communication, warning and the use of social media, 
are embedded in Australia’s emergency management regulatory system.  
Providing a strong institutional foundation for risk communication requires not 
only its inclusion in the regulatory system. The regulatory system itself needs 
to align with principles of good practice for regulation and governance.1 
Principles of good practice in regulation and governance identify a requirement 
to include avenues for determining accountability in a regulatory system.2 This 
                                                          
1 See, eg, Martin Lodge and Lindsay Stirton, ‘Accountability in the Regulatory State’ in 
Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge, The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (Oxford 
Handbooks Online, 2010) 3 (The handbook offers definitions of accountability which when 
used in ‘modern parlance’, ‘’signify the obligations of officials to account for their behaviour’). 
2 Blythe McLennan and John Handmer, 'Sharing Responsibility Australian Disaster 
Management - Final Report For The Sharing Responsibility Project ' (Bushfire CRC, 2014) 
118, 130-131 (This report noted that ‘engaging with good governance’…will be important for 
formulating processes to negotiate responsibility sharing in Australian Disaster 
Management); OECD, The Governance of Regulators (OECD Best Practice Principles for 
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includes regulatory systems for the management of emergencies, which 
operate at a time when ‘performance most matters’.3 As will be explored in 
Chapter Three, incorporating accountability into the regulatory system can 
demonstrate legitimacy and help to foster a relationship of trust with the 
community.4 Trust in turn, plays ‘a significant role in successful crisis 
management’, and in the effectiveness of risk communication messages and 
the perception of risk.5  
‘Accountability’ has several definitions.6 In this thesis, the primary objective is 
to address legal accountability, or the circumstances in which statutory 
authorities will need to justify their decisions relating to warning at law. When 
the justification for decisions is determined to be unreasonable against the 
legal standards of conduct expected at law, penalties and sanctions are 
applied.7 ‘Accountability’, is not only a legal concept. The term also refers to 
                                                          
Regulatory Policy, 2014) 27, 79-80, 88; Better Regulation Task Force, Principles of Good 
Regulation (2003) Crown Copyright, 1 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100407162704/http:/archive.cabinetoffice.gov.
uk/brc/upload/assets/www.brc.gov.uk/principlesleaflet.pdf>. 
3 Lina Svedin, Routledge Studies in Governance and Public Policy: Accountability in Crises 
and Public Trust in Governing Institutions (Routledge, 2012) 1-2 (The suspension of normal 
administrative conditions may be due to the fact that the rules ‘are neither adequate nor 
appropriate’ for the circumstances). 
4 Svedin, above n 3, 1-3; See, eg, Mary Campbell, ‘Restoring Trust in Government: A Cost-
Effective Approach to the Cry for “Accountability” (2003) 26(3) The Journal for Quality and 
Participation 44, 45 (The author highlights that accountability mechanisms will only operate 
to instil trust from the community where the measures taken are known to the community, 
therefore agencies need to deliver on what they say they will do and inform them they have 
fulfilled their commitment); Peri K Blind, ‘Building Trust in Government in the Twenty-First 
Century: Review of Literature and Emerging Issues’ (7th Global Forum on Reinventing 
Government, Building Trust in Government, 26-29 June 2007, Vienna, Austria) 3 (Blind, 
defines political trust as being ‘the judgment of the citizenry that the system and the political 
incumbents are responsive and will do what is right even in the absence of constant 
scrutiny’). 
5 Svedin, above n 3, 4; Jeanne X. Kasperson et al, ‘The social amplification of risk: 
assessing fifteen years of research and theory’ in Nick Pidgeon, Roger E. Kasperson and 
Paul Slovic (eds), The Social Amplification of Risk (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 31; 
Marjolein B.A van Asselt and Ortwin Renn, ‘Risk Governance’ (2011) Journal of Risk 
Research 431, 439-440; Paul Slovic, ‘Perceived Risk, Trust and Democracy’ (1993) 13 (6) 
Risk Analysis 675, 676. 
6 McLennan and Handmer, 'Sharing Responsibility Australian Disaster Management’, above 
n 2, 18; House of Lords, ‘The Regulatory State: Ensuring Its Accountability Volume I’ 
(Report, Select Committee on the Constitution, 6th Report of Session 2003-04, 2004) 19. 
7 Carol Harlow, State Liability Tort Law and Beyond (Oxford University Press, 2004) 51 citing 
D. Oliver, Government in the United Kingdom: The Search for Accountability, Effectiveness 
and Citizenship (Open University Press, 1991); McLennan and Handmer, 'Sharing 
Responsibility Australian Disaster Management’, above n 2, 18; Svedin, above n 3, 5 
(Reasonableness in a disaster or crisis can take on a new meaning when agencies are not 
only tasked with managing the impacts of the disaster, but ‘often find themselves victims’ of 
 13 
 
performance measures and practice standards that provide a benchmark 
against which to scrutinise and independently review performance.8 Together 
the variety of accountability mechanisms help to ensure that when an entity, 
such as a statutory authority has a share of responsibility for managing a risk, 
they carry out their roles in an effective manner.9  
What becomes evident in this research is that there is a low likelihood of legal 
accountability for failures in warning under the law of negligence. Yet the 
potential for legal accountability can act to improve standards of warning and 
deter poor performance. In the alternative, the promise of independent review 
through coronial inquiries may act as a further deterrent. However, a coronial 
inquiry is not the most effective review mechanism.10 The thesis therefore 
suggests that further investigation into the incorporation of performance 
measures, which can be applied prospectively, is warranted. Without some 
form of accountability measures, there is a possibility that responsibilities 
embedded in legislation and policy objectives will not be met.11  
 
 
                                                          
the disaster as well) Reasonableness in this thesis is adjudged under the laws of 
negligence. 
8 Better Regulation Task Force, above n 2, 4; OCED, Risk and Regulatory Policy: Improving 
the Governance of Risk (OECD Publishing, 2010) 25 (The presence of accountability 
mechanism such as performance standards are seen as a positive element of risk based 
approaches); Lodge and Stirton, above n 1, 2,4 (Noting that measures for accountability in 
the form of audit measures may have limited applicability); House of Lords, ‘The Regulatory 
State: Ensuring Its Accountability Volume I’ (Report, Select Committee on the Constitution, 
6th Report of Session 2003-04 (2004) 6, 14, 23 (Accountability can act as a ‘control 
mechanism’ for ‘Government to achieve efficient and effective regulation’, and inform of 
issues which can be implemented to refine and improve regulatory performance). 
9 Campbell, above n 4, 44, 45-46. 
10 Michael Eburn and Stephen Dovers, ‘Learning Lessons from Disasters: Alternatives to 
Royal Commissions and Other Quasi-Judicial Inquiries’ (2015) 74(4) Australian Journal of 
Public Administration, 495, 496-497. 
11 See, eg, Emergency Management Victoria, National Review of Warnings and Information: 
Final Report (Victorian Government, Melbourne, Cube Group, 2014) 5, 78, 81 (The National 
Review of Warnings suggests performance measures are required for measuring and 
evaluating the effectiveness of the content of warnings); Svedin, above n 3, 5; Inspector 
General of Emergency Management (Qld), Review of local governments’ emergency 
warning capability, Report 1 (2015) 6. 
 14 
 
Contextual Background 
Extreme weather and the increasing burden on the emergency management 
sector 
To appreciate the context of study and to underscore the importance of this 
research12 some background of the hazard context is required. In Australia 
and around the world the climate is changing.13 Natural hazards in the form of 
extreme weather events are increasing in intensity and frequency.14 This 
increase is predicted to continue.15 Problematically, extreme weather events 
affect communities and manifest as emergencies. The impacts and the 
emergencies that follow disrupt society16 and bring high social,17 cultural, 
environmental and economic costs.18 Increasing frequency of events, coupled 
with growing ‘community susceptibility’ and vulnerability to the impacts of the 
hazard,19 means that associated costs will continue to rise,20 as will the burden 
on emergency management services.21  
                                                          
12 See, eg, Dr Blythe McLennan et al, ‘Negotiating risk and responsibility through law, policy 
and planning’ (2014) 29(3) Australian Journal of Emergency Management 22, 22 (This 
article highlights the relevance of this type of work in light of increasingly extreme weather 
events and climate change). 
13 A Reisinger et al, ‘2014: Australasia’ in V.R Barros et al, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, 
Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part B: Regional Aspects (Contribution of Working Group II to 
the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) 1371, 
1374. 
14 Climate Council of Australia Pty Ltd, ‘The Burning Issue: Climate change and the 
Australian Bushfire Threat’ (2015); Climate Council of Australia, ‘Counting the Costs: 
Climate change and Coastal Flooding’ (2014); Reisinger et al, above n 13, 1371, 1375. 
15 Climate Council of Australia Pty Ltd, ‘The Burning Issue’, above n 14; Climate Council of 
Australia, ‘Counting the Costs’, above n 14; Reisinger et al, above n 13, 1371, 1375. 
16 United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), UNISDR 
Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction (2009) 9 
<http://www.unisdr.org/files/7817_UNISDRTerminologyEnglish.pdf>. 
17 Australian Business Roundtable for Disaster Resilience and Safer Communities, ‘The 
economic cost of the social impact of natural disaster’ Delloites (2015) 12-13 (Social costs 
include intangible costs such as mental health, family violence, alcohol and drug misuse). 
18 Stephane Hallegatte, 'The Indirect Cost of Natural Disaster and an Economic Definition of 
Macroeconomic Resilience' (Policy Research Working Paper 7357, World Bank Group, 
2015) 3-4 (There are numerous direct and indirect costs in natural disasters); Insurance 
Council of Australia, Catastrophe events and the community (2016) 
<http://www.insurancecouncil.com.au/issue-submissions/issues/catastrophe-events>.  
19 Productivity Commission (Cth), Report on Government Services 2016, 'Volume D: 
Emergency Management’ (2016) D.11. 
20 Australian Business Roundtable for Disaster Resilience and Safer Communities, above n 
17, 12 (Total costs are expected to increase and average $33 billion per year by 2050 in real 
terms). 
21 Productivity Commission (Cth), Report on Government Services 2016, above n 19, D.11. 
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Faced with an increased burden for service delivery and to effectively target 
limited resources, natural hazards and their potential impacts are being framed 
in the language of risk.22 Where emergency management once focused on a 
‘hazard centred’ and a ‘response management’ approach, it now embeds risk 
management practices.23 The aim is to strategically target risks with 
unacceptable consequences.24 Policy and strategic frameworks both locally 
and internationally employ the language of disaster risk reduction.25 This is no 
more evident than in Australia. The National Strategy for Disaster Resilience 
(‘NSDR’),26 the Australian policy statement for managing disasters focuses on 
disaster risk reduction, which is to be achieved by building resilience and 
fostering a shared responsibility for disaster risk.27  
Sharing responsibility for disaster risk reduction 
Although disaster risk reduction is a shared responsibility, government, and 
the statutory authorities it creates, have a role in managing emergency and 
disaster related risk.28 Viewed from a normative perspective, through the lens 
of social contract theories, government’s role in managing disaster risk is 
linked to its legitimate function as a protector of life and property.29 Viewed 
from a risk management perspective, the role of managing emergency related 
risk stems from the allocation of tasks to government as a risk owner. To 
                                                          
22 Attorney General’s Department (Cth), National Emergency Risk Assessment Guidelines: 
practice guide (Australian Emergency Management Handbook Series, 2015) 4-5 (Also 
Australian Institute of Disaster Resilience (Cth), National Emergency Risk Assessment 
Guidelines: Practice Guide (Australian Emergency Management Handbook Series, 2015); 
John Salter, ‘Risk Management in the Emergency Management context’ (1997) 12(4) The 
Australian Journal of Emergency Management 22, 22 (The author identifies the paradigm 
shift which has occurred). 
23 Salter, above n 22, 22; Mal Crondstedt, ‘Prevention, Preparedness, Response, Recovery 
– an outdated concept?’ (2002) 17(2) Australian Journal of Emergency Management 10, 11. 
24 Salter, above n 22, 22; Crondstedt, above n 23, 11. 
25 See, eg, United Nations, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, 
Adopted 14-18 March 2015, UN Doc A/CONF.224/CRP.1. 
26 Commonwealth, Council of Australian Governments (COAG), National Strategy for 
Disaster Resilience (2011). 
27 Commonwealth, Council of Australian Governments (COAG), National Strategy for 
Disaster Resilience (2011). 
28 McLennan et al, above n 12, 22. 
29 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1823) 
<http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/locke/government.pdf>; Dr James 
Alvey, ‘Classical Liberal vs Other Interpretation of John Locke: A Tercentenary Assessment’ 
(Refereed paper presented to the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, 
University of Adelaide, 29 September- 1 October 2004) 14; Patricia Sheridan, The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2014 Edition) 'Locke's Moral Philosophy' 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/locke-moral/>. 
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manage risk effectively, government as a risk owner and protector of citizens 
is expected to employ an effective risk governance framework. Ultimately, this 
governance framework30 sets out the institutional foundation for management 
of natural hazard and emergency related risk. The regulatory system, which 
forms part of this framework, incorporates components that set out policy, 
functions, responsibilities and accountabilities for action. In this thesis, the 
focus is on functions and responsibilities for emergency warning. 
The fundamental role of risk communication 
In managing risk, including disaster risk, communication plays a key, if not 
critical role.31 The use of risk communication and warning procedures act as a 
mitigation strategy or control tool which, when effectively employed, modify 
emergency related risk.32 For example, communication and warnings out to 
the community, which provide meaningful, timely, and appropriate information, 
can empower individuals..33 The information received enables them to make 
choices and take a share of responsibility for protecting their own lives and 
assets.34  
Receipt of risk communication and warning in all phases of the disaster cycle 
is beneficial. In Australia, emergencies and disasters are managed in line with 
the comprehensive approach to emergency management, which identifies four 
phases of the disaster cycle.35 In the early phases of the disaster cycle 
provision of risk communication, allow individuals to take preparatory 
measures to ensure that when disaster strikes they are ready.36 In view of this 
                                                          
30 The term ‘risk governance’ is a broad term, in this thesis the focus is on the institutions 
and regulatory aspects of a governance framework. 
31 Emergency Management Victoria, National Review of Warnings and Information, above n 
11, 1. 
32 Ibid 1; Attorney General’s Department (Cth), National Emergency Risk Assessment 
Guidelines (Australian Emergency Management Handbook Series: Handbook 10, 2nd 
Edition, 2015) 50-52. 
33 Commonwealth, Council of Australian Governments (COAG), National Strategy for 
Disaster Resilience (2011) 8. 
34 Ibid 7-8. 
35 See, eg, Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, Emergency management in Australia: 
Concepts and Principles, Manual 1 (2004) 3-4; National Governors’ Association, 
‘Comprehensive Emergency Management – A Governor’s Guide’ (Centre for Policy 
Research, 1979) 11-13; Crondstedt, above n 23, 10 (Noting that these phases are not 
necessarily distinct and linear phases in an emergency but may be fluid). 
36 See, eg, Dr I.M. McNeill & Professor J.M Boldero, ‘Improving the role of hazard 
communications in increasing resident’ preparedness and response planning’ (Annual 
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knowledge, statutory authorities undertake community meetings, disseminate 
brochures,37 and create information campaigns that identify preparatory 
measures.38 During the response phase of a disaster39 the receipt of warnings 
plays an immediate role in enabling an individual to make timely choices about 
feasible action. The receipt of a message in the appropriate format may mean 
the difference between life and death or extreme property damage. The key 
role of communication in the prevention phase of an emergency should not be 
discounted. However, it is responsibility and accountability for risk 
communication in the response phase of a disaster that is the focus of this 
thesis. The reason for this focus is that legal accountability will more likely be 
sought in wake of a natural disaster or emergency. Claims are likely to focus 
on a failure to issue warning or for errors in warning during an event that have 
subsequently resulted in harm to a member of the public.  
Emerging technologies for warning: benefits and challenges 
Information about natural hazard risk is disseminated through numerous 
channels. Within the regulatory system, emergency management plans, 
guidelines, protocols and public information plans address how risk 
communication ought to be managed and disseminated. Historically, 
dissemination has taken place over traditional channels or modalities of 
communication. In Australia, these modalities have included television, radio, 
press releases, door knocking, along with the use of Standard Emergency 
Warning Signal (SEWS), and Emergency Alert (EA).40 These modalities 
remain highly relevant. However, emerging Web 2.0 technologies, such as 
                                                          
Project Report 2014-2015, Bushfire and Natural Hazards CRC) 4 (This report highlights the 
work currently being undertaken in Australia on how best to connect with the community 
prior to emergency to ensure readiness and preparation for disaster events); Naim Kapucu, 
‘Collaborative emergency management: better community organising, better public 
preparedness and response’ (2008) 32(2) Disasters 239, 239, 250-251. 
37 McNeill & Boldero, above n 36, 3. 
38 See, eg, Queensland Fire and Emergency Service (Qld), If it’s Flooded, forget it (11 March 
2014) <https://www.qfes.qld.gov.au/communitysafety/swiftwater/>. 
39  Attorney General’s Department & Emergency Management Australia, Emergency 
Management in Australia Concepts and Principles (2nd Edition, 2014) 17,19 (The creation of 
warning systems is expected to occur in the preparedness phases of a disaster whereas the 
dissemination of warning messages has been classified as a response activity). 
40 Attorney General’s Department, Australia’s Emergency Warning Arrangements (April 
2013) 15-16. 
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Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Instagram now provide new channels over 
which to disseminate warning information.  
In terms of relevance to emergency risk communication, the uptake and use 
of social media by the community in everyday life is high41 and in emergencies, 
it is growing.42 In Australia in 2016, 95 percent of the population were reported 
as having a Facebook account, and 19 percent used a Twitter account.43 
Unlike traditional modalities for communication, in an emergency, Web 2.0 
platforms are available and used on mobile devices.44 The ability to access 
social media on mobile devices is highly beneficial to the sector as the 
platforms afford a readily accessible channel over which to disseminate 
communication.  
Social media channels in their varied presentations are attractive to the public 
and expected to stay.45 However, rather than supporting one way methods of 
communication46 Web 2.0 technologies present a new communication 
paradigm for the emergency management sector. They support two-way 
communication.47 The technologies allow users to post content, to create 
                                                          
41 See, eg, Sensis, Sensis Social Media Report 2016: How Australian people and 
businesses are using social media (1 June 2016) 
<https://www.sensis.com.au/assets/PDFdirectory/Sensis_Social_Media_Report_2016.PDF>
. 
42 Tomer Simon, Avishay Goldberg and Bruria Adini, ‘Socialising in emergencies – A review 
of the use of social media emergency situations’ (2015) 35(5) International Journal of 
Information Management 609, 609, 613; Dr Olga Anikeeva, Dr Malinda Steenkamp and 
Professor Paul Arbon, ‘The future of social media use during emergencies in Australia: 
insights from the 2014 Australian and New Zealand Disaster and Emergency Management 
Conference social media workshop’ (2015) 30(1) The Australian Journal of Emergency 
Management 22, 22; Australian Civil-Military Centre & The University of Adelaide, Australian 
Government, Social Networking, Social Media and Complex Emergencies (Issues Paper, 
June 2014) 4. 
43 Sensis, above n 41, 7.  
44 Ibid 29 (72% of users prefer to access social media over their smartphone). 
45 Anikeeva, Steenkamp and Arbon, above n 42, 22. 
46 Connie M White, Social Media, Crisis, Communication and Emergency Management: 
Leveraging Web 2.0 Technologies (CRC Press, 2012) 131; Alisa Kongthon et al, ‘The Role 
of Twitter during a Natural Disaster: Case Study of 2011 Thai Flood’ (Paper presented at 
2012 Proceedings of PICMET '12: Technology Management for Emerging Technologies 
(PICMET), Vancouver, 29 July - 2 Aug 2012) 2227. 
47 See, eg, White, above n 46, 131; Kongthon et al, above n 46, 2227; Emergency 
Management Victoria, National Review of Warnings and Information, above n 11, 3-4; 
Jesper Falkheimer and Mats Heide, ‘Strategic communication in Participatory Culture From 
One- and Two-Way Communication to Participatory Communication through Social Media’ 
in Derina Holtzhausen and Ansgar Zerfass, The Routledge Handbook of Strategic 
Communication (Taylor and Francis, 2014) 342 (Two-way communication suggests the 
platforms are more democratic); Regina E. Lundgren and Andrea H McMakin Risk 
 19 
 
communities or social networks that converse on diverse topics of interest.48 
As will be examined in Chapter Three, user generated content and two-way 
communication are beneficial as they facilitate greater participation. However, 
two-way communication is proving to be disruptive for a sector that has 
traditionally engaged in orderly, one-way, broadcast messaging. 
That social media is important to the community and the sector, is evidenced 
by its ability to facilitate social networks and the exchange of information. 
These properties of social media can promote social capital and community 
resilience.49 In times of crisis or emergency, information can rapidly cascade 
across social media networks, bringing messages to many sectors of the 
community. In some cases, social media may provide the most appropriate 
channels for some, if not all of the members of an at-risk community.50  
Accordingly, the channels require serious consideration for utilisation by the 
emergency management sector.  
Emerging technology for warning: challenges and legal concerns 
Alongside the benefits that social media channels may bring to emergency 
managers, they also bring challenges.51 Some of these challenges will be 
addressed in the hypothetical case study in Chapter Eight. If the challenges 
are not effectively managed, there is a concern or uncertainty as to whether 
                                                          
Communication: A Handbook for Communicating Environmental, Safety and Health Risks 
(John Wiley & Sons Ltd, Inc, 2013) 283. 
48 Timothy L. Sellnow and Matthew W. Seegar, Theorizing Crisis Communication (Wiley, 
2013) 128; Akemi Takeoka Chatfield, Hans J. (Jochen) Scholl and Uuf Brajawidagda, 
‘Tsunami early warnings via Twitter in government: Net-Savvy citizens’ co-production of 
time-critical information services’ (2013) 30 Government Information Quarterly, 377, 384; 
Adam Crowe, Disasters 2.0 The Application of Social Media Systems for Modern 
Emergency Management (CRC Press, 2012) 9. 
49 Fran Norris et al, ‘Community Resilience as a Metaphor, Theory, Set of Capacities and 
Strategy for Disaster Readiness’ (2008) 41 The American Journal of Community 
Psychology, 136, 137-139. 
50 See, eg, John H Sorensen, ‘Hazard Warning Systems: Review of 20 Years or Progress’ 
(2000) 1(2) Natural Hazards Review 119, 119-122; Denise C, Walker, Mass Notification and 
Crisis Communication: Planning, Preparedness and Systems (Taylor and Francis, 2012) 37, 
37-38; Chatfield, Scholl and Brajawidagda, above n 48, 384; Crowe, Disasters 2.0, above n 
48, 9; Sensis, above n 41, 16 (Reflecting on the statistics, whether the channels are 
appropriate will depend on the demographic of the community – where there is a young to 
middle age population social media may be the most appropriate channel for 
communication); Hazelwood Mine Fire Inquiry, ‘Hazelwood Mine Fire Inquiry Report’ (2014) 
384, 387, 400 (Social media will not be appropriate in all circumstances). 
51 Department of Homeland Security, ‘Using Social Media for Enhanced Situational 
Awareness and Decision Support: Virtual Social Media Working Group and DHS First 
Responders Group’ (June 2014) 5, 8, 29. 
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legal accountability, and liability will result, thereby posing a legal risk for 
statutory authorities.52  
These legal concerns are reflective of the growing incidence of action across 
many areas of law in the wake of disasters.53 As the growth in disaster law 
indicates, legal actions in the wake of disasters reflect a shift in beliefs. That 
is, disasters are no longer solely ‘Acts of God’ and ‘exceptional 
circumstances’.54 Rather the public sees them as phenomena capable of 
prediction, greater management and mitigation.55 Phenomena for which 
government, as having some share of the responsibility, need to be held to 
account.  
When statutory authorities are perceived to have ‘obligations’ and 
responsibilities in emergency management and warning,56 which they fail to 
carry out and which result in loss, members of the public will seek to attribute 
blame.57 As well as blame being sought through coronial inquiries and royal 
commissions, in Australia, citizens have also come together in the wake of 
flood and fire events to pursue class actions. Class actions have arisen against 
entities tasked with emergency management functions and responsibilities 
                                                          
52 A definition of legal risk is provided in the Definition of Key Terms section of this Chapter. 
53 Kristian Cedervall Lauta, ‘Legal Scholarship and Disasters’ in Rasmus Dahlberg, Oliver 
Rubin and Morten Thanning Vendel, Disaster research: multidisciplinary and international 
perspectives (Routledge, ebooks, 2016) 98-99; Daniel A. Farber, ‘Catastrophic Risk, Climate 
Change and Disaster Law’ (2013) 16 Asia Pacific Journal of Environmental Law 37, 41-46, 
53 (These legal actions can spread themselves across numerous areas of law throughout 
the disaster cycle). 
54 Lauta, ‘Legal Scholarship and Disasters’, above n 53, 97-99, 104; See, also, David E. 
Alexander, ‘Communicating earthquake risk to the public: the trial of the “L’Aquila Seven” 
(2014) 72(2) Natural Hazards 1159; Daniel A. Farber, ‘Tort Law in the Era of Climate 
Change, Katrina, and 9/11: Exploring liability for extraordinary risks’ (2009) 43(3) Valparaiso 
University Law Review 1075, 1076. 
55 Lauta, ‘Legal Scholarship and Disasters’, above n 53, 97-98, 104; See, also, Alexander, 
‘Communicating earthquake risk to the public’, above n 54, 1159; Farber, ‘Tort Law in the 
Era of Climate Change’, above n 54, 1076. 
56 McLennan and Handmer, 'Sharing Responsibility Australian Disaster Management’, above 
n 2, 18; C. Wendling, J. Radisch and S. Jacobzone, ’The Use of Social Media in Risk and 
Crisis Communication’ (2013) (OECD Working Papers on Public Governance, No. 25, 
OECD Publishing) 1-2, 8; John Carlo Bertot, Paul T. Jaeger, and Derek Hansen, ‘The impact 
of policies on government social media usage: Issues, challenges, and recommendations’ 
(2012) 29 Government Information Quarterly 30,  31-32 (Outlining some obligations and 
responsibilities with regards to social media.). 
57 McLennan and Handmer, 'Sharing Responsibility Australian Disaster Management’, above 
n 2, 15; Michael Eburn, ‘Litigation for failure to warn of natural hazards and community 
resilience’ (2008) 23(2) The Australian Journal of Emergency Management 9; Michael Eburn 
and Stephen Dovers, ‘Legal Aspects of Risk Management in Australia’ (2014) 4(1) Journal of 
Integrated Disaster Risk Management 61, 62-63. 
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within legislation.58 In light of the growth of disaster law, Lauta asserts that 
‘liability after disasters is becoming as certain as death and taxes’.59 Although 
the prospect of a claim arising may be becoming more certain, this thesis 
asserts that the likely satisfaction of claims under the law of negligence in 
Australia may be limited. The limited prospect of legal accountability may be 
reassuring to the sector. However, it is still important to ensure that prospective 
responsibilities for warning, which aim to achieve disaster risk reduction, are 
carried out effectively. Therefore, as previously highlighted, alternative 
accountability mechanisms that focus on performance may be required.  
A gap in the literature on social media liability 
As the introduction highlighted, there is an increasing uptake of social media 
technologies by members of the community. In part, as a response to this 
uptake, public expectations,60 and the need to improve effective delivery, the 
emergency management sector is incorporating social media into the suite of 
channels used for warning.61 The incorporation of social media channels is 
occurring to varying degrees across multiple layers of government with 
disparate levels of expertise.62 Many emergency service agencies, as well as 
state and local government bodies, now at least have a presence on social 
                                                          
58 See, eg, Rodriguez & Sons Pty Ltd V Queensland Bulk Water Supply Authority (T/As 
Seqwater) [2014] NSWSC 1771; Rowe v AusNet Electricity Services Pty Ltd [2015] VSC 
232; Matthews v AusNet Electricity Services Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 663; Warragamba Winery 
Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 701. 
59 Lauta, ‘Legal Scholarship and Disasters’, above n 53, 98-99. 
60 Ines Mergel, ’The social media innovation challenge in the public sector’ (2012) 17 (3-4) 
Information polity 281, 283; Crowe, Disasters 2.0, above n 48, 81, 84; Victoria Government, 
Victorian Emergency Management Reform, White Paper (December 2012) 8; Roushi Low et 
al, ‘Protecting the protectors: legal liabilities for the use of Web 2.0 for Australian Disaster 
response’ (In Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE International Symposium on Technology and 
Society: Social Implications of Emerging Technologies, University of Wollongong, 7-9 June 
2010) 416; Andrea Kavanaugh et al, ’Social media use by government: From the routine to 
the critical’ (2012) 29 Government Information Quarterly 480, 489. 
61 See, eg, NGIS, ‘Social Media helping Emergency Management: Final Report’ 
(Government 2.0 Taskforce, 2009) 5; Crowe, Disasters 2.0, above n 48, 88; Queensland 
Floods Commission of Inquiry, ‘Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry: Interim Report’ 
(August 2011) 132-133; Western Australia, ‘A Shared Responsibility: The Report of the 
Perth Hills Bushfire February 2011 Review’ (2011) 124-125, 128; Victoria Government, 
Review of the 2010-11 Flood Warnings and Response (Final Report by Neil Comrie AO, 
APM, 1 December 2011) 7, 80 (Since 2009 there has been a call for active engagement with 
social media on the part of emergency management). 
62 Hughes et al, above n 62, 1513 (The variability of usage of social media is a phenomenon 
noted in the United States); Anikeeva, Steenkamp and Arbon, above n 42, 23 (Noting 
considerations of slow adoption in some organisations in Australia). 
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media. This presence is primarily in the form of Facebook and Twitter 
accounts; however, even where accounts exist, the capability to disseminate 
warning and communicate is not always fully developed.63 As adverted to, 
anecdotal evidence suggests a lack of development of social media 
capabilities is in some part, due to concerns and uncertainty over legal 
implications stemming from its use.  
Concerns and uncertainty as to legal accountability 
These concerns are problematic. A threat of legal action for example, may 
make the sector ‘cautious and slow to issue warnings’.64 A lack of adoption 
and capability development may hinder uptake of communication modalities 
that could inform community members of hazard impacts in a timely manner. 
Uncertainty over legal implications is also problematic as it can lead to over 
compliance or under compliance in line with ‘perceived’ responsibilities.65 
Inappropriate levels of compliance in turn can lead to a less than optimal or 
efficient outcome66 and opens the door to economic cost and potential 
liability.67 
When uncertainty arises, it suggests a gap in knowledge exists. This gap may 
be due to a lack of research and understanding of the circumstances in which 
legal accountability will be imputed for social media usage in warning. It may 
also stem from a failure in current social media policies and guidelines to 
identify clearly, the legal basis for employing good practice principles. 
Alternatively, it may arise due to a gap in training. Of these three possibilities, 
the first two are the focus of this research. 
 
                                                          
63 Anikeeva, Steenkamp and Arbon, above n 42, 23. 
64 Stephen Dovers and John Handmer, Handbook of disaster policies and institutions: 
Improving emergency management and climate change adaptation (Routledge / Earthscan, 
2nd ed, 2013) 173. 
65 Simon Halliday, Jonathan Ilan, Jonathan & Colin, Scott, ‘The Public Management of 
Liability Risks’ (2011) 31(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 527, 527; Richard Craswell, 
and John E Calfee, ‘Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards’ (1986) 2(2) Journal of Law, 
Economics & Organization, 279, 279-280. 
66 Halliday, Ilan & Scott, above n 65, 527, 527-528; Craswell and Calfee, above n 65, 298-
299; Dovers and Handmer, Handbook of disaster policies, above n 64, 173. 
67 Halliday, Ilan & Scott, above n 65, 527, 538-544. 
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The gap in policies, guidelines and research 
An examination of the literature, policy, plans and guidelines, which guide 
dissemination of warning and the use of social media by government, 
reinforces that a gap in knowledge and doctrine does exist.68  Instruments that 
support operational activity for warning and social media use are evident.69 
However, few are based on the most recent research and many fail to explicitly 
address legal issues, such as negligence, which might arise. Alternatively, 
they fail to link good practice with a legal rationale for action. To incorporate a 
legal rationale for action would reinforce the need to integrate certain activities 
into practice.  
With gaps apparent in the policy and guidelines and legal uncertainties 
apparent, there is a need for research to fill this gap. Although there is a 
growing pool of literature on the benefits, challenges and patterns of use of 
social media channels in emergencies,70 there is little peer-reviewed literature 
                                                          
68 See, eg, Terry Flew et al, ‘Support Frameworks for the Use of Social Media by Emergency 
Management Organisations: Policy Report’ (13 November 2015) QUT Digital Media 
Research Centre, Brisbane, 4 (Noting the need for a national social media framework). 
69 See, eg, Emergencies (ESA Social Media Policy) Commissioner’s Guidelines 2011 (ACT); 
ACT Government, ACT Government Social Media Policy Guidelines, Version 1.0 (March 
2012); Queensland, Official Use of social media policy (2012); Department of Science, 
Information Technology and Innovation (Qld), Principles for the official use of social media 
networks and emerging social media (October 2015) 
<http://www.qgcio.qld.gov.au/products/qgea-documents/547-business/3519-principles-for-
the-use-of-social-media>; Public Service Commission (Vic), Guidance for Use of Social 
Media in the Victorian Public Sector (2010); Department of Business and Innovation (Vic), 
Government 2.0 Projects in VPS: An introduction to managing risks (2010); Victoria, VPS 
Gov 2.0 Risk Register and Management Plan (2010) <http://www.vic.gov.au/blog/social-
media-guides/victorian-public-service-government-2-0-risk-register-management-plan/>; 
New South Wales Police Force, Public Affairs Branch Official Use of Social Media Policy 
2013 (2013); Northern Territory, Web 2.0 for NT Public Servants (NTPS) Guidelines, Version 
1.2 (2013)’; Department of Finance (WA), Social Media Guidelines (September 2012); 
Government of South Australia, Social Media: Guidance for Staff and Agencies (2013) 
<http://files.oper.sa.gov.au/files/social_media_guideline_final.pdf>. 
70 Chatfield, Scholl and Brajawidagda, above n 48, 385; Axel Bruns and Jean Burgess, 
‘Crisis Communication in Natural Disasters: The Queensland Floods and Christchurch 
Earthquakes’ in Katrin Weller et al (eds), Twitter and Society (Peter Lang, 2014) 379; 
Deanne Bird, Megan Ling and Katharine Haynes, ‘Flooding Facebook – the use of social 
media during the Queensland and Victorian floods’ (2012) 27(1) The Australian Journal of 
Emergency Management 27; Amanda Lee Hughes and Leysia Palen, ‘Twitter Adoption and 
Use in Mass Convergence and Emergency Events’ (Proceedings of the 6th International 
ISCRAM Conference – Gothenburg, Sweden, May 2009); Terry Flew et al, ‘Social media 
and its impact on crisis communication: Case studies of Twitter use in emergency 
management in Australia and New Zealand’ (Paper presented at ICA Regional Conference: 
Communication and Social Transformation, 8-10 November 2013, Shanghai, China) 5; 
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regarding the circumstances in which liability will arise. Moreover, there is little 
literature that specifically links the use of social media in warning to the law of 
negligence.71 Where there is some examination of social media liability, 
jurisdictional differences mean the findings of this literature are not directly 
applicable to the Australian context.72 A gap in policies, guidelines and 
research suggests that Australian based research is required. 
Application of research outputs 
As this section of the thesis has highlighted, it is important to incorporate legal 
issues and the legal rationale for action into social media policies and 
guidelines. The outputs of this research provide a framework for carrying out 
this process. To incorporate legal issues means that not only do the 
instruments describe how to carry out effective risk communication. When 
underpinned by legal research, instruments may act to limit institutional risk 
arising out of social media usage. Because of the dynamic nature of the law,73  
                                                          
Crowe, Disasters 2.0, above n 48, 9; M Irons et al, ‘Social Media, Crisis Communication and 
Community-Led Response and Recovery: An Australian Case Study’ (Proceedings of the 
Research Forum at the Bushfire and Natural Hazards CRC & AFAC conference, Wellington, 
2 September 2014). 
71 Sharon Christensen, Bill Duncan and Amanda Stickley, ‘Shifting Paradigms of 
Government Liability for Inaccurate Information’ (2008) 15(2) elaw Journal, 185; (Noting the 
issues being brought before the courts are primarily in the nature of private / public issues in 
employment relations, as well as defamation, see, eg, Lucy Carter, ‘Social media defamation 
cases on the rise, as lawyers tell people to think before they tweet’, ABCNews (online), 25 
August 2015 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-25/social-media-defamation-cases-on-
the-rise/6723328>; Michael Eburn, ‘The emerging legal issue of failure to warn’ (2012) 27(1) 
Australian Journal of Emergency Management 52, 52; Michael Eburn, Emergency Law 
(Federation Press, 2015) (Although Michael Eburn covers a lot of the field of Emergency 
Law in Australia, even his work does not include an in-depth review of warning, or of social 
media). 
72 See, eg, A Scolobig, ‘The dark side of risk and crisis communication’ (2015) 3 Natural 
Hazards and Earth System Sciences Discussions 2739; Robert P. Hartwig and Claire 
Wilkinson, ‘Social Media, Liability and Insurance’ (Insurance Information Institute, December 
2011); Kar-Wai Tong, ‘Online Legal Risk in Social Media: Lessons from a Few Court cases in 
Hong Kong’ in  Allan H.K Yuen et al (eds), New Media, Knowledge Practices and 
Multiliteracies (Springer, 2014); Alexander, ‘Communicating earthquake risk to the public’, 
above n 54, 1159 (Noting criminal liability for misleading information); Edward S Robson, 
‘Responding to liability: Evaluating and Reducing Tort Liability for Digital Volunteers’ (2013) 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC, Policy Series 1. 
73 Derek Hansen, John Carlo Bertot & Paul T Jaeger, ‘Government Policies on the Use of 
Social Media: Legislating for Change’ (Proceedings of the 12th Annual International 
Conference on Digital Government Research, College Park, 12-15 June 2011) 131 (The 
author comments that ‘many of the law which govern social media are to some extent 
antiquated’ and will required updating). 
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it is important to ensure pre-existing policies and guidelines are up to date and 
in line with the most recent research.  
A gap in the literature on responsibility and accountability for 
warning 
Despite the key role of risk communication, the emergency management 
sector is often criticised for failing to communicate risk to the public in an 
effective manner.74 Irrespective of whether public expectations of the sector 
are too high, because of the critique, considerable research to improve 
warnings has been undertaken. A focus of the regulator has been on the 
creation of more effective content to influence the perception / response 
process of individuals.75 However, aside from sector reports and post disaster 
inquiries there has been little academic examination or evaluation of the 
regulatory system, as the institutional foundation for warning in emergencies 
in Australia. This includes a lack of analysis as to the extent to which risk 
communication and warning are embedded into hard and soft law 
instruments.76 This is despite a statement at the national level of the 
fundamental importance of communication to achieving core policy objectives 
in the disaster context.77  
                                                          
74 Hazelwood Mine Fire Inquiry, above n 50, 31, 384; Inspector General of Emergency 
Management (Qld), Review of local governments’ emergency warning capability, above n 
11, 6-7; Fire Services Commissioner (Vic), Review of community responses to recent 
bushfires (2013) 38; Monash Injury Research Centre, Review of Recent Australian Disaster 
Inquiries (2011) 
<http://www.em.gov.au/AboutAGD/Authorityandaccountability/Committeesandcouncils/Docu
ments/Review%20of%20Recent%20Australian%20Disaster%20Inquiries%20-
%20final%20report.PDF>. 
75 See, eg, Project which include, Professor Vivienne Tippett, Connecting communities and 
resilience: A multi-hazard study or preparedness, response and recover communications 
<http://www.bnhcrc.com.au/research/resilient-people-infrastructure-and-institutions/239>; 
Associate Professor Jennifer Boldero, Improving the role of hazard communications in 
increasing residents preparedness and response planning 
<http://www.bnhcrc.com.au/research/resilient-people-infrastructure-and-institutions/238>; 
Emergency Management Victoria, National Review of Warnings and Information, above n 
11. 
76 See, eg, Emergency Management Victoria, National Review of Warnings and Information, 
above n 11; Inspector General of Emergency Management (Qld), Review of local 
governments’ emergency warning capability, above n 11. 
77 Commonwealth, Council of Australian Governments (COAG), National Strategy for 
Disaster Resilience (2011) 8. 
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In 2014, a joint report by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies and United Nations Development Program provided 
findings from the largest comparative study of effective legislation for disaster 
risk reduction.78 Following on from this report in 2015, a ‘Checklist on Law and 
Disaster Risk Reduction’ was developed.79 The aim of the Checklist is to 
provide ‘guidance’ on ‘bringing national legal frameworks in line with 
international standards’ and frameworks, such as the Sendai Framework for 
Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (‘SFDRR’).80 A framework that Australia 
endorses. Together, the findings of the report and the checklist identify key 
activities for warning in the disaster context.81  One area of focus is whether a 
‘country’s laws establish clear procedures and responsibilities for early 
warning’.82  
The findings of the joint report align with practice standards for risk 
management that stipulate the need to plan for risk communication.83 In the 
risk management context, planning for risk communication includes the need 
to identify:  
i. The objectives of specific communication  
ii. Who will be involved 
iii. How the channels will work 
iv. What will be communicated and  
v. How the information will be communicated.84  
Together the international reports and the risk literature suggest there is a 
need to examine Australia’s regulatory system components for warning. The 
aim being to determine whether they satisfy principles of good practice. If the 
                                                          
78 IFRC & UNDP, ‘Effective law and regulation for disaster risk reduction: a multi country 
report’ (New York, 2014) (Mary Picard). 
79 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, ‘The checklist on law 
and disaster risk reduction' (Pilot Version, March 2015).  
80 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, above n 79, 4; United 
Nations, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, Adopted 14-18 March 
2015, UN Doc A/CONF.224/CRP.1. 
81 IFRC & UNDP, ‘Effective law and regulation for disaster risk reduction’, above n 78, 33-34, 
36 (Both establishment and operation of early warning systems should be supported, along 
with authority for warning and decision making, although some countries will differ as to how 
the frameworks are put in place).  
82 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, above n 79, 3.  
83 Standards Australia, Communicating and consulting about risk (HB 327:2010)18-20. 
84 Ibid. 
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components meet good practice, it is more likely that they will provide a strong 
institutional framework, and act as effective procedural controls, for managing 
natural hazard and emergency related risk. The implementation of good 
practice measures may also demonstrate that Australia is attempting to meet 
its commitments under the SFDRR.85 
Statement of the Research Problem 
The objectives of the thesis are to address two key questions. The first, 
investigates a particular problem in relation to social media, an emerging Web 
2.0 technology relevant to the field of emergency warning. That is, in what 
circumstances is a statutory authority within the emergency 
management sector likely to be held legally accountable for acts and/or 
omissions in warning? As social media is one possible channel for warning, 
an initial understanding of the likely legal accountability for warning more 
generally is fundamental. Once this understanding is established, the 
principles are applied to a specific case study of social media. 
 
The second question incorporated into the research problem is underpinned 
by broader and interlinked considerations regarding risk communication and 
warning more generally. That is, due to the fundamental importance of risk 
communication and warning in an emergency, to what extent is it 
embedded into the soft and hard law instruments that make up the 
emergency management regulatory system? 
Methodology 
Part One: Development of a theoretical narrative 
To address the research questions, the thesis is divided into three parts. These 
distinct parts utilise theoretical and doctrinal research respectively. The first 
part develops an interdisciplinary theoretical narrative86 or framework. The 
narrative draws on technical risk management standards, such as the Risk 
                                                          
85 Although the United Nations, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, 
Adopted 14-18 March 2015, UN Doc A/CONF.224/CRP.1.outlines commitments, it is not 
‘legally binding or enforceable’ on supporting nations.  
86 Lauta, ‘Legal Scholarship and Disasters’, above n 53, 100, 104 (Interdisciplinary research 
is required as ‘disasters are interdisciplinary objects and studying their legal implications 
requires fundamental knowledge of the affected societies, technologies and natures’). 
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Management - Principles and guidelines (AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009)87 and the 
‘National Emergency Risk Assessment Guidelines’88 which have been 
adopted by the emergency management sector in Australia. Part One draws 
on the theory of risk communication and theory which identifies normative 
propositions and good practice as to how risk should be managed and 
governed.89  
Normative propositions and considerations of principles for good practice used 
in this thesis derive from a variety of fields. They incorporate social contract 
theory, sociological theory on the risk society, as well as current research that 
examines drivers for regulatory reform, and good practice for regulatory 
design. By incorporating technical standards and theory, the research extends 
beyond the core legal research methodology of doctrinal analysis into ‘a 
broader cross-disciplinary research framework’.90 As will be examined below 
in the Synopsis of Chapters, the first stage of the research is captured in 
Chapters Two to Four of the thesis. 
Part Two: A legal analysis 
Section One: Exploring roles and responsibilities incorporated in the regulatory 
system for emergency management 
The second part of the thesis addresses the research questions through a 
blend of doctrinal analysis and content analysis.  The second part consists of 
two sections. The first section addresses the broader research question and 
identifies the extent to which responsibilities for risk communication and 
warning are present in the current regulatory system. 91 This section involves 
                                                          
87 Standards Australia, Risk Management - Principles and guidelines (AS/NZS ISO 
31000:2009). 
88 Attorney General’s Department (Cth), National Emergency Risk Assessment Guidelines 
above n 32; Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience (Cth), National Emergency Risk 
Assessment Guidelines (Australian Emergency Management Handbook Series, 2nd ed, 
2015). 
89 Terry Hutchinson, Researching and Writing in Law (Thomson Reuters, 3rd ed, 2010) 97; 
Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What we Do: Doctrinal Legal 
Research’ (2012) 17(1) Deakin Law Review 83, 85. 
90 Hutchinson and Duncan, above n 89, 83, 85. 
91 Kylie Burns, ‘Judicial Use and Construction of Social Facts in Negligence cases in the 
Australian High Court’ (Doctor of Philosophy, Griffith Law School, 2011) 34-35 (Burns’ 
thesis, outlines application of content analysis to legal research in some detail). 
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an analysis of hard and soft law instruments relevant to the Australian 
emergency management context. 92  
The most suitable methodology to employ to bring all the relevant regulatory 
instruments together for examination is content analysis. Incorporation of 
content analysis in this section extends the field of analysis beyond the 
traditional boundaries of doctrinal analysis. Doctrinal analysis ordinarily 
focuses on an examination of primary materials such as case law and hard 
law instruments (statute).93 If the examination of the regulatory system is 
limited to statute, a true picture of the extent to which risk communication and 
warning are embedded into the regulatory system, would be absent.  
As previously indicated, legislation is only one mechanism through which to 
implement policy objectives. As becomes evident in Chapter Five, legislation 
may only incorporate broad and high-level powers and functions. The policy 
intent, and more detailed responsibilities for warning and risk communication, 
will only become evident when soft law instruments (such as policy, plans and 
guidelines) are included in the analysis.94 The use of content analysis provides 
a methodology that achieves this holistic approach. Content analysis provides 
a basis for the researcher to determine patterns as to where risk 
communication and warning appear in the hierarchy of components. It also 
provides a basis for determining the extent to which risk communication and 
warning are present across the regulatory system as a whole. A comparison 
of the findings of the analysis against international good practice facilitates an 
evaluation of Australia’s emergency management regulatory system. The aim 
is to determine whether the system reflects the relevant principles.  
                                                          
92 Legislation Act 2003 (Cth) s 7, 8 (Provides a definition of a legislative instrument). 
93 See, eg, Hutchinson and Duncan, above n 89, 113; McLennan and Handmer, 'Sharing 
Responsibility Australian Disaster Management’, above n 2, 74. 
94 See, eg, Douglas Fisher, Legal Reasoning in Environmental Law: A study of Structure, 
Form and Language’ (Edward Elgar, 2013) 425 (Fisher labels these type of materials as 
‘para-legal’ rules); McLennan and Handmer, 'Sharing Responsibility Australian Disaster 
Management’, above n 2, 74 (Policies and strategic documents are often considered as 
vision statements rather than hard law instruments); Benedict Sheehy & Donald Feaver, 
‘Designing Effective Regulation: A Normative Theory’ (2015) 38(1) University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 392, 401-402 (Each of these instruments is one component within the 
entire regulatory system). 
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Section Two: Examining legal accountability under the law of negligence in 
light of functions and responsibilities 
The second section of Part Two, involves in-depth doctrinal analysis of the 
case law on negligence and the duty to warn. As indicated, social media is one 
channel through which to disseminate warnings. To determine the 
circumstances in which legal accountability will result from the use of social 
media, a broad understanding of legal accountability for warning is established 
in the first instance.  
To understand the likelihood of legal accountability, this section examines in 
the first instance how responsibility for warning is shared between government 
and citizens. Doctrinal analysis then facilitates an understanding of the 
circumstances in which responsibilities encapsulated in regulatory 
components are likely to act as a sufficient basis for the formulation of a 
common law duty to warn. The section then examines the standards of 
conduct that a statutory authority must seek to achieve when exercising their 
duty of care, along with the further elements that must be established at law. 
Together, these findings provide a basis for understanding the circumstances 
that are likely to result in exposure to legal accountability for any failure in 
warning. Doctrinal analysis in this phase will add to the body of disaster law 
by highlighting the recent application of the law of negligence to the area of 
warning in the context of emergency.95 The findings in this Part highlight that, 
due to the limited likelihood of liability, gaps in accountability for warning by 
statutory authorities may be apparent.96 These gaps may need to be 
addressed through alternative mechanisms.  
Having established an understanding of the broader warning context, a 
hypothetical case study of social media usage in a specific hazard scenario, 
applies the findings of section one and two. The case study acts as an 
exploratory device97 to explore, describe98 and analyse in what circumstances, 
                                                          
95 Lauta, ‘Legal Scholarship and Disasters’, above n 53, 100. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Robert K Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Sage Publications, 3rd ed, 
2003) 15. 
98 Victor Jupp (ed), The Sage Dictionary of Social Research Methods (Sage Publications, 
2006) 20. 
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statutory authorities may be held legally accountable for failures in warning 
through social media. Part Three then addresses conclusions and 
recommendations which arise out of the thesis. 
Definition of Key Terms 
The following is a definition of key terms frequently used throughout the thesis. 
Further definitions relevant to specific parts are identified within the relevant 
sections.  
Accountability 
‘Accountability’ can attract a myriad of definitions.99 In the context of 
discussions of government, accountability signifies ‘the obligation of officials 
to account for their behaviour’.100 Taking this definition further accountability 
has been defined as not only being ‘liable or required to give account of or 
explanation for actions’, it also includes a requirement, where relevant, to 
‘suffer the consequences, take the blame or undertake to put matters right if it 
should appear that errors have been made’.101 As previously identified in this 
Chapter, one ‘contentious’ forum for seeking accountability in Australia, is the 
invocation of a coronial inquiry or royal commission after a disaster or 
emergency.102  
In this thesis, however, it is legal accountability, which is the focus of 
examination.  ‘Legal accountability’ refers to those circumstances where the 
need to account for behaviour, to take blame, is formally recognised at law 
and attracts sanctions to ensure matters are put right.103  Under the law of 
negligence, the sanction is the requirement to pay compensation.104 
Compensation is paid to a party suffering any relevant harm; harm caused by 
                                                          
99 House of Lords, ‘The Regulatory State: Ensuring Its Accountability Volume I’ (Report, 
Select Committee on the Constitution, 6th Report of Session 2003-04 (2004) 19-21 (As 
stated in this report – ‘accountability’ ‘is a generic term, the precise definition of which 
depends on the circumstances’, and in practice there may be ‘multiple accountabilities’ to 
varying parties including citizens). 
100 Lodge and Stirton, above n 1, 2. 
101 Harlow, above n 7, 51. 
102 Eburn and Dovers, ‘Learning Lessons from Disasters’, above n 10, 497-500. 
103 McLennan and Handmer, 'Sharing Responsibility Australian Disaster Management’, 
above n 2, 18. 
104 Mahony v J Kruschich (Demolitions) Pty Ltd (1985) 156 CLR 522, 527; Peter Cane, 
Responsibility in Law and Morality (Hart Publishing, 2003) 4, 22, 49-50. 
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the behaviour of an entity that has contravened accepted standards of 
conduct.  
As well as legal mechanisms that examine considerations of accountability 
against obligations,105 accountability mechanisms may take the form of 
performance measures and standards. Performance measures and standards 
act as a benchmark to scrutinise activity.106 As well as acting as a benchmark 
for scrutiny, standards can be adopted proactively to guide the behaviour of 
an entity in line with relevant legislative and policy objectives.107 It is in Chapter 
Nine, that a further benefit of employing performance standards is that they 
may act as an objective benchmark against which to defend actions taken.  
Disaster / emergency 
In Australia, an emergency is defined as: 
An event, actual or imminent, which endangers or threatens to endanger 
life, property or the environment, and which requires a significant and 
coordinated response.108 
While international frameworks appear to utilise the term disaster rather than 
emergency, in Australia the latter of the terms is preferred.109 In Australia, 
                                                          
105 McLennan and Handmer, 'Sharing Responsibility Australian Disaster Management’, 
above n 2, 18. 
106 OCED, Risk and Regulatory Policy, above n 8, 25 (The presence of accountability 
mechanism such as performance standards are seen as a positive element of risk based 
approaches); Lodge and Stirton, above n 1, 2,4 (Noting that measures for accountability – in 
the form of audit measures may have limited applicability); House of Lords, ‘The Regulatory 
State: Ensuring Its Accountability Volume I’ (Report, Select Committee on the Constitution, 
6th Report of Session 2003-04 (2004) 6, 14, 23. 
107 See, eg, Inspector-General Emergency Management (Qld), Emergency Management 
Assurance Framework (2014); Inspector General of Emergency Management (Qld), Review 
of local governments’ emergency warning capability, above n 11 (Reviewing application of 
the emergency management standards in Queensland). 
108 Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, Australian Emergency Management Glossary, 
Manual 3 (1998) 38; See, also United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
(UNISDR), UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction (2009) 9 
<http://www.unisdr.org/files/7817_UNISDRTerminologyEnglish.pdf> (A definition of 
disaster - The UNISDR defines ‘disaster’ as:  A serious disruption of the functioning of a 
community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental 
losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope 
using its own resources). 
109 Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, Australian Emergency Management Glossary, 
Manual 3 (1998) x; Kathleen Tierney, ‘Disaster Response: Research Findings and Their 
Implications For Resilience Measures’ (2009) CARRI Research Report 6, 1-2 (Noting there 
can be large differences between disasters and emergencies, these differences, are such 
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however, although there are some differences in the legislative definitions of 
the terms across the jurisdictions,110 the terms disaster and emergency appear 
to be used interchangeably. This thesis also adopts this approach.  
Emergency Management Sector 
The term ‘emergency management sector’ is utilised throughout this thesis. 
The term includes all statutory authorities involved in the management of 
emergencies in Australia. This involvement may either come about through 
direct delivery of services or due to an organisation’s responsibility for creating 
regulatory arrangements for the delivery of those services. A broad definition 
of the term aims to encompasses not only the statutory authorities traditionally 
created by government to deliver emergency services, such as fire, police, 
ambulance, and state emergency services.111 It also aims to include layers of 
governments that have a legislated role in emergency management, such as 
State, Territory and local government.112 The examination of risk 
communication and warning will refer primarily to statutory authorities such as 
local government, fire, police and state emergency services. These entities 
are the ones primarily tasked with warning activity in an emergency. 
Legal Risk 
A ‘legal risk’ is the uncertainty that a statutory authority will be held legally 
accountable for acts or omissions, and will be exposed to sanctions that can 
manifest as fines, penalties, or compensatory damages. Uncertainty can arise 
in two areas, factual uncertainty and legal uncertainty.113 Legal uncertainty, 
which is the focus of this thesis, arises out of vagueness in the law, or 
                                                          
that it is not possible just to upscale from localised emergency to widespread disaster, but 
different thinking and understandings of processes and reactions is required). 
110 National Emergency Management Committee (Cth), National Emergency Risk 
Assessment Guidelines (2010) 52; Emergency Management Australia, Emergency Risk 
Management Applications Guide: Manual 5 (2nd ed, 2004) 48; State Emergency And Rescue 
Management Act 1989 (NSW) s 4; Emergencies Act 2004 (ACT) s 4, Dictionary; Emergency 
Management Act 2004 (SA) (Notably here a significant or co-ordinated response is not part 
of the definition); Emergency Management Act 2005 (WA) s 3; Emergency Management Act 
2013 (VIC) s 3; Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) s 13(2)(c). 
111 Productivity Commission (Cth), Report on Government Services 2016, above n 19, D.4. 
112 Ibid D.3-D.5. 
113 Tobias Mahler, ‘Defining Legal Risk’ (Proceedings of The Conference "Commercial 
Contracting for Strategic Advantage - Potentials and Prospects", Turku University of Applied 
Sciences, 2007) 18-21. 
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uncertainty as to how the law regulates, or should be applied to a given set of 
facts.114 For example, legal uncertainty may arise as to how the law of 
negligence will be applied in a certain circumstance. The uncertainty arises 
from the fact that determination of a claim in negligence will always depend on 
the facts of the particular case, which can bring about unpredictable and varied 
outcomes.  Factual and legal uncertainty has led to formal post event enquiries 
following many natural disasters to assess the response of the emergency 
services sector to the hazard.115 In some cases, class action litigation has 
followed. This process is not only costly to the sector and the community; it 
also acts as a blame game and may ‘convey a message of distrust of the 
emergency services’.116 
Regulatory System 
The definition of a ‘regulatory system’ in this thesis follows the holistic 
description set forth in the recent work of Sheehy and Feaver. Sheehy and 
Feaver describe a regulatory system as being made up of both a normative 
dimension (the policy) and a positive dimension (which contains the 
substantive rules aimed at putting the policy into practice).117 Each dimension 
is comprised of ‘numerous interconnected and interdependent components or 
instruments’.118 These components include a mixture of soft and hard law 
instruments that contain the substantive rules that govern the conduct of actors 
who are subject to the system.119  What constitutes a soft or hard law 
instrument, and those, which are relevant to this examination of emergency 
management system in Australia, are defined in Chapter Five. 
 
 
                                                          
114 Ibid 18-21. 
115 Eburn and Dovers, ‘Learning Lessons from Disasters’, above n 10, 495-496. 
116 Ibid 500. 
117 Sheehy and Feaver, above n 94, 392, 392-393, 399, 401 (Noting that the policy or 
normative dimension informs the positive dimension or the substantive rules to be put in 
place). 
118 Sheehy and Feaver, above n 94, 392-393. 
119 Donald Feaver and Benedict Sheehy, ‘Designing effective regulation: a positive theory’ 
(2015) 38(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal 961, 976. 
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Resilience 
There are varied definitions of ‘resilience’. The variety of definitions can be 
attributable to the disparate disciplines from which the term has emerged.120 
In the academic domain, including within Australia, the definition is the subject 
of increasing debate.121 As an internationally recognised instrument, and 
absent a comprehensive definition in Australia emergency management 
doctrine, the definition provided by the UNISDR is utilised for the purposes of 
this thesis. The UNISDR defines resilience as:  
The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, 
absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely 
and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its 
essential basic structures and functions.122  
A resilient community 
A ‘resilient community’ is a community, ‘that works together to understand and 
manage the risks that it confronts’.123 One aim of the National Strategy for 
Disaster Resilience in Australia, as the national policy statement for 
emergency and disaster management, is to build community and 
organisational resilience.124 
 
                                                          
120 Norris et al, above n 49, 130; Patricia H. Longstaff, T. G Koslowski and W. Geoghegan, 
‘Translating resilience: A framework to enhance communication and implementation’ 
(Symposium on Resilience Engineering, 2013); Melissa Parsons et al, ‘The Australian 
Natural Disaster Resilience Index: Conceptual framework and indicator approach’ (2016) 
(Report No, 157 Bushfire and Natural Hazards Co-operative Research Centre) 4-5. 
121 Parsons, above n 120, 4-5. 
122 United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), UNISDR 
Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction (2009) 24 
<http://www.unisdr.org/files/7817_UNISDRTerminologyEnglish.pdf> (Although it is noted 
that resilience is far more complex and involved than this definition might suggest, and in 
noting that in Australia research is currently being undertaken to provide indicators of 
resilience, for the purpose of this thesis, the definition provided internationally is sufficient for 
the message that needs to be conveyed); See, also, Australian Institute for Disaster 
Resilience, Australian Emergency Management Glossary, Manual 3 (1998) 94 (The 
Glossary defines resiliency as – ‘a measure of how quickly a system recovers from failures’) 
123 Council of Australian Governments (COAG), National Strategy for Disaster Resilience 
(2011) iv; Productivity Commission (Cth), Report on Government Services 2016, above n 
19, D.30. 
124 Council of Australian Governments (COAG), National Strategy for Disaster Resilience 
(2011) ii. 
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Response  
In Australia, the comprehensive approach is applied to emergency 
management. The approach includes four phases of emergency 
management, which are examined in Chapters Two, and Three. This thesis is 
primarily concerned with risk communication in the response phase of a 
disaster or emergency. The Australian Emergency Management Glossary 
defines response as:  
 Actions taken in anticipation of, during, and immediately after an emergency 
to ensure that its effects are minimised, and that people affected are given 
immediate relief and support 
 Measures taken in anticipation of, during and immediately after an 
emergency to ensure its effects are minimised.125 
Responsibility 
There is little agreement on a single clear meaning of the term ‘responsibility’, 
or the degree of accountability and obligation that it entails.126 A review of the 
literature on responsibility is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, in the 
context of law, the influential works of H.L.A Hart define a taxonomy of 
responsibilities.127 Of particular relevance to this research are Hart’s role 
responsibilities and liability responsibilities.128 Role responsibilities are the 
‘tasks assigned to a person by agreement or otherwise’ which it is their 
responsibility to, ‘think about’ and ‘to make serious efforts to fulfil’.129 The 
extent to which obligation or the likelihood that liability responsibility will attach 
to role responsibilities will vary.130 Chapter Five examines this concept. Rather 
than the term responsibility, terms such as ‘powers’, ‘functions’ and ‘duties’ are 
                                                          
125 Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, Australian Emergency Management Glossary, 
Manual 3 (1998) 94. 
126 McLennan and Handmer, ‘Sharing Responsibility Australian Disaster Management’ 
above n 2, 17-19; Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality, above n 104, 2 (Responsibility 
is ‘a term used in many different senses both inside and outside of the law’).  
127 See, eg, Peter Cane, ‘Role responsibilities’ (2016) 20 Journal of Ethics 279, 279; H.L.A 
Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 1968) 211-212 (These 
include – role responsibility, causal responsibility, liability responsibility, and capacity 
responsibility). 
128 Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, above n 127, 211-212. 
129 Ibid 212-213. 
130 Ibid 215-217. 
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more commonly used in legislation to connote some form of responsibility. 
These terms are also defined and examined in Chapter Five. 
Shared responsibility 
In Australia, government states that emergency management and disaster risk 
reduction is a shared responsibility. This is evidenced by the inclusion of the 
term ‘shared responsibility’ in Australia’s national strategy for managing 
disasters.131 There is no clear definition of the notion of shared responsibility, 
and considerations of how disaster risk should be shared is the subject of 
ongoing research in Australia.132 The basic premise of shared responsibility is 
that in order to build a resilience-based approach to disasters, there needs to 
be a whole of nation effort that involves ‘an increased responsibility’ for all.133 
Those to be involved include ‘political leaders, governments, businesses, 
community leaders, the not-for-profit sector as well as communities, 
individuals and households’.134 In this thesis, how responsibility for warning is, 
or ought to be shared, is informed by social contract theory and an examination 
of the law of negligence. 
Social Media 
The term ‘social media’ describes a variety of Web 2.0 platforms. The 
platforms are online systems and tools.135 The tools are designed to ‘facilitate 
interaction and connection’,136 the creation of user generated content,137 and 
‘peer production’.138 Without limiting the list of platforms, social media includes: 
                                                          
131 Council of Australian Governments (COAG), National Strategy for Disaster Resilience 
(2011). 
132 McLennan and Handmer, ‘Sharing Responsibility Australian Disaster Management’, 
above n 2, 5. 
133 Council of Australian Governments (COAG), National Strategy for Disaster Resilience 
(2011) ii, 5 (citing Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission Final Report 2010). 
134 Ibid 5. 
135 White, above n 46, 148; Low et al, above n 59, 411. 
136 Kavanaugh et al, above n 60, 482; B Fitzgerald et al, Internet and E-commerce Law 
Business and Policy (Thomson Reuters, 2011) 13; Terry Flew et al, ‘Social media and its 
impact on crisis communication’, above n 70, 5; Crowe, Disasters 2.0, above n 48, 9. 
137 Rodrigo Sandoval-Almazan and J Ramon Gil-Garcia, ‘Government-Citizen Interactions 
Using Web 2.0 Tools: The Case of Twitter in Mexico’ in Christopher Reddick and Stephen 
Aikins (eds), Web 2.0 Technologies and Democratic Governance (Springer, 2012) 235; Paul 
Henman, ‘Governmentalities of Gov 2.0’ (2013) 16(9) Information, Communication and 
Society 1397, 1397. 
138 Henman, above n 137, 1399. 
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blogs, microblogs (Twitter), wikis, social networking sites such Facebook, 
Myspace, Instagram, YouTube’.139 Of the platforms, Facebook and Twitter are 
most commonly referred to in this thesis, as they are key social media 
channels employed for dissemination in Australian emergency management. 
Synopsis of Chapters 
As adverted to in the methodology the thesis is divided into three main parts. 
The present Chapter, as the introductory Chapter, describes the primary 
objectives of the research, the contextual background and offers key 
definitions utilised throughout the thesis.  
Part One: Developing a theoretical narrative 
Part One consists of three Chapters that focus on building the theoretical 
narrative for the research. Chapter Two, entitled ‘Risk’, firmly situates the 
research in the risk management domain. In Australia, the emergency 
management sector has adopted a risk based narrative. Therefore, an 
understanding of the risk management process and the key role that risk 
communication plays in that process is highly relevant to this research. The 
Chapter provides an overview of central concepts and key definitions relevant 
to risk management. It also identifies and explores the risk management 
standards relevant to the emergency management sector in Australia.  
In the context of natural hazard and emergency related risk, the Chapter 
introduces the concept of risk ownership. Risk ownership in turn provides an 
understanding as to who should be responsible for managing certain risks in 
society, including emergency and natural hazard related risk. The Chapter 
highlights, that in managing risk and creating governance frameworks and 
their legal components, there will be numerous contextual factors which impact 
upon or constrain regulatory design. Some of the contextual factors relevant 
to the Australia context are explored in more depth in Chapter Four, 
‘Establishing the Risk Context’. A key element of Chapter Two is that it makes 
the role of law in the risk management process explicit. 
                                                          
139 Kavanaugh et al, above n 60, 482. 
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Chapter Three, ‘Risk Communication’, builds on the links made explicit 
between the role of risk communication and the success of risk management 
in Chapter Two.  The Chapter defines key terms. It also examines some of the 
criticism which has been levelled at the emergency management sector 
regarding its ability to effectively deliver risk communication and warning. What 
is recognised in this Chapter, is that there are challenges and complexities 
which impact on the delivery effective risk communication and warning. A 
particular challenge which is noted, are the numerous influences on the 
perception / response process of individuals in the community. The Chapter 
restates factors which act as positive levers for influencing the perception / 
response process. Links are then made between a number of these factors 
and the benefits of utilising social media for warning dissemination. An 
underlying theme in this Chapter, due to its links with accountability and 
effective risk communication, is the role of trust in the relationship between 
citizens and the State.140  
Chapter Four, ‘Establishing the Risk Context’, concludes the first part of the 
thesis and the theoretical narrative. Chapter Two established that government 
is a risk owner required to incorporate a risk management strategy. This 
Chapter examines some of the contextual factors which influence or constrain 
the creation of an effective strategy and its supporting institutional foundation. 
Contextual factors range from abstract theoretical considerations to concrete 
mechanisms which influence regulatory design. In this Chapter for example, 
social contract theory highlights the shared roles of government and citizens 
in a well-ordered society. Sociological theory on the risk society, introduced in 
Chapter Two, is further engaged to demonstrate a shift towards the 
individualisation of risk. As identified in Chapter Four, some tensions exist 
between the two theoretical lenses.  
The second part of the Chapter examines concrete mechanisms. It focuses on 
regulatory reform, the design of ‘better regulation’ and more specifically good 
practice for disaster risk governance. Finally, in light of the role of social media 
                                                          
140 Identifying factors that positively or negatively affect upon trust is important in an era of 
declining trust in government. 
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in this thesis, emergent communication technologies and how they impact on 
strategic decisions for risk communication and warning are examined. 
Part Two: Doctrinal analysis of the regulatory system which underpins 
legal accountability of the emergency management sector. 
Part Two signals a shift in focus from theory to legal analysis. Chapter Five, 
‘Risk communication and warning in the Australian emergency management 
regulatory system’, has two purposes. The first is to examine the broadest of 
the key objectives of the research. That is, the Chapter seeks to explore and 
evaluate against good practice principles identified in Chapter Four, the extent 
to which risk communication and warning is embedded within the emergency 
management regulatory system. The research adopts the methodology of a 
brief content analysis to achieve this task. Through analysis of national policy, 
state legislation, and soft law instruments, this Chapter provides findings on 
the integration of risk communication and warning in Australia’s emergency 
management regulatory system. The Chapter also determines whether the 
need to use social media is becoming embedded within regulatory 
components. 
The second purpose of the Chapter is to provide data that identifies functions, 
powers and responsibilities for warning and communication. These are 
functions and powers, which may form the basis of a duty of care. In light of 
the use of differing terms used to connote responsibility across the array of 
instruments examined, Chapter Six defines the terms, ‘functions’, ‘powers’ and 
‘responsibilities’. The Chapter also seeks to determine the level of obligation 
associated with each term. The functions, powers and responsibilities and the 
obligation to exercise them, are then further examined in Chapters Six and 
Seven against a background of current case law on the law of negligence. An 
underlying theme in Part Two, is the examination of the hierarchy of regulatory 
instruments and the role that the varying instruments play in the regulatory 
system. Specifically, Chapters Six and Seven begin to examine the weight that 
the various instruments which incorporate powers, functions and 
responsibilities carry at law and how they factor into any imputation of legal 
accountability.  
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Chapters Six and Seven investigate the law of negligence and the duty to warn 
as an area for which a gap in the literature is apparent. Although social media 
does not feature in these chapters, it is necessary to establish the broader 
question of legal accountability for warning before applying it to a specific 
channel for warning. Therefore, the two chapters set out the case law that is 
relevant to warning by a statutory authority. Chapter Six, ‘The Law of 
Negligence’, introduces the law of negligence and examines the required 
elements to establish a claim. Chapter Seven, ‘Negligence – Defences and 
Immunities’, examines defences and immunities which might be relevant. As 
well as investigating negligence and the duty to warn these Chapters, enrich 
the analysis by incorporating the theoretical narrative developed in Chapter 
Four. Consequently, each Chapter contains links to the abstract normative 
theory on the social contract and the risk society. The application of the theory 
to the law of negligence facilitates an understanding of how responsibility for 
certain risks is currently shared. It also highlights the legal standards of 
conduct required by of each party in light of their share of responsibility, in the 
context of civil liability and emergency management law.  
Chapter Eight, ‘Social media: a case study in legal accountability for warning’, 
is the final chapter in this Part. The Chapter specifically addresses the 
research question as to the circumstances in which statutory authorities are 
likely to be held legally accountable for warning via social media. It provides 
an exploratory case study of a hypothetical natural hazard scenario. Drawing 
on the theoretical narrative developed in Chapter Three, Chapter Eight 
restates the unique features of social media which make it a relevant or 
beneficial channel for risk communication and warning. Chapter Eight then 
applies the findings of Chapter Five, Six, and Seven to determine in what 
circumstances legal accountability may be imputed to a statutory authority for 
the use of social media. The Chapter highlights that addressing legal 
accountability for the use of social media will, in some instances, raise old 
issues of legal accountability in a new form. However, new issues, which 
require new thinking and further research, are identified.141  
                                                          
141 Australian Communications and Media Authority (Cth), ‘Connected citizens: A regulatory 
strategy for the networked society and information economy (June 2013) 4. 
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Part Three: Recommendations and Conclusions 
Chapter Nine, ‘Conclusions and Recommendations’, as the final chapter 
draws out the conclusions from each of the preceding Chapters. The primary 
focus are the findings in Chapters Five, Six, Seven and Eight. In this Chapter, 
recommendations are made as to whether refinements need to be made to 
the current regulatory system for emergency management to more effectively 
incorporate risk communication and warning. The thesis suggests that by 
refining instruments within the regulatory system, the instruments become 
procedural controls that are more effective. Controls which help to avoid or 
mitigate natural hazard and emergency related risk.  
Secondly, based on the findings of Chapters Six through Eight that legal 
accountability is likely to be limited, Chapter Nine identifies that further 
accountability mechanisms ought to be considered. In identifying this need, 
the thesis reinforces recent findings of the National Review of Warnings and 
Information: Final Report.142 As identified earlier in this Chapter, the inclusion 
of performance measures or standards of practice that acts as a benchmark 
against which to scrutinise activity are important. Standards for example can 
help to ensure that the emergency management sector is effectively managing 
its share of responsibility for achieving policy objectives. As a secondary 
consideration, adherence to performance standards may also act as an 
objective benchmark against which to defend actions taken during an 
emergency, in the context of a coronial inquiry. Chapter Nine recognises that 
in some jurisdictions performance measures and scrutinising bodies are 
already present. However, further research into the most appropriate 
mechanisms, and whether current mechanisms are effective, may be 
warranted.  
 
 
 
                                                          
142 Emergency Management Victoria, National Review of Warnings and Information, above n 
11. 
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Chapter Two: Risk Management  
Introduction 
The management of natural hazard and emergency related risk is a complex 
task. This is because, a ‘large number of diverse interacting’ entities, may be 
required to manage the risks related to hazards, which in themselves exhibit 
uncontrollable, unpredictable behaviour and act in a disruptive manner.143 
Stakeholders144 with responsibility for management of the risk may vary over 
the phases of the hazard.145  Their roles may complement, and overlap each 
other, in order to bring about an integrated and effective response.146 Yet 
response to and management of emergencies is not linear and confusion may 
result.147  
An effective way to manage risk, particularly across organisations, is by 
application of a structured, consistent and integrated approach. A recognised 
generic standard, which supports this approach, is the Risk Management 
Standard (AS/NZS 31000: 2009).148  A contextualised version of this standard 
for emergency management in Australia is evident. Currently in its second 
edition, the ‘National Emergency Risk Assessment Guidelines’ (‘NERAG’), 149 
provides a method for risk management which can be applied nationally. The 
application of NERAG represents a shift in emergency management from a 
                                                          
143 Attorney General’s Department (Cth), National Emergency Risk Assessment Guidelines: 
practice guide, above n 22, 5; OECD, 'Applications of Complexity Science: New Tools for 
Finding Unanticipated Consequences and Unrealized Opportunities’ (Report, OECD 
Publishing, 2009) 2-3 (These are features of a complex system which may require 
specialised management and regulatory responses). 
144 Attorney General’s Department (Cth), National Emergency Risk Assessment Guidelines: 
practice guide, above n 22, 5 (Stakeholders are defined as ‘a person or organisation that 
can affect, be affected by, or perceive themselves to be affected by, a decision or activity’ 
such as an emergency). 
145 See, eg, Attorney General’s Department & Emergency Management Australia, 
Emergency Management in Australia Concepts and Principles, above n 39, 3 (These phases 
have been set out in Australia, as PPRR (Prevention, Preparation, Response and 
Recovery). 
146 Productivity Commission, Report on Government Services 2016, above n 19, D.30; 
Ronald W Perry and Michael K. Lindell, ‘Preparedness for Emergency Response: Guidelines 
for Emergency Planning Process’ (2003) 27(4) Disasters 336, 344. 
147  Crondstedt, above n 23, 10; Attorney General’s Department & Emergency Management 
Australia, Emergency Management in Australia Concepts and Principles, above n 39, 5. 
148 Standards Australia, Risk Management - Principles and guidelines (AS/NZS ISO 
31000:2009). 
149Attorney General’s Department (Cth), National Emergency Risk Assessment Guidelines 
above n 32. 
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previously response and hazard focused sector to one based on risk 
management.150 Despite, the recognised benefits of applying a consistent and 
structured approach, the guidelines were historically largely ignored by the 
emergency management sector.151 However, the sector appears to have an 
increased drive towards uptake of a national risk based approach.152 
Employing the Standard is envisaged to assist in determining how best to 
‘expend limited community resources to achieve the greatest gain’ in disaster 
risk reduction.153  
Acknowledging the relevance of risk management to emergency management 
this Chapter also requires an examination of sociological theory that explains 
the shifting paradigm towards a risk based society. As well as sociological 
theory, the Chapter examines the risk management standards identified in the 
above paragraph. The aim of this examination is to identify core concepts and 
to define key terms relevant to this thesis and its legal thread of enquiry. The 
Chapter will not include assessment of natural hazard or emergency related 
risk. Instead, and in keeping with the legal focus of the thesis, the focus of 
inquiry will be on the role of the law in providing an effective institutional 
framework and procedural controls for risk management.  
The risk society: moves to a risk based framework 
Sociological theory explains why risk has become a paradigm under which 
emergency management now operates and why it has become a key 
consideration for decision-makers.154 Numerous sociological authors155 
                                                          
150 Salter, above n 22, 22; Ken Granger, Flo Bridger and Mikila Rosewall, ‘Emergency Risk 
Management in Australia and the Pacific: Information, Policy and Governance’ (Paper 
Presented at the Australian and New Zealand Disaster and Emergency Management 
Conference Surfers Paradise, Gold Coast (QLD), 5-7 May 2014). 
151 Granger, Bridger and Rosewall, above n 150, 2-3; Edward Pikusa, ‘The National 
Emergency Risk Assessment Guidelines: The Bumpy Road to National Consistency’ (Paper 
presented at the 55th Annual Flood Plain Conference, ‘Building a Resilient Australia’, 
Brisbane Convention and Exhibition Centre, 19-22 May 2015). 
152 Pikusa, above n 151. 
153 Attorney General’s Department (Cth), National Emergency Risk Assessment Guidelines: 
practice guide, above n 22, 4-5. 
154 Salter, above n 22, 22. 
155 See, eg, Niklas Luhmann, Risk: a sociological theory (Aldine Transaction, 2005, 1st ed); 
M Douglas, Risk and blame: essays in cultural theory (Routledge, 1992); Anthony Giddens, 
‘Risk and Responsibility’ (1999) 62(1) The Modern Law Review 1; Jens Oliver Zinn, ‘The 
sociology of risk and uncertainty: current state and perspectives’ (Conference Proceeding, 
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provide an understanding of risk in society156 with the work of Ulrich Beck 
being some of the more influential.157 Despite any contention or critique of 
Beck’s work,158 his theory continues to feature in work that links social and 
legal contexts159 and is therefore relevant to this thesis.  
In his work, Beck describes the transition of society to what he calls a ‘risk 
society’.160 A ‘risk society’ can be described as a society which is viewed as 
having an increased vulnerability and one which is facing new or a newly 
classified type of risk. The transition to a risk society incorporates an 
underlying shift in focus from classical risks, such as acts of god, 161 to risks 
that are the side-effects of the industrial era,162 such as global warming and 
climate change. As Beck states, classical risks are now becoming intertwined 
with and exacerbated by man-made hazards.163 In the natural hazard context, 
this is evidenced by more frequent and intense weather events potentially 
linked to global warming. As well as being subject to more frequent and intense 
events, society has become more vulnerable. This vulnerability is in part due 
to increasing development of at-risk environments, for example development 
of housing subdivisions on flood plains. It may also be due to the inability to 
mitigate natural weather events of increased intensity.164 It is in this domain 
that emergency management must now operate, taking on the increasing 
                                                          
The Australian Sociological Association (TASA) Annual Conference, Australian National 
University, 2009). 
156 John Tulloch and Deborah Lupton, Risk and Everyday life (Sage Publications, 2003) 1; 
Deborah Lupton, Risk (Routledge, 1999) 24-25. 
157 See Kristian Lauta, Disaster Law (Taylor and Francis ebooks, 2015) 26 (work on disaster 
law and risk society also highlighted Giddens and Luhmann’s work in defining a risk society); 
Zinn, above n 155, 1.  
158 See, eg, Zinn, above n 155, 3, 6. 
159 Lauta, Disaster Law, above n 157, 25-27; Lupton, above n 156, 60-61; Lee Godden et al, 
‘Law, Governance and Risk: Deconstructing the Public-Private Divide in Climate Change 
Adaptation’ (2013) 36(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 224, 234; Eburn and 
Dovers, ‘Legal Aspects of Risk Management in Australia’, above n 57, 62. 
160 Ulrich Beck, Risk society: towards a new modernity (Sage Publications, 1992). 
161 See, also, Giddens, above n 155, 3. 
162 Lauta, Disaster Law, above n 157, 26; Ulrich Beck, World at Risk (Wiley, ebook, 2013) 8, 
19-21. 
163 Beck, World at Risk, above n 162, 7; See, also, Giddens, above n 155, 4 (Giddens refers 
to manufactured risk created by ‘progression of human development’). 
164 Lauta, Disaster Law above n 157, 24-25, 28 (citing Perry and Quarantelli 2005 
vulnerability is the ‘weakness in social structures and social system’ – highlighting the links 
between risk and vulnerability, or more precisely risk as being the point of ‘amalgam 
between hazard and vulnerability’); Productivity Commission, Report on Government 
Services 2016, above n 19, D.11. 
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burden of more frequent, intense and at times catastrophic events,165 within 
the constraints of limited resources.  
The nature of the risk society 
The shift to a risk society changes the focus and actions of its members. In the 
first instance, organisations and individuals have an increased awareness and 
preoccupation with risk.166Accompanying this preoccupation is a new 
anxiety167  as stakeholders, who could be affected by risks, have an increasing 
desire to undertake action to manage, eliminate and avoid them. Linked to this 
desire to act is the pre-occupation or focus on risk analysis. As will be identified 
in this Chapter, risk analysis seeks to objectively measure risk and identify 
methods for modification, avoidance and control of risk.168 Risk analysis is 
supported by an apparatus which ‘operationalises’ it, for example guidelines 
and standards for risk management.169 Particularly in the case of government, 
as a potential owner of or stakeholder in numerous risks, focusing on risk 
analysis helps to ascertain the most efficient and effective methods to allocate 
scarce resources to manage risk.   
                                                          
165 Insurance Council of Australia, Catastrophe Events and the Community, above n 18; (It is 
noted in this research that catastrophes are ‘qualitatively and quantitatively’ different to 
disasters and emergencies which occur on a more frequent basis. This differentiation is 
relatively unimportant in the context of this thesis, as in all types of events risk 
communication and warning will still be required, although may have less of a mitigating 
effect where catastrophic events leave little room for evasive action, see eg, E.L Quarantelli, 
‘Emergencies, Disasters and Catastrophes Are Different Phenomena’ (Disaster Research 
Centre, University of Delaware, 2000) 1. 
166 Some of these risks come to dominate debate and cause anxiety in society; See, eg 
Giddens, above n 155, 3 (noting the preoccupation with the future, with risk and safety). 
167 This anxiety can be coupled with frustration when government refuses to accept or 
address the relevant risk, see, eg, Nick O’Malley, ‘Australia's climate stance savaged at UN 
summit’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 27 September 2014 
<http://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/australias-climate-stance-savaged-at-
un-summit-20140926-3gsr3.html>; Peter Hannam, ‘Australia singled out as a climate 
change 'free-rider' by international panel’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 5 June 2015 
<http://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/australia-singled-out-as-a-climate-
change-freerider-by-international-panel-20150604-ghgbde.html>. 
168 Lauta, Disaster Law, above n 157, 26-27, 29 (the process of risk assessment is an 
idealised process which turns uncertainty into something which can be acted on, distributed 
and made ‘controllable’ in theory although not in practice, giving a false sense of security 
and limiting the imagination and building of general robustness into a system); Giddens, 
above n 155, 3 (Also highlights the ‘idea of risk is bound up with the aspiration to control it’). 
169 Michael Power, ‘Risk, Social Theories and Organisation’ in Paul S Adler et al (eds), 
Oxford Handbook of Sociology, Social Theory and Organisation Studies Contemporary 
Currents (Oxford University Press, 2014) 374, 382; Godden et al, above n 159, 236 (Noting 
‘the increasing inclusion of risk management procedures in a wide range of laws’). 
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Emergency and disaster management regimes reflect the changes in focus 
and action apparent in a risk society. In the first instance, behaviour for 
managing natural hazards is now led by the new risk paradigm.170 
Internationally, for example, disasters are couched in terms of risk and disaster 
risk reduction.171 As previously adverted to, in Australia, the emergency 
management sector has an increasing drive to incorporate risk management 
principles through the application of NERAG.172 The NERAG guidelines 
propose analysis and assessments of natural hazards. Risk analysis and 
assessment activities are therefore now evident in each jurisdiction. Action is 
being taken to identify prominent hazards and understand their consequences 
for the community to effectively target limited resources.173 Having gained an 
understanding of the shifts relating to risk in society, the question arises: what 
is a risk? 
What is a risk? 
As a core term in this research, ‘risk’ requires definition and contextualisation 
to the emergency management environment. The definition of risk used within 
the Australian Emergency Management context is that provided for by the 
AS/NZS 31000:2009 Risk Management Standard (‘Risk Standard’). ‘Risk’ is 
defined as, ‘the effect of uncertainty on objectives’.174 Without further analysis, 
this definition lacks clarity. Further analysis suggests that a risk is a source (for 
example a natural hazard, such as a storm or cyclone) that has the potential 
                                                          
170 Salter above n 22, 22. 
171 See, eg, United Nations, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, 
Adopted 14-18 March 2015, UN Doc A/CONF.224/CRP.1. 
172 Attorney General’s Department (Cth), National Emergency Risk Assessment Guidelines 
above n 32; Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience (Cth), National Emergency Risk 
Assessment Guidelines, above n 88. 
173 See, eg, State Emergency Management Committee (WA), Western Australian State-level 
Risk Assessment: Seven Sudden Onset Natural Hazards, Storm, Earthquake, Bushfire, 
Tsunami, Heatwave, Cyclone and Flood (December 2013); Risk Frontiers, ‘Significant 
historical natural hazards in Queensland: An overview’ (‘State‐wide Natural Hazard Risk 
Assessment, Report 1, 2011) 1. 
174 Standards Australia, Risk Management - Principles and guidelines (AS/NZS ISO 
31000:2009) 5. 
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for interaction,175 or an impact,176 on something. The impacts may include 
impacts on ‘financial, health and safety, and environmental goals’.177 In the 
context of this thesis, a risk may be the uncertainty that a storm may cause 
flooding. Flooding may in turn affect a person’s property, causing economic 
loss or require that a person be rescued.  
Natural hazards as a risk source 
As identified in the previous section, a risk derives from a risk source. A risk 
source is as ‘an element either on its own or in combination which has the 
intrinsic or latent potential, to give rise to risk’.178 In part, due to affiliation with 
the Bushfire and Natural Hazards Co-operative Research Centre, this thesis 
focuses on natural hazards, that is, hazards produced by nature that may 
interact with other elements to create risk.179 The natural hazards forming the 
core focus of emergency management vary across Australian jurisdictions.180 
Commonly, they include storm, earthquake, bushfire, tsunami, earthquake, 
cyclone and flood.  As indicated, the focus of this thesis is on risk arising out 
                                                          
175 Standards Australia, Risk Management - Principles and guidelines (AS/NZS ISO 
31000:2009) 1; Standards Australia, Risk management guidelines - Companion to AS/NZS 
ISO 31000:2009 (SA/SNZ HB 436:2013) 10 (A risk is not an event but it is the potential of an 
interaction or impact on an objective). 
176 Ortwin Renn, ‘White Paper on Risk Governance’ in O. Renn and K Walker (eds), Global 
Risk Governance: Concept and Practice Using the IRGC Framework (Springer, 2008) 5. 
177 Standards Australia, Risk Management - Principles and guidelines (AS/NZS ISO 
31000:2009) 1; Renn, ‘White Paper on Risk Governance’, above n 176, 5 (Renn highlights 
these factors as objectives of value to people). 
178 Standards Australia, Risk Management - Principles and guidelines (AS/NZS ISO 
31000:2009) 4; Gisela Wachinger et al, ‘The Risk Perception Paradox - implications for 
governance and communication of natural hazards’ (2013) 33(6) Risk Analysis 1049, 1062 
(The authors note that many disaster risks are ‘multi-risk exposures’ which link natural and 
human induced hazards such as the 2011 Japanese tsunami and Fukushima nuclear effect). 
179 See, eg, United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), 
UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction (2009) 20-21 
<http://www.unisdr.org/files/7817_UNISDRTerminologyEnglish.pdf>; Keith Smith, 
Environmental Hazards: Assessing risk and Reducing Disaster (Routledge, 6th ed, 2013) 5 
(the author makes the distinction between natural and technological hazard types although 
makes an important point, that hybrid events do occur); Michael K Lindell and Ronald W 
Perry, Communicating Environmental Risk in Multiethnic Communities (Sage Publications, 
2004) 5  (By contrast the authors here suggest natural hazards are the interaction of 
‘physical event’ with the ‘human system’). 
180 See,  eg, State Emergency Management Committee (WA), Western Australian State-
level Risk Assessment, above n 173 (When it comes to undertaking risk assessment of 
natural hazards, Western Australia includes Storm, Earthquake, Bushfire, Tsunami, 
Heatwave, Cyclone And Flood); Risk Frontiers, ‘Significant historical natural hazards in 
Queensland’, above n 173 (Queensland hazards include riverine flooding, winds from 
tropical cyclones, hail from severe storms, bushfires, thunderstorm wind gusts, tornadoes, 
earthquakes, landslides and coastal hazards such as tsunamis, storm surge, and coastal 
erosion). 
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of natural hazards.181 When there is the potential for the natural hazard to pose 
emergency related risks182 or to manifest as an emergency, that the 
emergency management sector become involved.183  
‘Natural’ hazards: a growing, yet uncontrollable concern 
Natural hazards are a ‘natural’ phenomenon and considered an ‘involuntary’ 
risk source.184 The natural character of these phenomena adds to the 
complexity averted to at the commencement of this Chapter.185 Each hazard 
has differing lead times to impact, a potentially unpredictable magnitude, path, 
and effect, when interacting with the physical environment.186 They are also 
often uncontrollable.187 Yet, as evidenced, in recent studies by the Australian 
Climate Council, natural hazards, are increasingly acting and predicted to 
act188 on something that is of value to the community. To date, natural hazards 
impacts have led to severe consequences including extensive property loss, 
human fatalities, and economic cost.189 The increasing cost and 
                                                          
181 It is noted that emergency management legislation and activities, also include response 
to other hazards such as technological hazards or human acts (See, eg, Disaster 
Management Act 2003 (Qld) s 16). 
182 Attorney General’s Department (Cth), National Emergency Risk Assessment Guidelines: 
practice guide, above n 22, 5. 
183 Ibid 5.  
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perception of the risk, this will be discussed at a later stage); Mads P. Sorensen and Allan 
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for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction (2009) 
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risk and Error’ in John Handmer et al, New Perspectives on Uncertainty and Risk (Centre for 
Resource and Environmental Studies and Australian Counter Disaster College, 1991) 68-69 
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of ‘involuntary and unforeseeable danger’ formed the original meaning of the word hazard, 
distinguishing it from risk as more voluntary, although is now a disappearing phenomenon). 
185 Dennis Mileti, Disasters by Design (Joseph Henry Press, 1999) 133; Smith, above n 179, 
47-49 (Complexity, Smith suggests, arises from interactions between physical and human 
systems as well as interactions within each system); John Handmer and Stephen Dovers, 
Handbook of Disaster Policies and Institutions: Improving emergency management and 
climate change adaptation (Earthscan, Routledge, 2nd Edition 2013) 59 (the authors note the 
presence of complexity and uncertainty in disasters and emergencies). 
186 Smith, above n 179, 47-49. 
187 Ibid 96. 
188 Climate Council of Australia Pty Ltd, ‘The Burning Issue’, above n 14; Climate Council of 
Australia, ‘Counting the Costs’, above n 14. 
189 See, eg, Risk Frontiers, ‘Historical analysis of natural hazard building losses and fatalities 
for Queensland 1900-2011’ (State-wide Natural Disaster Risk Assessment and Risk 
Register Program Prepared by Risk Frontiers for Queensland Department of Community 
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consequences have fuelled the drive, in emergency management, to 
‘understand, reduce and communicate risk’ arising out of natural hazards.190 
Added to the cost, is the need to maintain effective service delivery in a climate 
of dwindling resources and high community expectations.191 
Risk Management 
To reduce and understand the likely exposure to the impact of natural hazards 
as an emergency, risk management is undertaken. Risk management is the 
‘activities undertaken to direct and control an organization with regard to 
risk’.192 Risk management includes the risk management process.193 This 
process, represented in Figure 1 below, involves what has been stated as the 
‘systematic application of management policies, procedures and practices’ to 
the management of risk’.194 In brief, it includes ‘the deliberate process of 
identifying, analysing, assessing, communicating, accepting, transferring and 
controlling risk to an acceptable level’.195 In the process of identifying, 
analysing and evaluating risk, a risk statement is created. Each statement is 
assigned a level of risk based on the likelihood and consequences of the 
risk.196 Likelihood and consequences are utilised as mathematical functions to 
                                                          
Safety, October 2012) 7-8; Attorney General’s Department (Cth), National Emergency Risk 
Assessment Guidelines, above n 88, 2. 
190 Attorney General’s Department (Cth), National Emergency Risk Assessment Guidelines, 
above n 88, 1-2. 
191 Attorney General’s Department (Cth), National Emergency Risk Assessment Guidelines: 
practice guide, above n 22, 6; Productivity Commission (Cth), Report on Government 
Services 2016, above n 19, D.12-D.13. 
192 Standards Australia, Risk Management - Principles and guidelines (AS/NZS ISO 
31000:2009) 2-3. 
193 Amiso M. George, ‘The Phases of Crisis Communication’ in Amiso M George and 
Cornelius B Pratt (eds), Case Studies in Crisis Communications (Routledge, 1st ed, 2012) 31 
(citing the FEMA definition for risk management which incorporates the process). 
194 Standards Australia, Risk Management - Principles and guidelines (AS/NZS ISO 
31000:2009) 2-3; Emergency Management Australia, Emergency Risk Management 
Applications Guide, above n 110, 49. 
195 George, above n 193, 32; Risk Steering Committee, US Department of Homeland 
Security, DHS Risk Lexicon 2010 Edition (September 2010) 30 
<https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-risk-lexicon-2010.pdf>.  
196 See, eg, Standards Australia, Risk Management - Principles and guidelines (AS/NZS ISO 
31000:2009) 5 (These terms are defined respectively as the ‘outcome of the event’ and the 
‘change of something happening’); State Emergency Management Committee (WA), 
Western Australian State-level Risk Assessment, above n 173, 14 (In some instances 
likelihood can be defined for risk assessment purposes, as the likelihood of the occurrence 
of the event or hazard, as well as the likelihood of the consequences occurring when that 
hazard eventuates). 
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compute the level of risk.197 However, it is important to note that this calculation 
may reduce risk to a simplistic calculation and fail to recognise the non-linear 
nature of risk.198 Therefore, likelihood and consequences reflect the minimum 
considerations to taken into account when calculating risk levels.199 Once risk 
levels are calculated, controls and mitigation activities are undertaken to 
reduce exposure to risk. These activities need to balance the management of 
the risk and safety and managing ‘other demands on resources’.200  
 
Figure 1: AS/NZS 31000: 2009 Risk Management process201 
 
 
                                                          
197 See, eg, Standards Australia, Risk Management - Principles and guidelines (AS/NZS ISO 
31000:2009) 5; State Emergency Management Committee (WA), Western Australian State-
level Risk Assessment, above n 173, 14. 
198 van Asselt and Renn, above n 5, 436 (Many risks are suggested to be complex and have 
multiple causes, agents and effects). 
199 Standards Australia, Risk Management - Principles and guidelines (AS/NZS ISO 
31000:2009) 8 (Differing opinions are expressed in the literature on the determinants to be 
considered in the ‘calculus’ of risk; however for the purposes of this research, the definition 
and determinants provided in the risk standard are sufficient to demonstrate the core 
process operates see, also OECD, ‘Boosting Resilience though Innovative Risk 
Governance’ (OECD Publishing, 2014) 26; Salter, above n 22, 24; Smith, above n 179, 71; 
IPCC, ‘Summary for Policymakers’ (2012) in C.B Field et al (eds), Managing the Risks of 
Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation (A Special Report of 
Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge 
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200 Smith, above n 179, 89-90. 
201 Standards Australia, Risk Management - Principles and guidelines (AS/NZS ISO 
31000:2009). 
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Emergency Risk Management 
Emergency risk management (‘ERM’) attracts its own definition. ERM is ‘risk 
management applied in the emergency management context’.202 As 
previously identified, in this thesis, the aspect of ERM investigated here, is the 
management of emergency related risks which derive from impacts of natural 
hazards on ‘objectives of value to the community’.203 In Australia, these 
objectives are identified as ‘health, property, economic performance and 
environmental quality.’204 In the context of ERM, the process for managing risk, 
which is outlined in Figure 1 above, has been adapted and contextualised to 
emergency management.205  Although risk management processes have been 
adapted to the emergency context, at times natural hazards present 
unimaginable and uncontrollable catastrophic risks. Catastrophic risk is 
challenging to treat and modify irrespective of any presence of a risk 
management framework. An exploration of key aspects of the risk 
management process provides a structure for the remainder of the Chapter.  
Risk ownership 
An integral aspect of risk management is the determination of who owns the 
risk and therefore how responsibility is shared or divided. The risk owner is the 
person or entity who, in line with their share of responsibility, have ‘the 
accountability and authority to manage a risk’.206 In Australia, numerous 
entities that share responsibility for natural hazard and emergency related risk. 
For example, in the case of storm entities and stakeholders with responsibility 
for risk management have included local government (in the planning domain), 
relevant response agencies (for hazard planning and response), as well as 
insurance companies and the community.207 When the roles of entities overlap 
                                                          
202 Attorney General’s Department (Cth), National Emergency Risk Assessment Guidelines: 
practice guide, above n 22, 5. 
203 Ibid 5. 
204 Attorney General’s Department (Cth), National Emergency Risk Assessment Guidelines: 
practice guide, above n 22, 16. 
205 Ibid. 
206 British Standards Institution (BSI), Risk management – vocabulary (PD ISO Guide 
73:2009, 30 September 2013). 
207 Pamela Box, Frank Thomalla and Robin van den Honert, ‘Flood Risk in Australia: Whose 
Responsibility is it anyway? (2013) 5 Water 1580, 1582.  
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or are interdependent, complications as to who is responsible for which aspect 
of risk management can arise.208  
 
Risk ownership and accountability 
Theoretically, numerous stakeholders or entities are considered to own, or 
share responsibility for natural hazard related risk. However, in practice it is 
specific agencies and government, which have been formally ‘charged with’ 
authority, tasks and responsibilities to manage hazard risk in the context of 
emergencies.209 This allocation of risk is achieved through policy, legislation 
and plans.210 Accompanying the formal allocation of responsibility is a 
correlating degree of public accountability or answerability for action.211 
Notably, public accountability is not required of other stakeholders who share 
responsibility for emergency related risk. The extent to which the relevant state 
agencies, as risk owners, are held accountable at law is investigated in detail 
in Chapters Six and Seven, in the context of legal accountability under the law 
of negligence.  
Clearly defined risk ownership, economic capability and accountability 
It is apparent that some tasks associated with risk ownership are already 
allocated in the regulatory system. However, risk ownership is not always 
clearly delineated, nor is it allocated to those entities with the economic 
capacity to manage risk. Clearly defined risk ownership assists in designating 
responsibility for the strategic management of that risk.212 When ownership is 
                                                          
208 Commonwealth, Council of Australian Governments (COAG), National Strategy for 
Disaster Resilience (2011) iii, 1; Celeste Young, John Symons and Roger Jones, ‘Whose 
Risk is it anyway? Desktop review of institutional ownership of risk associated with natural 
hazards and disasters’ (Victoria Institute of Strategic Economic Studies, Victoria University, 
2015) 3 (Noting that ‘society has been divided into five key institutions: local, state, and 
federal government, industry and business and civil society); Box, Thomalla and van den 
Honert, above n 207, 1584, 1589. 
209 Young, Symons and Jones, above n 208, 2, 13 (Noting that the citizen’s role in 
emergency management is not set out in the relevant instruments, as the relevant 
documents provide guidance as to how statutory authorities ought to carry out their role 
rather than what is expected of citizens). 
210 Ibid 2, 13. 
211 Ibid 31 (Note that resource capacity to address responsibilities of risk ownership and 
ensure accountability can be problematic). 
212 Young, Symons and Jones, above n 208, iv; Risk Management Capability Ltd, Risk 
Ownership: Capability Guidance (2011) 
<http://www.rmcapability.com/resources/Capability+Guidance+Sheet+-
+Risk+Ownership.pdf>. 
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defined, risk management can be strengthened and supported by strong policy 
and regulatory processes.213 Not only is clear delineation of ownership 
important for the management of risk, so too is allocation of ownership to those 
with sufficient resource capacity to manage their responsibilities. It is 
becoming apparent that shifts away from ‘state-centric’ government, to 
integrated, decentralised ‘multi-level governance systems, mean that risk 
ownership is being placed in the hands of entities with insufficient institutional 
capacity to manage their responsibilities.214 An insufficient institutional 
obviously affects the ability to meet key objectives. It may also raise 
implications for accountability. Therefore, although clear delineation of risk 
ownership is important, economic considerations are also highly relevant to 
ensuring risk is effectively managed. 
Allocation of risk ownership and shared responsibility 
Given that numerous stakeholders may own risk, and in spite of the formal 
allocation of aspects of risk management to the emergency management 
sector, the Australian government considers that ownership of natural hazard 
and emergency related risk is a shared responsibility.215 The expectation of a 
shared responsibility involves community members and other stakeholders 
playing an active role.216 This notion of shared responsibility is a shift that is 
                                                          
213 Young, Symons and Jones, above n 208, iv, 1. 
214 See, eg,  Sophie Blackburn, ‘The politics of scale and disaster risk governance: Barriers 
to decentralisation in Portland, Jamaica’ (2014) 52 Geoforum 101, 101-102; Emily Wilkinson, 
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Crisis and Disaster Management (Gower, 2012) 31-32; Ortwin Renn, Andreas Klinke, 
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Governance: A Synthesis’ (2011) 20 AMBIO 231, 231; Inspector General of Emergency 
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(institutional capacities include not only economic resources, but assets, skills and 
capabilities). 
215 Commonwealth, Council of Australian Governments (COAG), National Strategy for 
Disaster Resilience (2011) iii, 1; Noting that risk ownership is a dynamic and fluid concept 
and can therefore change over time (See, eg Young, Symons and Jones, above n 208, iv, 
16. 
216 Box, Thomalla and van den Honert, above n 207, 1587-1588; McLennan and Handmer, 
'Sharing Responsibility Australian Disaster Management’, above n 2, 5; Commonwealth, 
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indicative of the broader trend in today’s risk society towards the 
individualisation of risk.217  Notions of the ‘risk society’ and the individualisation 
of risk are covered in more depth in Chapter Four, ‘Establishing the Risk 
Context’. However, in brief, ‘individualisation of risk’ requires citizens to 
become ‘active risk managers’.218 This involves individuals as risk owners, 
taking their share of responsibility by safeguarding, insuring and mitigating risk 
exposure to their own lives, property and assets.219  
Problematically, the expectation of a shared responsibility acts in tension with 
community expectations that risk will be taken care of for them. Moving 
forward, there will need to be some re-education of the public of the changing 
paradigm from ‘protection’ to ‘shared responsibility’. However, a careful and 
legitimate approach by government is required. This is because although it is 
relevant to ‘involve interested and affected parties in collective decision 
making’ and action about risk, there may be issues in terms of negotiating the 
balance of ‘benefits and burdens’ of shared responsibility which fall on 
citizens.220 It is certainly clear that in light of the predicted increase in natural 
hazard impacts, and with dwindling resources for the sector, the expectations 
that government will take care of the risk is unrealistic. 221  
Risk Governance: the role of law in the risk management process 
Policy and regulation as regulatory components both shape and are shaped 
by the management of risk. Collectively, these and other legal instruments 
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(2011) iii. 
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come under the umbrella term, ‘risk governance’. Risk governance at a macro-
level is defined as the: ‘identification, assessment, management and 
communication of risk’ in a setting of ‘actors, rules, conventions, processes 
and mechanisms’, and through ‘the application of principles of good 
governance…to choose a solution which is politically and legally feasibly as 
well as ethically and publicly acceptable’.222 At a more micro-level, risk 
governance is the ‘institutional structures and policy processes that guide and 
restrain collective activities….to regulate, reduce or control risk problems’.223 
This thesis examines the policy and legal instruments that regulate, reduce 
and control natural hazard and emergency related risk, in the context of 
emergency management.  
Governance and risk management: supporting each other 
Governance arrangements and risk management depend on each other. This 
interdependence provides a rationale for examining the instruments that 
comprise governance arrangements.224 If ‘governance arrangements are 
effective, it is more likely that the organisation will function as intended and 
achieve its objectives’ in managing a risk.225 Conversely, ineffective 
governance arrangements can result in a failure to achieve objectives and be 
a further source of risk. It is therefore important to examine the regulatory 
components, which aim to regulate and control natural hazard and emergency 
related risk, to determine whether they meet good practice principles for 
effectiveness. An examination of legal mechanisms is also important, as they 
are the devices against which an entity identified as a risk owner, ‘is held to 
account’.226 If the regulatory components are ineffective, and accountability 
mechanisms employed, there can be a risk of exposure to legal claims that 
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require mitigation.227  The regulatory components and the role they play in 
directing, and providing responsibilities for emergency service agencies and 
government are examined in Chapter Four. The role of the law in directing, 
controlling and managing the risk itself, now requires examination.  
Risk Management: Establishing the risk context 
The first step in the risk management process, outlined in Figure 1 above is 
the establishment of the risk context. Establishing the risk context involves 
‘articulation of the objectives of the organization’, and the parameters that 
influence these objectives.228 The objectives of entities involved in emergency 
management have been outlined in Chapter One, as reducing disaster risk 
and building community resilience. The parameters influencing or constraining 
the ability to meet these objectives can be extensive. They include, internal 
parameters such as, ‘policy, accountabilities, information systems, decision 
making processes and adopted standards’ within the organization.229 They 
also include external parameters such as ‘social and cultural, legal, 
regulatory or political, financial, technological, economic’ influences.230 
These influences and constraints are important to understand, as they will 
affect the type and content of legal components that can be utilised to achieve 
the objectives.231  
Influences and constraints on regulatory system design for risk management 
To address each of the parameters that influence the risk management context 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. In line with the theme of the role of law in 
risk management, a limited range of parameters are introduced below and 
expanded upon in Chapter Four. These parameters include social, political 
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and legal / regulatory parameters, as well as the emerging technologies that 
are influencing the action of emergency management. 
Risk society and the individualisation of risk 
The first parameter addressed, focuses on the influence of sociological 
theory on regulatory system design for risk management. That is the notion 
that we now live in a risk society.232 Living in a risk society influences the way 
we see risk, expect it to be managed and seek to attribute blame for its 
mismanagement.233 The individualisation of risk, previously highlighted within 
this Chapter, is one aspect of this sociological theory. Considerations of the 
risk society and individualisation of risk, are seeing greater incorporation into 
legal analysis of risk, responsibility and accountability, and are therefore a 
highly relevant contextual parameter to consider.234 As has already been 
identified, notions of the individualisation of risk, or personal responsibility, are 
driving the design of policy initiatives such as shared responsibility. 
Social contract theory 
The second external parameter addressed is social contract theory. Social 
contract theory, is a political philosophy which espouses normative 
propositions as to the extent government may legitimately act in a liberal 
society. An investigation of social contract theory in Chapter Four 
acknowledges that emergency management is a legitimate area for regulatory 
action by government. However, in creating regulatory frameworks to support 
emergency management, social contract theory highlights that there are 
limitations on government power to curtail the rights of citizens.235 These 
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Press, 5th edition, 2008) 190-191. 
 60 
 
limitations and the respective roles of government and citizens in society will 
be examined and linked to the concepts of risk ownership and shared 
responsibility raised in this Chapter. Chapters Six and Seven also examine 
links between social contract theory and the role of common law. The focus in 
these Chapters is how negligence and related civil liability legislation set the 
standards of conduct and behaviour of government and citizens and create 
the basis for legal accountability. 
Risk based regulation 
The third parameter examined is the regulatory environment and the good 
practice principles that identify how regulation ought to be created once 
legitimate power for risk management has been established. In the regulatory 
environment, there is a trend towards the development of a ‘risk regulatory 
state’ and the use of risk based regulation.236 This trend suggests that ‘risk’ in 
general is increasingly being utilised as an ‘organizing principle’ for 
regulation.237 The role of risk is either as the object of regulation, as a 
justification for regulation, or as a frame for procedures or a frame for 
accountability.238 The literature on risk-based legislation again links back to 
the individualisation of risk and the notion that current regulatory frameworks, 
are seeking to ‘push responsibility for risk management down to the level of 
the individual or civil society’.239 Whether this tendency is evident or 
manifested in the words of the statutes in Australia will be adverted to in 
Chapter Five, in the content analysis of the relevant legislation.   
As well as a trend in the regulatory environment that highlights a move towards 
risk-based regulation, good practice principles for the creation of risk-based 
regulation are also evident. These principles are relevant to the evaluation of 
the current regulatory system and any recommendations in the concluding 
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Chapter of the thesis. Together these three external parameters outline some 
aspects of the societal, political and regulatory influences and their associated 
constraints, within which emergency management must operate.  
Social Media 
The final parameter examined relates to technological influences that impact 
on the risk communication in the emergency risk management context.  Risk 
communication is discussed in depth in Chapter Three; however, important to 
any discussion of risk communication is an acknowledgement of the 
technological changes that are occurring in the channels for communication. 
Social media is having a strong impact on the way in which information is 
shared; the speed at which it reaches recipient; as well as the breadth of 
penetration.240 As a growing modality for risk communication, it poses 
challenges and unanswered concerns for the emergency management sector. 
Therefore, it is a key contextual factor in this thesis and in the design of the 
regulatory system. 
Risk Assessment 
Once the risk context is established, risk assessment occurs. As Figure 1 
displays risk assessment is a three-staged process. It involves identification, 
analysis and evaluation of a risk. Risk identification, the first stage of the risk 
assessment process, engages in ‘identification of sources of risk’.241 As 
established in Chapter One, the risk source being examined is natural hazards 
that have the potential impact on communities as emergencies. Once the risk 
source is identified, the second stage of the risk assessment process is risk 
analysis. Risk analysis seeks to create an ‘understanding of the risk ‘, an 
understanding of its source, it possible consequences and potential likelihood 
of these consequences.242 Although the analysis of the risk on paper is a 
seemingly straightforward process, as already highlighted, a ‘considerable 
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degree of uncertainty’,243 complexity, and unpredictability is apparent.244 Once 
identified, evaluation of the collective risks, individually outlined in risk 
descriptions,245 takes place. This is the third stage of the process. The 
evaluation process applies the ALARP principle. That is, the evaluation 
determines the level of acceptability of the risk, whether it is intolerable, 
tolerable or acceptable and what is a feasible response to the risk in order to 
make it ‘as low as reasonably practicable’.246 The final stage of the risk 
management process requires that a decision is made as to whether further 
action is required, to ‘treat’247 or manage the risk.  
Acceptability of risk, risk treatment and management 
Once risks are described and the level of risk assessed, as indicated, the 
acceptability of the risk is considered.  Medium to high-level risks may be 
considered unacceptable or intolerable to a community or to risk managers.248 
Controls and mitigation options are then utilised to modify and manage an 
unacceptable risk. As indicated in the context of the ALARP principle, the aim 
is to make the risk as low as reasonably practicable. The mechanisms to be 
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employed, and who will pay for their implementation, can be a contentious 
issue. In 2016, for example, in New South Wales, Australia, coastal storms 
impacted on dwellings, causing millions of dollars of damage as properties 
eroded into the sea.249 Naturally, this loss was unacceptable to the 
homeowners. Although mitigation options had been mooted, the issue of who 
would pay had meant no mitigation activity had been undertaken.250 Therefore, 
even when risks are unacceptable, contention as to who should own the risk, 
and who should pay can, mean that the required action is not taken.  
In the process of assessing risk, contention is also evident as to which risks to 
manage and what constitutes an unacceptable or intolerable level risk.251 
When risk management processes are applied, there are suggestions of an 
imbalance towards a more technical perspective of the unacceptability of 
risk.252 Applying a purely technical perspective means any assessment of what 
is an unacceptable or undesirable consequence of risk that needs to be 
treated, is based on consensus.253 Yet each person has a different view of 
risk, and the adoption of an approach that includes social perspectives of risk 
and a plurality of views, is important.254 The need to include a plurality of view 
is perhaps amplified when attempting to garner community support for a model 
of shared responsibility. Its importance stems from the assertion that the 
inclusion of social perspectives into risk management, brings about politically 
legitimate policy which is then perceived as ‘equitable, relevant or acceptable’ 
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to the population.255 Policy, that is politically legitimate, is more likely to be 
successful.256 Although the thesis touches on normative concepts of politically 
legitimate policy in Chapter Four, as there is no assessment of risk included in 
the thesis, it is beyond the scope of the research to examine this tension. 
However, this tension should be recognised in government decision making. 
The role of law in risk mitigation and modification 
During the three-stage process of risk assessment, controls, which are, or can 
be, put in place to modify the likelihood and consequences of a risk, are 
considered. Legal instruments and procedures may control or modify the 
potential for a risk to arise or reduce the severity of consequences.  Controls 
to modify risks can range from physical objects to mandated processes.257 A 
physical control to modify risk of storm and flooding may include construction 
of a levees or sea walls; it may also include the dissemination of a warning.258 
Mandated processes or procedural controls include regulations, procedures 
and guidelines.259 In emergency management, procedural controls such as 
public Information plans and warning guidelines outline how and when to warn 
the public. In this way, they act both as a control in themselves, as a mandated 
process, as well as supporting the effective utilisation of the physical control, 
the actual dissemination of the message.  
Utilisation of a warning to modify risk will not remove all of the risk of exposure 
to hazard impacts.260 In fact, it is acknowledged that warnings, while going 
some way to reducing impacts, 261 may have a low control strength. This is 
because ‘not everyone will necessarily respond’ and take, or be able to take, 
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preventative actions to reduce the likelihood of harm occurring.262 To increase 
the effectiveness of warnings as a risk control, they must be part of a ‘well-
integrated set of controls including forecasts, intelligence gathering and public 
warnings’.263 To be effective, the controls also require ongoing monitoring to 
ensure they are achieving the modification to the risk that is sought. In keeping 
with risk management principles, of continual improvement, responsiveness 
to change and ‘best practice’,264 this research seeks to review some of the 
current procedural controls. The aim in Chapter Five, is to determine whether 
the controls hinder or support risk communication and warning, and function 
‘as assumed’,265 or require enhancement. 
Risk Treatment 
The final stage of the risk management process is risk treatment. Risk 
treatment is also labelled ‘risk mitigation and risk reduction’.266 Risk mitigation 
is defined as the ‘ongoing and sustained action’ to ‘limit the impact’ of 
events.267 The risk treatment phase involves the selection and implementation 
of options to address a risk.268 Notably, and in line with concepts of shared 
responsibility, this may involve transference of the risk to other parties.269 
Whichever option is selected, it is unrealistic and not economically possible, 
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to expect ‘absolute safety’ and ‘zero-risk level’.270 Consequently, there will be 
some residual risk, which the community will need to manage.271  
Risk mitigation options for natural hazard and emergency related risks include 
risk communication in the form of warnings.272 Therefore, as well as 
performing as a control, a warning has been acknowledged as a valid 
mitigation tool in the treatment phase of the risk management process.273 Early 
warnings and risk communication may for example, proactively modify a risk 
by alerting communities of the need to prepare their properties as storm 
season commences.  Warnings prior to, or during an event, particularly when 
consequences are likely to be of greater magnitude or have a different effect 
than first anticipated, may be a reactive mechanism to mitigate or control the 
immediate consequences and likely exposure to the impacts of the hazard. 
Whether warning is used to modify or mitigate natural hazard related risk, it 
will be incorporated in a control,274 such as legislation, an emergency 
management plan, guideline or standard. In recognition of the role that 
warnings and risk communication can play in modifying and controlling risk, 
Chapter Three undertakes a more thorough examination to highlight some 
elements that make warning effective. The Chapter also begins to identify the 
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role that social media plays in the dissemination of effective warning. It is 
anticipated that the elements for effective warning would be promoted and 
supported within the legal controls.  
Conclusion 
This Chapter outlines the risk management process, key definitions and the 
role of law in the management of risk. In doing so, the Chapter provides a 
framework and rationale for the research that forms the remainder of the 
thesis. Risk is defined at the outset of the Chapter, as the effect of uncertainty 
on objectives, such as financial, safety and environmental goals. An example 
of a risk source was given: a storm. A storm has the potential to lead to flooding 
and cause property damage. Risk ownership, determines who ought to be 
responsible and accountable for the management of the potential for the storm 
to cause property damage. Risk ownership may come about through physical 
ownership of an asset, so that the property owner is responsible for damage 
to their house. As well as the property owner, in Australia, emergency service 
agencies and government entities are allocated elements of risk ownership 
through policy and regulatory instruments. The relevant entities will be held 
accountable for their share of responsibility for managing natural hazard and 
emergency related risk. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the role of 
law in assisting emergency service agencies to manage their allocated risk.  
To effectively manage risk, an organisation puts in place governance 
structures, which include regulatory systems. These systems include policies 
and regulatory components. When governance structures and the relevant 
regulatory system for emergency management are effective, it is more likely 
that the objectives of risk reduction and community resilience will be achieved. 
Where ineffective, instruments can give rise to further risk, such as legal 
claims. Contextual parameters place will place limitations on government’s 
ability to effectively govern, control, manage and reduce risk. Some of the 
external parameters that influence the regulatory or governance context were 
briefly mentioned in this Chapter. They include social, political and regulatory 
influences that shape the governance context in Australia. Specific influences 
in each of these domains were identified as relevant to the emergency 
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management context. These were, shifts towards a risk society, 
individualisation of risk, the relevance of social contract theory to how 
responsibility for risk management should be shared, as well as the growing 
trend towards risk based regulation.  
Once the governance and regulatory system is created, the relevant 
instruments require ongoing monitoring and evaluation to ensure policy 
objectives are being achieved. 275 Some of the regulatory components will play 
an important role in the modification and mitigation of risk.  Legal instruments 
which support warning may act as, or support procedural controls to limit the 
exposure of the community to impacts of hazards. In the context of an 
emergency, an instrument that requires the community to be warned of an 
impending hazard may ensure that community members are alerted to the 
need to prepare their properties for potential impacts for example, of a storm. 
When individuals act on warning messages, the likelihood that damage will be 
suffered from the impact of storm may be lowered to an acceptable level. As 
indicated, to ensure specific controls and instruments are meeting their 
objectives, and reflect current good practice principles, they need to be 
monitored and updated. The following Chapter examines risk communication 
and warning in more detail. It aims to draw out the good practice principles 
that the procedural controls ought to incorporate, support and promote. 
  
                                                          
275 Standards Australia, Risk Management - Principles and guidelines (AS/NZS ISO 
31000:2009) vi, 9. 
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Chapter Three: Risk Communication  
 
‘Effective communication or the non-existence thereof, has a major 
bearing on how well people are prepared to face and cope with risk’.276 
 
Chapter Two examined the risk management framework and the role of the 
law in supporting that framework. The Chapter highlighted that communication 
and warning can be an effective control and mitigation measure in the 
management of natural hazard related risk.277 Communication, particularly 
warnings,278 which ‘inform and advise’279 citizens, provide a basis for decision 
making about the feasible actions that can be taken to protect lives,280 
property,281 and ‘manage risk’.282  
 
The importance of communication in the process of managing risk should not 
be underestimated. Communication occurs throughout all phases of the risk 
and hazard management cycles and takes place both internally and externally 
to an organisation. For example, emergency service agencies will undertake 
inter and intra-agency communication. This internal communication is a high 
priority, particularly for the effective co-ordination and activation of resources 
to prepare for, and respond to emergency related risk. Agencies will also 
communicate to external parties such as businesses and the community. The 
aim of this type of communication is to inform the relevant stakeholders of their 
likely exposure to hazard impacts.  As indicated, the communication informs, 
advises, educates and facilitates informed decision making of citizens. In 
keeping with the gap identified in Chapter One, of the ability to deliver effective 
communication to the public, this thesis focuses on external communication. 
 
                                                          
276 Renn, ‘Risk Governance: Towards an integrative framework’, above n 214, 55. 
277 Jane Bullock, George Haddow and Damon P. Coppola (eds), Homeland Security: The 
Essentials (Elsevier Inc, 2013) 270. 
278 Attorney General’s Department (Cth), Best Practice Guide for Warning Originators (June 
2013) 1.  
279 Ibid 1, 4. 
280 Jeanette Shepherd and Kitty van Vurren, ‘The Brisbane flood: CALD gatekeepers’ risk 
communication role (2014) 23(4) Disaster Prevention and Management 469, 471. 
281 Mileti, Disasters by Design, above n 185, 197. 
282 Attorney General’s Department (Cth), Best Practice Guide for Warning Originators, above 
n 278, 4, 5. 
 70 
 
In an emergency, the communication of risk to the public in an effective 
manner, is a highly complex and challenging task. There are practical issues 
for the dissemination of communication if critical infrastructure is disabled.283 
Hazard lead time284 along with issues of predicting the hazards paths,285 which 
are often prone to rapid change, may mean that there is a high degree of 
uncertainty as to what to communicate and to whom.286 Once the target 
audience is identified, there are then numerous factors that affect a citizen’s 
interpretation of information, their perception of risk, and the need to act. The 
actions of emergency service agencies for example, may influence the 
perception / response process. As entities tasked with communication of risk, 
it is important for these entities to identify activities they can take to positively 
impact on this process. Optimally, the activities, which have a positive 
influence, will be embedded in components of the risk governance framework 
so that the components act as effective controls in the management of 
emergency related risk.  
 
Extensive research has been undertaken in the field of risk communication, to 
determine factors that positively and negatively influence the perception / 
response process. One conceptual framework, which seeks to bring this work 
together, is the social amplification of risk framework (‘SARF’).287 This Chapter 
briefly examines the SARF, to illustrate the perception / response process, and 
to highlight the role that government and emergency service agencies play in 
affecting the process.288 Also examined is one of the less visible, but no less 
important factors, which impacts on this process, trust.289 A brief examination 
                                                          
283 Koehler, Kress and Miller, above n 244, 111-113; Tasmania, ‘2013 Tasmanian Bushfire 
Inquiry Report’, Volume 1 (2013) 143, 159 (For example, in the Tasmanian Bushfires, 
communications towers were disabled which led to the inability to communicate effectively in 
some regions); State Government Victoria, Review of the 2010–11 Flood Warnings and 
Response, above n 61, 19. 
284 D J Parker, S J Priest and S M Tapsell, ‘Understanding and enhancing the public’s 
behavioural response to flood warning information’ (2009) 16 Meteorological Applications 
103, 109 (The authors highlight that with ‘a decreasing warning lead time, more are 
expected to die’). 
285 Koehler, Kress and Miller, above n 244, 111-113; Hazelwood Mine Fire Inquiry, above n 
50, 12-13, 385. 
286 Lundgren & McMakin, above n 47, 314. 
287 Kasperson et al, ‘The social amplification of risk’, above n 5, 13. 
288 Kasperson et al, ‘The social amplification of risk’, above n 5, 13. 
289 Ibid 31. 
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of the role of trust in delivering effective risk communication and warning 
follows. 
The role of trust in risk communication 
Trust ‘underlies public confidence’ and credibility of the message sender in the 
eyes of the public. 290 If the message sender is trusted, the citizen will have 
confidence in the agency. They will believe the agency is a credible source of 
information and are therefore more likely to respond positively to the 
communication. In contrast, a lack of trust may negatively affect a citizen’s risk 
perception.291 A lack of trust becomes problematic when citizens fail to take 
the desired or necessary action in response to communication, action that is 
necessary to protect themselves and reduce impacts. When there is a lack of 
trust, emergency service agencies will carry the burden in terms of increased 
response call outs. Government may also carry a greater cost burden by 
having to provide recovery assistance. Consequently, understanding and 
embedding factors into governance frameworks, which positively affect trust, 
are vital considerations for the emergency management sector. 
The aim of this Chapter is to articulate good practice principles that support 
effective risk communication and the building of trust. Once good practice 
principles are identified and articulated as tangible actions, the relevant 
actions can be embedded into the legal components of the regulatory system. 
Good practice continues to develop over time. Therefore, regulatory 
components and procedures require ongoing revision to reflect these changes 
if they are to continue to perform as effective risk control and mitigation 
mechanism. If regulatory components across the regulatory system reflect 
good practice, the system can support consistent and competent action. This 
in turn assists in building trust and confidence in the emergency management 
sector.  
Before investigating principles of good practice that underpin effective risk 
communication and trust, the role of risk communication in the risk 
management process requires further investigation. Key terms require 
                                                          
290 Ibid 32. 
291 Ibid 32. 
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definition. The following sections define these key terms, before going on to 
examine the perception / response process of citizens. Further research then 
identifies characteristics that can be leveraged to support effective 
communication. These characteristics, and how they are articulated as 
tangible actions, provide the basis of the findings for this Chapter.   
The role of communication in risk management 
Renn asserts that, ‘effective communication has to be at the core of any 
successful activity to assess and manage risks’.292 The integral role of 
communication is represented in the risk management frameworks provided 
in Figures 1 & 2 below. Figure 1 clearly links risk communication and 
consultation with each stage of the risk management process. This process 
was first examined in Chapter Two. Figure 2, adds another layer to the 
understanding of the central role of communication, demonstrating its relevant 
to each phase of the risk governance process.  
Outside of these generic risk management and risk governance frameworks, 
and as highlighted in Chapter Two, communication is recognised as a 
significant risk mitigation / reduction tool in emergency management.293 Even 
in instances, where empirical studies suggest there is limited data to link timely 
warnings and saving of lives; these same studies still highlight that ‘receipt of 
a warning of some sort makes a positive difference to damage saving 
efforts’.294 As adverted to in Chapter One, the key role of communication and 
warning is also formally recognised in international frameworks for disaster 
                                                          
292 Renn, ‘White paper on Risk Governance’ above n 176, 54; van Asselt and Renn, above n 
5, 439. 
293 Mileti, Disasters by Design, above n 185, 174 (Warning systems ‘ give information to 
people at risk, enabling those in danger to make decision and take action’); Sellnow and 
Seegar, above n 48, 106; United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
(UNISDR), ‘Early Warning as a Matter of Policy' (The Conclusions of the Second 
International Conference on Early Warning, Bonn,16-18 October 2003) 5, 6, 12-14 (this 
report, highlights that early warning has ‘repeatedly been identified as a critical element of 
disaster risk reduction strategies’). 
294 Parker, Priest and Tapsell, above n 284, 109 (The authors also highlight that with ‘a 
decreasing warning lead time, more are expected to die’). 
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risk reduction.295 The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction,296 for 
example sets out seven key targets. The framework reinforces the need to 
implement and improve early warning systems at all levels of government in 
order to achieve disaster reduction goals and objectives.297  In sum, the key 
role, which communication plays in disaster risk reduction and management, 
appears incontestable.298  
Figure 1: Risk Management Process AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 299
 
 
 
                                                          
295 See, eg, United Nations, Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience 
of Nations and Communities to Disasters, Adopted 18-22 January 2005, UN 
Doc A/CONF.206/6; United Nations, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-
2030, Adopted 14-18 March 2015, UN Doc A/CONF.224/CRP.1. 
296 United Nations, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, Adopted 14-
18 March 2015, UN Doc A/CONF.224/CRP.1. 
297 United Nations, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, Adopted 14-
18 March 2015, UN Doc A/CONF.224/CRP.1, 12 (Goal 7: Substantially increase the 
availability of and access to multi-hazard early warning systems and disaster risk information 
and assessments to people by 2030). 
298 Norris et al, above n 49, 132, 135, 140; Longstaff, Koslowski, and Geoghegan, above n 
120 (It is also important to note that the provision of communication and information also 
supports the building of resilience, one of the key objectives of Australian national disaster 
policy). 
299 Standards Australia, Risk Management - Principles and guidelines (AS/NZS ISO 
31000:2009). 
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Figure 2: IRGC Risk Governance Framework300 
Ineffective communication 
In recognition of the key role of communication in reducing or mitigating 
disaster related risk, and as previously noted in Chapter One, extensive 
research is being carried out to establish principles of good practice. A need 
for this research is attributable to the failure of communication in emergencies. 
A failure ‘to capture complex elements of communications, the diverse needs 
of the public, and evolving role of mass media and new communications.’301 
This failure and the need for improvement is documented in Australia in post 
disaster enquiries.302 Failures focus on risk communications ‘not meeting best 
practice standards’, failing to deliver, ‘timely and appropriate’ information303 or 
effective communication.304 At the local government level, there is also a noted 
lack of development and testing of warning capacity.305 Although ‘a higher 
priority has been given to providing warnings in recent years’, it is recognised 
there are still ‘opportunities for improvement’.306 As previously indicated in this 
                                                          
300 Renn, ‘White paper on Risk Governance’, above n 176, 13. 
301 Sellnow and Seegar, above n 48, 106. 
302Monash Injury Research Centre, Review of Recent Australian Disaster Inquiries, above n 
74, 23; Hazelwood Mine Fire Inquiry, above n 50, 31, 384; Emergency Management 
Victoria, National Review of Warnings and Information, above n 11. 
303 Hazelwood Mine Fire Inquiry, above n 50, 31, 384. 
304 Fire Services Commissioner (Vic), Review of community responses to recent bushfires 
above n 74, 38; Emergency Management Victoria, National Review of Warnings and 
Information above n 11, 1.  
305 Inspector General of Emergency Management (Qld), Review of local governments’ 
emergency warning capability, above n 11. 
306 Fire Services Commissioner (Vic), Review of community responses to recent bushfires, 
above n 74, 38; Emergency Management Victoria, National Review of Warnings and 
Information, above n 11, 1. 
 75 
 
Chapter, as principles of good practice continue to emerge, it is important that 
doctrine, governance frameworks and regulatory systems reflect any 
developments.  
Defining risk communication and warning 
Risk communication 
‘Communication’, in the risk management vocabulary, is often coupled with 
consultation. ‘Communication’ is defined as, the ‘continual and iterative 
processes that an organization conducts to provide, share or obtain 
information and to engage in dialogue with stakeholders regarding the 
management of risk’.307 This broad definition suggests a dynamic, ongoing, 
two-way process. A process, which can include internal and external 
stakeholders. It is evident from this definition and Figures 1 & 2 provided 
above, that communication occurs throughout the whole of the risk 
management and risk governance cycle. The focus in this thesis, as identified 
in Chapter One, is not on the whole of the process and on all types of 
information. The focus is instead on that information provided to external 
stakeholders in the reactive or response phase of risk management.308 That 
is, as hazards are imminent or approaching, and communities are facing a 
likely exposure to hazard related risk that may manifest as an emergency.  
 
Communication, which takes place during an emergency, is referred to both 
as crisis communication,309 or crisis risk communication. 310 Although it is 
                                                          
307 British Standards Institution (BSI), Risk management – vocabulary (PD ISO Guide 
73:2009, 30 September 2013); Standards Australia, Risk Management - Principles and 
guidelines (AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009) 3. 
308 See, eg, Renn, ‘White paper on Risk Governance’, above n 176, 21 (Noting the steps in 
the risk chain based on Hoheneser et al’s work); Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, 
Emergency management in Australia: Concepts and Principles, above n 35, 4 (Response 
activities are those activities, ‘which activate preparedness arrangements and plans to put in 
place effective measures to deal with emergencies and disasters if and when they do 
occur’). 
309 B Reynolds and M W Seegar, ‘Crisis and Risk Communication as an Integrative Model’ 
(2005) 10 Journal of Health Communication 43, 45-46 (Risk communication has its origins in 
public health, whereas crisis communication has been said to have links to PR type 
communications); George, above n 193, 32 (George links the origins of risk communication 
to environmental health). 
310 Deborah C. Glik, ‘Risk Communication for Public Health Emergencies’ (2007) 28 Annual 
Review of Public Health 33, 34-35 (Uses the term crisis risk communication). 
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suggested that these labels may be interchangeable,311 there is research that 
also highlights the differences between the terms.312 This differentiation can 
revolve around timing and purpose in the risk management process.313 For the 
purposes of this thesis, it is sufficient to refer to risk communication in a broad 
sense, to capture risk and crisis communication.314 ‘Risk communication’ is 
not defined in the risk management vocabulary. It is however, a commonly 
used term,315 and attracts a multitude of overlapping interpretations.316 Risk 
communication in this thesis refers to a type of communication that involves 
‘the exchange of information among interested parties about the nature, 
magnitude, significance or control of a risk’.317 Interested parties considered in 
this thesis include ‘government agencies…communities and individual 
citizens’.318   
 
Risk communication has a definable purpose. In drawing together a number 
of overlapping perspectives, that purpose is to; ‘limit, contain, mitigate or 
reduce public harm’; by ‘identifying a threat or crisis’ and creating ‘public 
messages which create specific responses’; ‘enabling those at risk to make 
decisions and take action’.319 Renn’s research extends this purpose and 
                                                          
311 See, eg, Cornelius B. Pratt, ‘Theoretical Approaches to and Sociocultural Perspectives in 
Crisis Communication’ in Amiso M George and Cornelius B Pratt (eds), Case Studies in 
Crisis Communications (Routledge, 1st ed, 2012) 14 (Who suggests the terms can serve as 
substitutes); Wendling, Radisch and Jacobzone, above n 56, 7 (Risk and Crisis used 
interchangeably). 
312 Reynolds and Seegar, above n 309, 43, 45-47; Ben Sheppard, Melissa Janoske, and 
Brooke Liu, “Understanding Risk Communication Theory: A Guide for Emergency Managers 
and Communicators,” (2012) (Report to Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division, 
Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. College Park, 
MD) 5 (Crisis communication specifically refers to communication in the response phase of a 
disaster or emergency); M W Seegar,  ‘Best Practices in Crisis Communication: An expert 
Panel Process’ (2006) 34(3) Journal of Applied Communication Research 232, 234-235 
(Differences in terms stems from their disparate beginnings: risk communication deriving 
from a health context, whereas Crisis communication has been linked to Public Relations 
and ‘repairing a damaged image after a crisis’). 
313 Bullock, Haddow and Coppola (eds), above n 277, 269. 
314 See, eg, Sheppard, Janoske, and Liu, above n 312, 5. 
315 Dennis S. Mileti and Colleen Fitzpatrick, ‘The Causal Sequence of Risk Communication 
in the Parkfield Earthquake Prediction Experiment’ (1992) 12(3) Risk Analysis 393, 394 (As 
a seminal author in this area Mileti uses the term risk communication). 
316 Sheppard, Janoske, and Liu, above n 312, 5. 
317 Vincent T Covello, ‘Risk Communication: An Emerging Area of Health Communication 
Research’ (1992) 15 (1) Annals of the International Communication Association, 359, 359. 
318 Ibid. 
319 Reynolds and Seegar, above n 309, 48; Mileti, Disasters by Design, above n 185, 191 
(Mileti adds emphasis to the aim of warnings to ‘inform and prompt appropriate response’, 
by containing ‘alert and notification components’); Sorensen, above n 50, 119. 
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provides a more holistic view of risk communication. The author suggests that 
risk communication has a number of functions.320 Not only does it assist 
stakeholders in making informed choices. It also enables stakeholders to 
‘understand the rationale of the results and decisions from the risk appraisal 
and risk management phases’, made by risk managers such as 
government.321 Being able to understand the rationale for risk management 
decisions, assists in building mutual trust and confidence in institutions. 322  
 
Knowledge of the wider purpose of risk communication and its impact on trust 
and confidence is important to the emergency management sector. This is 
because trust and confidence underlie credibility, and it is credibility, that 
effective risk communication then relies on to persuade.323 Building 
competence and effective strategies for risk communication is therefore not 
only important for the purpose of mitigating harm. As identified at the 
commencement of this Chapter, it is also important for building trust and 
confidence in audiences. The aim is that audiences react appropriately and 
take the desired action in response to risk communication.324 Tangible 
activities, which can support trust, is discussed in the final section of this 
Chapter. 
Warning 
Warning is one aspect of risk communication.325 Warning in Australian 
emergency management is, ‘the dissemination of a message signalling an 
imminent hazard which may include advice on protective measures’.326 Its 
                                                          
320 Renn, ‘White paper on Risk Governance’, above n 176, 56-57 (Four functions of risk 
communication are: ‘education and enlightenment, risk training and inducement of behaviour 
changes (which helps people cope), creation of confidence in institutions for the assessment 
and management of risk, involvement in risk related decision and conflict resolutions’). 
321 Ibid 15. 
322 Ibid 22. 
323 Reynolds and Seegar, above n 309, 48; Mileti, Disasters by Design, above n 185, 191 
(Mileti adds emphasis to the aim of warnings to ‘inform and prompt appropriate response’, 
by containing ‘alert and notification components’); Sorensen, above n 50, 119. 
324 Renn, ‘White paper on Risk Governance’, above n 176, 55. 
325 Mileti and Fitzpatrick, above n 315, 394 (For example, Mileti includes dissemination and 
reaction to warnings in his discussion of risk communication). 
326 Attorney General’s Department (Cth), Best Practice Guide for Warning Originators, above 
n 278, 1; Attorney General’s Department (Cth), Australia’s Emergency Warning 
Arrangements, above n 40, 2. 
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purpose reflects the narrow view of risk communication. That is, that risk 
communication seeks to ‘inform the community of an impending or current 
threat and to prompt an appropriate response or action’.327 Activities that 
support warning are relevant to all phases of an emergency. The 
establishment of early warning systems328 for example, usually occurs in the 
prevention / preparation phases. Testing of warning messages and education 
of the public also occurs in these early phases. This preparatory activity 
provides the basis for effective action once the warning message is 
disseminated during, or just prior to, an emergency.329 This suggests, warning, 
like communication more generally, is an ongoing process. With these 
definitions in mind, how to create effective risk communication and warning, 
and how to embed tangible action for effective warning in the governance 
framework is now investigated.  
Planning and governance: risk communication and warning 
Before examining principles of good practice in risk communication and 
warning, a brief comment on the incorporation of risk communication and 
warning into regulatory systems and governance structures, is required. A 
more detailed examination will take place in Chapter. For now, it is important 
to note that early warning systems should be supported or mandated down to 
a local level where possible, supported by legislative structures,330 and risk 
communication planned.331 This final element, the risk communication plan, 
                                                          
327 Attorney General’s Department (Cth), Australia’s Emergency Warning Arrangements, 
above n 40, 2; Bullock, Haddow and Coppola, above n 277, 269. 
328 United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), UNISDR 
Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction (2009) 12 
<http://www.unisdr.org/files/7817_UNISDRTerminologyEnglish.pdf> (Defines an early 
warning systems as, ‘The set of capacities needed to generate and disseminate timely and 
meaningful warning information to enable individuals, communities and organizations 
threatened by a hazard to prepare and to act appropriately and in sufficient time to reduce 
the possibility of harm or loss’). 
329 Attorney General’s Department (Cth), Australia’s Emergency Warning Arrangements, 
above n 40, 3. 
330 IFRC & UNDP, ‘Effective law and regulation for disaster risk reduction’, above n 78, 33-
34, 36 (Both establishment and operation of early warning systems should be supported, 
along with authority for warning and decision making, although some countries will differ as 
to how the frameworks are put in place). 
331 Standards Australia, Communicating and consulting about risk (HB 327:2010); 
Commonwealth of Australia, Attorney General’s Department (Cth), National Emergency Risk 
Assessment Guidelines, above n 88, 31. 
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should be ‘developed at an early stage of the risk management process’.332 
This plan will be one component of the governance framework. As identified 
in Chapter One, the plan should outline ‘the objectives of specific 
communication, who will be involved, how the channels will work, what will be 
communicated, and how the information will be communicated’.333  
 
In light of these recommendations, the focus in Chapter Five, is on whether 
there is a clear inclusion of risk communication and warning in governance 
components. This includes whether there is a communication plan, one with 
identified objectives, and whether responsibilities for who should be involved 
in warning, are clearly allocated. In keeping with the focus on social media, 
attention is also drawn to how warning and risk communication will be 
delivered. An understanding of the need to plan, leads into the next section of 
this Chapter. This next section examines the process of an individual’s 
perception and response to risk. It also identifies principles of good practice 
which positively influence this process and which ought to be incorporated into 
a communication plan.  
Principles of good practice in risk communication: the detail 
What constitutes good practice in carrying out risk communication has evolved 
over time. There are suggestions that there have been three phases in the 
development of risk communication, which even though dated, are still referred 
to by prominent scholars.334 The first phase focused on conveyance of 
probabilistic information and education with regards to risk in a one-way 
trajectory.335 The second phase employed ‘greater levels of persuasion’, to 
alter unacceptable behaviour.336 For example, in areas such as health, 
negative images have been utilised to depict the long-term effects of smoking, 
to deter such habits. The third phase, focuses on two-way communication, 
                                                          
332 Standards Australia, Communicating and consulting about risk (HB 327:2010) 18-20. 
333 Standards Australia, Communicating and consulting about risk (HB 327:2010) 18-20. 
334 Renn, ‘White paper on Risk Governance’, above n 176, 55; William Leiss, ‘Three Phases 
in the Evolution of Risk Communication Practice’ (1996) 545 The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 85, 87-91. 
335 Renn, ‘White paper on Risk Governance’, above n 176, 55-56. 
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that is, mutual education and consensus building between stakeholders as to 
risk, risk acceptability and risk perception.337  
 
Importantly, the two-way dialogue enables entities to understand how risk is 
being perceived and responded to in the community. As identified in Chapter 
Two, incorporating community perceptions of risk and its acceptability into risk 
management decision making, adds to a more legitimate approach.338 The 
incorporation of community perspectives also provides opportunities to 
incorporate local knowledge on hazard impacts.339 Local knowledge is an 
important factor for building an understanding of how hazards affect, or are 
likely to affect, a community.  Although risk communication is a two-way 
process, in relation to natural hazard and emergencies, government will 
usually take a leading role.340 This is in part due to their greater knowledge of 
a risk, their possession of the predictive tools, which identify risk, and its 
responsibility to protect the community.341 Although greater responsibility is 
allocated to government, it is important to continue to build risk 
communication, which supports a two-way dialogue and the positive attributes 
it brings. As will be demonstrated in Chapter Eight, social media platforms will 
be an important, although disruptive technology to facilitate two-way 
interaction. 
Challenges of risk communication 
In communicating risk and creating ‘effective mutual communication’, there are 
numerous challenges to overcome.342 Not least of which is the diversity of 
stakeholders, with their differing ‘views, knowledge and understanding ‘or 
                                                          
337 Ibid 57; Leiss, above n 334, 90-91; Standards Australia, Communicating and consulting 
about risk (HB 327:2010) 18; Baruch Fischhoff, ‘Comment: Four answers to four questions 
(about risk communication) (2014) 17(10) Journal of Risk Research 1265, 1265 (That is for 
authorities to listen rather than ‘assuming they know what to say’). 
338 See Chapter Two, on the concerns over legitimacy of risk management decisions and 
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339 United Nations, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, Adopted 14-
18 March 2015, UN Doc A/CONF.224/CRP.1,15 (Calls for the use of local and indigenous 
knowledge in disaster risk reduction practices).  
340 Renn, ‘White paper on Risk Governance’, above n 176, 57; Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG), National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (2011) 2. 
341 Council of Australian Governments (COAG), National Strategy for Disaster Resilience 
(2011) 2. 
342 Van Asselt and Renn, above n 5, 439. 
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perceptions of risk’,343 as well as their needs and relative vulnerability to 
exposure.344 Although risk communication was previously considered a linear 
process of transmission, receipt and action, as Renn’s theory indicates, the 
linear theory is overwhelmingly rejected. 345 It is now recognised that 
individuals do not react on the objective risk content alone.346 Instead, they go 
through a staged347 or sequential348 social process349 of assimilation,350 which 
involves a number of steps. The SARF framework, in Figure 3 below, 
diagrammatically represents the stages of the perception / response 
process.351 A key purpose of the model is also to demonstrate how risk is 
amplified and attenuated in the community. However, the key focus here, is 
on the perception /response element of the framework and the role of 
government agencies in impacting that process. 
                                                          
343 Renn, ‘White paper on Risk Governance’, above n 176, 57; Standards Australia, 
Communicating and consulting about risk (HB 327:2010) 11(Also known as their risk 
perceptions). 
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Figure 3: The Social Amplification and Attenuation of Risk352 
 
As the first portion of the diagram indicates, there are numerous sources of 
information, information channels, social stations, as well as individual and 
social influences, which influence how a risk is perceived. Therefore, when a 
warning is sent, it may not bring about the intended response.353 The response 
and the way an individual personalises risk and what they should do about it354 
will instead depend on a number of factors. These factors include:  
 The channel or entity a warning or message is received from (does it 
come from a trusted reliable source?)  
 The personal experiences of the individual (have they experienced 
similar situations which mean they know the relevant action to take?) 
 The feasibility of response (is it possible to collect family in time to 
evacuate or get to a place of safety?).355  
                                                          
352 Kasperson et al, above n 5. 
353 Quarantelli, ‘People’s reactions to emergency warnings’, above n 345, 178. 
354 Dash and Gladwin, above n 345, 71; Shepherd and van Vurren, above n 280, 470, 476 
(In the case of diverse ethnic groups, this may be because ‘information to match their needs 
is not disseminated’ or only disseminated in English). 
355 Mileti, Disasters by Design, above n 185, 191; B. N Frisby, S.R Veil and T.L Sellnow, 
‘Instructional Messages During Health-Related Crises: Essential content for Self-Protection’ 
(2014) 29(4) Health Commun. 347, 348 (The authors suggest that’ individuals need to 
understand the message relates to them, understand the risk they face if they do not take 
the action, decide if they should act and what action to take’). 
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Consequently, any perception of risk derived from risk communication, is a 
product of ‘psychological, social, and political factors’.356 Pertinent to this 
thesis is the role of government agencies as a social station, a direct and 
indirect communicator of risk communication and warning. One that can 
influence, although not control, the perception / response process.  The aim of 
this Chapter is to determine optimal strategies for these agencies to positively 
influence risk communications where they can. 
Characteristics of Government Agencies as social stations 
Acting as a conceptual framework, the authors of SARF recognise that further 
and more in-depth research is available on each of the elements within the 
perception / response process.  Mileti, for example, has undertaken research 
into characteristics of the senders and receivers of messages. Leveraging 
these characteristics can positively influence message perception and 
response.357 Government agencies responsible for disseminating risk 
communication need to be aware of the receiver characteristics, to ensure they 
deliver appropriately framed358 message content.359 Message content, which 
positively influence the social / psychological aspects of the message 
receiver,360 to bring about compliant action.361 As already indicated, these 
receiver characteristics include previous experience of hazards,362 
                                                          
356 Paul Slovic, ‘The Psychology of risk’ (2010) 19(4) Saúde e Sociedade 731, 742. 
357 Mileti and Fitzpatrick, above n 315, 395. 
358 Glik, above n 310, 35-37. 
359 Mileti, Disasters by Design, above n 185, 191. 
360 See, eg, Glik, above n 310, 35-37 (appropriate message framing assists ‘stressed 
individuals with skewed perceptions to process the information at hand’). 
361 Paton and Johnston, above n 345, 273. 
362 Quarantelli, ‘People’s reactions to emergency warnings’, above n 345, 180; Parker, Priest 
and Tapsell, above n 284, 108; Wachinger et al, above n 178, 1052-1053 (Direct and 
indirect experience); Mileti, Disasters by Design, above n 185, 191, 228 ( ‘Prior disaster 
experience is a major predictor of higher levels of preparedness and effective response); 
Dennis Mileti & Paul W. O’Brien, ‘Warnings During Disaster: Normalising Communicated 
Risk’ (1992) 39(1) Social Problems 40, 45 (in the context of response to aftershocks, those 
having experienced damage during a quake’ are more likely to prepare’ in the advent of 
aftershock warnings or to ‘take the risk seriously’). 
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environmental cues363 as well as normative or optimistic bias.364  The 
appropriate framing of message content for emergency management warning 
is the subject of ongoing research.365 While the outputs of this thesis should 
work in conjunction with the findings on the framing of message content for 
recipients, the focus here is on sender rather than receiver characteristics. 
This is because, the sender characteristics are perhaps easier to 
operationalise as tangible activities that can be incorporated into legal 
components of the regulatory system.  
Sender characteristics 
Sender characteristics, which can positively influence perceptions of risk, and 
therefore the effectiveness of risk communication as mitigation tool, are 
numerous. In the first instance, positive responses from the community 
generally occur where information disseminated, ‘is correct and correctly 
transmitted’.366 Therefore, it is necessary to ensure accuracy367 or 
correctness of information.  A number of sender characteristics then support 
‘correct’ transmission of information. These include timing,368 
                                                          
363 Fire Services Commissioner (Vic), Review of community responses to recent bushfires 
above n 74, 2 (In some cases these direct observations from environmental cues are the 
first trigger of awareness of hazards); Barry Dewitt et al, ‘Environmental risk perception from 
visual cues: the psychophysics of tornado risk perception’ (2014) 10 (12) Environmental 
Research Letters 1, 1-2. 
364 Dash and Gladwin, above n 345, 71-72 (In some cases those familiar with hazards in 
their area ‘did not wait for government warnings to make decisions’ but made their own 
independent assessments of response requirements); Parker, Priest and Tapsell, above n 
284,108 (This type of bias leads to a ‘underestimated likelihood of adverse consequences’ 
as affecting the individual, (while it is seen as ‘dangerous to generalise socio-economic 
factors have some correlations to response action’); Miletti, Disasters by Design, above n 
185, 142 (Some of the socio-economic, psychological and geographic factors have 
produced mixed results in their ability to explain behaviour, and group and individual habits 
need changing to affect action); Mileti and O’Brien, ‘Normalising Communicated risk’, above 
n 362, 53 (Household factors have also been identified as impacting on perceptions); Dash 
and Gladwin, above n 345, 72 (These factors highlighted across a broad range of research 
may include, ‘age, gender, presence of children, race and ethnicity, income and disability’); 
Shepherd and van Vurren, above n 280, 471 (Building on the notion of race and ethnicity, 
perceptions of threats can be a function of ‘values, social influences, attitudes (for example 
‘mistrust of government sources due to previous exposure to authoritarian governments’) 
which impact on ‘decoding of information’). 
365 See, eg, Professor Vivienne Tippett et al, ‘Building Resilient Communities: Effective Multi-
Channel Communication in Disasters: Annual Report 2015-2016’ (2016) (Queensland 
University of Technology and Bushfire and Natural Hazards CRC). 
366 Norris et al, above n 49, 127, 140. 
367 Norris et al, above n 49, 140. 
368 White, Social Media, Crisis, Communication and Emergency Management, above n 46, 
148. 
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consistency,369 credibility, reach or penetration370 and tailored messaging.371 
To these factors Mileti would also add, specificity, certainty, channel, source 
and frequency.372 Many of these characteristics correspond with criteria for 
effective risk communication set out in the risk management standards.373 
What these characteristics suggest, is that a correctly disseminated risk or 
warning message, needs to be issued with sufficient time for individuals to 
react, and over a channel that is likely to reach them. The message also needs 
to come from a credible source. If multiple messages are disseminated, there 
also needs to be inconsistency across organisations. The following, highlights 
tangible activities to support these characteristics, along with corresponding 
challenges. 
Timing  
To ensure risk communication acts as an effective control of the management 
of hazard and emergency related risks, the message sender can leverage the 
timing of risk communication. A well-timed warning is critical for decision-
making.374 Studies within the community suggest that timely warning is 
particularly critical for persons classified as ‘threat monitors’ and ‘threat 
avoiders’.375  For example, those personality types categorised as ‘threat 
monitors’, generally ‘won’t leave unless necessary’ and they expect detailed 
warnings and information to inform their decisions of ‘when they really need to 
leave’.376 Obviously, such a person given a less than timely warning may not 
                                                          
369 Quarantelli, ‘People’s reactions to emergency warnings’, above n 345, 180. 
370 Attorney General’s Department (Cth), Best Practice Guide for Warning Originators, above 
n 278, 8-9; Paton and Johnston, above n 345, 271-272 (tailoring is required for the 
‘community context’ rather than ‘an assumption homogeneity of message recipient). 
371 Council of Australian Governments (COAG), National Strategy for Disaster Resilience 
(2011) 10 (this policy document highlights accuracy, tailoring and broad reach); Corina 
Hoppner et al, ‘Linking social capacities and risk communication in Europe: a gap between 
theory and practice? Natural Hazards (2012) 64, 1753, 1755 (A new challenge is the need to 
tailor message for ‘different actors at different spatial scales’). 
372 Mileti and Fitzpatrick, above n 315, 395, 399 (In this study particularly Mileti highlights the 
need for ‘repeated communications’ to reinforce messages as a ‘paramount factor’, 
warranting that risk communication suggests receiver seek additional information). 
373 Standards Australia, Communicating and consulting about risk (HB 327:2010) 19 (These 
include, ‘clarity, objectivity, timeliness, regularity and an opportunity for input or the 
exchange of views’). 
374 Sellnow and Seegar, above n 48, 107. 
375 Fire Services Commissioner (Vic), Review of community responses to recent bushfires 
above n 74, 16-17, 33. 
376 Ibid. 
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be able to process the message and make the necessary arrangements for 
evasive action.377  In sum, components of the governance frameworks that 
support risk communication should highlight the need for timely 
communication. Actions to support timeliness will need to take into account 
when selecting the channel for message dissemination. This is examined 
below. 
Challenges for timing 
Despite ongoing efforts in this area, timeliness continues to assert itself as an 
area where effectiveness is lacking or at times impossible.378 Ineffectiveness 
may be linked to the fast-moving nature of events and the problems they 
pose.379 This proposition is evidenced in examples of fire, flood and hail. In 
2010-2011, severe flooding affected Queensland. There was insufficient time 
to ‘warn of evacuation before access roads were closed’ due to rapidly rising 
floodwaters.380 In 2014, a storm supercell swept through Brisbane, 
Queensland, again there was no time to warn until hail was already raining 
down.381 In Victoria, in the case of bushfires, it is noted that when fire breaks 
out and threatens people or homes very quickly, it might not be possible to 
issue timely warning.382 If events are fast moving, reliance on a ‘total warning 
system’, a system that incorporates public education to ensure general 
                                                          
377 Thomas J. Cova et al, ‘Warning Triggers in Environmental Hazards: Who Should be 
warned to do what and when?’ (2016) Risk Analysis 1, 4-5, 7 (The authors highlight 
considerations of timing between receipt of warning and evacuation travel times which need 
to be considered in issuing warnings and balanced with warning too early when uncertainty 
margins are higher). 
378 Tasmania, ‘2013 Tasmanian Bushfire Inquiry Report’, above n 283, 161-163, 165; 
Hazelwood Mine Inquiry, above n 50, 384, 393, 401 (here communication failed to reach 
residents in ‘a timely way’ if they received communication at all, although the CFA were 
commended for timely services); Sweeney Research, ‘A qualitative research Report on CFA 
Warnings’ (September 2009) Reference No. 18942, 9. 
379 Mileti, Disasters by Design, above n 185, 191; Rebecca E. Morss et al, ‘Flash Flood 
Risks and Warning Decisions: A Mental Models Study of Forecasters, Public Officials and 
Media Broadcasters in Boulder Colorado’ (2015) 35(11) Risk Analysis 2009, 2010 (Flash 
Flooding); Betty H Morrow et al, ‘Improving Storm Surge Risk Communication: Stakeholder 
Perspectives’ (Jan 2015) 96.1 Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 35, 35. 
380 Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry, 'Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry – 
Final Report' (March 2012) 174. 
381 Cameron Atfield, ‘A year on from Brisbane’s freak hail storm’, The Brisbane Times 
(online), 27 November 2015 <http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/queensland/a-year-on-from-
brisbanes-freak-hail-storm-20151126-gl94so.html>. 
382 Victoria, 2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission Final Report, ‘Volume II: Fire 
Preparation, Response and Recovery’ (2010) (The Hon. Bernard Teague AO) 51. 
 87 
 
readiness prior to events is necessary.383 Public education should also  
acknowledgement that a warning may not be received.384 Current practice 
within the emergency management sector, in storm, cyclone and fire season, 
indicates community education of this type is beginning to take place.385 
Many of the enablers for timely delivery of messages relate to internal or 
interagency procedures for data collection and sharing, which facilitates 
organizational decision making.  These procedures are not the focus of this 
research however, they need to be acknowledged. Timely delivery of warnings 
and risk communication will depend on data availability and the speed at which 
decisions to take action and inform the public are made.386 Critical 
dependences for the provision of this data, in a format which can be utilised in 
decision making, can make expedient warning difficult.387 Emergency services 
agencies and local government for example, may rely on forecasts from the 
Bureau of Meteorology in order to understand the likely exposure to natural 
hazard related risks in their jurisdiction. Therefore, communication frameworks 
facilitating effective intra and inter-agency communication, with interoperability 
between systems, is required.388 However, this is a challenging process.389  
Once decisions are made as to who and what to communicate,390 public 
information professionals will create messages for dissemination. Message 
content requires signoff. Approval processes must balance the need to ensure 
                                                          
383 Emergency Management Victoria, National Review of Warnings and Information, above n 
11, 25-26. 
384 Ibid. 
385 Curriculum and Assessment Authority (Vic), Bushfire Education teaching and learning 
resources for early childhood settings, primary and secondary schools (2016) 
<http://www.bushfireeducation.vic.edu.au/>; State Emergency Service (Qld), Get Storm 
Ready <http://www.stormwise.com.au/step/how-prepare-storm>; ABC Emergency, Plan for 
an emergency: Cyclone (2016) <http://www.abc.net.au/news/emergency/plan-for-an-
emergency/cyclone/>. 
386 Morss et al, above n 379, 2009-2010; Sorensen, above n 50, 122; Cova et al, above n 
377, 1 (Decision making in deciding what targets group needs to take protective action, what 
is the best protective action and when should the protective be initiative are difficult 
questions – research is ongoing into the use of triggers to support timely decision making 
and action). 
387 Noting that the ability to predict and supply data is the subject of ongoing research, See, 
eg, Jeffrey D. Kepert et al, ‘Improved Predictions of Severe Weather to Reduce Community 
Impact: Annual Project Report 2014-2015’ (2015). 
388 State of Victoria, ‘2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission: Final Report – Summary’ 
(July 2010) (The Hon. Bernard Teague) 11, 18. 
389 Morss et al, above n 379, 2010. 
390 Cova et al, above n 377, 2-4. 
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appropriate content is sent, with the need to disseminate information quickly 
to the public. Creating efficiencies in these processes, for example, by creating 
pre-approved message templates, is key if government wishes to share of 
responsibility for taking action with community members. It is often only when 
the public become aware of a risk from an external source such as 
government, that evasive action can be taken. In sum, timely communication 
is critical for decision-making, and needs to be emphasised in protocols. The 
success of a protocol as a risk control will however be dependent on internal 
processes being efficient and streamlined.  
Accuracy 
A second point of leverage for effective risk communication, is accuracy or the 
provision of correct information. From a psychological perspective, 
communicating accurate information with the ‘best available knowledge and 
source of a threat’ helps to reduce anxiety and fear’.391 From a practical 
perspective the positive influence of accurate, or certainly the absence of 
misinformation, is self-evident. If a citizen is trying to assess their potential 
exposure to hazard impacts, misinformation ‘may lead to a poor or passive 
response’, a lack of understanding of the relevant action to take and the period 
in which they need to respond.392 Early errors in risk communication can also 
lead to a crisis or create problems’.393  
It is particularly this aspect, the provision of inaccurate information, information 
that leads a person into greater danger, where links to legal accountability 
become evident in Chapters Six and Seven. In light of the need for accuracy, 
there are tangible activities that can be incorporated into communication and 
warning protocols. These include the verification of information prior to issue. 
If this is not possible, notification that the information is unverified or of an 
unofficial nature of the content should be given.394 Information channels need 
                                                          
391 Misse Wester, ‘Fight, Flight or Freeze: Assumed Reactions of the Public During a Crisis 
(2011) 19(4) Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 207, 207-208, 212. 
392 Parker, Priest and Tapsell, above n 284, 110. 
393 Sellnow and Seegar, above n 48, 109, 111 (‘small variance in the communication 
process, in form, content, distribution and timing may produce wide fluctuations in system 
behaviour and lead to crisis’); George, above n 193, 32. 
394 See, eg, Brisbane City Council, Brisbane Storm and Flood Map 
<https://bnestorm.crowdmap.com/>. 
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to be monitored in order to address rumours and misinformation that might 
result in an inappropriate amplification or attenuation of a risk. There are 
however challenges in providing accuracy in messaging.  
Challenges for accuracy 
As highlighted in relation to timing there are challenges in accuracy in part due 
to technology. If predictive modelling of the likely impact of a hazard is 
available, there is an expectation that it should be utilised to provide accurate 
information.395 However, there is a limit in the ability to model and objectively 
assess or predict impact or exposure to hazards.396 This is particularly the 
case when a hazard of the relevant magnitude has never been experienced, 
and data is incomplete.397 Even if predictions are uncertain, there is a body of 
research, which supports the transmission of uncertainty. Framed in an 
appropriate way, being transparent about uncertainty, can lead to self-efficacy 
and ‘autonomous risk management’.398  
Chapter Four introduces contextual influences in emergency management. 
One of these influences is the growing use of social media in the community 
and its impact on the information landscape and the availability of accurate 
information. In anticipation of the examination of social media, it is noted that 
the platforms provide a large amount of unofficial, unconfirmed information that 
can compete with, contradict, or provide a stark contrast to official sources.399 
The vast quantities of information on social media, may overwhelm resource 
                                                          
395 Tasmania, ‘2013 Tasmanian Bushfire Inquiry Report’, above n 283, 161-162, 165. 
396 Ibid 29, 55; Victoria Government, Review of the 2010-11 Flood Warnings and Response, 
above n 61, 71-72. 
397 Gyrd Braendeland and Atle Refsdal, ‘Risk factors in emergency response (2013) 9(2) 
International Journal of Emergency Management 127, 128. 
398 Marie-Pierre L. Markon, Joshua Crowe, Louise Lemyre, ‘Examining uncertainties in 
government risk communication: citizens expectations’ (2013) 15(4) Health, Risk and 
Society, 313, 313-314; 321-322; Markon & Lemyre, ‘Public Reactions to Different Sources of 
Uncertainty’, above n 345, 1105-1106, 1116 (some types of uncertainty leads to a 
diminished uptake in action and a view of ‘incompetence of experts’, but if appropriately 
framed communication uncertainty can be positive where it relates to a ‘lack of data’ rather 
than ‘diverging expert opinion’ coupled with conceptualisation of a risk and appropriate 
strategies, increasing trust and reducing suspicion); Parker, Priest and Tapsell, above n 284, 
111-112. 
399 Mileti, Disasters by Design, above n 185, 196; Dennis J Parker and John W Handmer, 
‘The role of Unofficial Flood Warnings Systems’ (1998) 6(1) Journal of Contingencies and 
Crisis Management 45, 45 (these systems are ‘ignored as being beyond government 
control’). 
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capacity to monitor and correct misinformation.400 Issues of legal 
accountability in this area will be examined in Chapter Eight. Although 
technology can pose challenges for the provision of accurate information, the 
importance of accuracy should not be underestimated. This is because; the 
provision of inaccurate information may have negative impacts on response to 
subsequent warnings401 and may undermine trust.402 As briefly highlighted at 
the commencement of this chapter, trust is a key issue in the perception / 
response process.403 
Clarity, Conciseness and Specificity / Tailored messaging 
Due to their similarity, the characteristics of clarity, conciseness and specificity, 
which can positively influence the perception / response process, are 
examined here. These attributes are linked to message content and message 
design. They are important to note, not only because they improve the 
effectiveness of risk communication, but also because of the likely legal 
implications for failing to take them into account. Tailored messaging is 
described as ‘providing information that people are actually seeking’.404 
Information that is relevant and ‘strategically matched to audience needs, 
values, backgrounds, culture and experience’.405 A requirement for specific 
and tailored messaging features heavily in policy documents and inquiry 
                                                          
400 Queensland Police Service, Media and Public Affairs Branch, Queensland Police 
Service: Disaster Management and Social Media – a case study (2011) v, vi (Myth busting is 
helpful, if not required, for correcting inaccurate information), however see, eg, Wouter Jong 
& Michel L.A. Duckers, ‘Self-correcting mechanisms and echo-effects in social media: An 
analysis of the “gunman in the newsroom crisis”’ (2016) 59 Computers in Human Behaviour 
334, 334 (In social media communities inaccurate information may over a period of time self-
correct due to the ongoing input of citizens, therefore agency correction may not be as 
necessary). 
401 Glik, above n 310, 39; Tierney, Disaster Response’, above n 109 (Tierney disputes this 
negative impact of false warnings). 
402 Parker, Priest and Tapsell, above n 284, 110; Hoppner et al, above n 371, 1768. 
403 Wachinger et al, above n 178, 1053, 1061; Kasperson et al, above n 5. 
404 Fire Services Commissioner (Vic), Review of community responses to recent bushfires 
above n 74, 30. 
405 Reynolds and Seegar, above n 309, 45; State Government Victoria, Review of the 2010–
11 Flood Warnings and Response, above n 61, 47; Hazelwood Mine Fire Inquiry, above n 
50, 386, 396, 400 (Needs for ‘tailored communication that resonates with target audiences’ 
values’, considering complexity). 
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reports406 and has ‘high empirical support for an increase in public 
response’.407  
Conversely, a universal rather than tailored message ‘can have negative 
consequences’ where it does not take into account the physical spread of the 
audience. A universal message which contains directions for example on 
where to evacuate to, may cause some recipients to go in the wrong direction 
and send them into a ‘potentially dangerous’ situation.408 As well as tailoring, 
lack of clarity or the presence of ambiguity in a message, may mean the nature 
of the risk of harm is misunderstood. In either of these situations, legal 
implications may arise.409 In optimal circumstances, a warning will be tailored 
and unambiguous. However again the ability to predict hazard impacts and the 
ability to make decisions on who and what to communicate will challenge an 
agency’s ability to deliver to tailor and provide certain information.  
Consistency and Channels 
Further factors, which influence effective risk communication and warning, are 
the choice of message channels, and consistency in messages. In this regard, 
research supports the frequent use of multiple channels and the provision of 
consistent messages across each channel, to increase public response to risk 
communication.410 As earlier highlighted, with the advent of new technologies 
                                                          
406 Hazelwood Mine Fire Inquiry, above n 50, 386, 396, 400, 402; Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG), National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (2011) 1, 8. 
407 Mileti, Disasters by Design, above n 185, 191. 
408 Tasmania, ‘2013 Tasmanian Bushfire Inquiry Report’, above n 283, 163-164. 
409 See, eg, State of Queensland v Kelly [2014] QCA 27, [36], [44]-[47] (Where the symbols 
did not clearly depict the type of harm that could arise). 
410 Mileti, Disasters by Design, above n 185, 191; Mileti and Fitzpatrick, above n 315, 395, 
399 (In this study particularly Mileti highlights the need for ‘repeated communications’ so as 
to reinforce messages as a ‘paramount factor’, warranting that risk communication suggests 
receiver seek additional information); See also guidelines which suggest use of multiple 
channels, Queensland Government, Queensland State Disaster Management Plan (2015) 
29; Inspector-General Emergency Management (Qld), Emergency Management Assurance 
Framework, above n 107, 23; New South Wales Government, New South Wales State 
Emergency Management Plan (2012) 7 (The full suite of traditional and social media 
channels may be used); Emergencies (Emergency Plan) 2014 (No 1)(ACT) (Reference is 
made to a range of mediums); Emergency Management Committee (NSW), New South 
Wales Public Information Services Functional Area Supporting Plan (2005); State 
Government Victoria, Victorian Warning Protocol, Version 2.0 (July 2013) 11 (Where a 
‘multi-faceted approach’ is recommended to ‘ensure maximum penetration and saturation’); 
Attorney General’s Department (Cth), Code of Practice for Warning Republishers (April 
2013); Attorney General’s Department (Cth), Best Practice Guide for Warning Originators, 
above n 278. 
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the information landscape is changing. This includes a change in the types of 
channels that can, and are expected by the public, to be employed to 
disseminate messages. Instead of traditional mechanisms for communication, 
such as television, radio and press releases for example, the public are 
communicating over the internet. They are using mobile devices and 
applications such as Snapchat, Twitter and Facebook.  
New channels for communication 
Post disaster inquiries include recommendations for the inclusion of new 
technologies and channels of communication as part of a multi-channel 
strategy.411 As becomes apparent in the following Chapter, many of these 
newer channels have the advantage of speed of delivery on their side. 
However, and in reflection on the need for tailored delivery, it is important to 
deliver over channels that are relevant and appropriate to the target 
audience.412 To determine the most appropriate channel for the local 
community, procedures ought to highlight the need for community profiling413 
and protocols ought to reinforce the use of multiple message channels.  
Consistency 
As well as employing multiple channels for message delivery, the key issue is 
then consistency across channels. Consistency, or at least a lack of conflicting 
or contradicting information, will reduce frustration, confusion, discounting or 
disbelief in information.414 A presence of contradicting information also 
negatively affects the perceived competence of the relevant organisations and 
therefore trust and credibility. Inconsistency, also affects the ability of the 
                                                          
411 Victoria, 2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission Final Report, above n 382, 51. 
412 Hoppner et al, above n 371, 1767; Hazelwood Mine Fire Inquiry, above n 50, 384, 387, 
400. 
413 See, eg, Inspector General of Emergency Management (Qld), Review of local 
governments’ emergency warning capability, above n 11. 
414 Dennis Mileti et al, Public Hazards Communication and Education – the State of the Art 
(March 2004) 
<https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Dennis_Mileti/publication/253943459_Public_Hazards
_Communication_and_Education_The_State_of_the_Art/links/56ebeeb608aefd0fc1c71b5a.
pdf>; Mileti and O’Brien, ‘Normalising Communicated risk’, above n 362, 40,42; Hazelwood 
Mine Inquiry, above n 50, 392, 393 (a number of organisations involved meant contradictory 
information arose) Mary-Elise Manuell and Jeffrey Cukor, ‘Mother Nature versus human 
nature: public compliance with evacuation and quarantine (2011) 35(2) Disasters 417, 429-
430 (these authors discuss research that suggests an ‘overwhelming factor in evacuation 
success was co-ordinated information where provided by multiple organisations). 
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public to take timely action to avoid hazard impacts, when further verification 
is required.415  
There are noted challenges to the ability to provide consistent messaging. 
Chapter Five in its analysis of the current regulatory system, identifies that 
numerous parties may have a responsibility, or at least authority to warn. With 
the likely involvement of numerous entities, frameworks for collaboration and 
joint operating procedures are imperative. In Victoria, the One Source One 
Message initiative has been adopted to ensure all agencies are working on the 
same information to inform their communication.416 However, these initiatives 
are not necessarily occurring across each hazard, nor are they relevant for 
cross-jurisdictional events. This suggests gaps in consistency across agencies 
involved in warning requires some attention. 
Reach and penetration 
Intertwined with the use of multiple channels and timing is the notion of reach 
and penetration. As the Victorian Flood Review indicates, ‘a more accurate or 
timely warning’ is of ‘little value unless it is disseminated to those who need 
it’.417 Broad reach for risk communication and warning is highlighted in the 
National Strategy for Disaster Resilience.418 During the Queensland floods, for 
example, deaths occurred where people tried to drive through floodwaters. 
This was in some part attributable to the lack of information on road 
conditions.419 No message on the likely exposure to the hazard, reached the 
driver. The need for receipt, across a vastly differing population, who access 
different sources of information, reinforces the need for protocols to 
incorporate multi-channels initiatives to reach the target audience.420 
                                                          
415 Mileti, Disasters by Design, above n 185, 196. 
416 Emergency Management Victoria, Joint operating procedure: Incident public information 
for fire SOP J04.01 10.0 (February 2016) <http://files.em.vic.gov.au/JSOP/SOP-J04.01.pdf>; 
Fire Services Commissioner (Vic), Reference Architecture Victorian Information Network for 
Emergencies (VINE), Version 1.2 (May 2013). 
417 Victoria Government, Review of the 2010-11 Flood Warnings and Response, above n 61, 
39; See also, Manuell and Cukor, above n 414, 429 (On the need for ‘receipt’ of a warning).  
418 Council of Australian Governments (COAG), National Strategy for Disaster Resilience 
(2011) 10. 
419 Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry, 'Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry – 
Final Report', above n 380, 387-388. 
420 Fire Services Commissioner (Vic), Review of community responses to recent bushfires, 
above n 74, 39. 
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Leveraging tangible actions and characteristics  
To this point, several characteristics have been highlighted which government 
agencies, as the sender of risk communication and warnings, can leverage to 
influence citizen response. These characteristics included timely delivery, of 
accurate information, and a consistent message that is delivered via multiple 
channels. A message that is tailored to its audience and likely to reach its 
target.  
Overall, this and the preceding Chapter, have identified tangible activities to 
assist risk communication and warning. In the first instance, regulatory 
components need to support warning and the creation of early warning 
systems. They need to incorporate clear lines of responsibility and frameworks 
that support collaboration and bring about consistency in messaging across 
the sector. Discrete actions, which support the individual characteristics of an 
effective message, require both legislative support and inclusion in a 
communication plan. Tangible activities are ones that support and authorize 
decision-making and the dissemination of messaging. They are activities, 
which balance the need for formal processes and the need for timely 
information. Multiple channels underpinned by community profiling need to be 
incorporated, along with the use of new technologies to ensure relevant 
messages reach as many sectors of the community as possible.  
On an operational level, plans should, and already incorporate, the need for 
the correction of misinformation to ensure accuracy where possible. 
Verification of data will be required, and any uncertainty communicated to 
ensure transparency. Above all, and to ensure actions taken for warning are 
seen as legitimate, systems which promote a two-way conversation, a 
conversation which includes local information and multiple social views and 
perspective of risk, are necessary. This last point on legitimacy brings the 
research back to the idea of trust that was raised at the beginning of this 
Chapter.421  
                                                          
421 van Asselt and Renn, above n 5, 439-440 (Not only does trust affect communication but 
communication can affect, by providing a ‘better basis’ for building trust, so that ‘risk 
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Trust and risk communication 
As identified at the commencement of this Chapter, trust is critical to risk 
perception.422 Having now established tangible activities for effective risk 
communication, trust is examined in more depth. Research into the links 
between trust and risk communication reflects a wider field of research on the 
development of trust between government and citizens, known as social 
trust.423 As previously adverted to, trust feeds confidence424 and confidence 
and trust build credibility with an audience.425 If both trust and credibility are 
present, then there is more likely to be positive response to a risk message. 
Conversely, if trust is lacking, then risk management efforts may fail..426 When 
trust is lacking, risk may be misconstrued, perhaps over exaggerated or 
amplified, which in turn brings about inappropriate responses.427 In relation to 
current levels of trust, between government and citizens, studies suggest, 
there is a ‘long term decline in public confidence and trust in public social 
institutions’, with a corresponding decline in institutional credibility.428 This data 
suggests that government is in a ‘deficit position’ with regards to trust429 and 
further work is necessary to secure public trust. 
 
 
                                                          
management measures and arrangements’ become acceptable); Lundgren & McMakin, 
above n 47, 316; Slovic, ‘Perceived Risk, Trust and Democracy’, above n 5, 676. 
422 Slovic, ‘Perceived Risk, Trust and Democracy’, above n 5, 676. 
423 Cynthia G. Jardine et al, ‘Risk communication and trust in decision-maker action: a case 
study of the Giant Mine Remediation Plan’ (2013) 72 International Journal of Circumpolar 
Health 1, 2 (Social trust is defined here as ‘the willingness to make oneself vulnerable to 
another in a particular context (trust in government agencies)’). 
424 Ibid (Confidence is defined as ‘the belief that certain future events will occur as expected 
(confidence in government to take appropriate action’). 
425 Kasperson et al, above n 5, 31 (The decline in credibility aligns with the belief that trust 
underlies confidence and where there is confidence there is credibility); van Asselt and 
Renn, above n 5, 439-440; Lundgren & McMakin, above n 47, 316. 
426 Kasperson et al, above n 5, 31. 
427 Ibid 31; Shepherd and van Vurren, above n 280, 471 (A history of distrust can mean 
interpersonal sources which may be less reliable are consulted for information rather than 
government, which could generate inappropriate responses). 
428 Richard G Peters, Vincent T. Covello and David B. McCallum, ‘The Determinants of Trust 
and Credibility in Environmental Risk communication’ (1997) 17(1) Risk Analysis 43, 45-46 
(the determinants of trust and credibility were: knowledge and expertise, openness and 
honest and concern and care’); Kasperson et al, above n 5, 32; Edelman, Trust in Asia 
Pacific, Middle East & Africa 2015 
<http://issuu.com/edelmanapac/docs/trust_in_apacmea_2015/36?e=7100583/11155664>. 
429 Jardine et al, above n 423, 3. 
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Improving trust 
Before addressing how trust can be improved, it is necessary to understand 
how trust is destroyed. ‘Trust is fragile’ and easier to destroy than create.430 It 
can be negatively impacted by past performance.431 For example, past 
performance may have led to a perception in the community that there was 
lack of caring and competence. 432 Responsibilities for risk management may 
not have been fulfilled and ‘information not disclosed in a timely manner.433 
Destruction of trust can also occur if there is a ‘lack of coordination amongst 
risk management organisations, lack of listening, dialogue or an unwillingness 
to acknowledge risks’.434 Therefore, if emergency service agencies have 
previously failed to warn communities, have provided incorrect information, or 
sent inconsistent messages, distrust may be evident. The resulting distrust 
may lead individuals to make their own decisions as to how to respond to the 
risk at hand, based on what they perceive to be more reliable sources.  
In a context where distrust is evident, a question arises as to how trust can be 
improved. Although trust is fragile and readily destroyed, it can be built over 
time.435 What is relevant to note, is that not only is trust required for risk 
communication to be effective, risk communication also builds trust.436 It is 
therefore important to embed activities that support the building of trust and 
credibility, in to the design of governance frameworks. Activities can be based 
on elements that positively affect trust such as ‘competence, objectivity, 
fairness, consistency and faith’,437 ‘knowledge and expertise, openness and 
                                                          
430 Slovic, ‘The Psychology of risk’, above n 356, 731, 742; Kasperson et al, above n 5, 31; 
Ibid 1. 
431 Jardine et al, above n 423, 2. 
432 Lundgren & McMakin, above n 47, 317. 
433 Ibid. 
434 Ibid. 
435 Slovic, ‘The Psychology of risk’, above n 356, 731, 742 (Trust is built slowly yet is 
‘destroyed in an instant’, and the ‘when it comes to winning trust, the playing field is tilted 
towards distrust’). 
436 Renn, ‘Risk Governance: Towards an Integrative Framework’, above n 214, 15; Jardine 
et al, above n 423, 1. 
437 Kasperson et al, above n 5, 32; Wouter Poortinga & Nick F Pidgeon, ‘Exploring the 
Dimensionality of Trust in Risk Regulation’ (2003) Risk Analysis 961, 965; Peters, Covello 
and McCallum, above n 428, 45-46 (Similar determinants of trust are: knowledge and 
expertise, openness and honest and concern and care’). 
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honesty, and concern and care’.438 Although these elements appear abstract, 
it is possible to turn them into practical activities. For example, when 
constructing risk messages and warning, the message tone will need to 
convey care and concern, to show ‘value similarity’.439 The content will need 
to demonstrate knowledge and expertise, as well as communicate any 
uncertainty, in the area of the risk. Ongoing research is already evident in this 
area. 
Trust at the macro-level 
As well as measures, which focus on message tone and content, there are 
also practical measures that can be incorporated into risk governance 
frameworks.440 In keeping with the legal theme of the thesis, these measures 
are the focus of this research. The measures range from macro level activities, 
which include ensuring the design of the governance framework and 
regulatory system supports cross agency co-ordination as well as clear role 
allocation. These activities can support demonstrations of competence, 
consistency and co-ordination. Role allocation also needs to take into account, 
at the macro-level, that who delivers the message will affect trust.441  
Trust at the micro-level 
At a micro-level, there are also activities that are relevant to building trust. 
Leveraging the ‘sender characteristics’ raised earlier in this Chapter; operating 
procedures of government agencies, the sender of messages, can embed 
sign-off practices which allow for the timely release of information. Sufficient 
                                                          
438 Peters, Covello and McCallum, above n 428, 43, 45-46; Lundgren & McMakin, above n 
47, 317 (Factors which support trust also include caring, empathy, dedication, commitment, 
competence, expertise, honesty, openness, confidentiality and equity); See, also Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, 1370.0 – Measure of Australia’s Progress, 2013, November 2013 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/1370.0main+features422013>. 
439 Jardine et al, above n 423, 2 (Value similarity is similarity between government and public 
values). 
440 Poortinga & Pidgeon, above n 437, 962, 965-967 (For example to demonstrate 
competence, to bring about predictability and measures to ensure that citizens have trust in 
risk regulation). 
441 Lundgren & McMakin, above n 47, 318 (The authors suggest that ‘local officials and 
emergency responders were more trusted than federal officials’, and that ‘direct personal 
contact has the most significant effect on a person’s willingness to trust’); Jardine et al, 
above n 423, 4 (Trust may be held with an individual although the organisation they 
represent may still be distrusted). 
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resource allocation will be required to support active monitoring of information 
channels to correct misinformation. Correction of misinformation is also 
relevant in operational protocols. When errors occur, admission of the error 
and action to correct misinformation as soon as it is discovered is important.442 
Within protocols that determine how agencies operate as a sender of warning 
messages, there needs to be a balance between engagement in two-way 
conversation and limitations on employees to speak on behalf of the 
organisation. Although not an exhaustive list of activities, which support the 
building of social trust,443 these activities provide examples, which should be 
borne in mind in the examination of current governance structures.   
Conclusion 
While the previous Chapter identified the risk management process relevant 
to the management of natural hazard and emergency related risk, this Chapter 
has focused on the role of risk communication in that process. As the Chapter 
identifies, communication is a key or pivotal component in the management, 
mitigation and modification of risk. In light of this pivotal role, and the existing 
gaps in effective delivery, further activity is required to improve current 
processes.  
 
In terms of definitions, risk communication, an activity that can assist in the 
control or mitigation of risk, is the exchange of information amongst interested 
stakeholders. Its purpose is to mitigate harm, by ‘identifying a threat’ and 
creating ‘public messages which create specific responses’, ‘enabling those at 
risk to make decisions and take action’.444  Warning, a mitigation tool, is a sub-
category of risk communication. Warning involves ‘the dissemination of a 
message signalling an imminent hazard which may include advice on 
                                                          
442 Lundgren & McMakin, above n 47, 317. 
443 Slovic, ‘Perceived Risk, Trust and Democracy’, above n 5, 678 (Slovic’s provides 
examples of trust-increasing activities with regards to a nuclear plant which included – the 
existence of plans, responsive to any sign of problems, effective action taken, hold regular 
public hearings, monitoring, no evidence of withholding information, careful training of staff). 
444 Reynolds and Seegar, above n 309, 48; Mileti, Disasters by Design, above n 185, 191 
(Mileti adds emphasis to the aim of warnings to ‘inform and prompt appropriate response’, 
by containing ‘alert and notification components’); Sorensen, above n 50, 119. 
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protective measures’.445 The purpose of a warning, is to ‘inform the community 
of an impending or current threat and to prompt an appropriate response or 
action’.446  The dissemination of a warning can assist in sharing responsibility 
for disaster risk reduction. It does so by identifying threats and informing the 
community of their likely exposure to hazard related risk, along with any 
relevant action to be taken. In this way, the burden of taking action, rather than 
falling on the emergency management sector, can become the personal 
responsibility of the informed individual. 
 
To be effective, both risk communication and warning, require planning and 
support in the components of the risk governance structure. They require clear 
lines of responsibility to be drawn, and processes that facilitate co-ordination 
and support competent and consistent activity. Based on these 
recommendations, the research in Chapter Five, which examines the current 
risk governance structure, focuses on: whether there is clear inclusion of risk 
communication and warning in governance components; the presence of a 
communication plan; the objectives of the plan and whether responsibilities for 
who should be involved are clearly allocated. What is noted is that risk 
communication is envisaged as a two-way ongoing and dynamic process. A 
process that supports the mutual education of stakeholders. Where these two-
way conversations are utilised, and local information and community 
perspectives are included in risk management activity, risk management 
solutions will be deemed more legitimate. They are also more likely to be 
acceptable to the public. Inclusion of activities into the governance framework, 
which support a two-way dialogue, are therefore important. 
 
For the components of the governance structure to be effective, and assist in 
consistent and competent delivery of risk communication, an understanding of 
the risk perception / response process is required. An understanding of this 
process along with the activities that positively influence response is 
                                                          
445 Attorney General’s Department (Cth), Best Practice Guide for Warning Originators, above 
n 278, 1 (A warning is defined as ‘is the dissemination of a message signalling an imminent 
hazard which may include advice on protective measures’); Attorney General’s Department 
(Cth), Australia’s Emergency Warning Arrangements, above n 40, 2. 
446 Attorney General’s Department (Cth), Australia’s Emergency Warning Arrangements, 
above n 40, 2; Bullock, Haddow and Coppola, above n 277, 269. 
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fundamental for governance and regulatory system design. The framework 
utilised to represent the perception / response process in this Chapter, is the 
SARF framework. Analysis of the framework highlights that perception / 
response and personalisation of risk communication and warning, is a staged 
process with numerous inputs. It is a highly complex process; one with many 
aspects that government is unable to control. As depicted in Figure 3, 
government agencies are only one of the many social stations that influence 
individuals’ decision-making processes. Despite their potentially limited 
sphere of influence, there are characteristics, which statutory authorities can 
leverage, to support competent action on their behalf. The Chapter provided 
examples of some of the factors, which underpin a correct or correctly 
transmitted message. These factors included timeliness, consistency, 
accuracy, specificity and tailored messaging. There was also a need to ensure 
that message receipt is achieved through the employment of multiple channels 
of communication.  
 
In highlighting these factors, and drawing attention to the role of social media 
in the bigger picture, this Chapter also acknowledged that the context within 
which risk communication occurs is now disrupted by emerging technologies.  
Social media is changing the way people communicate, the speed at which 
people can communicate, and the public expect that they will be used. The 
two-way nature of the platform is challenging to incorporate into regulatory 
systems, and embed in processes that have traditionally supported one-way 
broadcast warnings. Technology and the impact it has design of a regulatory 
system design is one of the contextual factors that influences risk 
management. Contextual factors relevant to the risk management context are 
discussed in the following Chapter.  
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Chapter Four: Establishing the risk management context 
 
The purpose of this Chapter is to establish the context in which risk 
management activities for emergency related risks are being undertaken. As 
Chapter Two highlighted, in the process of allocating management of risk, risk 
owners are identified. The risk owner is expected to strategically manage their 
share of the relevant risk. This thesis examines the role of statutory authorities, 
as shared owners of natural hazard and emergency related risk. More 
particularly, it examines the regulatory system or governance structures which 
have been created to support risk management activities. This Chapter 
recognises that when designing governance strategies and the regulatory 
system, there will be factors that influence or constrain the way the system is 
conceptualised. These include, although are not limited to, sociological, 
political, regulatory and technological influences. In continuing to add depth to 
Chapters Two and Three, this Chapter investigates these four factors of 
influence.  
These contextual factors, which affect decision-making at different levels, can 
be grouped into two categories. The sociological and political factors, for 
example, provide abstract theories, or theoretical lenses, which impact the 
design of a regulatory system. Out of these theories come moral norms upon 
which to base decisions. The regulatory and technological influences affect 
concrete practices for the creation of effective instruments, as well as 
communication of risk and warning.  
In terms of theoretical lenses, the first to be examined in this Chapter is social 
contract theory. Social contract theory outlines normative propositions on the 
need for legitimate governance, the duty of government to act within the limits 
of its powers, and the responsibility to enable and protect the freedoms and 
liberties of individual citizens.447 When making decisions about the most 
appropriate risk governance components to adopt, ensuring these 
components act and remain within, legitimate limits of power, will be important. 
                                                          
447 See, eg, Locke, Two Treatises of Government, above n 29; Alvey, above n 29, 14; 
Sheridan, above n 29. 
 102 
 
As indicated in Chapter Three, remaining within the legitimate limits of power 
is important for engendering trust in the community.448  
The second theory, which was first examined in any depth in Chapter Two, is 
the sociological theory of the risk society.449 In Chapter Two the Beck’s theory 
on the risk society provided insights into the current shift towards a risk based 
society and the operationalisation of risk into procedures of risk analysis. In 
this Chapter, the theory is employed to demonstrate the drive in a risk society 
towards the individualisation of risk,450 or the pushing of the management of 
risk back onto the individual.451 As becomes evident, this principle creates 
tensions with the social contract view that government is a protector of life and 
property. However, individualisation of risk is evident in emergency 
management under the concept of shared responsibility. A policy objective 
which seeks to spread responsibility across a broad cross section of 
stakeholders, including citizens.  
In contrast to abstract norms for decision-making, regulatory and technological 
influences directly impact decision-making. These influences highlight 
principles which regulation should seek to uphold, and identifies channels 
through which to communicate risk. In terms of construction of regulation (a 
specific component of the governance framework), ongoing research provides 
principles which seeks to improve its design. Of particular relevance to this 
thesis, the principles of good practice in regulation highlight the need for 
decision-makers to streamline procedures through the removal of red tape. As 
becomes apparent, they also identify the need to incorporate accountability 
measures. The general shift towards risk based regulation, and how best to 
regulate for disaster risk regulation is examined.  
In terms of technology, and as has been adverted to frequently in the thesis, 
new channels for communicating risk, in the form of social media have 
emerged. The presence and increasing use of these technologies, affect how 
                                                          
448 Poortinga & Pidgeon, above n 437, 962; Kasperson et al, above n 5, 32; Peters, Covello 
and McCallum, above n 428, 45-46; Lisa M. PytlikZillig et al, ‘The dimensionality of trust-
relevant constructs in four institutional domains: results from confirmatory factor analyses’ 
(2016) 6(2) Journal of Trust Research 111, 111, 114. 
449 See, eg, Beck, World at Risk, above n 162; Sørensen and Christiansen, above n 232.  
450 Hamilton, above n 217, 453. 
451 Black, ‘The Role of Risk in Regulatory Processes’, above n 217, 6. 
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individuals communicate with each other and expect to be communicated with 
by government. Although the unique features of social media can be 
harnessed to improve risk communication and build trust, they also provide 
challenges. As identified in Chapter Three, social media disrupts traditional 
processes for the dissemination of risk communication which have historically 
been based on the broadcast of official warnings and government control of 
information. For emergency managers’ challenges, apparent in the use of 
social media, raise concerns about legal accountability and institutional risk. A 
key question for decision makers in the sector is how best to utilise the 
technologies, and incorporate them into governance components, in a way 
that supports: effective risk communication; ongoing legitimacy of government; 
and addresses legal concerns.  
Before proceeding to examine each of the theoretical lenses and practical 
factors in more detail, it is noted, that they are not the only influences on 
decision-makers that affect risk governance choices. Certainly, organisational 
culture, economics, and internal processes, will also influence action.452 The 
four factors are however relevant to demonstrate that numerous components 
constrain and influence the decisions taken as to the most appropriate method 
for risk management.  With these factors in mind, it is now appropriate to 
examine the influence of social contract theory on the management of risk. 
Social contract theory: an introduction 
Social contract theory provides normative political principles, which outline the 
nature and theory of government, as well as key factors that ought to be upheld 
by decision-makers in the creation of law.453  Some critics would argue the 
concept of social contract is anachronistic;454 has fallen out of favour;455 or 
                                                          
452 Standards Australia, Risk Management - Principles and guidelines (AS/NZS ISO 
31000:2009) 3. 
453 Marett Leiboff and Mark Thomas, Legal Theories: Contexts and Practice (Lawbook Co, 
2009) 1; Penner & Melissaris, above n 235, 3-4 (The authors highlight the obvious linkage 
that ‘principles underpinning political society will have a direct impact on the form and 
content of the law’); John Rawls, Political liberalism (Colombia University Press, 1999) 
44,46; George E Glos, ‘The Normative Theory of Law’ (1969) 11 William and Mary Law 
Review 151, 159. 
454 Standards Australia, Risk Management - Principles and guidelines (AS/NZS ISO 
31000:2009) 3. 
455 Johann Sommerville, ‘The social contract (Contract of Government)’ (2011) Oxford 
Handbooks online 
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focuses too heavily on the individual rather than the common good.456 
However, interpretations of social contract theory are still highly relevant 
today.457 The ongoing relevance of the theory is in part due to the dominant 
role it has played in shaping Australia’s legal institutions.458 Although the 
interpretations of social contract theory reference an idealised or hypothetical 
moral order,459 the theory does provide an understanding that a ‘plurality of 
individuals’ make up society’.460 Both of these factors are important to consider 
in the creation of legitimate risk governance frameworks, which in turn 
engender trust in the community.461 As an idealised moral order, the theories 
draw attention to what ought to be.462 The principles they espouse, articulate 
norms, duties and obligations, from which expectations of accountability will 
flow.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
<http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199238804.001.0001/oxford
hb-9780199238804-e-33>. 
456 Ruth W. Grant, John Locke’s Liberalism (University of Chicago Press, 2010) 2-3; John 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971) 27-29. 
(Social contract theory contrasts with utilitarian and economic theories of law, which focus 
on ‘impersonal economic efficiency’ and for ‘the best outcome for all’). 
457 David Boucher and Paul Kelly (eds), The social contract from Hobbes to Rawls 
(Routledge, 1994) 1; Amir Paz-Fuchs, ‘The Social Contract Revisited the Modern Welfare 
State: Overview and Critical Report’ (The Foundation for Law, Justice and Society, 2011) 
(Rawls work has led a modern renaissance in social contract theory). 
458 Stephen Bottomley and Simon Bronitt, Law in Context (The Federation Press, 4th ed, 
2012) 1, 37, 38; Leiboff and Thomas, above n 453, 18; Penner & Melissaris, above n 235, 4; 
Robert C. L. Moffat, ‘Philosophical Foundations of The Australian Constitutional Tradition’ 
(1965) 5 Sydney Law Review 59, 61, 78-79 (The Australian constitution is said to have 
drawn heavily on the US constitution, aspects of which are said to be ‘pure translations of 
words of John Locke’, a prominent social contract theorist); Sir Robert Garran, 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia (1867-1957)(2000) (A 
digital text sponsored by New South Wales Centenary of Federation Committee University of 
Sydney Library) <http://adc.library.usyd.edu.au/data-2/fed0014.pdf>; Paz-Fuchs, above n 
457, 3 (Noting Australia’s position as a liberal democracy). 
459 Paz-Fuchs, above n 457, 3. 
460 Ibid. 
461 PytlikZillig et al, above n 448, 111, 114. 
462 Glos, above n 453, 159; Jordan Daci, ‘Legal Principles, Legal Values and Legal Norms: 
are they the same or different’ (2010) 1(2) Academicus International Scientific Journal, 109, 
113. 
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Key principles from social contract theory  
The examination of social contract theory focuses on the works of John 
Locke463 and John Rawls.464 These theorists provide early and modern 
interpretations of the theory. Principles from the social contract theory are 
embedded or implicit in legal institutions.465 However, at times it is important 
to explicitly refer to the ideal. Re-articulation of the principles reminds decision 
makers that they need to take a holistic and objective viewpoint when 
addressing emergency related risk in the regulatory system. This is a 
viewpoint, which can be forgotten, or misunderstood.  
Turning firstly to Locke, his theory highlights the need for legitimate 
government, legitimate use of power, and obligations to uphold certain 
rights within society.466 In applying Locke’s theory, it is clear to see that 
emergency management is a legitimate area of power.467 This is because the 
objective of emergency management is to protect society ‘against those things 
that threaten health, safety and welfare of the people’.468 Exercise of the power 
to manage emergency related risk, must remain within boundaries of 
legitimate action. It must uphold the rights of freedom and liberty of those in 
society. Therefore, when asking citizens to evacuate property, for example, 
there must be a balance between the use of power to remove a person, and 
                                                          
463 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, above n 29, (Locke is considered to be the 
founding father of liberal political theory which is still pertinent in Australia today, see, eg, 
Grant, above n 456, 200; John Summers, Dennis Woodward and Andrew Parkin, 
Government, Politics, Power and Policy in Australia (Pearson Education Australia,7th ed, 
2002) 297, 304; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Cth), About Australia: The land 
and its people <http://dfat.gov.au/about-australia/land-its-people/Pages/government.aspx>; 
Ariadne Vromne, Katharine Gelbert, Anika Gauja, Powerscape: Contemporary Australian 
politics (Allen & Unwin, 2009) 36. 
464 See, eg, Rawls, A Theory of Justice, above n 456; Rawls, Political liberalism, above n 
453. 
465 Grant, above n 456, 200; Paz-Fuchs, above n 457, 3-4. 
466 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, above n 29. 
467 See, eg, Mark Pelling and Kathleen Dill, ‘Disaster politics, tipping points for change in the 
adaptation of socio-political regimes’ (2010) 34 (1) Progress in Human Geography, 21, 31-
34. (Care needs to be taken when legislating to ensure that a shared or decentralised 
response does not ‘limit the States presence or lead to a failure to deliver’). 
468 Thomas Pope, Social Contract Theory in American jurisprudence: Too much liberty and 
too much authority (Taylor and Francis, 2013) 4; Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 
above n 29, Essay 2, 94, 97, 229, 135; Gary Gerrard, The New Social contract (University 
Press of America, 2002) xii; (In Locke’s work power was to be used for, ‘good of man’, for 
the ‘preservation of their lives, liberties, property and possessions’). 
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their right to stay and defend their property.469 In an emergency however, 
powers can be extensive in order to ensure that lives of both emergency 
service providers and the public are not at risk.470 The final principle of 
relevance in Locke’s theory is that while government has the rights to enforce 
the law, it will also be subject to the law. Therefore, when it fails to meet any 
responsibility to protect, which has a concurrent obligation or duty attached, it 
may have to face the consequences for breaching a legal duty or obligation. 
The extent to which statutory authorities are likely to be held legally 
accountable for failing to meet responsibilities for communication and warning, 
will be investigated in Chapters Six and Seven. 
In contrast to Locke’s work on the creation of government, Rawls’ presents a 
more modern theory, which identifies principles of justice, or justice as 
fairness, within society. These principles underpin state legitimacy, and, in 
practice are incorporated into the Constitution,471 and in some cases a Bill of 
Rights.472 The principles reinforce the need for regulators and emergency 
managers to balance rights and action. The ‘liberty principle’473 for example, 
endorses the individual’s right to retain the ‘most extensive total system of 
liberties’474 and the freedom to pursue their own private lives. In practice, and 
in context of risk communication, warning systems may be created for the 
advancement of community safety. However, Mileti suggests that in respecting 
individual rights and liberties, warning must ‘influence and guide public 
                                                          
469 See, eg, Emergency Management Act 1986 (VIC) s 24(7) (Victorian legislation which 
seeks to balance the right of homeowners to stay at their property). 
470 (In this instance, it could be said that power is being used for the ‘good of man’, see, eg, 
John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, above n 29, Essay2, 229) 
471 See, eg, Moffat, above n 458, 61, 78-79. 
472 Rawls, A theory of Justice Revised Edition, (Belknap Press, 1999) 194; James Waghorne 
and Stuart MacIntyre, ‘Liberty: A history of civil liberties’ (University of New South Wales 
Press, 2011) 6, 167, 172; Louise Chappell, John Chesterman and Lisa Hill, The politics of 
human rights in Australia (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 9 (the authors describe rights 
‘as permitting action and imposing obligations on others’, setting ‘minimum standards of 
treatment and entitlement’); Gwynneth Singleton et al, Australian Political Institutions 
(Pearson Australia, 10th ed, 2013)11 (these can be known as positive rights); Vromne, 
Gelbert and Gauja, above n 463, 30 (a ‘core liberal idea’ is obeyance by individuals of 
objective laws, that is ‘the rule of law’); Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT); Charter of Human 
Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (VIC) (There is no Commonwealth Bill of Rights in 
Australia, and the Commonwealth Constitution houses only a limited number of mostly 
negative rights). 
473 Penner & Melissaris, above n 235, 190. 
474 John Rawls, A theory of Justice Revised Edition (Belknap), above n 472, 56. 
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behaviour but not interfere with civil liberties’475 by breaching privacy, or by 
ordering action.  Therefore, regulators will need to balance risk management 
action, with rights. They will need to tailor action to fit the currently accepted 
norms of society. However, and as was noted in the previous paragraph, the 
power to limit rights, may be extensive in times of emergencies, particularly 
where the curtailment of rights acts for the ‘good of man’.476 
Shared responsibility under the social contract 
From Rawls’ work, regulators in emergency management can also gain insight 
into the legitimate expectations they may have of society to share 
responsibility for managing their own risk. For example, in an ideal world, and 
in pursuit of a well-functioning society, individuals would ‘restrain their actions 
(so that they) are compatible (and not encroach upon) similar access to 
freedom and liberty of others’.477As well as this core principle, interpretations 
of Rawl’s theory also highlight further duties of the individual. In a well-
functioning and co-operative society for example, there are natural duties for 
individuals to support just institutions and have mutual respect for citizens.478 
There is also civic duty. Civic duty stems from an individual’s public identity. 
It requires them to act with the public interest; standards of public reason; and 
a fair system of social cooperation in mind.479   
Identified in Rawl’s theory are moral ideals of civic duty, and citizen 
responsibility. In practice, these ideals could be legitimately interpreted by 
government in the context of emergencies to mean that, for example, in 
pursuing the freedom to build a home, an individual might not build on a flood 
plain with high likelihood of exposure to impact of natural hazards. If a citizen 
                                                          
475 Mileti, Disasters by Design, above n 185, 195. 
476 Nan Hunter, The law of Emergencies: Public Health and Disaster Management (Elsevier 
Science, 2009) 45, 58. 
477 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, above n 456, 60-61 (The basic liberties are ‘political liberty, 
freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, freedom to 
hold property and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure under the rule of law’). 
478 Rawls, A theory of Justice Revised Edition (Belknap), above n 472, 98 (It is relevant to 
note the duty to provide natural aid has not been encapsulated as a positive legal obligation 
on citizens, for example there is no duty to rescue or provide first aid See, eg, Eburn, 
Emergency Law, above n 71, 61-62. 
479 Richard Dagger, ‘Citizenship as fairness John Rawls Conception of Civic Virtue’ in Jon 
Mandle and David A. Reidy (eds), A companion to Rawls (John Wiley & Sons, 1st ed, 2014) 
297-299, 304 (Dagger suggests it is the duty of citizens to also hold government to 
standards of public reasons). 
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chooses to take this type of risk, their civic duty should compel them to support 
institutional decisions to establish appropriate building regulations. An 
individual would insure and protect their asset. They would have a plan in mind 
so as not to place an extra burden on emergency services when a hazard 
affects their person or property. In the context of communication and warning, 
the government may also legitimately expect that in the interests of a well-
functioning society, and in the event of an emergency, an individual would 
seek out information. An individual would listen to and support institutions, by 
heeding instructions directed at them, and the public at large. Interestingly, the 
application of Rawls theory of the social contract as a basis for regulatory 
construction appears to fit more readily with modern government ideas of 
shared responsibility.480 
This brief overview of moral and normative propositions provides insight into 
high-level considerations, which need to be factored into the design of 
governance structures, and regulation of risk. Normative propositions identify 
the need for legitimate government, and the need to balance action with right. 
In addition, they provide a foundation as to what can reasonably be expected 
of individuals who share responsibility for natural hazard and emergency 
related risk. These norms do however operate in the context of a risk society, 
and within a modern and complex state. Consequently, the fundamental 
proposition that government is a ‘protector of life and property’ may require 
renegotiation in light of the shift to the acceptance of shared responsibility. To 
investigate this proposition further, the following section examines the 
increasing pre-occupation and prevalence of risk in modern society that is 
impacting on regulatory structures. 
Risk Society 
Chapter Two identified the work of Ulrich Beck on the risk society. Theory on 
the risk society highlights the changes that have become apparent in society 
due to the increasing focus on risk. Building on the initial examination of the 
theory, a further feature of the risk society, which is relevant in this thesis, is 
the shift towards the individualisation of risk. As management of risk in society 
                                                          
480 This contrasts with the acceptance that government is a protector of life and property. 
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becomes more burdensome on government and expectations for risk 
management higher,481 personal responsibility in the form of resilient 
community members, becomes a crucial element of risk management. 
Government policies therefore attempt to ‘mesh risk, responsibility and the 
exercise of prudent choice’482 and formulate policy directions such as shared 
responsibility.483 These policies act to transfer or shift responsibility and 
management of risk across a variety of stakeholders.484 Such policy initiatives 
aim to turn citizens from passive to active participants, and redefine what it is 
to be a responsible or prudent citizen.485 In practice, the responsible individual 
will now be required to ‘manage their exposure to risks, such as property 
damage, from extreme weather events exacerbated by climate change’.486 
There is an anticipation that citizens will protect or insure against their own 
exposure to risk.  
In developing mechanisms to individualise and push the burden of risk back 
on society, it is important to remember social contract theory and its norms for 
legitimate government. When attempting to mesh both social contract theory 
and the individualisation of risk into a functional regulatory system, there will 
be tensions between the theory and normative propositions. For example, the 
ability to reconcile propositions that government is a protector of life and 
property, and the expectation that individuals will take care of their own 
interests, may require fundamental changes to the current emergency 
management governance system.  Individualisation of risk, and the sharing of 
responsibility, even when considering citizen’s civic duty for social co-
operation, must occur within the boundaries of legitimacy. To remain legitimate 
and maintain trust, it is essential that government act within traditional 
boundaries. In the meantime, a renegotiation or agreement to modernise the 
                                                          
481 Eburn and Dovers, ‘Legal Aspects of Risk Management in Australia’, above n 57, 61, 62-
63 (Regarding litigation and blame); Rochford, above n 234, 173. 
482 Kemshall, above n 217, 60-61. 
483 Council of Australian Governments (COAG), National Strategy for Disaster 
Resilience (2011) iii, 1. 
484 Godden et al, above n 159, 237-238. 
485 Hamilton, above n 217, 454, 456; Black, ‘The Role of Risk in Regulatory Processes’, 
above n 217, 6. 
486 Kemshall, above n 217, 60-61; Godden et al, above n 159, 238. 
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application of the principles underpinning the social contract needs to be 
negotiated.  
Regulation of risk  
Building competence and trust into regulation 
While the previous section investigated abstract theoretical lenses, which 
influence decisions for governance and management of risk, this section 
examines design of risk based regulation itself. Regulatory instruments are 
one component of the regulatory system. As previously emphasised, to be 
effective the design of the regulatory system must facilitate competent and 
legitimate action. The necessity for competent, legitimate, and therefore 
effective action is two-fold. First, it ensures that emergency related risk is 
managed appropriately and effectively, and ensures that policy objectives are 
met. Secondly, and as was examined in Chapter Three, competence and 
legitimacy underpin community trust.487 Trust in turn is important to generating 
appropriate responses to risk communication and warning. Regulation, which 
underpins emergency management action, should be designed to ensure the 
relevant statutory authorities are able to do their job. It should therefore ensure 
that authorities are seen as legitimate authority; that they perform as they 
should and exercise their power appropriately; making fair decisions and 
engaging in fair treatment in the execution of power.488  
New direction in regulation: risk based regulation 
As society has become more pre-occupied with risk, and risk analysis has 
intensified, there has also been an increase in the creation of risk-based 
regulation.489 Risk based regulation has risk as an organising principle, either 
as an object of regulation, justification for regulation, or a frame for regulatory 
procedures and accountability relationships.490 The incorporation of risk as an 
                                                          
487 Poortinga and Pidgeon, above n 437, 962; PytlikZillig et al, above n 448, 1, 6. 
488 See, eg, PytlikeZillig et al, above n 448, 1, 14. 
489 Professional Standards Authority, The role of risk in regulatory policy, above n 236, 3-4; 
OCED, Risk and Regulatory Policy, above n 8, 46. 
490 Black, ‘The Role of Risk in Regulatory Processes’, above n 217, 1, 7, 30-31; Professional 
Standards Authority, The role of risk in regulatory policy, above n 236, 2; OCED, Risk and 
Regulatory Policy, above n 8, 29-30; (In Australia, in emergency management risk plays 
each of these roles). 
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organising principle is believed to have benefits that include; assisting decision 
making on risk priorities, as well as effective targeting of scarce resources.491 
The term ‘risk based regulation’ has two distinct meanings. It refers to 
regulation which deals with societal risks, such as risk to health and safety; it 
also refers to regulatory and institutional risks, such as liability and damage to 
reputation for failing to meet regulatory objectives.492In this thesis, both 
definitions are relevant. In Australia, emergency management legislation 
seeks to manage societal risks emanating from natural hazards. However, it 
also seeks to manage inter-related risks of liability and reputational risk when 
legislative objectives are not met.493 While it is not deemed feasible to reduce 
natural hazard and emergency related risks to zero,494 the focus of risk based 
regulation is to improve effectiveness of the risk governance and the regulatory 
system. As highlighted in Chapter Two, effective risk governance helps to 
achieve policy objectives and effective management of risk.495 
Principles for better regulation 
When considering risk based regulation, it is important to consider principles 
for building better regulation and more particularly principles for building better 
risk regulation. This includes providing good governance through, ensuring 
‘role clarity’, ‘accountability and transparency’ and ‘performance evaluation’.496 
These principles of good governance align with properties of better regulation 
such as proportionality, accountability, consistency, transparency and 
                                                          
491 Professional Standards Authority, The role of risk in regulatory policy, above n 236, 2 (As 
an organising principle, focusing on risk assists in directing finite resources more efficiently 
to solve social problems); OECD, Risk and Regulatory Policy, above n 8, 16-18, 25, 28 (It 
also helps ‘improve decision making processes by providing new insights’ and provide 
‘defensible rationale for decision making’). 
492 Black, ‘The Role of Risk in Regulatory Processes’, above n 217, 30-31; Professional 
Standards Authority, The role of risk in regulatory policy, above n 236, 2; OCED, Risk and 
Regulatory Policy, above n 8, 29-30. 
493 See, eg, Black, ‘The Role of Risk in Regulatory Processes’, above n 217, 2; Emergencies 
Act 2004 (ACT) s 198; State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 1989 (NSW) s 62; 
Emergency Management Act 2013 (NT) s 113; Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) s 144; 
Emergency Management Act 2004 (SA) s 32; Emergency Management Act 2006 (TAS) s 
55; Emergency Management Act 2013 (VIC) s 75; Emergency Management Act 2005 (WA) 
s 100; Professional Standards Authority, The role of risk in regulatory policy, above n 236, 8. 
494 OECD, Risk and Regulatory Policy, above n 8, 239. 
495 Ibid 13. 
496 Ibid 27. 
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targeting.497 Reflecting on these principles, the thesis focuses on 
accountability. Accountability was defined in Chapter One. The definition 
included legal accountability along with mechanisms for scrutinising and 
independently reviewing action.498 With indications of limited legal 
accountability, this thesis seeks to determine whether there is a need to build 
in additional accountability mechanisms for emergency management in 
Australia. Conclusions on accountability will be highlighted in Chapter Nine.  
Viewed from a normative perspective, principles for better risk based 
regulation also align with the drive for individualisation, which arose out of 
examination of the risk society. For regulation, which manages risk to be 
effective, it is suggested that risk ought ‘to be managed at the level of society 
where it will be most effective’.499 The current regulatory structure which 
allocates control and management of risk to agencies within the emergency 
management sector. On the basis of the above assertion however, it would be 
expected that government should not ‘intervene and assume responsibility for 
risks that are better management by individuals, businesses, families…’.500 
That risk should be managed with the individual at the top of a risk 
management hierarchy, further supports notions of shared responsibility and 
resilient communities, and the move away from government as protector of life 
and property.501 In practice, this might involve an individual taking care of and 
insuring their property against seasonal hazards. If risk were to be managed 
on this basis, government would only need to intervene to assist vulnerable 
persons or upon occasions of events of high impact, where a co-ordinated 
response is required.  
 
 
                                                          
497 Better Regulation Task Force, above n 2, 1; OECD, Risk and Regulatory Policy, above n 
8, 39 (The outcomes of the Better Regulation Taskforce have been received a high level of 
support). 
498 Better Regulation Task Force, above n 2, 4; OECD, Risk and Regulatory Policy, above n 
8, 25 (The presence of accountability mechanism such as performance standards are seen 
as a positive element of risk based approaches). 
499 OECD, Risk and Regulatory Policy, above n 8, 25. 
500 Ibid. 
501 Ibid. 
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Guidelines for Better Regulation: Cutting Red Tape 
The regulation of risk is not only influenced by broad principles for regulatory 
reform. It is also influenced by specific reforms in Australia that focus on the 
reduction of red tape and regulatory burden.502 Any critique of current 
governance components for emergency management requires an 
understanding the nature of this reform. The reduction of regulatory burden 
seeks to refocus regulators away from the default utilisation of legislation to 
solve policy problems.503 It also calls for a ‘proportionate regulatory response’ 
to risks.504 Therefore, in the Chapter Five content analysis, any critique that 
regulation does not cover a relevant area, may be because an alternative 
policy instrument has been deemed more appropriate to achieving the task. In 
reviewing governance components, it is relevant to note, that the reduction in 
red tape also seeks to ensure processes and procedures do not get in the way 
of effective deployment of emergency response activities.505Therefore, any 
recommendations for improvements, or for accountability mechanisms, will 
need to balance, prescriptiveness and additional burdens on the sector, with 
the need for effective local deployment.  To date, the emergency management 
sector has already undertaken activities that seek to reduce red tape.506  
                                                          
502 Australian Government, Cutting Red Tape <https://www.cuttingredtape.gov.au/>; (Similar 
initiatives are evident in the context of Emergency Management in the United States, see, 
eg,  George D. Haddow, Jane A.Bullock and Damon P. Coppola,  Introduction to Emergency 
Management (Elsevier, 4th Edition, 2010) 341 (The reduction in regulatory burden is similarly 
being felt in the United States, see, eg, Anthony Kimery, ‘Bill to Cut FEMA Contracting Red 
Tape Stalled in US Senate, Lawmakers Say’, Homeland Security today.us, 11 March 2012 
<http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/industry-news/single-article/bill-to-cut-fema-contracting-red-
tape-stalled-in-us-senate-lawmakers-say/0fac7fbd468343ee59d7e5e356680afd.html> and 
the United Kingdom, see eg, Professional Standards Authority, The role of risk in regulatory 
policy, above n 236, 2). 
503 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Cth), The Australian Government Guide 
to Regulation (2014) 4, 21, 24, 26, 29 (Looking for example at whether the options chosen is 
‘effective, appropriate, efficient, least costly, has the lowest regulatory impact’ and using for 
example, light touch less prescriptive legislation, self-regulation, quasi-legislation, co-
regulation, or other policy instruments such as information campaigns, market based 
instruments, service charters, standards). 
504 OECD, OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform: Australia 2010: Towards a Seamless 
National Economy (OECD Publishing, 2010) 105. 
505 See, eg, Cutting Red Tape in Emergency Response with Proper Planning (8 November 
2012), Technical Response Planning <http://www.emergency-response-
planning.com/blog/bid/56235/Cutting-Red-Tape-In-Emergency-Response-with-Proper-
Planning>. 
506 See, eg, Inspector General Emergency Management (Qld), Emergency Management 
Assurance in Queensland: Sharing Responsibility, Accepting Accountability and Measuring 
Performance <https://www.igem.qld.gov.au/reports-and-publications/documents/Emergency-
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Regulating disaster risk 
In addition to Australia’s moves towards greater risk based regulation and red 
tape reduction, international research highlights ‘best practice’ design of 
disaster risk regulation. Chapter One, for example, identified the checklist 
which focuses law makers for disaster risk reduction on ten key questions.507 
Given policy objectives in Australia, it is important to note that the checklist 
may be predicated on a business as usual, or traditional approach to disaster 
and emergency management. An approach, which sees the role of 
government as protector of citizens, rather than one supporting a shared 
responsibility. However, without a renegotiation of the social contract, the 
international approach remains relevant.  
As stated, the checklist would contain a number of matters for the 
consideration of lawmakers. Questions range from, whether there is a 
presence of dedicated and tailored law for disaster risk management with clear 
roles and responsibilities from a national to a local level, through to budgetary 
considerations, and the training and inclusion of civil society and vulnerable 
persons.508 The presence of dedicated law and the clarity and distribution of 
roles and responsibilities across differing levels of government will be 
investigated in Chapter Five. Further to this, a question as to whether ‘laws 
include adequate mechanisms to ensure that responsibilities are fulfilled’, is 
posed.509 This question is addressed in the first instance in Chapters Six and 
Seven in the context of the breach of a legal duty, through negligence. Where 
the findings suggest that negligence does not act to adequately ensure 
responsibilities are fulfilled, this thesis will argue that further accountability 
                                                          
Management-Assurance-in-Queensland.pdf>; Queensland Fire and Emergency Service, 
‘Queensland Fire and Emergency Service 2013-2014 Annual Report’ (2014) 36-37. 
507 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, above n 79 (Although 
the checklist was created in reflection on the previous international framework for Disaster 
Risk Reduction, the focus on warning has changed little in the new iteration of the 
framework: United Nations, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, 
Adopted 14-18 March 2015, UN Doc A/CONF.224/CRP.1). 
508 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, above n 79, 3, 8-9 
(Further sub-items are outlined throughout the checklist document to ensure disaster law is 
on track). 
509 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, above n 79, 3. 
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mechanisms are required to ensure that the policy objectives for management 
of emergency related risk are met.  
Regulating risk communication 
To ensure policy objectives for disaster risk reduction are met, questions 
around the inclusion of risk communication in regulatory components arise. 
This point was raised in Chapter Three, but requires reiteration here. The first 
consideration when examining risk communication and the regulatory system 
is that risk communication and the presence of early warnings systems in 
emergency management are of high importance.  In light of this knowledge, 
risk communication and warnings systems should be supported or mandated 
down to a local level, ensuring there are laws that establish ‘clear procedures 
and responsibilities for early warning’.510  
Risk communication should also be planned511 and ‘developed at an early 
stage of the risk management process’.512 The plan should outline, ‘the 
objectives of specific communication, who will be involved, how the channels 
will work, what and how the information will be communicated’.513 Whether 
incorporation of these factors, are sufficient to bring about effective 
communication in the context of dynamic and often unpredictable natural 
hazard events remains to be seen. Together, however these properties for 
effective governance of risk communication provide a benchmark for action. 
They also provide a framework against which to analyse the current 
governance frameworks in Chapter Five. Chapter Five focuses on, not only 
the presence of disaster law, it also seeks to identify the incorporation of 
requirements for communication plans, as well clear responsibilities in 
communication and warning.  
                                                          
510 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, above n 79, 107 (The 
guiding questions which support this checklist items suggest ensuring the ‘laws require EWS 
for the most frequent and serious hazards’); IFRC & UNDP, ‘Effective law and regulation for 
disaster risk reduction’, above n 78, xiii , 33-34, 36 (Both establishment and operation of 
early warning systems should be supported, along with authority for warning and decision 
making, although some countries will differ as to how the frameworks are put in place). 
511 Standards Australia, Communicating and 
 consulting about risk (HB 327:2010); Attorney General’s Department (Cth), National 
Emergency Risk Assessment Guidelines, above n 32, 31. 
512 Standards Australia, Communicating and consulting about risk (HB 327:2010) 18-20. 
513 Ibid. 
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Technological influences on modalities for communication: Social 
Media 
The final influence, which establishes the contemporary context for regulatory 
system design for the management of emergency and hazard related risk, is 
the influence of technology on risk communication. As adverted to in Chapters 
One and Three, technological change has brought about the introduction of 
new channels or modalities for communication. These channels, collectively 
known as social media, include third party Web 2.0 platforms. Platform include 
blogs, microblogs (Twitter), wikis, as well as social networking sites such 
Facebook, Myspace, Instagram and YouTube’.514 The wide availability and 
usage of these platforms is in part because they are free to use. The wide 
availability and usage of these platforms is also influencing expectations as to 
how government can, and should, go about communicating risk and warning 
to the community.515 As an added benefit, the platforms are also creating new 
possibilities in communication.516  
As will be identified in Chapter Eight, the exponential growth of the platforms, 
expectations of use and reliance on them,517 now mean that social media is a 
prominent, if not ‘crucial’ consideration in emergency risk and warning 
communications.518 How best to utilise these channels and incorporate them 
                                                          
514 Kavanaugh et al, above n 60, 482. 
515 Crowe, Disasters 2.0, above n 48,  8, 10; See, eg, Sensis, above n 41, 3 (Three Quarters 
of Australian’s are now on social media); White, Social Media, Crisis, Communication and 
Emergency Management, above n 46, 122 (Noting that the platforms are here to stay); 
Twenty First Century Communications, Using Social Media for Emergency Notifications’: 
Seven Questions for Emergency Managers to Consider, 6 
<http://www.tfccalert.com/media/Social-Media-for-Emergency-Managers.pdf> (This means 
they are also a cost effective platform, aside from the resource capacity required to monitor 
them). 
516 Andrew Skuse and Tait Brimacombe, ‘Social Networking, Social Media and Complex 
Emergencies' (Issues Paper, Australian Civil-Military Centre & The University of Adelaide, 
2014) 4. 
517 Crowe, Disasters 2.0, above n 48, 81, 84; Victoria Government, Victorian Emergency 
Management Reform, above n 60, 8; Low et al, above n 60, 416; Kavanaugh et al, above n 
60, 489; Mergel, above n 60, 283; Victoria Government, Review of the 2010-11 Flood 
Warnings and Response, above n 61, 7, 80; Tasmania, ‘2013 Tasmanian Bushfire Inquiry’, 
above n 283, ix, 1, 137. (These expectations exist within the sector as well as within the 
public circles). 
518 Emergency Management Victoria, National Review of Warnings and Information, above n 
11, 4; Inspector General of Emergency Management (Qld), Review of local governments’ 
emergency warning capability, above n 11, 21 (It is notable that local governments are at 
varying stages of development of social media initiatives, and some difficulties with their use 
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into regulatory components such as communications plans, procedures and 
protocols, requires serious consideration.519  
Benefits of social media 
There are numerous benefits in using social media as a dissemination channel 
for warning. When traditional modalities for communication can lack timeliness 
or fail, social media may still be available. In the dynamic environment of 
natural hazard events, they can be used to disseminate rapidly changing 
information.520 This thesis focuses on the benefits to agencies when using 
social media to ‘push’ information to the public.521 Social media is 
characterised as online systems and tools. 522 A further benefit of these online 
systems they are designed to, ‘facilitate interaction and connection’.523 They 
allow the creation of user generated content524 and facilitate participation; 
creation of community; and the building of collective intelligence.525  
As well as participation and the creation of community, the unique features of 
social media support aspects of trust building and effective risk communication 
                                                          
due to resource capacity are noted); Anikeeva, Steenkamp and Arbon, above n 42, 22-
23.(Noting the reliance on social media); Skuse and Brimacombe, above n 516, 50. 
519  Eleanor R. Burgess and Aaron Shaw, ‘Evaluating Open Collaboration Opportunities in 
the Fire Service with FireCrowd’ (Paper presented at the Open Symposium 2016, Berlin, 
Germany, August 17-19, 2016) (One way to do this is through open collaboration through 
groups to create the best standard operating procedures. 
520 Victoria Government, Review of the 2010-11 Flood Warnings and Response, above n 61, 
97-99; Tasmania, 2013 Tasmanian Bushfires Inquiry - Recommendations and Response 
(2013). 
521 The focus on pushing information is purely designed to limit the scope of the thesis and in 
no way detracts from the key role social media is now playing in pulling information for 
situation awareness and for humanitarian efforts, see, eg,  NGIS, above n 61, 14; Cf Sarah 
Vieweg et al, ‘Microblogging During Two Natural Hazards Events: What Twitter May 
Contribute to Situational Awareness’ (Paper presented at CHI 2010: Crisis Informatics, 
Atlanta, 10-15 April 2010) 1079, 1080; Adriana S. Vivacqua and Marcos R. S. Borges, 
‘Taking advantage of collective knowledge in emergency response systems’ (2012) 35(1) 
Journal of Network and Computer Applications 189, 189. 
522 White, Social Media, Crisis, Communication and Emergency Management, above n 46, 
148; Low et al, above n 60, 411. 
523 Kavanaugh et al, above n 60, 482; Fitzgerald et al, above n 136, 13; Flew et al, ‘Social 
media and its impact on crisis communication’, above n 70, 5; Crowe, Disasters 2.0, above n 
48, 9. 
524 Sandoval-Almazan and Gil-Garcia, above n 137, 235; Henman, above n 137, 1397; 
Sellnow and Seegar, above n 48, 128. 
525 Henman, above n 137, 1399; Anikeeva, Steenkamp and Arbon, above n 42, 22. (The 
ability to create content allows community groups to create their own locally owned social 
media groups which ‘engages and involve the community’); Derina Holtzhausen and Ansgar 
Zerfass, The Routledge Handbook of Strategic Communication (Taylor and Francis, 2014) 
341. 
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that were raised in Chapter Three. Social media, for example, supports two-
way communication between multiple stakeholders.526  As highlighted in 
Chapter One, the two-way nature of communication is disruptive to traditional 
processes of communication within the emergency management sector. 
However, and importantly, the ability to build collaborative content between 
stakeholders helps to make information transparent, and ‘democratises’ 
communication.527 Both transparency and two-way communication are 
fundamental for trust and risk communication.528  
On a practical level, the use of social media to disseminate messages assists 
in timing and the reach of communications. Social media platforms are 
available online and are widely used in conjunction with mobile devices.529 
Mobile devices are often with the public 24 hours a day. Remembering that 
reach of risk information facilitates effective communication, social media via 
these devices may ensure greater reach and a more accessible audience than 
traditional channels.530 Additional benefits of the platforms are not only that 
they facilitate broader reach;531 the information supplied operates in real 
time.532 Timely messaging can also further increase confidence (and therefore 
trust) in the sector.533 Although there are numerous benefits to social media, 
                                                          
526 See, eg, White, Social Media, Crisis, Communication and Emergency Management, 
above n 46, 131; Kongthon et al, above n 46, 2227; Emergency Management Victoria, 
National Review of Warnings and Information, above n 11, 3-4; Falkheimer and Heide, 
above n 47, 342 (This suggests the platforms are open and more democratic); Lundgren & 
McMakin, above n 47, 283 (Building community). 
527 Falkheimer and Heide, above n 47, 342 (This suggests the platforms are open and more 
democractic); Aine Regan et al, ‘Risk communication and social media during food safety 
crises: a study of stakeholders’ opinions in Ireland’ (2014) Journal of Risk Research 1, 1; 
Maria Grazia Busa, ‘Trust-building through Social Media Communications in Disaster 
Management’ (Paper presented at WWW 2015 Companion, Florence, Italy, 18-22 May 
2015) 
528 Regan et al, above n 527, 2 (The tone used is more conversational and personal, which 
conveys empathy and care – key to building trust). 
529 Anikeeva, Steenkamp and Arbon, above n 42, 22; Sensis, above n 41, 4 (‘Smartphone 
continues to grow as the most likely device people use to access social media’, in some age 
groups over ‘90% of their social media interaction is by Smartphone). 
530 Anikeeva, Steenkamp and Arbon, above n 42, 26. 
531 Chatfield, Scholl and Brajawidagda, above n 48, 385; Bruns and Burgess, ‘Crisis 
Communication in Natural Disasters’, above n 70, 379 (The ability to retweet is ‘the most 
important driver of visibility’ of messages). 
532 Chatfield, Scholl and Brajawidagda, above n 48, 377; Crowe, Disasters 2.0, above n 48, 
9; White, Social Media, Crisis, Communication and Emergency Management, above n 46, 3. 
533 Anikeeva, Steenkamp and Arbon, above n 42, 23; Kasperson et al, above n 5, 32. 
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the platforms are not always accessible,534 nor does everyone favour them.535 
Therefore, as was specified in Chapter Three, the usage of multiple modalities 
of communication, and ones tailored to the respective community is still 
necessary.536 Evidence that this approach is being incorporated into 
governance components will also be examined in Chapter Five in the content 
analysis. 
Social media, institutional risk and effective policies 
In using social media, regulators need to incorporate principles of good 
practice into policies and procedures for risk communication. The importance 
of good practice is two-fold. In the first instance, it ensures, as was raised in 
Chapter Two, that any channels utilised for risk communication are of use in 
furthering its effectiveness as a risk modification device. Secondly, where 
principles of good practice, backed by legal analysis is incorporated, it assists 
in limiting the institutional risk of organisations and therefore removes a barrier 
to implementation. In view of concerns over institutional risk, Chapter Eight 
provides a case study of social media. The case study examines the unique 
and disruptive features of the platforms that can raise concerns regarding legal 
accountability. Unique features which will be considered in Chapter Eight are 
the algorithms in Facebook which affect message timing537and the 
decentralised nature, and therefore lack of control, of a message.538 The case 
study also identifies legal issues that might arise from the volume of unverified 
and unverifiable data. Unverified and unverifiable data can affect the credibility 
                                                          
534 Although they are more robust than traditional channels which require electricity. 
535 Sensis, above n 41, 15 (There is a marked decline in use of social media for the 50-64 
and 65+ age groups); Emergency Management Victoria, National Review of Warnings and 
Information, above n 11, 11; Regan et al, above n 527, 10-11; Hazelwood Mine Fire Inquiry, 
above n 50, 25, 31, 400. 
536 Hazelwood Mine Fire Inquiry, above n 50, 384, 387-388; Emergency Management 
Victoria, National Review of Warnings and Information, above n 11, 11; Anikeeva, 
Steenkamp and Arbon, above n 42, 24. 
537 Marijn Janssen & George Kuk, ‘The challenges and limits of big data algorithms in 
technocratic governance’ (2016) 33 Government Information Quarterly 371, 371; T Gillespie, 
‘The relevance of algorithms’ in T Gillredpir, P Boczkowski & K Foot (eds), Media 
Technologies: Essays in Communication, Materiality, and Society (MIT Press, 2014) 167, 
168. 
538 Falkheimer and Heide, above n 47, 342-343; Crowe, Disasters 2.0, above n 48, 9, 11. 
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of the message, and can raise concerns over information accuracy, which 
might then cause amplification of a risk and consequent unnecessary panic.539  
The case study applies findings of doctrinal analysis related to the duty to 
warn, developed in Chapters Six and Seven, to determine the circumstances 
under which liability is likely to result. The case study will highlight principles 
of good in light of the prospect of legal liability in the area of negligence. In 
taking this approach, the case study provides legal rationale for including 
activities such as monitoring, verification and channel choice, into social media 
guidelines, a perspective that at this stage is largely lacking.540 More generally, 
these findings are important, as without concrete analysis, perceptions of 
liability may act as a barrier to implementation. They may also result in under 
or over-compliance and a less than optimal approach.541 Therefore, 
information, which grounds these perceptions, and provides mechanisms for 
action, are an important step forward. 
Conclusion 
This Chapter has outlined four contextual factors, which operate at varying 
levels of abstraction, to influence government action and governance 
                                                          
539 Regan et al, above n 527, 3-4, 12 (Concerns are raised over inaccurate, unverified or 
biased information which can then cause alarm in the population); Lundgren & McMakin, 
above n 47, 286 (To alleviate the pressure, partnerships may be set up with VOSTS which 
assist in processing this type of data, see, eg, Leila Martini, ‘Monitoring and Use of Social 
Media in Emergency Management in Florida’ (Doctor of Public Health, University of South 
Florida, 2015) 72, 109; Hughes et al, above n 62, 1506; Department of Homeland Security, 
‘Using Social Media for Enhanced Situational Awareness’, above n 51, 5). 
540 See, eg, Emergencies (ESA Social Media Policy) Commissioner’s Guidelines 2011 
(ACT), ‘ACT Government, ACT Government Social Media Policy Guidelines (March 2012) 
Version 1.0; ICT Policy and Coordination Office (Qld), Official Use of social media guideline: 
Final (December 2010); Department of Science, Information Technology and Innovation 
(Qld), Principles for the official use of social media networks and emerging social media 
(October 2015) <http://www.qgcio.qld.gov.au/products/qgea-documents/547-business/3519-
principles-for-the-use-of-social-media>; Public Service Commission (Vic), Guidance for Use 
of Social Media in the Victorian Public Sector (2010); Department of Business and 
Innovation (Vic), Government 2.0 Projects in VPS: An introduction to managing risks (2010); 
Victoria, VPS Gov 2.0 Risk Register and Management Plan (2010) 
<http://www.vic.gov.au/blog/social-media-guides/victorian-public-service-government-2-0-
risk-register-management-plan/>; Public Affairs Branch, NSW Police Force, Official Use of 
Social Media Policy (3 September 2013); Northern Territory, Web 2.0 for NT Public Servants 
(NTPS) Guidelines, Version 1.2 (2013); Department of Finance (WA), Social Media 
Guidelines (September 2012); Government of South Australia, Social Media: Guidance for 
Agencies and Staff (2010); Government of South Australia, Social Media: Guidance for Staff 
and Agencies (2013) <http://files.oper.sa.gov.au/files/social_media_guideline_final.pdf>. 
541 Craswell and Calfee, above n 65, 279-280. 
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structures that underpin management of emergency and natural hazard 
related risk. It represents the final in a series of three framework Chapters. The 
first of these Chapters examined concepts of risk, risk management and the 
role of law and governance frameworks in supporting risk management. It also 
highlighted that government is a shared owner of emergency and natural 
hazard risk and in order to effectively manage this risk, strong governance 
frameworks need to be in place. The Chapter highlighted that each component 
of the framework may act as a control mechanism to modify and mitigate risk. 
It is therefore important that they are robust. Risk management is an iterative 
and dynamic process. Therefore, each component needs to be updated with 
the most recent principles of good practice to ensure their ongoing relevance. 
This forms one of the purposes of this thesis. 
Where Chapter Two examined risk management, Chapter Three identified risk 
communication as a pivotal element of effective risk management. Risk 
communication and the related task of warning are pivotal to risk management. 
This type of communication ‘informs the community of impending or current 
threat to prompt action and response’.542 This information in turn enables 
citizens to make decisions and take evasive action.543 Dissemination of 
warning and information also allows emergency managers to share the burden 
for disaster risk reduction.  
As identified in Chapter Three, risk communication and the ability to affect 
behaviour in the desired fashion is complex. This is because a number of inter-
related elements come together to affect the perception / response process of 
individuals within the community.  The Chapter also identified that a key 
element for effective risk communication is the development of trust.544 To 
engender trust in the community, government needs to demonstrate 
competence, care, effectiveness and legitimacy. In light of the need to facilitate 
competent action, principles of good practice for government agencies, as a 
                                                          
542 Attorney General’s Department (Cth), Australia’s Emergency Warning Arrangements, 
above n 40, 2; Bullock, Haddow and Coppola (eds), above n 277, 269. 
543 Reynolds and Seegar, above n 309, 48; Mileti, Disasters by Design, above n 185, 191 
(Mileti adds emphasis to the aim of warnings to ‘inform and prompt appropriate response’, 
by containing ‘alert and notification components’); Sorensen, above n 50, 119. 
544 Kasperson et al, above n 5, 31; van Asselt and Renn, above n 5, 439-440; Lundgren & 
McMakin, above n 47, 316. 
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sender of risk communication, need to be incorporated into policies and 
procedures. At a broad level, this includes, incorporating two-way channels for 
communication, as well as focusing on timing, accuracy and consistency in 
messaging. 
In the knowledge that government is a shared owner of natural hazard and 
emergency related risk, and in light of the need to effectively incorporate and 
plan risk communication, the subject of this Chapter was contextual elements, 
which influence government’s ability to do so. The elements considered, 
operated at varying levels of abstraction. They included philosophical, 
sociological, regulatory and technological influences. These influences 
highlighted that any governance components designed to support the 
management of risk needed to be in legitimate areas of government; remain 
within the limits of power; and balance individual rights and the need for action. 
A qualification to the absolute duty to protect individual rights is apparent in 
emergencies however; in the form of the extended powers to support need to 
react in an emergency.  
Modern interpretations of social contract theory also outlined expectations that 
government might have of citizens when responsibility is shared. This included 
a reasonable expectation that citizens, due to their civic duty, and mutual 
respect for another’s rights, would protect themselves from exposure to the 
relevant risks. Sociological theory also highlighted the rationale for the 
increased pre-occupation with risk and its increasing inclusion in governance 
components to improve efficiency and target limited resources. Sociological 
theory also noted the increasing individualisation of risk, and the associated 
redefinition of what it is to be a prudent and responsible citizen. What became 
apparent is that, at times, sociological theory and traditional normative 
principles of social contract theory, which underpin Australia’s constitutional 
arrangements, may act in tension.  
The final part of the Chapter focused on specific mechanisms, which influence 
the design of regulation, as well as technologies, that impact on risk 
communication.  It was noted that risk based regulation is becoming more 
prevalent. Reform into regulatory approaches is also evident. Regulatory 
 123 
 
reform, suggests that a regulatory approach, whether based on risk or 
otherwise, should seek to streamline processes and cut regulatory burden on 
organisations and the community. Each of these factors will influence how 
government chooses to regulate and govern risk management.  
The final component of this Chapter focused on changing modalities in 
communication. These changes influence the design of governance 
components for risk communication and warning. Social media for example, 
has become a prevalent and expected form of communication amongst some 
groups in society. While the technologies have unique features, which will 
improve competence in risk communication and warning, they are disruptive 
to traditional communication processes.  The unique features of social media 
platforms also raise legal concerns. Any decision as to how to design effective 
governance components for risk communication and warning will need to 
incorporate social media, to ensure risk communication continues to be 
effective across all sectors of society. However, decision-making will also need 
to account for institutional risks of liability. 
The following Chapters form Part Two of the thesis. These Chapters analyse 
legislation and case law relevant to emergency management. The framework 
of analysis is based on the key principles for effective governance, regulation 
and risk communication. These principles were highlighted in each of the 
framework Chapters. The analysis of case law and legislation illustrates how 
normative principles and principles of good practice, which have been 
previously identified, align with the existing legislative and legal frameworks. 
Chapter Five for example, will examine the current risk governance 
components, to determine whether they incorporate specific disaster laws, 
clear responsibilities and embed communication as a fundamental risk 
mitigation factor. Chapters Six and Seven will then determine whether the 
current laws, provide effective ‘adequate mechanisms’545 to ensure 
responsibilities in these areas are met. The findings of these Chapters will be 
applied in Chapter Eight, to a case study of social media. The aim of Chapter 
                                                          
545 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, above n 79, 3. 
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Eight is to determine whether legal concerns are well founded and what needs 
to be done to remove any barriers to action.   
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Part Two: A Legal Analysis 
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Chapter Five: Risk communication and warning in the 
Australian emergency management regulatory system 
 
Chapters Two, Three and Four developed the conceptual theoretical 
framework, which will be applied to explore and critically analyse the 
emergency management regulatory system in Australia. The theoretical 
framework incorporated technical standards for risk management and 
intertwined these with layers of theory. Chapter Two identified that the 
emergency management sector is allocated some aspects of ownership of 
natural hazard and emergency related risk. Agencies within the sector are 
expected to manage the risk that has been allocated to them by law through 
the creation and employment of risk governance components. Risk 
governance and the hard and soft law components that make up the 
governance system, play a key role in supporting effective management of 
natural hazard and emergency related risk. 
This thesis focuses on the dissemination of risk communication and warning 
that the risk governance system ought to address based on concepts of 
effective governance.  Chapters Two and Three identified that both risk 
communication and warning, play a key role in the risk management process, 
acting as both a risk control or modification mechanism. International studies 
suggest, that risk communication needs to be planned, and early warning 
systems incorporated into the regulatory structure. The regulatory structure 
needs to clearly articulate particular responsibilities for risk communication 
and warning. As well as identifying the importance of risk communication. 
Chapters Three and Four, highlight that it is essential to utilise multiple modes 
of dissemination of risk messaging. Social media, for example, is an emerging 
channel, gaining significant traction. The inclusion of social media within 
regulatory components is now expected. Where responsibilities for risk 
communication, warning and social media usage are included in hard and soft 
law regulatory instruments, they need to be backed by adequate accountability 
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mechanisms to ensure they are fulfilled as far as practicable.546 The presence 
of accountability mechanisms, ensure that the statutory authorities with a 
share of responsibility for managing emergency related risk, meet the 
standards required for emergency messaging.  The inclusion of accountability 
mechanisms ensures that governance components, act as effective risk 
controls, and facilitate positive trust relationships between governments and 
citizens.  
With these theoretical considerations in mind, this Chapter turns its focus to 
addressing the two key areas of research. Of the two key areas of research 
identified in Chapter One, the first to be addressed is the question as to the 
extent to which risk communication and warning is present in the regulatory 
system. To organise the response to this question, further questions which 
reflect principles of good practice and help to organise the response have been 
developed. These questions include: 
 
1.  Whether the current regulatory system incorporates risk 
communication and warning throughout the various layers of the 
system;   
2. Whether the regulatory components articulate clear responsibilities for 
risk communication and warning;   
3. Whether the regulatory system components embed a requirement to 
use social media, and if so, whether there is clear articulation of 
responsibility for the use of the channels.   
 
Question 1, aims to determine whether there is recognition in the regulatory 
system of risk communication as a key mitigation tool. Questions 2 and 3, as 
well as assisting in an examination of the broader research question, also 
serve a second purpose. These Questions identify functions and 
responsibilities for warning. These functions and responsibilities are then 
utilised in Chapters Six and Seven in the examination of legal accountability 
under the law of negligence. As the thesis move into doctrinal analysis, it 
                                                          
546 See, eg, Feaver and Sheehy, above n 119, 968, 971 (The authors highlight the need for 
a tight coupling of control and accountability components in the regulatory system, noting the 
need to ensure accountability mechanisms are not ‘over burdensome’). 
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becomes apparent that the terms responsibility and liability are ‘certainly not 
synonymous’.547 As will be demonstrated in the remaining Chapters of the 
thesis, the presence of responsibilities and functions within regulatory system 
components may not be sufficient to formulate a duty of care. Consequently, 
their presence in legislation may not be sufficient and ground a cause of action 
under the law of negligence, from which sanctions will flow.  
Defining the regulatory system and its components 
Before addressing the methodology, which underpins the research in this 
Chapter, a re-iteration of the definition of the regulatory system is essential. 
As identified in Chapter One, a regulatory system is defined as having both a 
normative (the policy) and positive dimension (which contain the substantive 
rules aimed at putting the policy into practice).548 Each dimension is ‘made up 
of numerous interconnected and interdependent components or 
instruments’.549 These components include a mixture of soft and hard law 
instruments. These instruments contain the substantive rules that govern or 
guide the conduct of the party.550   
The terms, ‘hard law’ and ‘soft law’ also require a brief definition. A hard law 
instrument is one, which is binding and enforceable at law, usually with 
sanctions attached.551 Recognised forms of hard law instruments are 
regulations, which includes statutes, subordinate and delegated legislation.552 
By contrast, the ‘orthodox understanding of the effect of soft law’ 
instruments,553 is that they are not directly legally enforceable.554 There is 
                                                          
547 Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality, above n 104, 1. 
548 Sheehy and Feaver, above n 94, 392-393, 399, 401 (Noting that the policy or normative 
dimension informs the positive dimension or the substantive rules to be put in place). 
549 Sheehy and Feaver, above n 94, 392-393. 
550 Feaver and Sheehy, above n 119, 976. 
551 Greg Weeks, ‘Soft Law and Public Authorities: Remedies and Reform (Hart Publishing, 
2016) 16; McLennan and Handmer, 'Sharing Responsibility Australian Disaster 
Management’, above n 2, 69. 
552 McLennan and Handmer, 'Sharing Responsibility Australian Disaster Management’, 
above n 2, 69 (Hard laws also include the Constitution and enforced quasi-regulation). 
553 Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Grey-Letter Law’ (December 1997) Report of the 
Commonwealth Interdepartmental Committee on Quasi-regulation, ix (Soft law instruments 
have also been labelled ‘grey letter law’). 
554 McLennan and Handmer, 'Sharing Responsibility Australian Disaster Management’, 
above n 2, 70 (They are aimed at ‘encouraging rather than compelling people to make 
decisions or change behaviour’); Weeks, above n 551, 1-2, 13 (The author notes the court 
does ‘take notice of soft law’). 
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some confusion as to the status of the instruments, and it may depend on the 
extent to which they are integrated with legislation, as to whether compliance 
with them is necessary.555 Recognised forms of soft law components are 
policies, plans, guidelines, standards and manuals.556 Hard and soft law 
instruments, those emanating from both the normative and positive 
dimensions of the emergency management regulatory system, form the 
subject of this Chapter. With the growing use of soft law instruments, to provide 
flexible approaches to ‘solving social problems’,557 an important thread of this 
Chapter, is the extent to which soft law instruments will be binding on the 
emergency management sector. 
Methodology: Content Analysis 
As identified in Chapter One, to address the research questions, a short form, 
or abbreviated content analysis, was utilised as the primary research method 
in this Chapter. The rationale for adopting this research method was also 
provided. Content analysis is a method of ‘empirical legal research’,558 which 
allows for the collation and systematic investigation of a nominated set of texts. 
The use of this research method allows the research to uncover patterns and 
draw inferences, around an identified theme.559 Although content analysis is 
relatively new to the field of law, its usage is evolving, particularly in the United 
States.560 As identified in Chapter One, the adoption of this methodology is 
suitable in this context as it furnishes the researcher with a holistic view of the 
presence of warning across the whole of the regulatory system.  
                                                          
555 Fisher, Legal Reasoning in Environmental Law, above n 94, 337; Commonwealth of 
Australia, ‘Grey-Letter Law’, above n 553, ix, xiv, xvi, xviii (Those that are binding have been 
labelled quasi-regulation, a ‘range of rules, instruments and standards’). 
556 Weeks, above n 551, 2, 14, 18, 22 (The author notes different types of policy, identifying 
policy which seeks to ‘modify and effect conduct’ as being soft law, so too guidelines, and 
manuals may be interpretative rules which do not ‘impose new legal obligations’, however 
some may constitute quasi-regulation); Fisher, Legal Reasoning in Environmental Law, 
above n 94, 425 (Fisher describes the materials defined as soft law instruments, as 
paralegal materials). 
557 Feaver and Sheehy, above n 119, 961. 
558 Lee Epstein and Andrew D. Martin, 'Quantitative Approaches to Empirical Legal 
Research' in Peter Cane and Herbert M. Kritzer (eds), The Oxford handbook of empirical 
legal research (Oxford University Press, 2010) 902. 
559 Klaus Krippendorff, Content Analysis: an introduction to its methodology (Sage, 3rd ed, 
2013) 10, 24. 
560 Burns, above n 91, 34-35. 
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An alternative research approach, which is often adopted in a legal thesis, is 
doctrinal analysis. In this thesis, doctrinal analysis was not considered an 
appropriate methodology to answer this first research question, as the 
methodology provides a limited analysis of legislation and case law.  In this 
examination of the regulatory system, the research question required that 
mentions of risk communication, warning and social media, were to be 
examined across a variety of regulatory components.  Content analysis was 
therefore employed to allow for the incorporation of paralegal materials,561 
such as public policy and plans. As identified in the definition of a regulatory 
system the formulation of policy is the first stage in addressing a social 
problem or risk problem.562 Inclusion of policy within this analysis is therefore 
essential in providing a more complete picture of whether risk communication 
and warning is identified a key priority from the outset.  
 
As a research tool, content analysis can be utilised for three principle 
purposes:  
1. ‘describing the manifest characteristics of the communications, 
asking what, how and to whom something is said  
2. To make inferences as to the antecedent conditions of the 
communication – that is why something is said and   
3. To make inferences as to the consequences of the 
communications – what are the effects of what is said’563  
 
Reflecting on the principles for the use of content analysis, the research 
method in this context564 is used to identify what is said about responsibilities. 
The methodology is also used to examine how the responsibilities are framed, 
for example whether they are mandatory or discretionary, as well as to whom 
the responsibilities are directed. Content analysis is also used to draw 
inferences as to the effect of what is said, by applying doctrinal analysis to 
                                                          
561 Fisher, Legal Reasoning in Environmental Law, above n 94, 425 (These materials include 
policies, plans, and guidelines).  
562 Sheehy and Feaver, above n 94, 402-403. 
563 Krippendorff, above n 559, 51 (Using the principles purposes cited in Holsti’s work as 
being an effective framework for examining the various components of the regulatory 
system). 
564 Epstein and Martin, above n 558, 902. 
 131 
 
determine its legal effects and whether responsibilities form the basis of legal 
duties. Inferences can also be drawn from the body of the texts collectively.565 
These inferences provide an understanding of the extent to which risk 
communication is a priority within the system. The method of analysis also 
allows the researcher to identify the extent to which risk communication and 
warning is embedded and aligned across all layers of the regulatory system.  
 
Technical aspects of the content analysis 
 
A short form, content analysis was utilised in this thesis. What is meant by 
short form, or abbreviated content analysis, is that not every relevant 
document was captured, nor was each associated process fully developed. 
The aim of the analysis was to provide indicative results and draw out some 
initial patterns from which inferences could begin to be drawn and from which 
research that is more detailed might follow. Consequently, it is acknowledged 
that there are limitations as to the application of results. It is also 
acknowledged that one of the drawbacks of content analysis, is the ‘subjective 
view of the researcher’, when it comes to interpretation of the data.  
Process 
The content analysis required the creation of a simple Microsoft Access 
database to capture the contents of the components. The relevant fields are 
highlighted in a ‘view’ of the table in Figure 4. Data was entered through the 
form identified in Figure 5. To ensure consistency in data entry, descriptions 
were included against each field in the underlying table. These descriptions 
outlined the scope of what was to be included within the field. From the data 
collected, Microsoft Access reports were generated. These reports formed the 
basis of analysis and incorporated various cross-sections of the data. The first 
reports created sought to identify the wording around risk communication. A 
second set of reports drew out the responsibilities, and the type of component 
in which responsibilities were contained. To determine whether there was 
                                                          
565 Krippendorff, above n 559, 30. 
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alignment of responsibilities throughout the regulatory system, further reports 
were created to compare similar components across jurisdictions.566   
 
Figure 4: Content Analysis: Database Fields 
 
 
  
 
Figure 5: Content Analysis: Database Form 
  
 
                                                          
566 Sheehy and Feaver, ‘above n 94, 398 (At least a lack of inconsistency is required, or 
absence of friction between components). 
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Regulatory components captured 
 In total, fifty-five regulatory components were captured in the database. These 
components included policy, legislation, plans, guidelines, standards, codes 
and frameworks, which were publicly available on searching the internet. A 
search of the core organisations websites, for example, the State Emergency 
Services, and Emergency Management Australia, was also undertaken. The 
aim of this search was to pinpoint the governance components that the 
organisation perceived to be the most recent version. A drawback of the 
content analysis is that since its completion in February 2016, some of these 
components have been updated. As all of this material was publicly available, 
no ethical clearance was required to carry out the analysis.  
Relevant instruments 
As a federation, each State and Territory in Australia provides its own 
instruments and emergency management framework. Policy, plans and 
relevant emergency or disaster management legislation, were therefore 
sought from each jurisdiction. From a preliminary survey of the legislation, two 
points became clear. Emergency and disaster management legislation, as 
defined in Chapter One, usually only operates in conditions that constitute an 
emergency as defined within the statute. Agencies may derive power or 
responsibilities to warn from alternative legislation, for example, from specific 
legislation establishing and outlining functions for fire, police or state 
emergency services.567 In most cases, the emergency and disaster legislation 
works in tandem with the alternate legislation covering some of the same field. 
What this highlights, is that powers, responsibilities and functions for 
communication and warning may be derived from alternate legislation. These 
powers, functions and responsibilities, could conceivably continue to coexist 
during emergencies, and would therefore be relevant to identifying agency 
responsibility. To more effectively identify an agency’s responsibility to warn 
and utilise social media, a wider net had to be cast which captured this 
additional legislation. 
 
                                                          
567 See, eg, Fire Brigades Act 1989 (NSW); Fire and Emergency Services Act 1990 (Qld). 
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Data extraction strategy 
 
Once the relevant instruments were located, three main strategies were 
employed to extract the data. The first was a plain reading of the component 
to extract any information that was manifest in the express wording of the 
instrument. This included the date of creation, the jurisdiction, the level of 
government from which it derived and the type of instrument. Secondly, a scan 
was undertaken to locate the aim of the instruments, its links to other 
components. There was also consideration as to whether there was a 
mandatory requirement to create the components. The mandatory nature of 
the instrument is important to discussions in this Chapter of whether the 
component will constitute soft law or quasi-regulation. Finally, searches were 
conducted for the key words. The mentions of these terms were counted and 
the wording around the terms was incorporated into the database.  Within the 
wording of the relevant section, any information as to the party responsible for 
warning, communication and particularly the use of social media was 
identified. 
 
Identification of Terms and Keywords 
From an early reading of the components, it was clear that alternative search 
terms to ‘risk communication’ and ‘social media’ might be required. In most 
instances for example, communication to the public was incorporated under a 
variety of terms. These terms included ‘communication’, ‘information’ or 
‘community engagement’. Although the term ‘social media’ was utilised, in 
some instruments an alternative term, ‘new tech’ was utilised. These terms 
were therefore incorporated into the search strategy. The next step was to 
classify each component by type. This classification is important because as 
becomes apparent in the following sections, the type of component in which 
responsibility for risk communication and warning resides can be highly 
relevant to the determination of a legal duty.  Fortunately, and in most cases, 
instrument types were clearly and were extracted from their title.  
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The role of governance components in the regulatory system 
As stated, the regulatory components examined in this Chapter include hard 
and soft law instruments such as policy, legislation, plans, guidelines and other 
governance components. As previously identified, each component plays a 
different role in the hierarchy of the regulatory system, some are enforceable 
and binding, while others are not. Figure 6 below provides an example of the 
hierarchy of instruments that may be present in a regulatory system for 
emergency management. Absent a comprehensive Australian representation 
of a regulatory system, one, which places policy and doctrine at the top of the 
hierarchy, the diagram, is adapted from Emergency Management in Ontario. 
The diagram represents Queensland’s disaster management arrangements, 
as it is the basis for the case study in Chapter Eight. The diagram aims to 
provides an understanding of role of each of the various regulatory 
components, their legal effect, and how they operate together to deliver policy 
objectives for disaster risk reduction. These aspects of the diagram are 
discussed in detail in the remainder of this Chapter. 
  
  
Figure 6: Hierarchy of Instruments in Queensland’s Regulatory system for 
disaster management568 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
568 Figure 6 is adapted from, Minister of Community Safety & Correctional Services (Ontario), 
Legislation and Regulation (25 May. 2016) 
<http://www.emergencymanagementontario.ca/english/insideemo/legislationandregulation/emergency_
management_doctrine.html>. 
Doctrine: National / State Policy   
National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (NSDR) 
Queensland Strategy for Disaster Resilience  
 
Legislation: Disaster Management Act 2003 
Disaster Management Regulations 2014 
Policy / Strategy: Queensland Disaster 
Management 2016 Strategic Policy Statement 
Standards: Emergency Management Assurance 
Framework / Standards  
Guidelines: District / Local Disaster Management 
Guidelines 
 
Plans: Disaster Management Plans / Subplans 
State / Regional / Local Plan Examples:  
State Disaster Management Plan 
Brisbane District Disaster Management Plan 
Ipswich City Council Local Disaster Management 
Plan 
 
Procedures (e.g. Agency specific Standard 
Operating Procedures) / Manuals (Emergency 
Management Manual Series, AIIMS Manual) / 
Codes (e.g. Cth codes for warning) / Policies 
(e.g. social media policy) 
 
Queensland Disaster Management 
Regulatory System 
 
Que 
Role of Instrument 
Policy: outlines the intent or normative 
principles of how to address emergency 
related risk.  Implemented in part, through 
legislation as one policy instrument 
Legal Effect: non-binding / unenforceable 
 
Legal  Legislation and regulation: provides a 
statutory framework, powers and duties, for 
the creation of relevant bodies, directives, 
sanctions and immunities. 
Legal Effect: Hard law – binding and 
enforceable 
Instruments created by legislative entities: 
explain in detail what to do and how to do it. 
Some instruments provide indicative 
benchmarks or performance measures. 
Legal Effect: Soft law / Quasi-legislation – 
unenforceable, greater compliance in some 
cases. 
Plans / Subplans: operationalise legislative 
requirements. Required to be created in a 
manner consistent with policy / standards / 
strategic framework and guidelines.  
Legal Effect: Dependant on whether created 
as delegated legislation, otherwise soft law, 
unenforceable. 
Procedures / Guidelines / Manuals / 
Standard Operating Procedures: provide 
detailed guidance to support the 
implementation of DM plans and legislative 
requirements. 
Legal Effect: Most often soft law and 
unenforceable 
As indicated in the above hierarchy, the nature and role of the component, will 
determine whether it is appropriate to incorporate detailed responsibilities or 
prescriptive ‘how to’ processes for operational activity. The diagram also 
indicates whether the relevant instrument is hard law, and therefore 
enforceable, or soft law. As becomes clear in Chapter Six, even the functions, 
powers and responsibilities contained within the hard law components, may 
not be sufficient to ground a cause of action in the event of a failure to comply.  
While to a layperson, a function, power or responsibility may suggest some 
level of obligation, this is not always the case. As is made evident by the 
definitions below, and as becomes apparent in Chapter Six, a legal obligation 
to carry out the activity may not attach. Both the role of each of the instruments 
within the hierarchy and the language used within the instruments are 
examined below. 
A Hierarchy of Instruments 
Policy 
Referring to Figure 6 above, and in line with the definition of the regulatory 
system in this Chapter, policy (rather than doctrine), is the relevant starting 
point for examination of the regulatory system.569 Policy development is a 
multi-layered process, which can incorporate stakeholder and community 
consultation.570 The process seeks to characterise, and determine how to 
address a problem or risk from an abstract or normative perspective.571 The 
resulting policy statement, ‘influences’ the directions taken in subsidiary 
components, or policy instruments to address a risk.572 The role of high level 
                                                          
569 Catherine Althaus, Peter Bridgman and Glyn Davis, Australian Policy Handbook (Allen & 
Unwin, 5th Ed, 2013) 207(Although the policy statement is utilised as the starting point for 
analysis here, the policy cycle is iterative and often non-linear). 
570 Althaus, Bridgman and Davis, above n 569, 101-102; Sheehy and Feaver, above n 94, 
409, 414; Sarah Maddison, and Richard Denniss, An introduction to Australian Public Policy: 
Theory and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2013) Ch 7. 
571 Althaus, Bridgman and Davis, above n 569, 101-102; Sheehy and Feaver, above n 94, 
409, 414; Maddison and Denniss, above n 570. 
572 Handmer and Dovers, above n 185, 50; See, eg, Sheehy and Feaver, above n 94, 402 
(The authors put forward a model for regulatory coherence which commences with the 
normative axis, containing the policy framing and approach followed by the regulatory 
approach which implements the policy objectives); Yvonne Haigh, Public Policy in Australia: 
Theory and practice (Oxford University Press, 2012) 85-87; Althaus, Bridgman and Davis, 
above n 569, 92-93 (Policy instruments more commonly used in Australia include, 
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policy is to act as a vision statement,573 a strategic benchmark,574 or guide,575 
which articulates the desired approach to emergency management.   
As previously highlighted, the Australian National Strategy for Disaster 
Resilience provides policy directives for disaster risk reduction, which 
envisage shared responsibility and resilience building.576 Each State and 
Territory government, as well as each State Emergency Management 
Committee, may also have policy or a strategic framework for managing a 
problem.577 As a vision statement or guiding instrument, policy is non-binding. 
It is unlikely to include particular responsibilities for risk communication and 
warning. Instead, in this context, policy will usually indicate the level of priority 
which should be attributed to risk communication and warning when managing 
a problem.  
Legislation 
Legislation is a common instrument used to implement policy. As indicated, in 
relation to principles of better regulation, it may not however, be the most 
effective or appropriate.578 As a hard law instrument, legislation is an authority 
based device, aimed at ‘individuals, groups or institutions’.579 It is used to 
prescribe behaviour, mandate action or to ‘prohibit or permit forms of 
                                                          
‘advocacy, policy through the leveraging of network partnerships, money (spending and 
incentives’, direct government action through agencies, as well as policy through law and 
legislation).  
573 McLennan and Handmer, 'Sharing Responsibility Australian Disaster Management’, 
above n 2, 74. 
574 State Disaster Management Group (Qld) Disaster Management Strategic Policy 
Framework (November 2010) 4. 
575 Council of Australian Governments (COAG), National Strategy for Disaster Resilience 
(2011) iii. 
576 Council of Australian Governments (COAG), National Strategy for Disaster Resilience 
(2011) iii, 1, 4-5. 
577 See, eg, Queensland Government, Queensland Strategy for Disaster Resilience 
<http://www.dilgp.qld.gov.au/resources/plan/local-government/queensland-strategy-for-
disaster-resilience.pdf>; State Disaster Management Group (Qld) Disaster Management 
Strategic Policy Framework (November 2010); State Emergency Management Committee 
(Tas), Strategic Directions Framework (2013-2018); Emergency Management (Vic), 
Victorian Emergency Management Strategic Action Plan 2015-2018 (2015) (It is noted that 
State Emergency Management Committee policies may fall lower in the hierarchy as 
reflected in Figure 6, as it is only many of these bodies are created by legislation within the 
jurisdiction and are then afforded the power to create policy and strategic frameworks). 
578 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Cth), above n 503, 26-27. 
579 Haigh, above n 572, 86. 
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conduct’,580 with referable sanctions in place.581 Chapter Seven also identifies 
that legislation may contain immunities which act to legally exculpate a person 
or statutory authority for activities carried out in pursuance of the Act.  
Legislation is also utilised to create the institutions which carry out the policy 
objectives. A statute will often establish the agencies responsible for action 
and delegate power to appropriate parties.582 In the United States and 
Australia, emergency management is a creature of law.583 Each jurisdiction 
has a specific disaster or emergency management statute, as well as alternate 
legislation which creates the agencies with are operative within the emergency 
services sector. The different statutes operate in tandem during an 
emergency. Agencies may therefore be afforded powers and functions for 
warning under both emergency management legislation, and agency specific 
legislation. In general, legislation is adopted for broad level considerations, 
and for matters of significance,584 rather than for ‘matters of detail or matters 
likely to experience frequent change’.585 As risk communication and warning 
is considered significant to risk mitigation, it is likely that there will be related 
functions in legislation for these activities.586 Details of the channels for 
dissemination however, are unlikely to be found.  
 
In this Chapter, the aim is to determine to what extent responsibilities for 
warnings and risk communication exist in the legislation and other regulatory 
components. Extracting specific responsibilities from legislation is often 
complex. In the first instance, this is because responsibilities framed in 
                                                          
580 Ibid. 
581 McLennan and Handmer, 'Sharing Responsibility Australian Disaster Management’, 
above n 2, 69. 
582 Office of Queensland Parliament, Legislative Instruments Handbook 2.1 (2015) 1 
<http://www.opc.gov.au/about/docs/LI_Handbook.pdf?v1>. 
583 Nicholson, above n 227, 237. 
584 See, eg, Haigh, above n 572, 85-91 (Noting that each policy instrument and tool are 
utilised differentially to achieve the aims of policy); Department of the Premier and Cabinet 
(Qld), The Queensland Legislation Handbook – Governing Queensland (5th ed, 2014) 2.2 
Some of these reasons include a ‘permanence of a significant policy objective’, ‘modification 
of existing rights and obligations’ or the ‘high level importance of the policy’). 
585 Department of the Premier and Cabinet (Qld), above n 584, 7. 
586 See, eg, Barbara Ryan and Dr Amalia Matheson, ‘Significance of communication in 
emergency management’ (2010) 25(1) The Australian Journal of Emergency Management 
54,54; Emergency Management Victoria, National Review of Warnings and Information, 
above n 11. 
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legislation can be vague rather than prescriptive. A less prescriptive approach 
in legislation affords flexibility to respond to ‘changing disaster demands’.587 
Secondly, legislative instruments provide for ‘powers’ or ‘functions’,588 rather 
than responsibilities relevant to statutory bodies.589 These terms will be 
examined in due course. To provide an example however, the Meteorology 
Act 1955 (Cth), conveys specific functions on the Bureau of Metrology (BOM). 
The statute includes a function to ‘issue warnings of gales, storms and other 
weather conditions likely to endanger life or property, including weather 
conditions likely to give rise to floods or bushfires’.590 Further particular 
wording within statutory provisions may be used to convey whether the 
function is mandatory or discretionary. Figure 6 suggests legislation is 
ordinarily considered binding and enforceable. However, in Australia, unless 
the legislation is prescriptive, it is only on analysis of the case law which 
interprets the legislation that enforceability of the legislation will be understood. 
An analysis of the case law will assist in making a determination as to whether 
a function constitutes a mandatory legal responsibility or duty, for which an 
agency may be held legally accountable in negligence.  
Additional regulatory components 
Across the regulatory system for emergency management there are numerous 
other instruments, predominately soft law, which influence activity and 
operations of the sector. These instruments also contain responsibilities. As 
depicted in Figure 6, in terms of relevant components, emergency or disaster 
management plans and standards, are required to be created under the 
relevant legislation.591A discretionary power may also exist to create further 
                                                          
587 See, eg, Perry and Lindell, above n 146, 342-343. 
588 Macmillan Publishers Group Australia, Macquarie Dictionary 2003 (online), 'function' (A 
‘function’ suggests, ‘an activity or action proper to a person or institution’); Lexis Nexis, 
Encyclopaedic Australian Legal Dictionary (14 September 2016) ‘function’ (A function is a 
power, duty or authority, it may also include a responsibility – however in the definition 
highlighted, this reading of the word function was defined in the Act itself, see, eg, Animal 
Health Act 1995 (TAS) s 3(1)). 
589 A statutory body must then allocate its resources as it sees fit across the range of 
functions it is charged with. 
590  Meteorology Act 1955 (Cth) s 6(1)(c). 
591 See, eg, Emergencies Act 2004 (ACT) s 147; Emergency Management Act 2013 (NT) s 
9; Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) s 49; Emergency Management Act 2006 (Tas) s 32; 
Emergency Management Act 2013 (Vic) s 48 (Although both Tasmania and the Northern 
Territory also required the creation of regional and municipal / local emergency plans only 
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supporting guidelines, codes, protocols and communication plans and sub-
plans which incorporate activities adapted to regional requirements.592 These 
plans and standards are more detailed, because as Figure 6 demonstrates, 
they explain how to carry out the legislative requirements. These components 
may therefore specifically outline which party will be responsible for a warning 
or public communication, and who will take the lead role in communication. 
They may also highlight the relevant modalities which should be used to 
disseminate information in the emergency setting.  
 
As identified, additional regulatory components contain ‘responsibilities’ for 
operational activity. However, as earlier highlighted, there is some uncertainty, 
as to the role that soft law, or paralegal materials play at law, and whether 
liability might flow from a failure to comply with them.593 At times, soft law 
instruments may be so integrated with legislation that a failure to comply with 
it may be sufficient ground liability. In these instances, the soft law instrument 
is more akin to ‘explicit (and enforceable) government regulation’.594 However, 
whether the content of these instruments provides the basis for the formulation 
of a duty of care, and therefore, whether they are enforceable at law, will need 
to be determined in each circumstance. The question will be, does the failure 
to follow a guideline or a protocol provide grounds to raise an action in 
negligence or a duty of care?  
 
The ‘voluntary’ nature and the enforceability of additional regulatory 
components 
 
While Figure 6 suggests soft law instruments such as guidelines, standards 
and procedures may be non-binding and unenforceable; this may not prove to 
be true in the Australia context. As will be demonstrated in Chapter Six, the 
                                                          
Queensland District and Local Plans were included in the content analysis, as these will be 
utilised in the case study example to demonstrate the role of such plans or guidelines). 
592 See, eg, Emergency Management Act 2013 (Vic) s 44 (The commissioner may create 
protocols and guidelines in relation to warning – note the State Government Victoria, 
Victorian Warning Protocol, Version 2.0 (July 2013)). 
593 Fisher, 'Legal Reasoning in Environmental Law’, above n 94, 337; Commonwealth of 
Australia, ‘Grey-Letter Law’, above n 553, ix, xiv, xvi, xviii (Those that are binding have been 
labelled quasi-regulation, a ‘range of rules, instruments and standards’). 
594 Fisher, 'Legal Reasoning in Environmental Law’, above n 94, 337; Weeks, above n 551, 
2; Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Grey-Letter Law’, above n 553, x. 
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case law suggests that soft law components may not have the force of law and 
only be the subject of voluntary compliance. However, as previously indicated 
whether they have the force of law, and ‘dictate a conclusion’ or action595 may 
depend on the language used; whether the instrument is publicly available;596 
and the way in which the instrument is integrated with the primary Act.597  For 
example, the legislation may afford a discretion to create guidelines and 
standards. Upon creation of the guidelines, the legislation may stipulate that a 
degree of compliance, or at least consistency with the instrument is 
required.598 Therefore, the soft law instrument may have some binding effect. 
Conversely, the legislation may afford a discretion or be silent on the creation 
of further instruments. If a manual, guideline or protocol is created to assist in 
meeting legislative responsibilities, or to outline effective practice, it is likely 
that compliance with this type of soft law instrument will be voluntary. 
 
In Queensland, for example, the creation of guidelines and standards 
respectively is discretionary.599 Once created however, the legislation requires 
the state, district and local disaster management plans are to be consistent 
with the relevant guidelines and standards.600 The Chief Executive then has 
                                                          
595 Smoker v Pharmacy Restructuring Authority (1994) 125 ALR 577, 579. 
596 Weeks, above n 551, Chapter Nine (See generally, examination of the duty of care and 
the various applications to a Manual which is known or unknown to the public). 
597 See, eg, Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 
701, 429-430; Sheridan v Borgmeyer [2006] NSWCA 201, [18]; Maynard v Rover Mowers 
Ltd [2000] QCA 26; [17] (Where protocols and codes were deemed not more than a 
standard without legal force, however they may prove relevant to determining whether 
reasonable precautions have been taken) Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (Ruling No 2) 
(2011) 34 VR 584, [78]-[79](An emergency plan does not constitute delegated legislation 
which would bring about a statutory duty but may assist in the finding of a common law 
duty); See, also LexisNexis, Encyclopaedic Australian Legal Dictionary (at 13 Sept 2016) 
‘guidelines’ (Guidelines may be considered policy which ‘does not have the force of law 
unless the empowering legislation provides it is binding’); Fisher, Legal Reasoning in 
Environmental Law, above n 94, 337 (For example ‘there may be obligations on how to 
perform rather than obligations on outcomes’, or there may a ‘clear link to ensure 
compliance with the plans’ for example).  
598 Cf, Attorney General’s Department (Cth), Code of Practice for Warning Republishers 
(April 2013), Attorney General’s Department (Cth), Best Practice Guide for Warning 
Originators, above n 278 (By contrast the Commonwealth Code of practice and best practice 
guidelines are not intended to impose mandatory requirements but act as complementary 
guidance for state activities). 
599 Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) s 49, 50, 54, 58 (Interestingly the District and Local 
Disaster Management Guidelines themselves state their purpose is to provide guidance and 
support to meet legislated functions, rather than overtly requiring consistency with their 
contents) See, also, Emergency Management Act 2005 (VIC) s 18, 41 (Where the same 
position exists for Emergency Management Plans). 
600 Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) s 50, 54, 58. 
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the function, to ensure that ‘disaster management and disaster operations in 
the State are consistent with’ the strategic policy framework, the guidelines, 
standards and disaster management plan.601 Where there is a mandate to act 
consistently with an instrument, there may be greater likelihood that any failure 
to do so abide by them would be sufficient to raise a duty of care, the breach 
of which would ground a cause of action.602 This proposition will be examined 
further in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight. Irrespective of a legal obligation to 
comply with a soft law instrument and the functions it provides, the failure to 
do so may still lead to public criticism. A non-judicial inquiry which also follow 
and can negatively impact on the reputation and feelings of trust with the 
authority. 
Roles and obligations within components: ‘functions’, ‘powers’ 
and ‘responsibilities’  
As identified in the preceding paragraphs, across the regulatory components 
analysed in this Chapter, various terms are used to describe the role of an 
authority in warning. A statutory authority may have a function to warn, a power 
to warn, or a responsibility to issue warnings. To appreciate the likely legal 
implications for failing to carry out these functions, powers, and 
responsibilities, it is necessary to understand the level of obligation that 
attaches to these terms when they are used within statute.  
Function, power, duty 
In the first instance, a ‘function’ is addressed. A ‘function’ may be a power, 
authority or a duty.603 A function appears to grant power or authority to carry 
out a role or activity,604 which includes a power to act. These definitions do not 
however appear to incorporate an obligation to act. The term ‘duty’ is also 
                                                          
601 Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) s 16A. 
602 See, eg, Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 
701, 429-430; Sheridan v Borgmeyer [2006] NSWCA 201, [18]; Maynard v Rover Mowers 
Ltd [2000] QCA 26; [17] (Where protocols and codes were deemed not more than a 
standard without legal force, however they may prove relevant to determining whether 
reasonable precautions have been taken). 
603 See, also, Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 34 (Where a function includes a power); Acts 
Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) Schedule 1. 
604 See, eg, Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, above n 127, 212-213 (As in role 
responsibilities). 
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included in the definition of a function. A ‘duty’ is defined in legal terms as ‘a 
legal obligation owed from one person to another’, which ‘may require 
performance of certain actions’.605 This definition incorporates a greater sense 
of obligation, however, as becomes apparent in Chapter Six the obligation 
does not necessarily mean that liability will ensue. In some jurisdictions, there 
remains a discretion over whether to discharge a duty.606 Therefore, 
depending on the wording of the relevant act, something more may be required 
to demonstrate there is an obligation to discharge a duty, function or power to 
act.  
Responsibility 
The term ‘responsibility’, defined in Chapter One, was found in this analysis to 
be the term more commonly used in soft law instruments. Applying Hart’s 
taxonomy of responsibilities, responsibility for warning in an emergency 
situation in hard and soft law instruments is likely to be classified as role 
responsibilities.607 As becomes evident, in some cases, statements of role 
responsibility purely act to outline what responsibilities are,608 while others 
embed an obligation to act.609 The following three Chapters highlight, in the 
context of warning, that although a person may be blameworthy for failure to 
perform functions, they may not be legally responsible or legally 
accountable.610 A finding of legal responsibility will depend on the legal rules, 
                                                          
605 LexisNexis, Encyclopaedic Australian Legal Dictionary (at 8 October, 2016) ‘duty’. 
606 See, eg, Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 23(1)(2), 32CA (1) Schedule 1 (Given that a 
function includes a duty, and that a function may be performed, there is an element of 
discretion in the discharge of a duty); Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic) s 40, 45 (A 
duty ‘shall’ be performed from time to time, and shall means that the power must be 
exercised). 
607 Karin Boxer, ‘Harts Sense of ‘Responsibility’’ in Christopher Pulman (ed) Hart on 
Responsibility (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 31, 32; McLennan and Handmer, ‘Sharing 
Responsibility Australian Disaster Management’, above n 2, 17-19; Cane, Responsibility in 
Law and Morality, above n 104, 30-31; Cane, ‘Role responsibilities’, above n 127, 279-280 
(Role responsibilities can be attached to ‘persons who occupy a distinctive office in a place 
or institution, and to which specific duties are attached’); Hart, Punishment and 
Responsibility, above n 127, 212-213 (A role responsibility  outlines duties, which are the 
relevant person’s responsibility to perform or fulfil – it is a task assigned to a person). 
608 Boxer, above n 607, 31, 32; McLennan and Handmer, ‘Sharing Responsibility Australian 
Disaster Management’, above n 2, 17-19; Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality, above n 
104, 30-31; Cane, ‘Role responsibilities’, above n 127, 281. 
609 See, eg, Emergency Management Act 2013 (VIC) s 42, 43 (Where certain person must 
ensure that warnings are issued) Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (VIC) s 45; Cane, 
Responsibility in Law and Morality, above n 104, 1-2 (Noting that there may be ‘responsibility 
without legal liability and legal liability without responsibility’). 
610 Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, above n 127, 223. 
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and whether the relevant elements of liability have been satisfied in the 
circumstances.611 Having defined the relevant terms which appear within the 
instruments, it is now necessary to address the findings that were made after 
the examination of the regulatory components. The findings will address the 
key questions outlined at the commencement of this Chapter.  
Content Analysis Results 
The following results identify whether risk communication and warning is 
incorporated into regulatory components. They also provide an indication of 
whether responsibility for warning and the use of social media is clearly 
identifiable. The results are grouped as a response to each of the three key 
questions identified at the commencement of the Chapter. In response to each 
research question, the results are segmented to delimit the type of regulatory 
components in which references to warning and social media were identified. 
This segmentation is important in the following Chapters. As highlighted in the 
previous section, the type of component in which the responsibility is found, 
may play a role in whether a duty of care, which would ground a cause of 
action in negligence, is likely to be formulated. 
 
Question 1: Does the current regulatory system incorporate risk or 
public communication and information and warning within governance 
components? 
 
Because of its important role in the mitigation and control of natural hazard 
and emergency related risk, this question was formulated to determine 
whether risk or public communication and warning, feature within regulatory 
system components. The frequency of the terms within the data suggests that 
public communication, specifically warning is present in a variety of regulatory 
components. As Table 1 identifies, this is particularly true, in the case of soft 
law instruments such as plans, protocols, guidelines, standards. It is less 
frequently true for legislation612 and policy. Qualitative analysis of the wording 
                                                          
611 Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, above n 127, 215. 
612 See, legislative exceptions, Emergency Management Act 2013 (VIC) s 21, 42, 43 (where 
warning and communications are specifically mentioned as a function of the chief executive 
and other relevant bodies); See also, Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) s 4(c) (Where 
the objects of the Act include ensuring that communities receive appropriate information 
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of the components provides a further level of understanding as to the 
emphasis placed on communication and warning. In high level policy for 
example, despite few mentions of warning, The National Strategy for Disaster 
Resilience, identifies ‘communicating with and educating people about risks’ 
as one of seven key areas for action.613 The strategy places a fundamental 
importance on the role of communication in building a resilient community. As 
defined in Chapter One, a resilient community ‘works together to understand 
the risks that is confronts’614 and is a self-reliant community.  
 
Table 1: Presence of the term ‘warn’ across Australia’s emergency 
management regulatory components 
 
Policy Document 
State Legislation Warn 
Mentions 
Commonwealth 
(CTH) 
National Strategy for Disaster 
Resilience 
2 
Queensland (QLD) Queensland’s Strategy for 
Disaster Resilience 
2 
 Disaster Management Strategic 
Policy Framework 
2 
Tasmania (TAS) Tasmania State Emergency 
Management Committee Strategic 
Policy Framework 
1 
Victoria (VIC) Victorian Emergency 
Management Strategic Action 
Plan 2015-2018 
9 
                                                          
about responding to and recovering from a disaster); Emergencies Act 2004 (ACT) s 8(4)(h), 
149 (This Act emphasises the importance of communicating information, advice and warning 
to the community during an emergency, and requires that the emergency plan contain a 
community communication and information plan, which addresses a number of details); Fire 
and Emergency Act (NT) (Role of the fire and rescue service includes conduct of emergency 
education and awareness). 
613 Council of Australian Governments (COAG), National Strategy for Disaster Resilience 
(2011) 8, 9 (The fundamental importance of communication is noted for building a resilient, 
empowered and self-reliant community). 
614 Council of Australian Governments (COAG), National Strategy for Disaster Resilience 
(2011) 8,9 (The strategy notes the importance of knowledge building when communicating 
with individuals, so communicating is about educating and assisting in the understanding of 
risks). 
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 Emergency Management in 
Victoria Part 1: Emergency 
Management Manual Victoria615 
1 
 
 
 
Legislation 
State Name of Act Warn 
Mentions 
Australian Capital 
Territory (ACT) 
Emergencies Act 2004 1 
Commonwealth Meteorology Act 1955 1 
New South Wales 
(NSW) 
State Emergency Service Act 
1989 
1 
 State Emergency and Rescue 
Management Act 1989 
1 
 Rural Fires Act 1997 1 
 Fire Brigades Act 1989 0 
Northern Territory 
(NT) 
Bushfires Act 0 
 Fire and Emergency Act 2004 0 
 Emergency Act 2013 2616 
Queensland (QLD) Fire and Emergency Services Act 
1990 
23617 
 Public Safety Preservation Act 
1986 
0 
 Disaster Management Act 2003 5618 
South Australia (SA) Emergency Management Act 
2004 
0 
 Fire and Emergency Services Act 
2005 
5619 
Tasmania (TAS) Emergency Management Act 
2006 
0 
                                                          
615 See, eg, Emergency Management (Vic), Emergency Management Manual Victoria 
<https://www.emv.vic.gov.au/policies/emmv/> (The determination for this research that the 
manual provides policy is based on the web reference which outlines the purpose of the 
manual, the first Chapter of the manual was classified as a policy document for the content 
analysis, in part because it contains the framework and objectives for Emergency 
Management). 
616 Emergency Act 2013 (NT) s 18 (The references to warn in this Act refer to when an 
emergency situation is deemed to exist). 
617 Although there is a high count of the word warning in this Act, none of the references to 
warning here relate to public information warnings. 
618 Only one of the references to warn in this Act relate to public warning for emergencies. 
619 Fire and Emergency Services Act 2005 (SA) s 80 129 (The references to warning here 
relate only to broadcast of total fire bans and the power to provide and erect sirens for the 
purpose of warning for outbreak or threat of fire). 
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 Fire Service Act 1979 1620 
Victoria (VIC) Victoria State Emergency Service 
Act 2005 
0 
 Country Fire Authority Act 1958 7621 
 Forests Act 1958 4 
 Emergency Management Act 
2013 
11622 
 Emergency Management Act 
1986 
0 
 Metropolitan Fire Brigades Act 
1958 
5 
Western Australia 
(WA) 
Bush Fires Act 1954 0 
 Fire Brigades Act 1942 0 
 Fire and Emergency Services Act 
1998 
0 
 Emergency Management Act 
2005 
0 
Other Regulatory Components 
State Component Name Warn 
Mentions 
Australian Capital 
Territory (ACT) 
Emergencies (Plan) 2014 (No.1) 16 
Commonwealth 
(CTH) 
Emergency Warnings choosing 
your own words 
97 
 Best Practice Guide for Warning 
Originators 
189 
 Code of Practice for Warning 
Republishers 
65 
 Australia's Emergency Warning 
Arrangements 
150 
New South Wales 
(NSW) 
New South Wales State 
Emergency Management Plan 
13 
 New South Wales Public 
Information Services Functional 
Area Supporting Plan 
6 
Northern Territory 
(NT) 
Territory Emergency Plan 20 
                                                          
620 Fire Service Act 1979 (TAS) s 133 (Relates to the governor’s ability to create fire 
regulations with an inclusion of warning). 
621 A duplication of the word warning can exist in legislation such as this Act, where warning 
is mentioned in the contents of the Act as well as within substantive sections of the Act. 
622 A duplication of the word warning can exist in legislation such as this Act, where warning 
is mentioned in the contents of the Act as well as within substantive sections of the Act. 
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Queensland (QLD) Queensland State Disaster 
Management Plan 
34 
 Emergency Management 
Assurance Framework 
14 
 Queensland District Disaster 
Management Guidelines 
12 
 Queensland Local Disaster 
Management Guidelines 
32 
 District Disaster Management 
Plan example: 
Brisbane District Disaster 
Management Plan 2014-2015 
43 
 Local Disaster Management Plan 
example: 
Redland City Disaster 
Management Plan (2016) 
23 
South Australia (SA) State Emergency Management 
Plan 
165623 
Tasmania (TAS) Tasmanian Emergency 
Management Plan 
41 
Victoria (VIC) State Emergency Response Plan: 
‘Part 3: Emergency Management 
Manual Victoria’ 
67 
 Emergency Management 
Performance Standards (VIC) 
13 
 Victorian Warning Protocol 244624 
Western Australia 
(WA) 
State Emergency Management 
Plan for Fire August 2013: 
Westplan – Fire 
21 
 State Emergency Management 
Plan for Flood (Westplan– Flood) 
64 
 State Public Information 
Emergency Management Support 
Plan (Westplan - Emergency 
Public Information) 
18 
 
                                                          
623 This document appears as an anomaly in that it combines not only the emergency 
management plan but the public information plan as an appendix to the document, therefore 
acting to combine, what in some jurisdictions appears as two separate documents, and 
being based in part on public information there are a high number of references to warning. 
624 This number of mentions of warning in this document is somewhat of an anomaly, in that 
as the word warning is utilised within the header, footer and title of the document, these are 
included in the count and are difficult to separate out, 4 metadata references for warning 
were not included in the count. 
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Policy statements 
There are a limited number of jurisdictions that have created policy statements 
directed towards emergency management. As indicated in Table 1 there is 
little evidence of publicly available, state government or emergency sector 
policy in South Australia, Western Australia or New South Wales. Of those 
jurisdictions which have created policy statements, those formed by central 
government and the relevant State and Territory emergency management 
committees, indicate a presence of public communication and warning. There 
is however, less emphasis on communication and warning in the State 
components, than in the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience. 
Accordingly, rather than being a central area for action, statements related to 
communication and warning are usually incorporated under key areas for 
action such as ‘Response’. Where a statement related to risk communication 
and warning is present, it tends to acknowledge the need for ‘ongoing effort to 
communicate risk information to the community’;625 the need to develop 
strategies within the response phase for effective communication in order to 
minimise the impacts of a disaster;626 or the need to improve communication 
and ‘enhance public information and community warning capabilities’.627 
These policy statements reflect the need for risk communication in the form of 
ongoing education, as well as a response-related tasks focused on a specific 
threat.  
Legislation 
 
As earlier indicated, legislation is a hard law instrument, which is legally 
binding on a statutory authority, and therefore legally enforceable. As indicated 
communication has been identified as a key mitigation mechanism and a key 
strategic priority at a national level. Despite the national focus, as Table 1 
highlights, the need to communicate or more particularly warn the community, 
                                                          
625 Queensland Government, Queensland Strategy for Disaster Resilience 4 
<http://www.dilgp.qld.gov.au/resources/plan/local-government/queensland-strategy-for-
disaster-resilience.pdf>. 
626State Disaster Management Group (Qld) Disaster Management Strategic Policy 
Framework (November 2010) 11. 
627 State Emergency Management Committee (Tas), Strategic Directions Framework (2013-
2018) 7; Emergency Management (Vic), Victorian Emergency Management Strategic Action 
Plan 2015-2018 (2015) 23. 
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filters down into legislation, to a limited degree. In addressing public 
communication more generally, the emergency management legislation in 
Queensland, is the only example which links the need to convey information 
to the public, to achieve the objects of the Act.628 The remainder of the 
emergency management legislation that incorporates warning and public 
communication, focuses more generally on the establishment of the statutory 
bodies, and the necessary framework and infrastructure for efficient and 
effective emergency management or service delivery generally.629 Functions 
relevant to communication include the need to ‘emphasise the importance of 
communication and warnings’ or to provide a forum for their development and 
improvement.630  
 
Regarding warning more specifically, there are again limited references in the 
emergency management legislation. The exception to this is in Victoria, where 
there is direct incorporation of a function to issue warnings for fire.631 
Becoming more diluted, in Queensland, warning is one of the many response 
activities which an agency can carry out.632 In contrast to even infrequent 
references to communication and warning in these jurisdictions, South 
Australia, the Northern Territory and Tasmania do not include the words 
communication, information or warning, in their emergency management 
legislation.633 Outside of the emergency management statutes, and as earlier 
identified, warning is mentioned once in relation to functions of the Bureau of 
Meteorology in Commonwealth legislation.634 In Victoria and New South 
                                                          
628 Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) s 3(a), 4(c) (Where the provision of information is 
linked to achieving the objects of the Act to mitigate, prepare and response effectively to 
emergencies). 
629 Emergencies Act 2004 (ACT) s 149 (This reference in this Act is about the requirement to 
create a community communication and information plan); Emergency Management Act 
2013 (VIC) s 5, 42, 43 (In this Act, there is an emphasis on issuing warnings and providing 
information about fire to the community); State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 
1989 (NSW) s 15 (The only reference is for the SEMC to arrange for graduated warnings of 
emergencies to the public). 
630 Emergencies Act 2004 (ACT) s 8(4)(h); Emergency Management Act 2005 (WA) s 14. 
631 Emergency Management Act 2013 (VIC) s 5, 42, 43 (In this Act, there is an emphasis on 
issuing warnings and providing information about fire to the community); State Emergency 
and Rescue Management Act 1989 (NSW) s 15 (The only reference for the SEMC to 
arrange for graduated warnings of emergencies to the public). 
632 Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) Schedule (Definition of response activities). 
633 Emergency Management Act 2004 (SA); Emergency Management Act 2006 (TAS). 
634 Meteorology Act 1955 (Cth) s 6(1)(c). 
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Wales, there is also some inclusion of warning in fire legislation.635 An initial 
conclusion based on these results is that there is little direct inclusion of 
functions for risk communication and warning in hard law instruments. As will 
be demonstrated in Chapter Six, the absence of functions in this area will affect 
the ability to assert a duty of care is owed at common law. 
Other Regulatory Components 
In contrast to high level policy and legislation, and as is evident in Table 1, the 
soft law instruments incorporate a greater number of references to warning. 
The communications plans, standards and guidelines across all levels of 
government, also include greater emphasis on public communication more 
generally. The greater emphasis on both warning and public communication 
in these instruments is likely to be related to their role, identified in Figure 6, 
as providing a ‘how to’636 of emergency management. These instruments 
generally take a more comprehensive approach to communication and 
warning. They suggest or require public communication plans and sub-plans. 
They include the need to create communication infrastructure. They also 
highlight leading combat agencies, allocate roles and responsibilities for the 
dissemination of public communication and warning,637 as well as identifying 
key capabilities to be developed, and principles to follow.638  
                                                          
635 See, eg, Meteorology Act 1955 (Cth) s 6; State Emergency Service Act 1989 (NSW) s 
12(3); Fire and Emergency Services Act 1998 (WA) s 18E; Fire and Emergency Services 
Act 2005 (SA) s 108 (3)(3), 129. 
636 See Figure 6. 
637 See, eg, Emergencies (Emergency Plan) 2014 (No 1) (ACT); Queensland Government, 
Queensland State Disaster Management Plan (2015) 14 (Replaced by Queensland 
Government, Queensland State Disaster Management Plan (September 2016) (Provides 
that the functional lead agency for warning is Queensland Fire and Emergency Services 
supported by the State Disaster Coordination Centre); New South Wales, New South Wales 
State Emergency Management Plan (2012) 7 (This plan suggests that combat agencies 
have statutory responsibilities to issue warnings – however on a survey of the legislation 
there is no direct reference to warning aside from Fire and the State Emergency Services); 
Department of Police and Emergency Management (Tas), Tasmanian Emergency 
Management Plan, Issue 8 (2015) 48 (Which highlights the key role of BOM with assisting 
parties being DHHS, council media the State Emergency Service and the Tasmanian 
Police); Government of South Australia, State Emergency Management Plan, Version 2.14 
(2015) 186-187; Territory Emergency Management Council (NT), Territory Emergency Plan 
(2014) 48, 73; Emergency Management Victoria (Vic), Emergency Management Manual 
Victoria, 'Part 3: State Emergency Response Plan' (2014) 3-10-3-13 (Where fire, control 
agencies and the Bureau of Meteorology have responsibilities to issue warnings). 
638 Inspector-General Emergency Management (Qld), Emergency Management Assurance 
Framework, above n 107, 23-25; Queensland Government, Queensland State Disaster 
Management Plan (May 2015); Emergency Management Queensland, Department of 
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Conclusion 
From the components analysed, and in response to the question posed in this 
section, the results clearly indicate that risk communication in the form of 
public communication and warning is present in a number of regulatory 
components. Principally references to these terms occur in policy, plans, 
standards and guidelines. As identified in the earlier framework Chapters 
however, international research suggests that warning and communication 
should be incorporated into law. Aside from exceptions within Queensland and 
Victoria, the greater emphasis is placed on public communication and warning 
in the ‘how to’ instruments. As previously identified many of the ‘how to’ 
components would not create a legal duty to act. Where these instruments are 
not binding and enforceable, there may be gap in the Australia regulatory 
system which is inconsistent with international recommendations.639  
In terms of horizontal alignment within the regulatory system, and in reflecting 
on Figure 6, public communication and warning flows down from high level 
policy to the ‘how to’ documents. The adoption of communication and warning 
in these documents is presumed to be in response to the priority which is 
placed on this area in the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience.  However, 
the lack of inclusion in State policy and legislation, suggest a lack of alignment 
and therefore coherence, in the national regulatory system as a whole.640 
Further research is required to understand the effect of the lack of focus on 
communication and warning within state policy and legislation. The aim of this 
research would be to determine whether an absence of warning and 
communication decreases the understanding amongst agencies that risk 
communication is a key control or mitigation device for natural hazard and 
emergency related risk. 
 
                                                          
Community Safety, Queensland District Disaster Management Guidelines (2012); 
Emergency Management Queensland, Queensland Local Disaster Management Guidelines 
(2012) (See sections referring to response and planning phases); Emergency Management 
Victoria (Vic), Emergency Management Manual Victoria, 'Part 3: State Emergency Response 
Plan' (2014) 3-29. 
639 See, eg, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, above n 79, 
4. 
640 Sheehy and Feaver, above n 94, 398. 
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Question 2: Are responsibilities for public communication, more 
particularly warning apparent in regulatory components? 
 
This section builds on the knowledge developed in response to Question 1, to 
further develop an understanding of whether clear responsibilities for public 
communication and warning exist. The focus here is on the responsibility to 
warn the community of potential risks which can enable individuals within a 
community to be self-reliant and undertake self-protection in an emergency 
situation. By drawing out the data related to warning, any responsibility can be 
aligned with the case law analysed in the following Chapters in relation to the 
duty to warn and a breach of that duty. 
Policy Statements 
As identified in the previous section, the need to incorporate public 
communication and warning as a priority was apparent in limited policy 
documents.  This outcome is most likely attributable to the role of policy in the 
overall regulatory system as a broad vision statement on how to approach and 
manage emergencies. With incorporation in policy limited, the extent to which 
responsibilities for communication and warning are expressed and identifiable, 
or as being attributable to a specific agency, is negligible. 
Legislation 
Hard law instruments such as the Emergency and Disaster Management Acts 
within each Australian jurisdiction, along with the Acts that establish 
emergency service agencies, formed the next layer of instruments examined. 
On a plain reading of the legislation, it can be difficult to pinpoint 
‘responsibilities’ for public communication and warning. This is because, as 
highlighted earlier, the term ‘function’ is often used. A ‘function’ has been 
defined in legal terms as ‘a power, duty or authority’ to act, it may only include 
a responsibility where expressly defined within an Act.641  Although the 
                                                          
641 Macmillan Publishers Group Australia, Macquarie Dictionary 2003 (online), 'function' (A 
‘function’ suggests, ‘an activity or action proper to a person or institution’); Lexis Nexis, 
Encyclopaedic Australian Legal Dictionary (14 September 2016) ‘function’ (A function is a 
power, duty or authority, it may also include a responsibility – however in the definition 
highlighted, this reading of the word function was defined in the Act itself, see, eg, Animal 
Health Act 1995 (Tas) s 3(1)). 
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definition provided here incorporates the notions of duty, as previously averted 
to it is only in particular circumstances that a function or power in statute, is 
sufficient to form the basis for a legal duty of care. 
 
As indicated, a limited number of functions for communication and warning 
were incorporated in the relevant statutes. In Queensland, as was highlighted 
in response to the previous research question, there was an 
acknowledgement of the need to convey information to meet the objects of the 
Act. However, there are only indirect references to responsibilities for warning 
and communication.642 In this Act, a reference is also made to functions of 
district and local government management groups. These functions include 
the need to ensure the community is ‘aware of ways of mitigating the adverse 
effects of an event and preparing for, responding to and recovering from a 
disaster’.643 While this suggests communication is required, there is no 
mandate or direct reference to the need to warn.  
 
In Victoria, greater emphasis is placed on warning for fire. Responsibilities are 
made clear in both emergency management and related emergency service 
legislation. In this jurisdiction, for example it is a mandated requirement to 
ensure the community is warned of fire.644 This requirement falls on the 
Emergency Management Commissioner, with the specific requirement to 
issue major fire warnings, falling on the State Response Controller, and 
otherwise the controlling officer.645 So too, fire legislation in the jurisdiction 
highlights the duty to warn of fire and the party responsible.646 Despite an all-
hazard approach,647 which would be expected to be incorporated in this 
legislation, the focus on fire in Victoria, is presumably due to the previously 
                                                          
642 See, eg, Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) Schedule (Issuance of a warning is one 
possible response activity and then many parties have responsibilities for ‘responding’ to a 
disaster). 
643 Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) s 23(f), 30(f). 
644 Emergency Management Act 2013 (Vic) s 42. 
645 Emergency Management Act 2013 (Vic) s 42, 43, 44 (Noting here that in carrying out 
these roles, ‘the relevant person must have regard to guidelines, protocols and operating 
protocols issued under the Act’). 
646 Country Fire Authority Act 1958 (Vic); Metropolitan Fire Brigades Act 1958 (Vic) (The 
responsibility falling on the chief officer); Forests Act 1958 (Vic). 
647 Emergency Management Australia, Emergency Management Australia: Concepts and 
Principles (Manual 1, 2004) viii. 
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identified allocation of warning functions to the Bureau of Meteorology. As 
identified the Bureau of Meteorology, at a federal level, has a function to issue 
warnings for ‘gales, storms and other weather conditions likely to endanger life 
and property including weather conditions likely to give rise to flood and 
bushfires’.648  
In both Western Australia and the Australian Capital Territory, there are 
legislated functions to ‘emphasise the importance of communication and 
warnings’, or to provide a forum for their development.649 Functions are also 
outlined for the creation of infrastructure which supports communications and 
warnings.650 However it is only in New South Wales, that the emergency 
service legislation, which establishes the respective services, provide for 
functions falling on the ‘service’ to act as the combat agency for a specific 
hazard, and provide warning infrastructure and warnings specifically.651 If 
there are two sources of potential powers or functions for a statutory authority 
in the emergency management sector, confusion may arise as to which takes 
precedence, or whether the emergency services legislation continues to 
operate in an emergency. Aside from these functions, which at times are 
vague, and fall on a ‘service’ rather than an individual, there is an absence in 
legislative instruments of clear and specific legal responsibilities or 
requirements to issue a warning.  
Additional Regulatory Components 
Table 1 identifies numerous instances where the term ‘warning’ is used within 
soft law instruments. In each jurisdiction, emergency or disaster management 
plans are required to be created under statute.  In each of these plans, either 
combat agencies, nominated agencies, or public information co-ordinators, 
                                                          
648 Meteorology Act 1955 (Cth) s 6(1)(c). 
649 Emergencies Act 2004 (ACT) s 8(4)(h); Emergency Management Act 2005 (WA) s 14 
(These functions fall on the Emergency Services Commissioner and the State Emergency 
Management Committee respectively). 
650 Emergency Management Act 2013 (NT) s 46; Emergencies Act 2004 (ACT) s 9; State 
Emergency and Rescue Management Act 1989 (NSW) s 3. 
651 Rural Fires Act 1997 (NSW) s 9(1)(a1) (‘The rural fire service has a function to issue 
public warnings about bush fires and bush fire threats in the State for the purpose of 
protecting life and property’); State Emergency Service Act 1989 (NSW) s 8(1)(a) (The State 
Emergency Service is the combat agency responsible for dealing with flood, ‘including the 
establishment of flood warning systems’).  
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are assigned specific ‘responsibilities’, or at least the role of managing or 
issuing public information and warning.652 It is noted that allocation of 
responsibilities, is not uniform and differs in each jurisdiction. The most 
comprehensive of the emergency management plans, is the South Australian 
State Emergency Management Plan which includes a public information plan 
as an appendix.653 Although the legislation requires the plans, they are still soft 
law in that they are not regulation. Confusingly, however, the extent to the 
responsibilities within plans may be quasi-regulation and more likely 
enforceable, is unclear.654 As will be examined in Chapter Six, despite lacking 
legislative qualities, ‘courts are now prepared to view soft law as both 
significant and persuasive to the extent that it ‘often has something 
approaching [binding legal effect]’.655  
 
The language of public information plans, warning protocols and supporting 
hazard specific plans in some jurisdictions afford a greater understanding as 
to responsibilities and whether there is a requirement to comply with the 
instruments.656 Plans along with relevant standards, note the critical role that 
                                                          
652 See, eg, Emergencies (Emergency Plan) 2014 (No 1); Queensland Government, 
Queensland State Disaster Management Plan (May 2015) (Provides that the functional lead 
agency for warning is Queensland Fire and Emergency Services supported by the State 
Disaster Coordination Centre, replaced by the Queensland Government, Queensland State 
Disaster Management Plan (September 2016)); New South Wales Government, New South 
Wales State Emergency Management Plan (2012) (Interestingly this plan suggests that 
combat agencies have statutory responsibilities to issue warnings – however on a survey of 
the legislation there is no direct reference to warning aside from Fire and the State 
Emergency Services); Department of Police and Emergency Management (Tas), Tasmanian 
Emergency Management Plan, Issue 8 (2015) (Which highlights the key role of BOM with 
assisting parties being DHHS, council media the State Emergency Service and the 
Tasmanian Police); Government of South Australia, State Emergency Management Plan 
Version 2.14 (2015) (Replaced by Government of South Australia, State Emergency 
Management Plan, Version 2.15 (2015)); Territory Emergency Management Council (NT), 
Territory Emergency Plan (2014) (Replaced by Territory Emergency Management Council 
(NT), Territory Emergency Plan (February 2016)); Emergency Management Victoria (Vic), 
Emergency Management Manual Victoria, 'Part 3: State Emergency Response Plan' (2014) 
(Where fire, control agencies and the Bureau of Meteorology have responsibilities to issue 
warnings). 
653 Government of South Australia, State Emergency Management Plan Version 2.14 
(2015). 
654 Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Grey-Letter Law’, above n 553, 9-10 (Noting the blurred 
lines between explicit government regulation and quasi-regulation); Weeks, above n 551, 15, 
24. 
655 Weeks, above n 551, 15. 
656 See, eg, Government of Western Australian, State Emergency Management Plan for Fire 
(Westplan – Fire)(2013)(Replaced by Department of Fire and Emergency Services (WA), 
State Hazard Plan for Fire (WESTPLAN - FIRE)(May 2016))(In this supporting hazard plan 
for example, the Department of Fire and Emergency Services is responsible for the 
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the public information role plays in an emergency.657 The Standards 
themselves, rather than attributing responsibility, ‘play an informational and 
quality assurance role’658 and indicate the performance benchmarks, that are 
required to be met.659 The Commonwealth codes and guidelines are not 
prescriptive. Instead, their stated purpose is to act in an advisory capacity, to 
outline the principles and policies relevant to effective warning, and therefore 
compliance with them is voluntary.660 The Commonwealth component which 
outlines warning arrangements, also highlights the limited role or responsibility 
of the Commonwealth government in warning. Australia's Emergency Warning 
Arrangements, identify that the role of the Commonwealth government is to 
provide ‘national leadership around emergency warning activity’ which 
includes assisting states and territories to enhance their warning 
                                                          
distribution of Severe, Extreme and Catastrophic fire weather warnings and other warnings 
beyond the normal Department of Meteorology dissemination); Brisbane District Disaster 
Management Group, Brisbane District Disaster Management Plan 2014-2015 (September 
2014); Redland City Council, Redland City Disaster Management Plan: Part 
1(2016)(Specific agencies are identified under the response strategy for carriage of 
warnings for specified events, with the district and local groups being identified as having a 
responsibility to support early warnings, or as being the official source of public information); 
State Government Victoria, Victorian Warning Protocol, Version 2.0 (July 2013); State 
Emergency Management Committee (NSW), New South Wales Public Information Services 
Functional Area Supporting Plan (2005) (Which provides for the role of the Public 
Information Services functional area co-ordinator, and noting that all agencies responding to 
an emergency are entitled to release information); Western Australia, State Public 
Information Emergency Management Support Plan (Westplan Emergency Public 
Information)(2012) (Which outlines the role of the controlling agency in managing the public 
information function). 
657 Emergency Management Victoria, Emergency Management Performance Standards 
(December 2015) 19 (Replaced by Emergency Management Victoria, Emergency 
Management Performance Standards, Version 2.0 (December 2016)); Inspector-General 
Emergency Management (Qld), Emergency Management Assurance Framework, above n 
107, 23-24. 
658 Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Grey-Letter Law’, above n 553, xv. 
659 Inspector-General Emergency Management (Qld), Emergency Management Assurance 
Framework, above n 107. 
660 Australian Government, Emergency Warnings choosing your own words (Edition 2, 
December 2008); Attorney General’s Department (Cth), Best Practice Guide for Warning 
Originators, above n 278; Attorney General’s Department (Cth), Code of Practice for 
Warning Republishers (April 2013);  Attorney-General's Department(Cth), Australia's 
Emergency Warning Arrangements (April 2013); Weeks, above n 551, 18; See also, 
Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, 429-
430, Sheridan v Borgmeyer [2006] NSWCA 201, [18]; Maynard v Rover Mowers Ltd [2000] 
QCA 26; [17] (Where protocols and codes were deemed not more than a standard without 
legal force, however they may prove relevant to determining whether reasonable 
precautions have been taken) See, also LexisNexis, Encyclopaedic Australian Legal 
Dictionary (at 24 September 2016) ’Administrative Law’ (Where a guidelines may be 
considered policy which ‘does not have the force of law unless the empowering legislation 
provides it is binding’). 
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capabilities’.661 Therefore, while clear responsibilities are incorporated into soft 
law components, compliance with the majority are voluntary. As will be 
highlighted in Chapter Six however, compliance with soft law instruments, in 
particular standards and procedures, may be influential in determining whether 
a breach of a duty of care has occurred.  
 
Conclusions 
 
These results for this section reveal that responsibilities for public 
communication and warning, are to be found within regulatory components in 
the Australian Emergency Management context. With a few exceptions, clear 
and direct references to responsibilities are primarily identifiable in soft law 
instruments, rather than high level policy and legislation. In terms of the 
enforceability of the soft law components, aside from those created in the 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT),662 many of the instruments may not have 
the force of law.663 Consequently, aside from the exceptions described in 
legislation, where there is a clear function for warning allocated to  the Bureau 
of Metrology, or a duty to warn of fire is evident, the Australian regulatory 
system for emergency management might not meet recommendations arising 
out of principles of good  practice for disaster risk reduction law. As highlighted 
in Chapters Three and Four, principles of good practice call for clear 
responsibilities for communication and warning, as well as provision for early 
warning systems to be incorporated into law.664 In examining these 
responsibilities further, Chapters Six and Seven, will examine case law to 
determine which components will more likely act to ground a cause of action 
in negligence based upon a breach of a legal duty of care. 
 
                                                          
661 Attorney-General's Department (Cth), Australia's Emergency Warning Arrangements 
(April 2013) 5. 
662 See, eg, Emergencies (ESA Social Media Policy) Commissioner’s Guidelines 2011 (ACT) 
(Which are created as legislative instruments). 
663 See, eg, Legislation Act 2003 (Cth) s 4 (‘primary law means an Act or an instrument 
made under an Act or a provision of an Act or an instrument made under an Act’). 
664 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, above n 79, 3-4. 
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Question 3: Is the need to use, and / or responsibilities for the use of 
social media present in regulatory system components?  
In response to the third research question, an analysis of the data identifies an 
inclusion, although lack of emphasis on social media as a channel for 
dissemination. This is true across Commonwealth and State level policy and 
legislation. The exceptions are indirect references to new technologies in the 
National Strategy for Disaster Resilience when it is appropriate to the audience 
needs,665 as well as a limited reference to emerging technologies, within the 
‘Victorian Emergency Management Strategic Action Plan 2015-2018’.666 As 
earlier identified, these instruments are vision statements, and instruments 
which should not attract detail, therefore these findings are unsurprising.  
Table 2: Depicts regulatory components other than legislation and policy 
where ‘social media’ is mentioned. 
 
State Component Name Social 
Media 
Mentions 
Australian Capital 
Territory (ACT) 
Emergencies (Plan) 2014 (No.1) 
667 
2 
Commonwealth 
(CTH) 
Emergency Warnings choosing 
your own words 
0 
 Best Practice Guide for Warning 
Originators 
1 
 Code of Practice for Warning 
Republishers 
1 
 Australia's Emergency Warning 
Arrangements 
2 
                                                          
665 Council of Australian Governments (COAG), National Strategy for Disaster Resilience 
(2011), 8, 13 (The Strategy notes the ‘significant progress being made through the 
introduction of new technologies’, and refers to the growing use of mobile applications and 
smart devices in the area of communication, as well as the expectation ‘from the community 
that government agencies’ will utilise them). 
666 Emergency Management (Vic), Victorian Emergency Management Strategic Action Plan 
2015-2018 (2015) 23 (The plan envisages enhancing system and platforms to deliver 
services including ‘the implementation of communications plans in line with social, technical 
environments and emerging technologies where appropriate’). 
667 Emergencies Act 2004 (ACT) s 147 (The creation of the plan is mandatory under this 
primary legislative instrument). 
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New South Wales 
(NSW) 
New South Wales State 
Emergency Management Plan668 
1 
 New South Wales Public 
Information Services Functional 
Area Supporting Plan 
0 
Northern Territory 
(NT) 
Territory Emergency 
Management Plan669 
1 
Queensland (QLD) Queensland State Disaster 
Management Plan670 
5 
 Emergency Management 
Assurance Framework 
0 
 Queensland District Disaster 
Management Guidelines 
1 
 Queensland Local Disaster 
Management Guidelines 
2 
 District Disaster Management 
Plan example: 
Brisbane District Disaster 
Management Plan 2014-2015 
1 
 Local Disaster Management Plan 
example: 
Redland City Disaster 
Management Plan (2016) 
1 
South Australia (SA) State Emergency Management 
Plan671 
7 
Tasmania (TAS) Tasmanian Emergency 
Management Plan672 
1 
Victoria (VIC) State Emergency Response Plan: 
Part 3: Emergency Management 
Manual Victoria673 
1 
 Emergency Management 
Performance Standards (VIC) 
0 
 Victorian Warning Protocol 2 
                                                          
668 State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 1989 (NSW) s 12 (The creation of the 
plan is mandatory under this primary legislative instrument). 
669 Emergency Management Act 2013 (NT) s 9 (The creation of the plan is mandatory under 
this primary legislative instrument). 
670 Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) s 49, 53, 57(The creation of the plan is mandatory 
under this primary legislative instrument). 
671 Emergency Management Act 2004 (SA) s 9(1)(b) (preparation of the plan is stated as a 
function so may carry less of a mandate than in other jurisdictions). 
672 Emergency Management Act 2006 (TAS) s 32. 
673 Emergency Management Act 2013 (VIC) s 48, 53. 
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Western Australia 
(WA) 
State Emergency Management 
Plan for Fire August 2013: 
Westplan – Fire674 
3 
 State Emergency Management 
Plan for Flood (Westplan– Flood) 
0 
 State Public Information 
Emergency Management Support 
Plan (Westplan - Emergency 
Public Information) 
7 
 
Table 2 presents results from publicly available emergency management 
plans, public information or related plans, general codes and guidelines, for 
communication and warning.  In Queensland, district and local plans or 
guidelines were also included as this jurisdiction will form the basis of analysis 
of the case study. As figures in the Table demonstrate, the greater frequency 
of references to social media, are in emergency management and 
communications plans, standards, and guidelines, as opposed to policy and 
legislation. In some instances, however, references to social media or new 
technologies are not present or are limited.  
 
Where a reference to social media was present, a qualitative examination of 
the related wording was undertaken. When social media is mentioned this 
examination identified that there is an expectation to consider its use. In some 
cases, components merely highlight the availability of the channels,675 
noting that as one modality for warning, social media is ‘increasingly used’, 
and is seen as ‘an effective and inexpensive, contemporary form of mass 
communication’.676 The components call for inclusion in public information 
                                                          
674 Emergency Management Act 2005 (WA) s 18 (This provision was difficult to interpret in 
terms of the mandatory nature of the plans, as it is mandatory to create plans but specific 
plans are not specified. Two plans are selected as Western Australia have created hazard 
specific plans incorporating all aspects of emergencies, whereas other have created a 
central emergency management plan supported by hazard specific plans). 
675 Queensland Government, Queensland State Disaster Management Plan (May 2015) 
(Replaced by Queensland Government, Queensland State Disaster Management Plan 
(September 2016) 30); Queensland Government, Queensland Government arrangements 
for coordinating public information in a crisis (2011) 2 
<http://www.disaster.qld.gov.au/Disaster-
Resources/Documents/DPC2739_Crisis_Communication_Document_FINAL.PDF>. 
676 Attorney General’s Department (Cth), Australia’s Emergency Warning Arrangements, 
above n 40, 16-17; Emergency Management Queensland, Queensland Local Disaster 
Management Guidelines (2012) 44. 
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and warnings plans677 and communications infrastructure and 
systems.678 Other components identify that social media channels 
should,679 will680 and are being adopted681 to communicate and warn the 
public during emergencies. Even where specific reference to using social 
media is not made, a reference is made to the need to employ multiple 
methods or channels for warning.682 Throughout the components there is 
an absence of a prescriptive requirement to use the channels, which are 
clearly envisaged as a discretionary channel.683 Adopting this position in the 
components is consistent with the notion developed in Chapter Three, that the 
channels may not be relevant or appropriate to every audience.684  When 
                                                          
677 See, eg, Emergency Management Queensland, Queensland Local Disaster Management 
Guidelines (2012) 45 
678 Government of South Australia, State Emergency Management Plan, Version 2.14 
(2014) 185, 187 (Replaced by Government of South Australia, State Emergency 
Management Plan, Version 2.15, ‘Annex C: Public Information and Warnings’ (2015) Part 3, 
10, 12 (All possible means of communication to be used to disseminate warnings)). 
679 Western Australia, State Public Information Emergency Management Support Plan 
(Westplan Emergency Public Information) (2012) 24. 
680 Redland City Council, Redland City Disaster Management Plan: Part 1 (2016) 47 (The 
group ‘will provide information and warning via a number of sources including electronic 
media’); Government of Western Australian, State Emergency Management Plan for Fire 
(Westplan – Fire) (2013) 42 (alerts are issued via social media channels); Territory 
Emergency Management Council (NT), Territory Emergency Plan (2014) 28 (Where the 
ABCNT will endeavour to deliver information including on social media). 
681 Attorney General’s Department (Cth), Australia’s Emergency Warning Arrangements, 
above n 40, 17-18 (Social media is now being recognised by many emergency service 
agencies as important tools for communicating with people in an emergency). 
682 Western Australia, State Public Information Emergency Management Support Plan 
(Westplan Emergency Public Information) (2012) 24(‘Twitter; Facebook and YouTube 
should be actively used’, however, still on the condition that it is appropriate); Queensland 
Government, Queensland State Disaster Management Plan (2015) 28 (Queensland 
Government, Queensland State Disaster Management Plan (September 2016) 29); 
Inspector-General Emergency Management (Qld), Emergency Management Assurance 
Framework, above n 107, 23-24; New South Wales Government, New South Wales State 
Emergency Management Plan (2012) 7 (The ‘full suite of traditional and social media’ 
channels may be used); Emergencies (Emergency Plan) 2014 (No 1)’(2014)(ACT) 14 
(Reference is made to a range of mediums); Emergency Management Committee (NSW), 
New South Wales Public Information Services Functional Area Supporting Plan (2005) 21-
22; State Government Victoria, Victorian Warning Protocol, Version 2.0 (July 2013) 9 
(Where a multi-faceted approach is recommended to ensure ‘maximum penetration and 
saturation’); Attorney General’s Department(Cth), Code of Practice for Warning 
Republishers (2013) 3; Attorney General’s Department (Cth), Best Practice Guide for 
Warning Originators, above n 278, 9. 
683 Queensland Government, Queensland State Disaster Management Plan (May 2015) 29 
(reference is made to ‘non-government (warning) systems being available such as social 
media’) Emergency Management Victoria (Vic), Emergency Management Manual Victoria, 
'Part 3: State Emergency Response Plan' (2014) 3-28; Department of Police and Emergency 
Management (Tas), Tasmanian Emergency Management Plan, Issue 8 (2015) 60 (Where it 
is stated that warning channels might include social media). 
684 See, eg, Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), Best Practice Guide for Warning 
Originators, above n 278, 10 (‘A ‘high technology’ solution may not be appropriate in all 
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social media is embedded in these components, there are limited 
discernible responsibilities attributable to a specific organisation, 
against which to ground a cause of action.685 The findings in this section will 
inform the case study in Chapter Eight that examines whether legal 
implications will arise for the failure to utilise social media. However, based on 
these initial findings, there may be little likelihood of legal obligation to use 
social media as a channel. 
Conclusion 
The objective of this Chapter was to explore the Australian emergency 
management regulatory system in light of the conceptual theoretical 
framework developed in Chapters Two, Three and Four. This Chapter 
addresses key areas of research identified in the problem statement. The 
contribution of this Chapter to the thesis and field of study, is two-fold. In the 
first instance, the Chapter clarifies whether in recognition of its fundamental 
role in mitigating and controlling impacts of hazards, risk communication and 
warning, is reflected and emphasised in the emergency and disaster 
management regulatory system, and, hard law instruments.  
The second contribution of the Chapter is that it provides foundation material 
as to the responsibilities which arise for risk communication and warning, as 
well as the use of social media. These responsibilities will be examined in 
further Chapters, in light of the case law relevant to the duty to warn. The aim 
of the further analysis is to determine whether the identified responsibilities are 
likely to form the basis of a duty of care, which is a necessary component for 
                                                          
situations if, for example, the solution is not sufficiently robust to warn the greatest majority 
in a timely manner.’). 
685 Queensland Government, Queensland State Disaster Management Plan (May 2015) 23 
(Where agencies using social media are responsible for updating, maintaining and 
monitoring social media constituent with the Official Use of Social Media Guideline (Qld) 
replaced by Department of Science, Information Technology and Innovation (Qld), Principles 
for the official use of social media networks and emerging social media (October 2015) 
<http://www.qgcio.qld.gov.au/products/qgea-documents/547-business/3519-principles-for-
the-use-of-social-media>); Queensland Government, ‘Coordinating public information in a 
crisis’, above n 675, 2; Government of South Australia, State Emergency Management Plan, 
Version 2.14 (2015) 182 (Where the control agencies are responsible for distribution of 
messages generally, and the PIFS will support the release of public information monitoring 
all channels including social media); Western Australian, State Public Information 
Emergency Management Support Plan (West-plan – Emergency Public Information) (2012).  
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legal accountability in negligence.  The rationale for this inquiry, is that it 
follows recommendations of international studies on effective disaster risk law. 
These studies identify the need for communication, in particular warning, to be 
embedded in dedicated emergency and disaster law, to ensure that 
communication is planned, and that clear responsibilities exist. Secondly, the 
identification of responsibilities that might give rise to a duty of care, will 
provide a foundation for doctrinal analysis. The doctrinal analysis in turn aims 
to give greater certainty to agencies in the sector, with regards to their 
concerns about legal implications for warning in an emergency situation. 
 
At the commencement of the Chapter, the regulatory system was defined as 
comprising of interrelated components. These components include both hard 
and soft law instruments which have different effects in law in terms of their 
enforceability. Attention was drawn to the knowledge that the instruments 
within the regulatory system operate in a hierarchy. In terms of the need to 
comply with differing components, few appear to compel action, however there 
is some confusion as to the effect of soft law instruments, which may act as 
quasi-regulation. Guidelines and protocols for example, are considered 
voluntary soft law instruments which do not require compliance, nor are they 
legally enforceable. However, the enforceability of soft law instruments may 
depend on the language of the statute which provides the power for their 
creation. Therefore, when guidelines or plans, are required by legislation, and 
there is also a requirement to act consistently with them, they may have some 
legal effect.  Moreover, identification of the role each component plays within 
the hierarchy is important to building an understanding as to whether the 
responsibilities they contain will be sufficient to ground a cause of action. The 
outcome will depend however, not on whether the component is labelled a 
guideline or regulation, but whether the language imports some notion of the 
use of discretion in the exercise of a function.  
 
Considering the knowledge that each component plays a different role in the 
hierarchy, a content analysis of the instruments was undertaken. In response 
to the two areas of inquiry there are a number of findings. It was apparent from 
the content analysis of the components for example, that the need for 
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communication and warning in an emergency or disaster is recognised. The 
emphasis placed on communication and warning across the regulatory 
components however, varies and is not aligned. At the federal level, there is 
emphasis on communication with the public as a priority area. This emphasis 
is based on the understanding that communication can assist in the 
achievement of national policy objectives for disaster risk reduction and 
resilience in communities. A limited number of State policy components and 
legislation reflect this priority. What is apparent, from the analysis, is that 
further down the hierarchy there is a strong emphasis upon the incorporation 
of what is called ‘public communication’ and warning, in soft law instruments 
such as plans, guidelines, and standards. However, in critiquing the design of 
the regulatory system, whether this strong emphasis in components which 
does not constitute hard law, is sufficient to meet requirements to be an 
effective law in the area of disaster risk reduction, is doubtful.  
 
In line with the second research question, the data identified clear 
responsibilities for public communication and warning embedded within some 
of the regulatory components. Again, however, clear roles and responsibilities 
are primarily found within the soft law instruments such as emergency 
management and supporting plans, guidelines and standards, rather than in 
legislation. The effect of responsibilities at this level of the hierarchy, may be 
that while they are sufficient to raise a public expectation and perhaps reliance 
on the fact that they will be met, they may not be sufficient to ground a cause 
of action in law. In a few instances, the components contain a mandated duty 
to warn in the area of a fire emergency. However, in other examples the term 
‘function’ is associated with warning. As earlier defined, the term ‘function 
suggests there is a power and authority to carry out an activity, rather than a 
mandated responsibility or obligation recognised at law. This will be further 
examined in Chapters Six and Seven. In critiquing the regulatory components, 
the lack of a clear assignment of responsibilities may not meet 
recommendations for good practice in disaster risk reduction.686 
                                                          
686 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, above n 79, 4, 13 
(Although there is some room for inclusion of these facets of disaster risk reduction in 
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With regard to the final area of inquiry, responsibilities related to the use of 
social media, references within the components were sparse. At the level of 
policy, there is an acknowledgement of social media through indirect 
references to the significant progress which is being made with new 
technologies. The researcher did not expect to find references to social media 
within the policy and legislation because these are high level components, 
which provide either vision statements, powers or frameworks for action, rather 
than attracting detail. The data supported this supposition. References to 
social media were instead found within emergency management and 
communications plans, standards and guidelines. These components in some 
cases merely highlighted the availability of the channels as an option to 
incorporate into a multi-channel warning strategy. In some components, there 
was an assertion that the channels, should, will, and are being adopted. 
However, it was clear overall that there was no prescriptive requirement to 
incorporate social media. Even when the channels were referred to, there were 
limited discernible responsibilities or actions attributed to an organisation. 
Moving forward, these findings will provide the basis of analysis for legal 
implications for the use, or failure to use social media in an emergency, in 
Chapter Eight.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
procedures, the document requires a check of national laws, along with disaster risk 
reduction legislation and regulation). 
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Chapter Six: The law of negligence 
 
‘In light of these now regularly occurring natural disasters, it is unclear 
whether the state has a legal duty to prepare, warn, and mitigate natural 
disaster damages’.687 
 
The primary aims of this thesis are firstly to examine whether risk 
communication is embedded within the regulatory system. Secondly, the aim 
is to gain clarity of the circumstances in which, when using or failing to use 
social media as a warning dissemination channel, the emergency 
management sector is likely to face legal implications. Chapter Six specifically 
addresses one area of law in which legal implications may be faced, the law 
of negligence. The investigation of the law of negligence draws on theoretical 
principles established in Chapters Two, Three and Four to explain the role of 
this area of law in society and its application to the State.  
Chapter Two, identified that the statutory authorities which comprise the 
emergency management sector, own aspects of natural hazard and 
emergency related risk. To reiterate, a risk owner, is a ‘person or entity with 
the accountability and authority to manage a risk’.688  Risk ownership arises in 
emergency management from the government’s legitimate role as a body with 
power to protect society ‘against those things that threaten health, safety and 
welfare of the people’, such as natural hazards.689 Risk ownership may also 
be allocated. In Australia, the emergency management sector, through policy, 
legislation and plans, have been formally ‘charged with’ functions, powers and 
responsibilities, to manage natural hazard risk in the context of 
emergencies.690  
In this thesis, emphasis is placed on the examination of responsibilities for risk 
communication and warning of natural hazard events, which have been 
                                                          
687 JL Frattaroli, ‘A State’s Duty to Prepare, Warn, and Mitigate Natural Disaster Damages’ 
(2014) 37(1) Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 173, 175. 
688 British Standards Institution (BSI), Risk management – vocabulary (PD ISO Guide 
73:2009, 30 September 2013). 
689 Pope, above n 468, 4; Locke, Two Treatises of Government, above n 29, Essay2, 94, 97, 
229, 135; Gerrard, above n 468, xii. 
690 Young, Symons and Jones, above n 208, 2, 13. 
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allocated to statutory authorities within the sector. Chapter Five, sought to 
establish through application of content analysis, whether clear responsibilities 
for risk communication and warning were embedded into regulatory system 
components.  Several functions and responsibilities were pinpointed.  As 
indicated, risk ownership also includes notions of accountability. Legal 
accountability seeks to ensure that the responsible party is ‘required to give 
account or explanation of their actions, and where appropriate, suffer the 
consequences, take the blame or undertake to put matters right’.691 The major 
objective of Chapter Six is to assess through doctrinal analysis, whether 
failures in performance of functions and responsibilities for the dissemination 
risk communication and warning are sufficient to formulate a duty of care, for 
which an agency may be held legally accountable.   
The belief that statutory authorities ought to be held to account is supported 
by the frequency of actions arising from a natural disaster, collectively known 
as disaster law.692 However, although the public may wish to lay blame for 
damage suffered to their person or property, this desire may be based a moral 
belief that someone should be held accountable.693 What becomes apparent, 
is that the responsibilities incorporated in hard and soft law instruments may 
be what have been labelled task or role responsibilities.694 The extent to which 
this type of responsibility attracts liability responsibility695 will depend on the 
‘rules of liability’,696 and the extent these rules impose accountability.697 
                                                          
691 Harlow, above n 7, 51. 
692 Lauta, ‘Legal Scholarship and Disasters’, above n 53, 97-98, 104; See, also, Alexander, 
‘Communicating earthquake risk to the public’, above n 54 (The article highlights the desire 
to place blame and the extent of claims in the aftermath of a disaster); Farber, ‘Tort Law in 
the Era of Climate Change’, above n 54, 1076; Eburn, ‘Litigation for failure to warn’, above n 
57; Eburn and Dovers, ‘Legal Aspects of Risk Management in Australia’, above n 57, 62-63. 
693 McLennan and Handmer, ‘Sharing Responsibility Australian Disaster Management’, 
above n 2, 44. 
694 Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, above n 127, 212, 215-217. 
695 Ibid 215-217. 
696 Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality, above n 104, 31 (Cane asserts that outlining 
prospective responsibilities is one of the prime functions of law); McLennan and Handmer, 
'Sharing Responsibility Australian Disaster Management’, above n 2, 18 (The authors label 
these prospective responsibilities as ex-ante obligations); Fisher, Legal Reasoning in 
Environmental Law, above n 94, 62-63, 330. 
697 McLennan and Handmer, 'Sharing Responsibility Australian Disaster Management’, 
above n 2, 18, 44 (Noting Handmer and McLennan acknowledgement that ‘ex-ante 
obligations are closely connected to ‘ex-post’ accountability); Cane, Responsibility in Law 
and Morality, above n 104, 35 (Ex-post accountability is the ‘attribution of historical 
responsibility, as a means of enforcing, reinforcing and underwriting prospective 
responsibility). 
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Consequently, legal outcomes may not equate with individual expectations of 
how the law should apply, and a statutory authority as a risk owner may not 
be made to suffer the consequences of their omissions at law. The findings of 
these next two Chapters appear to support the notion a limited notion of legal 
accountability. That is, despite the presence of responsibilities to protect, 
which can give rise to high public expectations and perhaps reliance on receipt 
of information, the law of negligence has already shifted to notions of shared 
responsibility. It therefore only recognises a qualified and limited responsibility 
to protect. 
In this Chapter, doctrinal analysis of the case law draws into focus how ‘rules 
of liability’ apply between particular parties in the context of responsibilities 
and functions for risk communication and warning for natural hazard events. 
A variety of legal causes of action may be relevant to acts or omissions in the 
use of social media and warning.698 In this thesis, however, the aim is to 
address a gap in the research and guidelines. Consequently, the focus is on 
one of the most dominant areas of tort law: the law of negligence. Chapter Six, 
draws on social contract theory which was identified in Chapter Four, to 
provide an examination of the role of tort law, and the law of negligence, in 
society. The Chapter identifies and addresses in detail the three elements 
which are necessary to establish an action in negligence. It investigates how 
these elements have been applied in the context of the duty to warn, both for 
a failure or omission to warn in an emergency, as well as a failure to provide 
an adequate or effective warning.  
Understanding the law of negligence 
As negligence acts as a basis for examining legal accountability in this thesis 
a fundamental understanding of the law torts; the law of negligence; its 
                                                          
698 See, eg, New South Wales Police Force, Public Affairs Branch Official Use of Social 
Media Policy 2013 (2013)11-12; Department of Finance (WA), Social Media Guidelines 
(September 2012) 25; ABC Editorial Policies, Guidance Note: Moderating User Generated 
Content (19 May 2014) 7-8 <http://about.abc.net.au/reports-publications/moderating-user-
generated-content-guidance-note/> (Note is made of defamatory statement, disclosure of 
confidential information); ACT Government, ACT Government Social Media Policy 
Guidelines, Version 1.0 (March 2012) 10-13; Government of South Australia, Social Media: 
Guidance for Agencies and Staff (2010) 4, 7 (Noting comments on privacy risks and on 
monitoring for defamatory material, this is alongside the reference to the need to ensure 
adequate record retention). 
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application to the State; and its function in maintaining a well-ordered society, 
is necessary. The law of torts originated in medieval times.699 Based on case 
law, torts has continued to develop and adapt to changes in society to become 
a collection of distinct legal actions, which include defamation, negligence and 
nuisance.700 Of these actions, negligence has become one of the dominant 
torts. Due to a gap in the research identified in Chapter One, the law of 
negligence is also the legal action, which is the subject of investigation in this 
Chapter.701  
What is negligence? 
Negligence is a private law remedy which protects individual rights702 when 
fault or wrongdoing by another causes a risk of harm or injury.703 Fault or 
wrongdoing is based upon either a failure to act (non-feasance) or wrongful, 
negligent or careless action (misfeasance). To establish an action in 
negligence in Australia, three elements must be proven by the plaintiff on the 
balance of probabilities. The elements will be examined in further detail later 
in this Chapter, however in brief they are:  
1. The existence of a duty of care 
2. A breach of the duty of care 
                                                          
699 Amanda Stickley, Australian Torts Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th ed, 2016) 1; David, 
Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (Oxford University Press, 2001) 
158, 170 (Links may also be made further even further back to Roman law). 
700 Stickley, Australian Torts Law, above n 699, 1 (These wrongs include, trespass to 
person, land, or personal property, negligence, misrepresentation, defamation and 
nuisance); LexisNexis, Halsbury’s Laws of Australia (at 01 March 2016) 415 Tort. 
701 Stickley, Australian Torts Law, above n 699, 143; P. H. Winfield ‘The History of 
Negligence in Torts (1926) 42 The Law Quarterly Review 184, 191, 194-196; James 
Oldham, English Common Law in the Age of Mansfield (The University of North Carolina 
Press, 2014) 276 (Negligence came into its own around the 19th Century and was known as 
‘an action on the case in negligence’, prior to the 19th century negligent was used as a 
descriptor of mode of behaviour referring to what a reasonable man would or would not do 
when considering others).  
702 See, eg, Danuta Mendelson, The New Law of Torts (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 
2014) 6 (The rights that tort law in general protects include, rights to ‘physical integrity 
(bodily harm), right to freedom of serious interference with mental integrity, rights to 
property); Amanda Stickley, Australian Torts Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2013) 
175 citing Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 563, [64]. 
703 Andrew Clarke, John Deveraux, Julian Werren, Torts: A practical learning approach 
(LexisNexis, 2nd ed, 2011) 73 (The meaning of the word tort in French is ‘a civil wrong’, the 
remedy is distinguished as private as opposed to public law) 14; Kit Barker et al, The Law of 
Torts in Australia (Oxford University Press, 5th ed, 2012) 1-2 (Public law by contrast is 
‘concerned with institutions and powers of government and relations and interactions 
between government and citizens’, although it is notable that although a private remedy torts 
can also be applied the government / citizen relationship). 
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3. Damage related to the breach704 
The law of negligence has now been modified by statute in Australia.705 If 
negligence is established, a remedy of compensatory damages is available to 
the plaintiff, subject to the defendant being unable to establish a relevant 
defence.706  
In its assessment of fault and wrongdoing, the law of negligence has been 
labelled a ‘law of responsibility’, as it ‘allows persons to be held responsible 
for having wrongfully injured others’.707 Establishment of the three elements, 
which may lead to attribution of liability, ensure ‘legal responsibility’ is allocated 
to the wrongdoer, and ensure reparation is made when ‘they have harmed 
others without justification’.708 Consequently, the party held responsible, 
‘restores the injured person to the position he or she was in before the tort was 
committed’, in effect, ‘making them whole’.709 This thesis examines fault or 
wrongdoing by a statutory authority in an emergency situation. It analyses, in 
light of each of the elements required to be established: in what circumstances 
are they likely to be held legally responsible when there is a failure to warn 
(non-feasance). It also analysis the circumstances in which an authority may 
be legally responsible if it employs a negligent or careless warning strategy 
(misfeasance). A key aspect of a finding of legal responsibility will be that the 
action of the authority causes a risk of harm to another person and or their 
property.  
The role and function of torts and negligence 
In keeping with the theoretical understandings developed in Chapter Four, of 
the role of the institution of law within society, it is important to understand the 
                                                          
704 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 552. 
705 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW); Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (WA); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas); Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT). 
706 Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880) LR 5 App Cas 25, 39; Mahony v J Kruschich 
(Demolitions) Pty Ltd (1985) 156 CLR 522, 527. 
707 John C.P Goldberg and Benjamin C Zipurskey, ‘Tort law and Responsibility’ in John 
Oberdiek (ed) Philosophical Foundations of the law of torts (Oxford, 2014) 17, 25. 
708 Justice Keith Mason, ‘Fault, causation and responsibility: Is tort law just an instrument of 
corrective justice?’ (2000) (19) 3 Australian Bar Review 201. 
709 See, eg, Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880) LR 5 App Cas 25, 39; Mahony v J 
Kruschich (Demolitions) Pty Ltd (1985) 156 CLR 522, 527; Goldberg and Zipurskey, above n 
707, 28. 
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function of the law of torts and negligence. A number of instrumental functions 
are commonly associated with the law of torts. For example, negligence is said 
to be instrumental in distributing loss, deterring unreasonable conduct, as well 
as providing access to corrective justice and compensation.710 If an individual’s 
interest is harmed through the fault of another, as earlier described, the law of 
negligence will seek to correct the harm between the parties, and provides 
compensatory damages for the harm that has occurred.711  
Notions of instrumental functions of tort can be abstract, it is therefore relevant 
to provide a practical understanding of how these functions would apply to the 
emergency management sector. For example, when agencies fail to act, or 
act without reasonable care in warning of an imminent hazard, they may be 
liable to pay compensatory damages for the harm that a member of the public 
has suffered. Compensatory damages will aim to restore the injured person to 
‘the same as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong’.712 In 
this way, the law of negligence corrects behaviour and compensates for harm. 
However, the law of negligence also acts as a deterrent. The possibility of 
liability in negligence for example, means that statutory authorities within the 
sector may seek to improve their conduct. An authority may seek to ensure it 
takes what is recognised as ‘reasonable care’, in order to avoid causing harm 
to others and to avoid the potential liability that ensues.  Consequently, and as 
                                                          
710 Peter Cane, 'Tort Law and Public Functions' in John Oberdiek (ed) Philosophical 
Foundations of the Law of Torts (Oxford, 2014) 161,164-165, 168 (Non-instrumentalist and 
responsibility theories have also been highlighted as relevant to tort); Stephen Perry, ‘The 
Moral foundations of Tort Law’ (1992) 77 Iowa Law Review 449, 449; Nicola Anna May 
Durrant, 'The role of law in responding to climate change: emerging regulatory, liability and 
market approaches' (Doctor of Philosophy, Queensland University of Technology, 2008); 
Jules Coleman, Scott Hershovitz and Gabriel Mendlow, ‘Theories of the Common Law of 
Torts’ in Edward N. Zalta (ed) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2015 
Edition) <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/tort-theories/> (These theories 
are mooted for overarching purposes or as a tool for ‘remediation of a social problem’); 
Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality, above n 104, 219 (Tort law and private law cannot 
be ‘solely explained in terms of deterrence of corrective justice and both represent functions 
of law but not its only functions’). 
711 See, eg, Mahony v J Kruschich (Demolitions) Pty Ltd (1985) 156 CLR 522, 527; Cane, 
Responsibility in Law and Morality, above n 104, 4, 22, 49-50. 
712 Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880) LR 5 App Cas 25, 39. 
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will become highly relevant to the conclusions in this thesis, negligence offers 
a mechanism to encourage the improvement of performance.713  
Social contract theory and the role of negligence 
A system to reconcile rights 
As well as the more commonly considered instrumental functions of the law of 
tort and negligence further functions are identified. These further functions are 
examined as they better align with some of the underlying theoretical narrative 
and themes of this thesis, which include a focus on social contract theory and 
understandings of shared responsibility.714 To demonstrate the linkages 
between functions of negligence and theory, it is necessary to recall that 
Chapter Four introduced the theories of John Locke and John Rawls. The 
examination of Locke’s social contract theory identified, that on entering the 
social contract, on the creation of government, citizens give up their rights to 
the State to pursue one another at law. The State instead establishes a 
system, the institution of law, which allows citizens to pursue these rights.715 
The institution acts as a machine of the State.716 It is adjudicated by the 
courts,717 and acts to reconcile the rights between parties.718 In light of social 
contract theory therefore, the function of tort law, or more specifically the law 
of negligence, is to reconcile the rights of individuals against each other when 
harm has occurred. While not negating that the earlier mentioned instrumental 
functions of negligence, due to better alignment with the underlying themes of 
the research, the role of negligence in reconciling rights and how they lead to 
a sharing of responsibility for action, is the focus of this thesis. 
 
 
                                                          
713 Bernadette Richard, Melissa De Zwart, Karinne Ludlow, Tort Law Principles (Lawbook 
Co, 2013) 24; John F Flemings, C Sappideen and Prue Vines, Fleming’s the law of torts 
(Thomson Reuters, 10th ed, 2011) 8. 
714 Coleman, Hershovitz, and Mendlow, above n 710. 
715 Paz-Fuchs, above n 457, 3-4; Penner & Melissaris, above n 235, 195. 
716 Arthur Ripstein, ‘As if it never happened’ (2007) 48 William and Mary Law Review 1957, 
1969. 
717 Arthur Ripstein, ‘Tort Law in a Liberal State’ (2007) (1)2 Journal of Tort Law 1, 7 (Noting 
that Ripstein rather looking for a description of the function that tort plays, as an 
instrumentalist would, seeks instead to describe the place of tort in a state system). 
718 Ibid. 
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Standards of conduct 
To reconcile or adjudicate the rights of the respective parties, the courts 
require a recognised standard. Proponents of social contract theory suggest a 
starting point for identifying this standard is embodied in the normative 
principles set forth in Locke and Rawls work.719 The normative principles 
identify the limits to an individual’s freedom to pursue their own interests with 
respect to another.720 That is, social contract theory suggests that individual 
freedom is tempered ‘by the knowledge that no one ought to harm another in 
life, health, liberty of possession’.721 This means that when exercising 
individual freedom, the individual ought to consider compatibility of action with 
others’ rights to pursue their interests.722 The law of negligence then translates 
‘the need to act with another’s interests in mind’723 into a standard of conduct 
embodied within the institution of law. This standard of conduct is required by 
the law if a duty of care is recognised.  
Ultimately, the purpose of the standard of conduct is to procure, ‘civil peace 
and prosperity’.724 The standard also ensures, society is preserved and that, 
every member of society enjoys ‘a free and peaceable enjoyment of all the 
good things of this life that belong to each of them.’725 As indicated, the 
standards of conduct embedded in the formulation of a duty of care, are legal 
standards of behaviour which have evolved over time. It is important to note 
that the legal standards of care may not align with ‘moral or ethical obligations, 
or what common sense might or might not have dictated as an appropriate 
course of action’.726 Consequently, the reconciliation of rights that society 
expects of statutory authorities with regards to their perceived legal obligations 
                                                          
719 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, above n 29, Essay 2, 109; Rawls, Political 
liberalism, above n 453, 60-61. 
720 Ripstein, ‘As if it never happened’, above n 716, 1969. 
721  Locke, Two Treatises of Government, above n 29, Essay 2, 109; Jeffrey C. Sindelar Jr, 
‘Of form and function: Lockean Political Philosophy and Mass Tort (2012) 90(4) Nebraska 
Law Review 887, 908. 
722 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, above n 456, 60-61. 
723 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, above n 456, 60-61. 
724 Sindelar, above n 721, 916. 
725 Ibid. 
726 Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 237 CLR 215, 223; James Goudkamp, ‘The Spurious 
Relationship between Moral Blameworthiness and Liability for Negligence’ (2004) 28(2) 
Melbourne University Law Review 343, 343-344 (Goudkamp argues there may be some 
alignment with moral considerations but argues that ‘morality and legal liability often fail to 
coincide’). 
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to warn in emergency situations, may not be realised when moral and legal 
positions diverge.   
Applicability of the law of negligence to the state 
The previous section outlined the role and purpose of the law of negligence. 
The section established that negligence is an action which aims to reconcile 
the rights between parties in the light of harm which has occurred. As the focus 
in this thesis is on acts or omissions of statutory authorities, the next question 
to arise is whether the law of negligence and the standard of conduct are 
applicable to the government as a public body. If so, a further question is 
whether the law of negligence reconciles rights between public and private 
parties in the same way as it does between private parties.  
As a starting point to answer these questions, social contract theory asserts 
that government as lawmakers are subject to the law.727 This would suggest 
negligence ought to apply to government bodies and statutory authorities. 
From an historical perspective, actions in negligence were bought against 
those in positions of trust and responsibility. Certain categories of 
relationships, such as the doctor / patient relationship, became recognised as 
automatically giving rise to a duty of care.  However, the extension of 
negligence to government bodies came later728 as the category of persons to 
whom negligence applies continued to evolve.729 In certain circumstances 
actions between a private party and a government body will be considered as 
falling within a category of recognised relationship, for example when they act 
as an employer or an occupier. Otherwise, actions between government and 
citizens, including those which relate to nonfeasance and misfeasance in 
warning, are treated as a new category of relationship: as a ‘novel case’. Novel 
cases will be discussed in due course, what is important to note is that they 
                                                          
727 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, above n 29, Essay 2, 89, 143. 
728 Oldham, above n 701, 277, 279. 
729 LexisNexis, Halsbury’s Laws of Australia, (at 01 March 2016) 415 Tort, ‘Person who may 
be liable in Tort’ [415-140]; Mark Aronson, ‘Government Liability in Negligence’ (2008) 32(1) 
Melbourne University Law Review 44, 44-45; See, also, Disaster Management Act 2003 
(Qld) s 4A(c); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 34 (Definitions of public authority means the 
Crown, local government and public authorities constituted under an Act). 
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are decided on a case by case basis, and therefore their outcomes can be 
unpredictable.730 
Limits on the application of negligence to the State 
The previous paragraph identified that the law of negligence is applicable to 
the State. However, the manner in which it has been applied to reconcile rights 
between a public body and a private party contrasts to its application to private 
parties.731 This is because, as opposed to an individual pursuing only their own 
interests, the State is a ‘public functionary’.732 A public functionary ‘acts in the 
interest of the public as a whole’ within the constraints of limited resources and 
has numerous matters of policy to consider.733 For example, emergency 
service agencies, are publicly funded bodies, which act to provide safety and 
security to the community as a whole. That a different application of the 
principles of negligence is required when considering liability against the State, 
is circumscribed by statute.734 Within civil liability statutes, concessions are 
afforded to public functionaries. These concessions help to ensure that the 
need to balance ‘public interest in the performance of public functions, against 
the interest of individual citizens’ are taken into account in a determination of 
a case.735 When compared with actions against private citizens,736 the relevant 
provisions support a ‘swing’ away from expansive development of 
establishment of liability under the law of negligence against the State and by 
implication the emergency management sector.737  
                                                          
730 See, eg, Prue Vines, ‘The Needle in the Haystack: Principle in the Duty of Care in 
Negligence’ (2000) 23(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 35, 36-37. 
731 Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality, above n 104, 251 (As Cane, suggests, the 
social function of the law of negligence to repair harm between parties is the same for 
individuals and statutory bodies, however the distributive function is applied differently); 
Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 553. 
732 Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality, above n 104, 252-254 (Public functions are 
those ‘that are meant to be performed on behalf of and in the interests of the public’, rather 
than performed on ‘behalf of or in the interests of any particular individual or group’); 
Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 553. 
733 Commonwealth, ‘Review of the law of Negligence – Final Report’ (Honourable David Ipp, 
Chairperson) Canberra, September 2002, 151-152. 
734 Stickley, Australian Torts Law, above n 699, 238-240. 
735 Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality, above n 104, 252-254. 
736 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 553. 
737 The Hon Wayne Martin, ‘The Civil Liability Act: Impact and Effect’ (2011) 22 Insurance 
Law Journal 187, 187, 202 (This has occurred in part due to the introduction of legislative 
provisions as well as through a general movement in common law principles which 
recognised the expansive ability to claim liability and associated burden). 
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The law of negligence and shared responsibility 
That there is a limit to the extent to which public functionaries may be pursued 
under the law of negligence, is supported by the following excerpt from the 
Australian High Court:  
Employers, government, statutory authorities and others have been forced to 
exercise their minds in the interests of those who may be injured by their 
conduct and to improve their performance accordingly. Even empires must 
however have their borders and equally society should be entitled to 
expect that people will take elementary precautions at least for their own 
safety against obvious risks.738  
As this excerpt suggests, not only is there a limit to the extent statutory 
authorities may be pursued, there is an expectation embodied within this 
statement that individuals will take some precaution for their own safety. This 
statement not only resonates with broad theoretical principles, such as Rawls’ 
concepts of civic duty. It aligns with the noted change in direction in society 
towards individualisation of risk – where responsibility for risk is pushed back 
on the individual.739 It also aligns with the concept of a shared and personal 
responsibility for disaster risk reduction, which has been raised in the 
emergency management context.740  
In limiting claims against the State, and seeking to share responsibility, it is 
important to remember that the protection of life and property is a legitimate 
area of government action. Reflecting this underlying normative proposition, it 
is evident that the protection of life and property in an emergency, has been 
allocated to statutory bodies within the emergency management sector. As 
identified in Chapter Three, the activity of warning will assist in the protection 
of life and property and is fundamental to successful risk reduction and 
community resilience.  Consequently, should it become clear from analysis in 
this Chapter, that negligence actions against the State, which might otherwise 
                                                          
738 Mulligans v Coffs Harbour City Council (2005) 223 CLR 486, 511.  
739 Hamilton, above n 217, 454, 456; Black, ‘The Role of Risk in Regulatory Processes’, 
above n 217, 6 (Black highlights the drive to ‘push responsibility for risk management down 
to the level of the individual or civil society’); Commonwealth, ‘Review of the law of 
Negligence’, above n 733, 29. 
740 Council of Australian Governments (COAG), National Strategy for Disaster Resilience 
(2011) iii, 1. 
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deter unreasonable conduct will be limited, further accountability mechanisms 
may need to be put in place. Accountability mechanisms aim to ensure that 
policy goals, such as reduction of disaster risk and increased community 
resilience, are met. 
Doctrinal analysis of the law of negligence 
The first part of this Chapter provided a framework of understanding as to what 
negligence is, and what it seeks to achieve. It also identified, that although this 
legal action is relevant for consideration against statutory authorities, there will 
be limits to its application against these government bodies. The remainder of 
the Chapter addresses the three elements of negligence to determine the 
circumstances in which statutory authorities have previously been held legally 
accountable for acts and omissions in warning. The findings of this section will 
then be applied to the case study of warning over social media in Chapter 
Eight. 
The first element: Duty of care  
Without a duty, there can be no liability.741 As earlier adverted to, in some 
instances there will be a recognised category of relationship between the 
parties which automatically gives rise to a duty of care.742 However, the 
relationship between a citizen and a statutory authority in the context of 
warning, is likely to be classified as a novel case. In novel cases, ‘there is no 
simple test for determining whether a duty of care exists’, instead there must 
be something else in the relationship between the parties to demonstrate that 
a duty of care existed, and that legal responsibility for harm should ensue.743 
The features which determine whether there is a sufficient relationship upon 
which to base a duty of care, are examined below. 
                                                          
741 Sullivan v Moody (2001) 2017 CLR 562, [42]; Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v 
Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 555; See, also, Carolyn Sappideen, Prue Vines and Penelope 
Watson, Torts: Commentary and Materials (Lawbook Co, 2012, 11th ed) 181 (the duty 
defines the scope and substance of negligence law and describes the behavior for which the 
plaintiff should be compensated); Clarke, Deveraux and Werren, above n 703, 28-29. 
742 See, eg, Sappideen, Vines and Watson, Torts: Commentary and Materials, above n 741, 
180. 
743 Stickley, Australian Torts Law, above n 699, 192-193; Vines, ‘The Needle in the 
Haystack’, above n 730, 36-37. 
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One aspect of establishing the duty is identification of its scope and content.744 
The content of a duty will be, ‘to conform to the legal standard of reasonable 
conduct in the light of the apparent risk’, that is, to take reasonable care, or 
‘reasonable steps, to avoid foreseeable risks’ of harm or injury.745 In the 
context of warning of a natural hazard, the duty of care may be to warn a 
potentially affected community of an imminent hazard. The requirement to take 
reasonable care when issuing a warning may only require the agency to issue 
a general warning to that community. The warning would provide information 
regarding the nature of the hazard and steps that they can take to avoid 
foreseeable injury.  
Criteria for formulating a duty of care 
The ‘test’ for formulating a duty of care in the novel cases relevant to this 
thesis, has developed over time.746 The Australian High Court has held that to 
establish a duty of care, there must first be reasonable foreseeability of 
harm, to either the victim, or ‘a class of person of which the victim was one’.747 
In the emergency context the issue would be, is it reasonably foreseeable that 
a person in an affected community, if not warned of a flood hazard, will suffer 
harm? A judgment is then made as to whether a duty of care should arise 
because of the ‘salient’ or factual features in the relationship between the 
parties.748 The factual features examined below generally incorporate a 
mixture of policy and legal questions, which attempt to balance the respective 
rights and obligations of the parties..749 As will be demonstrated in the 
                                                          
744 See, eg, Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales [2014] 204 LGERA 
238, [321] (This case highlights that formulation of a duty of care needs to look at, by whom, 
to whom and in what circumstances a duty is owed). 
745 Mulligan v Coffs Harbour City Council [2003] NSWSC 49, 248 (Whealy J); Road and 
Traffic Authority of NSW v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330, 347 (Gummow) citing Vairy v 
Wyong Shire Council, McHugh J. 
746 See, eg, Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (the neighbour principle); Anns v London 
Borough of Merton [1978] AC 728 (the two-stage test); Janesch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 
549 (tests for proximity); Caparo Industries v Dickman [1992] 2 AC 605 (the Caparo test); 
Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman [1985] 157 CLR 424 (incremental approaches); 
Sappideen, Vines and Watson, Torts: Commentary and Materials, above n 741, 193-196. 
747 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 572, 581; Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 563, 
582. 
748 Caltex Refineries (Queensland) Pty Limited v Stavar (2009) 259 ALR 616, 647; 
Sappideen, Vines and Watson, Torts: Commentary and Materials, above n 741, 193, 196.  
749 See, eg, Norman Katter, ‘” Who then in law is my neighbor?” Reverting to first principles 
in the High Court of Australia (2004) 12(2) The Tort Law Review 85, 89 (These 
considerations are court policy, which include indeterminate liability, unwarranted 
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examination of the case law specific to warning, in the context of natural 
hazards and emergencies, which are dynamic, often uncontrollable and 
difficult to predict, formulation of a duty of care can be a difficult process. 
Examining reasonable foreseeability  
Reasonable foreseeability is the ‘touchstone of recognising a duty of care’.750 
The test of reasonable foreseeability derives from Lord Aitkin’s judgment in 
Donoghue v Stevenson:751  
The rule that you are to love they neighbour becomes in law; you must not 
injure your neighbour; and the lawyer’s questions, Who is my neighbour? 
receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or 
omissions which you can reasonably foresee would likely to injure your 
neighbour (reasonable foreseeability). Who, then, in law is my neighbour?  
The answer seems to be persons who are so closely and directly 
affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation 
as being affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions 
which are called into question (who is my neighbour).752 
This excerpt from Lord Aitkin’s judgment begins to delineate the boundaries of 
the expected standards of conduct between parties. The judgment identifies 
that an individual, when pursuing their own interests, need not consider every 
other person, as alluded to under social contract theory. Instead they must 
consider their neighbour. In the law of negligence, a neighbour is someone ‘so 
closely and directly affected by my acts’ that they should be held in 
contemplation.753 The risk of harm to be foreseen is one ‘a reasonable person 
                                                          
interference with the autonomy of individuals; vulnerability and control, knowledge, 
undermining existing patterns of law in other fields, statutory intent, economic efficiency); 
See more specifically notes on indeterminacy in: Clarke, Deveraux and Werren, above n 
703, 50, 74; Richard, De Zwart, Ludlow, above n 713, 24; Caltex Refineries (Queensland) 
Pty Limited v Stavar (2009) 259 ALR 616, 642-643 (Allsop J); Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] 
AC 562, 580 (As Lord Atkin states, ‘acts or omission which any moral code would censure 
cannot in a practical world be treated so as to give a right to every person injured by them to 
demand relief’, so limits must apply, and that limitation is reasonable foreseeability). 
750 Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317, 330 (Callinan J); Katter, above n 749, 
85. 
751 [1932] AC 562. 
752 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 580 (emphasis added); Noting discussion in 
Katter, above n 749, 95. 
753 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 580; See, also, Katter, above n 749, 95; Clarke, 
Deveraux and Werren, above n 703, 8, 73, 282, 284 (Who is my neighbour changes and 
‘responds to the social, economic and cultural changes’ in contemporary society’). 
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in the defendant’s position would have foreseen’, or what they ‘ought to 
anticipate’.754 In the hazard context, ‘a neighbour’ may be a community that 
the emergency management sector, having knowledge of an imminent hazard, 
would have foreseen would be impacted by that hazard. Although a 
touchstone of the duty of care, reasonable foreseeability on its own is not 
sufficient to ground that duty in novel cases.755 
Salient or ‘factual’ features 
The second aspect to formulating a duty of care, is judicial consideration of the 
salient or ‘factual’ features of the relationship between the parties.756 These 
salient features may bear differential weighting in each case,757 and can 
include:  
…the foreseeability of harm, the nature of the harm alleged, the degree of 
control able to be exercise by the defendant to avoid harm; the degree of 
vulnerability of the plaintiff to the harm from the defendants conduct, including 
the capacity and reasonable expectation of a plaintiff to take steps to protect 
itself; any degree of reliance or assumption of responsibility, the nature of the 
hazard and knowledge by the defendant that the conduct will cause harm, 
conflicting duties arising in statute or law, consistency with the scope, 
terms and purpose of any statute relevant to the existence of a duty.758 
Of the salient features listed, control759and the knowledge of the plaintiff, along 
with the defendant’s vulnerability,760 commonly feature in the reasoning of the 
court.  
                                                          
754 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 580; Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v 
Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 578 (McHugh) (The precise risk of injury is not required to be 
foreseen, but the ‘class of risk’); Barker et al, above n 703, 460-461; Vairy v Wyong Shire 
Council [2005] 223 CLR 422, 456 (Hayne).  
755 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 555. 
756 Caltex Refineries (Queensland) Pty Limited v Stavar (2009) 259 ALR 616, 642-643 
(Allsop P); Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562, 573 (Noting that reasonable foreseeability 
on its own is not sufficient for the finding of a duty of care). 
757 Caltex Refineries (Queensland) Pty Limited v Stavar (2009) 259 ALR 616, 643 (Allsop P). 
758 Caltex Refineries (Queensland) Pty Limited v Stavar (2009) 259 ALR 616, 642-643 
(Allsop P). 
759 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 541, 558, 577 (Where the 
court determined that the ‘Council had no control over the risk of harm that eventuated’, the 
pollution of a lake which resulted in contaminated oysters). 
760 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 577-578 (In fact McHugh 
went as far to say, that if questions of foreseeability, control, knowledge and vulnerability are 
answered affirmatively, and questions regarding impacting on core-policy making, or 
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Control 
Examining each of these core features in turn, references to, and application 
of control within case law, has been inconsistent.761 Control has been referred 
to as direct control over the ‘harmful cause of the damage’, such as the hazard 
itself,762 for example a storm or a fire. Utilising this application of control there 
would be few cases in which a statutory authority within the sector would have 
control over a natural hazard. However, control has also been referred to as 
‘the degree and nature of control able to be exercised by the defendant to 
avoid harm’.763 The application of this definition of ‘control’, brings into question 
the powers that an authority possesses, its managerial control for example.764 
Applying this definition of control calls for an examination of statutory functions 
which might be relevant to show that had powers and functions been 
exercised, harm may have been avoided. For example, if an authority had 
exercised a power or function to warn, this might have alerted members of the 
public, who could then have taken precautionary or preventative action to 
avoid the harm. Having defined the terms functions, powers and 
responsibilities in Chapter Five, this Chapter highlights that when judicial 
reasoning is applied, there will only be limited instances where the presence 
of a ‘function’, ‘power’ or ‘responsibility’ will give rise to a duty of care and a 
legal obligation will result. 
 
 
                                                          
supervening policy reasons are answered negatively a duty will ordinarily be found); Perre v 
Apand (1999) 198 CLR 180, 180 (although knowledge appears to be linked to means of 
knowledge of an ascertainable class of vulnerable persons who were unable to protect 
themselves from harm’ rather than knowledge of the risk). 
761 Scott Wotherspoon, ‘Translating the public law “may” into the common law “ought”: The 
case for a unique common law cause of action for statutory negligence’ (2009) 83 Australian 
Law Journal 331, 333. 
762 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, 
[707]; Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512 (In Brodie v Singleton Shire 
Council there is consideration of control over the road as they physical structure which is the 
cause of the harm). 
763 Caltex Refineries (Queensland) Pty Limited v Stavar (2009) 259 ALR 616, 643 (Allsop P); 
Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 577 (McHugh J) 
(Alternatively, was the authority in a position of control and did it have the power to control 
the situation that brought about the harm to the injured person). 
764 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 558-559, 579-581.  
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Functions, powers, responsibilities and links to a duty of care 
As a starting point, the case law related to the law of negligence indicates that 
the finding of a common-law duty of care in novel cases, is not dependent on 
the presence of statutory power or function.765 Therefore agencies within the 
emergency management sector, may still be subject to a duty of care to warn, 
despite any absence of power in statute. Where a function or power for 
warning does exist in statute or another regulatory component, it may be 
considered as a starting point or foundation for asserting a duty of care. The 
function or power will be examined with respect to the degree of control that 
the authority had in the circumstances.766 The duty of care however, arises 
independent of statute law and arises under the common law.767  
The case of Graham Barclay Oysters v Ryan768 demonstrates this latter 
principle. The case states: ‘a public authority has no duty to take 
reasonable care to protect other persons merely because the legislature 
has invested it with a power whose exercise could prevent harm to those 
persons.769 In this case claimants became ill after ingesting contaminated 
oysters harvested from a lake.  The question arose as to whether the State 
had a duty to exercise its power to control the oyster industry. Whether the 
local government also had a duty to exercise a power in regards to the lake 
where the oysters were contaminated, was also a relevant consideration. The 
above statement, reinforces that the decision to exercise a power or function 
within a statute, is often discretionary. Noted exceptions, to this principle is 
when an authority uses its ‘powers to intervene in a field of activity and 
increased the risk of harm to persons’, or when, ‘where the power is invested 
                                                          
765 Caltex Refineries (Queensland) Pty Limited v Stavar [2009] NSWCA 258, [115]-[121] 
(Where the claim for negligence was based on an Asbestos Rule rather than any specific 
statute); Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (Ruling No 2) (2011) 34 VR 584, [114]-[116]. 
766 Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (Ruling No 2) (2011) 34 VR 584 at 606, 609-610. 
767 Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (Ruling No 2) (2011) 34 VR 584 at 606, 609-610 citing 
Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 237 CLR 215, 259-260; See, also, Caltex Refineries 
(Queensland) Pty Limited v Stavar (2009) 259 ALR 616, 632, 646 (citing Sibley v 
Kais (1967) 118 CLR 424, 427-428 (Where it was ‘accepted that the existence of the 
regulation and its breach is not determinative either of the existence of a co-ordinate 
common law duty or of its breach’). 
768 (2002) 211 CLR 540. 
769 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 575-576 (McHugh) 
(emphasis added); Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330, 343-345 (Brennan 
CJ) (The case refers to this as the earlier considered ‘doctrine of reliance’). 
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to protect the community from a particular risk and the authority is aware of a 
specific risk to a specific individual.’770 Therefore when an agency within the 
emergency management sectors uses its power to disseminate warning, and 
by doing so increases the risk of harm, perhaps by providing an ambiguous, 
poorly timed or inadequate warning, a duty of care may arise. 
Even where powers and functions are in statute, the court has historically 
taken a cautionary approach to imputing a duty of care. The caution arises out 
of the limits of the courts powers, and a reluctance to go beyond those limits. 
When entering into the social contract, a system of government is created. In 
Australia, the Constitution created by the government enshrined the doctrine 
of the separation of powers that divides the powers of government between 
the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, as a means to safeguard 
liberty.771 As a collection of unelected representatives, the role of the judiciary 
is to interpret legislation, and apply common law precedent.772 By contrast, 
parliament enact statute law underpinned by policy and reasoning.773 The 
policy of the legislature that underpins statute law must be taken into 
consideration by the judiciary.774 Therefore, and so as not to overstep the 
extent of their powers, a court has stated that without clear words of parliament 
that indicates they want to create a duty, the court is reluctant to translate the 
wording of a statute to impute a duty of care.775 Further analysis of the case 
law shift now from ideas of control, and statutory power into considerations of 
knowledge and vulnerability.    
 
                                                          
770 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 575-576 (McHugh) (As 
stated in the judgement, ‘If the legislature has invested the power for the purpose of 
protecting the community, it obviously intends that the power should be exercised in 
appropriate circumstances’). 
771 Haig Patapan, ‘Separation of Powers in Australia’ (1999) 34(3) Australian Journal of 
Political Science 391, 394-395. 
772 Harold Luntz, ‘The use of policy in negligence cases in the High Court of Australia’ in 
Michael Bryan (ed) Private Law in Theory and Practice (Taylor and Francis, 2007) 55 
(Noting that Australia is based on the Westminster system and the doctrine of the separation 
of powers); Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 575 (McHugh). 
773 Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330, 345. 
774 Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330, 345-346, 358; Sutherland Shire 
Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424, 483. 
775 See, eg, Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330, 346. 
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Knowledge 
As well as control, the knowledge of the agency is a salient feature for the 
formulation of a duty of care.776 On its own however, knowledge is not 
sufficient to raise a duty.777  Knowledge refers to knowledge ‘of an existing risk 
of harm to the plaintiff or, to a specific class of persons who included the 
plaintiff (rather than a risk to the general public)’.778 In the emergency context, 
this may be knowledge of flash flooding due to storms for example. In general, 
government knowledge about hazards is rapidly improving due to the 
presence of experts within the sector and the development of predictive 
tools.779 This means that statutory authorities within the emergency sector, will 
often have a vastly greater degree of knowledge than the public about how the 
weather event is developing and tracking.780  Where the risk of harm is high,781 
this information can, and perhaps should be pro-actively used to generate 
warnings.782  
In circumstances where government has greater knowledge, the share of 
responsibility for proactive warning may or should fall on government. This is 
particularly so if there are no environmental cues which would signal citizens 
to take care of their own interests, or for example where individuals are visitors 
to an area.783 In cases of greater comparative knowledge in the hands of 
government, there will also be a greater tendency to consider a duty of care 
may arise. However, as earlier adverted to, natural hazard events, their 
direction and force, are inherently unpredictable and dynamic. Despite 
increasingly available predictive technologies and growing expertise, as recent 
reports demonstrate, it can still be incredibly challenging to find available and 
                                                          
776 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 582. 
777 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 583 (There is ‘no 
affirmative duty of care merely because the authority knows that unless it acts an individual 
will suffer harm’). 
778 Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40, 46-48 (Mason J).  
779 Lauta, Disaster Law, above n 157, 106. 
780 Inspector General of Emergency Management (Qld), 2015 Callide Creek Flood Review: 
Volume 1, Report (June 2015) 79-80; Council of Australian Governments (COAG), National 
Strategy for Disaster Resilience (2011) 3 (This means shared responsibility may be unequal 
at times and the burden may fall on the emergency management sector to provide 
information).  
781Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (Ruling No 2) (2011) 34 VR 584, [117]. 
782 Inspector General of Emergency Management (Qld), 2015 Callide Creek Flood Review: 
Volume 1, above n 780, 79-80.  
783 See, eg, State of Queensland v Kelly [2014] QCA 27. 
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‘credible information’ for events.78   Therefore although the authority may have 
information about a risk of harm regarding a hazard to the public, actual 
knowledge of ‘a specific problem to certain individuals’ may be limited, and so 
too will be the likelihood of a finding of a duty of care. 784  
A court will also consider the vulnerability of the public. Vulnerability is taken 
as, ‘the degree of vulnerability of those who depend on the proper exercise by 
the authority of its powers’785 that the ‘authority exists and is empowered to 
protect them from’.786 Therefore, if communities depend on government 
powers to warn of emergency events, a court will consider whether the 
community are vulnerable. A court will also consider any assumption of 
responsibility for the dissemination of warning by the relevant statutory 
authorities.787 A determination of vulnerability however will also consider, 
whether the ‘injured person could not reasonably be expected to adequately 
safeguard himself or herself or those interests from harm?’788  Consequently, 
in some cases, the individual may be no more vulnerable ‘than any other 
members of the public’ 789 and there will be no reason that a specific duty will 
be owed to them as an individual. 
In terms of self-protection, even if there is no warning on the day, public 
information campaigns are another tool in the policy toolbox790 which are used 
to pre-empt storms, cyclone and fire seasons. Queensland, for example has 
instituted the ‘Get Ready Queensland’ campaign in conjunction with the 
RACQ,791 and the ‘If it is Flood Forget it’ campaign.792 These campaigns 
outline actions individuals within the community can take, empowering them 
to protect themselves in anticipation of events occurring. Flood and coastal 
                                                          
784 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 583. 
785 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 597. 
786 Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330, 332. 
787 Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180, 228; Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman 
(1985) 157 CLR 424, 498 (That is an ‘assumption by one party of a responsibility to take to 
avoid or prevent injury, loss or damage to the person or property of another’). 
788 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 577. 
789 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, 
[708]. 
790 Althaus, Bridgman and Davis, above n 569, 93. 
791 Queensland Government, RACQ Get Ready Queensland (2016) 
<https://getready.qld.gov.au/>. 
792 Queensland Fire and Emergency Service (Qld), If it’s Flooded, forget it (11 March 2014) 
<https://www.qfes.qld.gov.au/communitysafety/swiftwater/>. 
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hazard maps are also becoming widely available to the public which might pre-
empt and empower individuals to take preparatory action.793 With information 
available for protective measures widely available,794 rather than being reliant 
on emergency managers exercising their powers to warn on the day, 
individuals may be able to help themselves. Consequently, it may only be in 
catastrophic events, where the risk of harm is high, general information is not 
available, and specific communities are unable to take self-protection 
measures, that a duty may be found. However, as identified later in this 
Chapter, establishing causation, particularly for property damage in a 
catastrophic event may be an issue. In catastrophic events, it is quite possible 
the harm complained of may have occurred despite a warning. 
Supervening policy considerations 
In conjunction with factors of control, knowledge and vulnerability, to balance 
public and private interests and how responsibility for harm should be shared, 
a court will consider supervening policy reasons for imputation of a duty of 
care.795 Where reasonable foreseeability, knowledge, control and vulnerability 
all favour the finding of a duty of care against a statutory agency, supervening 
policy issues may be of little relevance.796 A key issue in the management and 
response to a natural hazard emergency, for example is that statutory 
authorities need to be able to make key decisions without fear of 
liability.797Having examined some of the commonly referred to salient features 
                                                          
793 Department of Environment and Heritage Protection (Qld), Coastal Hazards and mapping 
(2 July 2015) < https://www.ehp.qld.gov.au/coastalplan/coastalhazards.html>; Department of 
Environment and Heritage Protection, Queensland Government, Coastal hazard map index 
(3 August 2016) <http://environment.ehp.qld.gov.au/coastal-hazards/>. 
794 Which for example, may trigger individuals to take out insurance for potential hazard 
impacts where available, see, eg, Commonwealth of Australia, National Disaster Insurance 
Review – inquiry into flood insurance and related matters (September 2011) 
<http://www.ndir.gov.au/content/report/downloads/NDIR_final.pdf>; Justine Bell, ‘Insurance 
for Extreme Weather Events in Australia – Current Policy Trends and Future Directions’ 
(2011) 8 Macquarie Journal of Business Law 339, 357; 'Insurance claims in doubt as 
superstorm threatens to erode property values', 9Finance, 7 June 2016 
<http://finance.nine.com.au/2016/10/07/15/18/insurance-claims-in-doubt-as-superstorm-
threatens-to-erode-property-values>. 
795 Caltex Refineries (Queensland) Pty Limited v Stavar (2009) 259 ALR 616, 642-643 
(Allsop P); Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 577-578. 
796 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 701 
[686] citing Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1, [93]. 
797 Explanatory Notes, Civil Liability Bill 2003 (Qld) 2-3; Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State 
of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, [686], [713] citing Crimmins v Stevedoring 
Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1, [93]. 
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for establishing a duty of care, an examination of judicial consideration of the 
formulation of a duty is necessary. 
Case law on warning 
Before examining an application of the criteria for establishing a duty of care 
in the context of warning, a background understanding of the nature of the 
cases examined is provided. The negligence cases which examine the duty to 
warn, and which were analysed in this thesis, cover a variety of factual 
circumstances and differing relationships. They include for example medical 
negligence cases where the doctor has failed to warn the patient of a risk 
within a procedure. These cases examine fault and wrong-doing in the context 
of the doctor / patient relationship. In these cases, a duty of care automatically 
arises due to the existence of the relationship.798 As identified in this research 
the relationship between citizens and the state, in the context of warning, 
rather than being a relationship automatically recognised at law, is usually a 
novel one. Despite this difference in establishing the duty of care, the case law 
on warning and medical negligence provides relevant examination of the 
element of causation which is highly valuable to an understanding of the 
action. 
Further warning cases, include a series of recreation and diving injury cases. 
These cases focus on the omission or failure to adequately warn of a potential 
danger in the natural environment. This includes for example, the presence of 
a rock or sandbar in a body of water which may not be visible to an observer 
yet poses a potential risk if a person were to dive into the body of water.799 In 
a number of these cases, the defendant is a public authority with a statutory 
power for care, control and management of a channel, a coastline, or a reserve 
in which the risk is located. The authority will owe a duty of care to entrants 
                                                          
798 See, eg, Tracey Carver and Malcolm K Smith, ‘Medical Negligence, Causation and 
Liability non-disclosure of Risk’ (2014) 37(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal, 
972, 973; Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232; Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434. 
799 Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40 (Water-skiing, ambiguous signage); 
Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422, 423 (Diving, no sign erected); Mulligans v 
Coffs Harbour City Council (2005) 223 CLR 486 (Diving no sign erected); Swain v Waverley 
Municipal Council (2005) 220 CLR 517 (Diving into sandbar at Bondi Beach, placement of 
the flags as a safe place to swim); Road and Traffic Authority of NSW v Dederer (2007) 234 
CLR 330, 338, 345-346 (Reference is made to the statutory functions). 
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upon land.800 Where the defendant is not an occupier of land, a novel duty is 
considered. Whatever the different cases contribute to ascertaining a duty of 
care, they provide an examination of breach and causation, often arguing 
principles from the highest courts in Australia. These cases are very relevant 
here as they identify judicial precedent which will be followed across the 
differing jurisdictions. 
The final collection of warning cases is those focused on the natural hazard 
context. These cases examine negligence in relation to a public or statutory 
authority, where a duty to warn is included in the scope of the duty of care. 
Although being most relevant to this examination of warning there are limited 
cases in this area and many have settled out of court. Others, derive from 
courts which are lower in the court hierarchy and therefore may have less 
value in their ability to offer judicial precedent. Of those available, most have 
arisen in Australia in the context of fire hazard and related emergencies.801 
The following exposition, examines the formulation of a duty of care in these 
cases. An understanding of how the court has historically adjudicated warning 
claims in the context of a duty to warn, is fundamental to an understanding of 
likely outcomes for future claims, which will be examined in Chapter Eight.   
Establishing a duty of care in the warning cases 
 
With a background understanding of the contributions of the case law to this 
thesis in mind, this section examines specific cases to investigate how the 
criteria for establishing a duty of care have been applied in the warning 
context. As indicated in the previous section, in some warning cases the 
                                                          
800 See, eg, Caltex Refineries (Queensland) Pty Limited v Stavar (2009) 259 ALR 616, 642, 
643; See, also, Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422, 423; Mulligans v Coffs 
Harbour City Council (2005) 223 CLR 486, 486; See, also, Papatonakis v Australian 
Telecommunications Commission  (1985) 156 CLR 7, 28 (Brennan and Dawson); 
Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna (1987) 162 CLR 479, 480  (Questions about an 
occupiers liability are now resolved under the general principles of negligence).  
801 See, eg, Matthews v Ausnet Electricity Services Pty Ltd (Formerly SPI Electricity Pty Ltd) 
(Ruling No 40) [2015] VSC 131 (settled); Rowe v AusNet Electricity Services Pty Ltd [2015] 
VSC 232 (Murrindindi Black Saturday bushfire class action) (settled 2015); Warragamba 
Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 701; Electro Optic 
Systems Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales [2014] 204 LGERA 238; Father Evans v New 
South Wales (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 1381) (ongoing) (This list of cases does not profess to 
be exhaustive). 
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formulation of a duty of care has been non-problematic. This is either because 
of the pre-established relationship between the parties; the reliance on duties 
to entrants on land; and statutory powers and functions of the authority which 
enabled them to regulate and ‘control human activity’.802 Warning in 
emergency situations will however be considered a novel case. Therefore, an 
examination of how courts have examined the criteria of reasonable 
foreseeability, and the salient features of the relationship and functions 
provided for in regulatory components, is required.  
As identified, the first criteria to be satisfied in the formulation of a duty of care 
is identification of a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm. For example, is it 
reasonably foreseeable that the failure to warn a potentially affected 
community of an imminent hazard, could lead to harm to persons or their 
property interests.803 In the context of warning and hazards, the weight of 
precedent suggests that reasonable foreseeability will not be difficult to prove. 
For example, in Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales 
where fire spread outside of containment lines and ‘weather conditions were 
escalating to almost unprecedented levels of fire danger’, ‘significant fire 
danger approaching extreme’ would have been reasonably foreseeable.804 
Turning to salient features, it would be impossible to adequately cover the 
evaluative process of each of the features, however some examples in the 
hazard context, where novel cases are specifically addressed, are useful. In 
Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (Ruling No 2),805 both a statutory and 
common law duty to warn were claimed. The facts of this case relate to a fire 
initially caused by a broken powerline, which spread in multiple directions 
causing unprecedented loss of life and property destruction. The warning 
component of this case was directed at State parties in Victoria (Country Fire 
Authority (CFA), Victoria Police and the Department of Sustainability and 
                                                          
802 Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422, 422 (The requirement to exercise this 
power in this case was uncontested); Mulligan v Coffs Harbour (2005) 223 CLR 486, 497. 
803 There is no requirement that the extent of the harm nor the exact chain of events needs 
to be foreseeable, see, eg, Chapman v Hearse (1961) 106 CLR 112, 112. 
804 Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales [2012] ACTSC 184, [141]-
[142] (Although it was highlighted that the level of damage could not have been considered 
reasonably foreseeable). 
805 Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (Ruling No 2) (2011) 34 VR 584. 
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Environment) for a failure to provide proper and adequate warnings of the 
fire.806  
The claimant argued that particularly the CFA had a duty to provide what were 
effectively quite detailed warnings and information.807 In this case there was 
an insufficient basis to establish a statutory duty to warn. However, to 
determine early on whether there was merit in the case proceeding, and 
whether there could be any foundation to assert a duty of care was owed, the 
judge considered the relevant regulatory components. As a starting point, 
Forrest J considered that the Emergency Management Act (VIC), along with 
the associated emergency management plan might provide a sufficient ‘basis 
for a common law duty of care’, such that the claim was not dismissed at first 
instance.808 Ultimately this case was settled out of court, and as an early 
review has little precedential value. The case was correct in considering 
statute as an initial consideration in the duty of care. However, it does not 
provide a rule that subsidiary regulatory components will always be a sufficient 
basis for the formulation of a duty of care. 
Further case law in the area of warning reiterates that statutory powers are a 
starting point for formulation of a duty. The cases then undertake an evaluative 
judgment of statutory powers where relevant, alongside the salient factors. For 
those cases where there is no recourse to the argument that the relevant 
authority is an occupier of land with a common law duty, the reasoning usually 
leads to the inability to formulate a duty of care to warn.809 In Warragamba 
Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9)810 for example a negligence 
claim was bought against statutory authorities for various issues relating to a 
bushfire in the Blue Mountains in New South Wales. In this case, the warning 
component of the case was directed at a number of parties for the failure to 
                                                          
806 Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (Ruling No 2) (2011) 34 VR 584, [4].  
807 Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (Ruling No 2) (2011) 34 VR 584, [92]-[94]. 
808 Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (Ruling No 2) (2011) 34 VR 584, [111]-[112]. 
809 Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales 2014 ACTCA 45 [461]-[462] 
(The case includes a short reference to a duty to warn (alongside a case for negligent 
misstatement) in respect of fires originating in NSW in 2003 and burning into ACT, causing 
property damage); Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] 
NSWSC 701, [1114], [1119], [1120], 1121]. 
810 [2012] NSWSC 701. 
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give warnings to those who could have protected themselves.811 The claimant 
unsuccessfully tried to rely on the consideration that the National Parks and 
Wildlife Service were an occupier of the Park and had a duty to its neighbours, 
which included a duty to warn.812   
In this case, a salient factor relied on by on plaintiffs was the agency’s 
knowledge of the existence of fire and its direction.813 As a key counter 
argument, and in seeking to apply the narrower interpretation of control, the 
defendant alleged a lack of control over ‘the harmful cause of the damage’, the 
fire.814 If the wider definition had been applied however, it may have been 
considered that there was managerial control of the area. Rather, an in line 
with the highlighted reasoning in Graham Barclay Oysters v Ryan,815 the fire 
was identified as the natural force causing the harm, to which the agency had 
not contributed or worsened,816 therefore a duty of care was not established.817 
In the fire cases, supervening policy considerations have also been raised. 
These policy considerations seek to reinforce that a fire fighter, must ‘make 
difficult decisions in difficult circumstances (for example where unpredictable 
and non-uniform hazard risks impact communities in a short space of time) 
and should be given considerable latitude before being held guilty of 
negligence’, so as not to divert resources from core duties.818 As this policy 
consideration is likely to apply to all emergency situations, formulation of a 
duty of care may be a difficult hurdle to overcome.  
 
 
                                                          
811 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, 
[1116]. 
812 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, 
[1121]. 
813 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, 
[687]-[690].  
814 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, 
[707]. 
815 (2002) 211 CLR 540. 
816 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, 
[707]. 
817 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, 
[701]-[703]. 
818 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, 
[712]-[713]. 
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Scope of the duty to warn 
Recalling that a duty of care is limited by its scope and content, plaintiffs have 
tended to seek a scope which requires specific warnings. Ultimately however, 
there claims have often been unsuccessful. In the diving and recreation cases, 
the scope of the duty included the erection of unambiguous signs, either 
prohibiting or warning of the dangers of the specific risk.819 In the case of fire, 
plaintiffs have suggested that warnings should have included: ‘the fire source, 
direction, speed, spread, communities likely to be impacted, approximate time 
of impact, changing conditions and their effects and unpredictability of the fire 
and consequences of not heeding a warning’.820 In Warragamba Winery Pty 
Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9), plaintiffs have argued the scope of the 
duty should include the dissemination of warnings over specific radio channels 
relevant to the community.821  
An examination of the judgments in these warning cases, highlights that a 
court focuses more on whether the duty to warn is established generally, rather 
than focusing on identifying specifics of the duty. In negating a duty of care 
which includes a requirement to warn, it can be difficult to extract the precise 
reasoning which has been applied by the various courts. Often the duty of care 
and the breach of the duty are examined together. It is therefore difficult to 
extract a unifying principle. A few examples indicate however, that in refusing 
the imposition of the duty as cast, the various courts have taken into 
consideration principles applicable to establishing liability of a public authority, 
which are now reflected in civil liability legislation.822 That is, judges have 
considered the burden that would be placed on a statutory authority, as a 
public functionary. In Vairy v Wyong Shire Council823  for example, when 
considering the need to erect signs to warn of a risk of injury when diving from 
                                                          
819 Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422, 422, 427 (It is noted that in their 
dissenting judgement, Gleeson CJ and Kirby J, suggest that ‘warning signs only serve a 
purpose if they are likely to inform a person of something that the person does not already 
know, or to draw attention to something that the person might have overlooked or 
forgotten.’); Mulligans v Coffs Harbour City Council (2005) 223 CLR 486, 486. 
820 Matthews v AusNet Electricity Services Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 663, [272]. 
821 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, 
[1123]. 
822 See, eg, Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 35. 
823 (2005) 223 CLR 422. 
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a rock platform into shallow water, the court decided that to impose a duty to 
‘erect of signs’, would impose too great a burden. Imposition of the duty, would 
require a potentially indeterminate number of warning signs be erected given 
the large area of coast line under its management.824 As a specific example in 
the hazard context, Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales 
(No 9) reiterates the principles relevant to statutory authorities as public 
functionaries, highlighting that a specific duty may be too wide, particularly 
where a multitude of specific warnings would need to be issued due to the 
number of fires burning.825  
The case law examined here suggests that the formulation of a duty of care 
for warning, particularly in the context of hazard, where multiple impacts are 
occurring, may be difficult. Where there is little control over the cause of harm, 
provided that the authority has not created or worsened the harm, it may be 
difficult to meet the threshold test. This may be the case unless specific powers 
have been provided in the statute creating the authority. 
Breach of a duty of care 
Should the formulation of a duty of care be successful, the breach of that duty, 
is the second element of the negligence claim. The breach of a duty of care is 
determined by application of a multi-faceted calculus of factors. These factors 
are applied to determine whether the act or omission is a breach of the legal 
standard of care which is expected in society. That is, whether the statutory 
authority has exhibited a reasonable standard of care, or has fallen ‘short of 
the standard of behaviour measurable in law’.826 The question of breach, is a 
prospective consideration. It examines not whether the risk could have been 
prevented but whether a reasonable standard of care was exercised in the 
circumstances, given the probable risk of harm.827  
                                                          
824 Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422, 422, 449, 452. 
825 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, 
[765]. 
826 Clarke, Deveraux and Warren, above n 703, 292, 159 (The standard of behaviour is that 
of the reasonable person, ‘a hypothetical construct’). 
827 Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330, 343, 
353. 
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When considering a particular hazard risk, a fire, a flood, or a cyclone, what 
would constitute reasonable care? Research suggests that what constitutes 
‘reasonable’ at law, may not be ‘commensurate with actions adopted by risk 
managers’ when considering the same risk.828 The reasonable standard of 
care, or actions necessary to be taken, at law, in certain circumstances, may 
therefore be lower. Despite this assertion, there is a concern in the hazard 
context, that as ‘super-storms and natural disasters become a constantly 
worsening phenomenon; the necessary standard of care seems to be 
intensifying’.829 
‘Calculus’ of Breach 
To determine whether there has been a breach of a duty of care, a number of 
factors are taken into consideration. In Australia, most jurisdictions have 
enacted civil liability legislation, which slightly modifies the original common 
law calculus of the breach of a duty of care.830 Under the civil liability 
legislation, breach of a duty requires examination of whether the risk was 
reasonably foreseeable and not insignificant,831 and the precautions a 
reasonable person would have taken to meet the risk.832 To determine the 
precautions a reasonable person, or in this case a reasonable statutory 
authority, would take the court considers: the probability of the harm 
eventuating; the seriousness of the harm; the burden of taking precautions; 
and the social utility of the risk causing activity.833 Of further relevance may be 
customary and statutory standards and anticipation of carelessness by the 
                                                          
828 Rochford, above n 234, 183. 
829 Frattaroli, above n 687, 200-201. 
830 See, eg, Wrongs Act 1958 (VIC); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW); Civil Liability Act 2002 
(WA); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas); Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); Civil Liability Act 
2003 (Qld); See, also, Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40, 47-48 (Mason J) 
(This case outlines the original common law formulation of a breach of a duty of care).  
831 Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40, 47-48 (Mason J); Eburn, “The Emerging 
Issue of a failure to warn’, above n 71, 52  (That is as long as the risk is not far-fetched or 
fanciful, as Eburn has suggested in the medical cases, a 1:14000 risk, or one that is 
‘extremely unlikely’ is still considered in certain circumstances to be reasonably foreseeable, 
as it is not the ‘probability or likelihood of the occurrence’ that is measured, more whether it 
is a fantastic or far-fetched possibility). 
832 See, eg, Wrongs Act 1958 (VIC) s 48; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5B; Civil Liability 
Act 2002 (WA) s 5B; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 12; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 
43; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 9(1). 
833 Civil Liability Act (2003) Qld s 9(2). 
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person to whom the duty is owed.834 In assessing the burden of taking 
precautions, the fact that alternate actions could have avoid or reduce the risk, 
or that subsequent action to address the risk of harm has been taken, does 
not on its own give rise to liability.835 
As well as provisions which apply to breach of care generally, there are further 
provisions specifically relevant to public authorities.836 These provisions 
include considerations of policy. The policy considerations call for an 
examination of the range of activities the authority is required to address, any 
resource limitations as well as the freedom a public authority has to choose in 
which areas to allocate resources.837 These latter provisions, as has already 
been noted in the formulation of the duty of care, are explicitly referred to within 
the warning cases to defeat a claim against local government authorities. It is 
these provisions which at times make a breach of a duty a difficult hurdle to 
overcome. 
Breach in the warning cases 
To determine a breach, it is relevant to understand what a warning is seeks to 
achieve: 
A warning sign seeks to convey information which an observer would not or 
may not otherwise have known, or seeks to remind the observer of something 
that otherwise would not or may not be considered.… A warning would remind 
those (considering the risk). It may inform the young or the ill-informed of 
something they did not know or understand.838 
 
As the excerpt highlights, a warning conveys unknown information or reminds 
a party of information that may not have been considered. For example, a 
warning provides information of the direction and magnitude of a natural 
                                                          
834 Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40, 47-48 (Mason J). 
835 See, eg, Wrongs Act 1958 (VIC) s 49; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5C; Civil Liability 
Act 2002 (Tas) s 12; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 44; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) 
10. 
836 Wrongs Act 1958 (VIC) s 83; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 42; Civil Liability Act 2002 
(WA) s 5W; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 38; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 110; 
Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 35. 
837 Wrongs Act 1958 (VIC) s 83; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 42; Civil Liability Act 2002 
(WA) s 5W; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 38; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 110; 
Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 35. 
838 Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422, 467. 
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hazard such as a fire, or cyclone, which would not be known to the public. A 
warning, should also inform the public of the general nature of the particular 
risk.839 In alerting people to something they may already know, a warning is 
not necessarily required where the risk is one which would be in the minds of 
persons generally.840 Nor is the standard such that the authority has to 
envisage every type of person who might be subject to the risk when 
determining whether to issue a warning.841  
However, when warnings are issued, clarity is required, and any ambiguity as 
to the nature of the risk, may equate to a failure to exercise reasonable care, 
and therefore a breach of duty.842 When warnings are clear, ‘evidence of non-
compliance by others with the warning signs, does not justify the conclusion 
that they are inadequate’.843 For example, when agencies warn not to drive 
through flood waters, and a person dies for failing to comply with the warning, 
this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the warning issued was 
inadequate. Highly relevant to a determination of breach, is the shared 
responsibility of the public, in that it is ‘incumbent’ upon members of the public 
to ‘read the signs’.844 
Factual circumstances and basis for breach 
Across the case law related to a duty to warn, there are a number of acts or 
omissions which claimants have referred to as having the potential to establish 
a breach of the duty of care. These are variously described as a failure to 
                                                          
839 Sharp v Parramatta City Council (2015) 209 LGERA 220, 220; Woods v Multi-Sport 
Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 260, 473-474; Tracey L. Carver, ‘Obviously Obvious: 
Obvious Risks, Policy and Claimant Inadvertence’ (2007) 14(1) eLaw Journal 66, 67 (The 
warning does not have to state the precise nature and full extent of the risks). 
840 Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422, 439. 
841 Mulligans v Coffs Harbour City Council (2005) 223 CLR 486, 495-496. 
842 Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40, 40; State of Queensland v Kelly [2014] 
QCA 27, [71]. (In this Queensland court decision, the findings at first instance commented 
on the effectiveness of the signs, that in negating a signs effectiveness the use of 
pictograms may have inaccurately demonstrated the nature of the risk, the final court 
decision reversed the decision of trial judge based on a failure to consider the obviousness 
of the risk). 
843 State of Queensland v Kelly [2014] QCA 27, [35], [42]. 
844 State of Queensland v Kelly [2014] QCA 27, [27]. 
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notify,845 a failure to provide ‘proper’ and ‘adequate’ warning846 or to provide 
adequate and complete information as to the threat posed.847 Issues also stem 
from the type of warning issued, for example, general rather than specific 
warnings,848 the choice of media, 849 or inappropriate timing of warnings. 850 
These claims, although often unsuccessful, highlight that the public expect and 
rely upon well timed warning messages, with sufficient and adequate 
information, over a broad range of media channels. These expectations, 
reinforce attributes of risk communication that were identified in Chapter 
Three, as good practice to adopt in order to bring about public response. The 
presence of case law regarding these attributes suggests that there is a 
continued perception of a failure to deliver in these areas. Despite the 
recommendations and public expectations, failure to deliver on these qualities 
have not equated to a breach of a duty of care.851 Rather it is the complete 
lack of warning (a failure to warn at all of the particular risk), or lack of clarity 
and ambiguity, which has given rise to liability. To date, none of the case law 
has raised issues of inconsistency across messages.  
Determining a reasonable standard of care in warning cases 
The factors relevant to establishing a breach of a duty of care have been 
outlined. In the first instance, when assessing reasonable care in light of an 
                                                          
845 See, eg, Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 
701 [1130]-[1132] (Notably the court would not have found the parties to have been in 
breach); Matthews v AusNet Electricity Services Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 663, [270]; Vairy v 
Wyong Shire Council [2005] 223 CLR 422, 429-430, 455-456 (The breach was a failure to 
erect one or more signs warning against diving from a rock platform). 
846 Matthews and Ausnet Electricity Services [2014] VSC 663, [285] (The warning was too 
late for those involved). 
847 Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales [2014] 204 LGERA 238, 
[457]; Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40, 40, 48 (Where the warning issued 
was a sign indicating a change in depth of water, however its placement meant it had an 
ambiguous meaning and could easily be read incorrectly so as to induce a person to believe 
otherwise about a hazard). 
848 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, 
[1133] (Where general warnings did not include warnings to the specific community). 
849 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, 
[1123], [1125] (Preferred radio station). 
850 See, eg, Vairy v Wyong Shire Council [2005] 223 CLR 422, 465 (A reasonable person 
would not have marked at every point). 
851 See, eg Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 
701, [1124] (Discussion in Warragamba Winery where timings were an issue however the 
intervals at which warnings were issued was adjudged reasonable without the necessity to 
add those preferred by the community). 
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act or omission a court will take into account the entirety of the warnings. 852 
Case law indicates that a court will also consider the content of any warnings 
or information issued.853 This will include pre-season messaging, general 
community information sessions, in-season warnings, or warnings over a 
number of consecutive days or hours prior to the impact of an event.854 A court 
will also consider the general practice and policy historically adopted by the 
agency. For example, issuing a general, rather than a specific warning to a 
community, may demonstrate reasonable care if it has been the normal 
practice.855 Of general note, this should alert agencies to the fact that if one 
method of warning is no longer practicable or desired, for example warning by 
door-knocking, time must be taken to re-educate the community to avoid 
breaching a duty of care. Incorporating notions of personal and shared 
responsibility it is important to re-iterate that the court will expect, in assessing 
any allegation of breach, that ‘plaintiffs will exercise reasonable care for their 
own safety’.856  
The calculus: reliance on ‘limited resources’  
Of the factors which establish breach, establishing reasonable foreseeability 
of the risk of harm has been unproblematic to prove. It is difficult to discern 
however, the role the individual factors such as the ‘probability that harm would 
occur if action was not taken’ and ‘the likely seriousness of the harm’ have 
                                                          
852 See, eg, Matthews and Ausnet Electricity Services [2014] VSC 663, [276],[288]; State of 
Queensland v Kelly [2014] QCA 27, [42] (Sufficiency of the signs taken in combination to 
bringing home the message to a reasonable person). 
853 Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales [2014] 204 LGERA 238, 
[457].  
854 See, eg, Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 
701; Matthews v Ausnet Electricity Services [2014] VSC 663, [276],[288] (These might 
include warnings given rather than in the immediate vicinity of the hazard impact, those 
warnings issued at the commencement of the season, and general community information 
sessions ‘in the years leading up to’ the event, along with the ‘notoriety of the risk’); State of 
Queensland v Kelly [2014] QCA 27, [42] (Sufficiency of the signs taken in combination to 
bringing home the message to a reasonable person). 
855 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, 
[710], [1142]. 
856  Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330, 398 
(Gummow). 
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played.857 These factors rather than being reasoned independently, become 
part of an ‘amalgam’ which ‘obscures the underlying reasoning of the court’.858  
One factor which does stand out, and is used by authorities to negate a claim, 
is an argument centred on the ‘limited availability of resources’.859 This 
argument is usually aligned with recognition of the statutory authority’s 
collective responsibilities. Ultimately, any lack of resources means that, in 
most jurisdictions,860 if the cost to the authorities of carrying out numerous 
responsibilities when considering all obligations is burdensome, they may be 
excused from taking action.861 The case of Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v 
State of New South Wales (No 9),862 provides an example. In this case, it was 
stated that: ‘there is a limit to what (the organisations) can do’ as all were 
‘entities with limited resources’.863 To issue ‘specific and targeted warnings’ 
when there ‘were so many fires burning’ at the same time, when there was  
greater urgency in other communities, would not have been practical and been 
too great a burden on resources.864 Whether the same claims of limited 
resources, would continue to support the absence of a breach of a duty of care 
in the future, is unclear. In the case of communication and warning for 
example, jurisdictions now have escalation frameworks in place. These 
frameworks give access to a greater capacity to warn865 when resource 
capabilities of the entity responding are pushed beyond the limit.    
                                                          
857 Jane Stapleton, ‘Factual Causation’ (2010) 38 Federal Law Review 467, 469; Civil 
Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 9(2). 
858 Stapleton, ‘Factual Causation’, above n 857, 469. 
859 See, eg, Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 
701, [710]; Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422, 451-452; Mulligans v Coffs 
Harbour City Council (2005) 223 CLR 486; See, eg, comment in Martin, above n 737, 200 
(That should a public hospital ‘which decided it lacks resources to support round the close 
specialist obstetric care would be in a position to rely on the exception…(where it was 
asserted) there was a failure to provide that care or a delay).  
860 Wrongs Act 1958 (VIC) s 83; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 42; Civil Liability Act 2002 
(WA) s 5W; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 38; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 110. 
861 See, eg, Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 35 (Including the burden of taking precautions, 
and limitations on general resources of authorities). 
862 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 701. 
863 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, 
[1133]. 
864 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, 
[1246]; Note also the reference to Matthews v AusNet Electricity Services Pty Ltd [2014] 
VSC 663, [286] (Where it was observed that the agency was fighting a ‘unprecedented 
catastrophe involving a number of major fires’); See, eg, Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) (In 
Queensland this would take into account s 35(a) and (c)). 
865 See, eg, Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) s 30(d).  
 202 
 
The calculus: multiple responsibilities 
Alongside resource constraints, the collective responsibilities of a statutory 
authority are referred to in determining whether there was an absence of a 
breach of duty. For example, in the diving and recreation cases, the court 
reasoned that, to exercise a reasonable standard of care would not have 
required the entity to single out the particular risk or require that preventative 
action be taken 866 This conclusion was in part because the risk was a readily 
apparent and ever-present danger, even if posing a catastrophic risk.867 It was 
a risk that was likely to be in the knowledge and understanding of the users of 
the area generally. It would also one among a multitude of risks which was 
required to be managed by the public authority.868 This conclusion of the court 
is qualified where the magnitude of the risk increases and there is a greater 
probability of injury, making the requirement for a warning more likely.869 The 
case of Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9)870 
reinforces that this same argument has been applied to a statutory authority 
established for the purposes of emergency prevention.  
The role of regulatory components in assessing a breach and reasonable care 
Chapter Five, identified that some regulatory components, rather than acting 
as the basis for formulating a duty, will be relevant to the determination of 
breach. In that Chapter, numerous soft law instruments at various levels of the 
hierarchy, were identified. Many of the guidelines, plans, protocols and codes 
contained detailed roles and responsibilities of the statutory bodies. How do 
they impact the breach of a duty of care? Compliance with regulatory 
components can have a positive effect on negating a breach of a duty for a 
public authority. In Queensland, statutory provisions relating to liability for 
public authorities, reinforce this proposition. Civil liability provisions specifically 
state that compliance with procedures and standards, may act as ‘evidence of 
the proper exercise of its functions in the matter to which the proceeding 
                                                          
866 Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422, 464 (This was in consideration of the 
greater number of risk and the cost and efficacy is placing such signs as being likely to 
prevent behaviour). 
867 See, eg, Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422, 466, 470. 
868 Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422, 454. 
869 Mulligans v Coffs Harbour City Council (2005) 223 CLR 486, 496 (McHugh). 
870 [2012] NSWSC 701. 
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relates’ and that reasonable care has been taken.871 Therefore, ‘non-
compliance’ or certainly inconsistency872 with any standard or guidelines, in 
carrying out a duty of care, ‘may be persuasive evidence of negligence’.873  
It is important to remember however, that compliance with procedures is 
balanced with all the other factors to be considered in the determination of the 
breach of a duty. Therefore, although evidence of compliance is recognised 
under the civil liability legislation as evidence of proper exercise of an 
authority’s functions,874 it is not conclusive evidence of the exercise of 
reasonable care.875 This is particularly the case if the procedures complied 
with are out of date or do not reflect good practice. So, too the case of 
Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) suggests that 
procedures, or ‘protocols are guidelines. Like Australian Standards, they can 
show what is possible or desirable. But the breach of a protocol does not of 
itself ground a cause of action or point to a breach of statutory duty.’876  Despite 
this assertion, case law does suggest that any non-compliance will, ‘call for a 
convincing explanation the more the standard in question is adhered to by 
everyone else’.877 In considering the role of these components, a court will 
also examine the interaction of the component with the legislation, and 
whether the wording suggests adherence to the component is mandatory.878 
                                                          
871 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 35(d). 
872 See, eg, Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) s 50. 
873 Flemings, Sappideen and Vines, above n 713, 427. 
874 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 35(d). 
875 Sibley v Kais (1967) 118 CLR 424, 427. 
876 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, 
429-430; Sheridan v Borgmeyer [2006] NSWCA 201, [18]; Maynard v Rover Mowers Ltd 
[2000] QCA 26; [17] (Where protocols and codes were deemed not more than a standard 
without legal force, however they may prove relevant to determining whether reasonable 
precautions have been taken) Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (Ruling No 2) (2011) 34 VR 
584, [78]-[79 ](An emergency plan does not constitute delegated legislation which would 
bring about a statutory duty but may assist in the finding of a common law duty); See, also, 
LexisNexis, Encyclopaedic Australian Legal Dictionary (at 24 September 2016) 
’Administrative Law’; Fisher, Legal Reasoning in Environmental Law, above n 94, 337 (For 
example ‘there may be obligations on how to perform rather than obligations on outcomes’, 
or there may a ‘clear link to ensure compliance with the plans’ for example). Electro Optic 
Systems Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2014] 204 LGERA 238, 377 (In this case procedures 
were ‘very theoretical’, not necessarily suited to the issue at hand however in this case a 
discussion of the failure to follow protocols went to discussion of a lack of good faith). 
877 Flemings, Sappideen and Vines, above n 713, 150; Rodriguez & Sons Pty Ltd v 
Queensland Bulk Water Supply Authority (t/as Seqwater) [2014] NSWSC 1565 [13]. 
878 LexisNexis, Encyclopaedic Australian Legal Dictionary (at 24 September 2016) 
’Administrative Law’ (Where a guideline may be considered policy which ‘does not have the 
 204 
 
As an example, in Queensland, the Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) in 
its guiding principles, states that ‘all events...should be managed in 
accordance with the…’strategic policy framework, the disaster management 
plan and any disaster management guidelines’.879 In the state of Queensland, 
the use of ‘should’ suggests some level of discretion, which may mean that a 
failure to follow plans and guidelines may not be sufficient on its own to 
demonstrate an actionable breach of duty. 
Conclusions on breach 
As highlighted in this section, whether a duty of care has been breached is 
tested from the perspective of what action a party, who was prospectively 
faced with a risk of harm, would do in the circumstances.880 In the context of a 
natural hazard and in assessing whether reasonable care has been taken, the 
finding of a breach of a duty of care has often been defeated. This is despite 
the fact that the harm suffered is often reasonably foreseeable. A decision to 
negate the finding of breach will usually reference policy decisions over the 
limited availability of resources, and the multiple responsibilities of a statutory 
authority. With frameworks in place which extend the resource capacity of 
agencies, recourse to this particular policy consideration may carry limited 
weight in the future. In entering a pleading for the breach of a duty of care, 
either party may seek to lead evidence of compliance, or lack of compliance 
with procedures, protocols and guidelines. However, the success of this tactic 
will depend on the interaction of the components with the legislation. It will also 
depend on the factual circumstances, as to whether in the particular 
circumstances, a failure to comply will demonstrate breach. As a final note, 
courts recognise when examining factors which may constitute breach, that 
                                                          
force of law unless the empowering legislation provides it is binding’); Fisher, Legal 
Reasoning in Environmental Law, above n 94, 337. 
879 Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) s 4A(b), 16A(b), 50 (the chief executive is also to 
ensure that disaster management and disaster operations are consistent with these same 
documents, as well as the disaster management guidelines, equally any plans must be 
consistent with the disaster management standards and guidelines). 
880 Martin, above n 737, 192; (There is a shift in the case law after the millennium away from 
‘hindsight bias’ to look ‘from the perspective of the participants prior to the occurrence of the 
risk having eventuated’). 
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some risks are ever present in the landscape. In light of these hazards it is 
anticipated that citizens should exercise reasonable care for their safety. 
Damage 
 
Damage, the final element in a negligence action, is absolutely necessary to 
perfect liability.881 Damage generally includes harm to property, person 
(physical or mental injury) or economic loss, which is the reasonably 
foreseeable consequence of the breach.882 That is, the damage is within the 
scope of the liability to be considered. To prove the element of damage, there 
needs to be a causal link ‘between the breach of duty and the harm 
suffered’.883 The harm suffered must be considered to be in the scope of the 
defendant’s liability as set out in the duty of care.884 Thus, it must be proven 
on the balance of probabilities885that the failure, for example, of a statutory 
authority to adequately warn of the presence or imminent exposure to a fire or 
flood, led to property damage or personal injury.  
 
The test for causation 
 
Establishing the test for causation, which is applied in practice, has historically 
been problematic and confusing. This is because causation has been 
described as ‘the most ill-defined’ principles of law.886 Although it might be 
imagined that a review of the judgments would be enlightening, Stapleton 
suggests that the reasoning of the courts has become a truncated amalgam 
                                                          
881 Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537, 577; Harriton v Stephens (2006) 226 CLR 52, 52; Civil 
Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 11; See, also, The Hon Justice Susan Keifel AC, ‘Developments in 
the Law Relating to Medical Negligence in the last 30 Years’ (2016) 19 International Trade 
and Business Law Review 1, 4. 
882 Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 234, 257; Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537, 547 
Margaret Beazley, ‘Damages’ in John F Flemings, C Sappideen and Prue Vines (eds), 
Fleming’s the law of torts (Thomson Reuters, 10th ed, 2011) 225-226 (Types of damage 
recognised will differ within jurisdictions, and have differential controls applied to the action). 
883 See, eg, Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 242; March v E & MH Stramare Pty 
Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506, 509; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 11; Keifel, above n 881, 4. 
884 Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 234. 
885 See, eg, Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 12; Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 234. 
886 Mirko Baragic and Sharon Erbacher, ‘Causation in negligence: From anti-jurisprudence to 
principle – Individual responsibility as the cornerstone for the attribution of liability’ (2011) 18 
Journal of Law and Medicine 759, 759. 
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of ideas.887 Conclusions, are often ‘reached intuitively and without a lengthy 
articulation of the reasons’.888  Consequently, it has been difficult to discern a 
clear pattern of reasoning or to determine with any sense of predictability how 
the court will decide.889 Legislative restatements of the element within statute 
purported to assist in clarifying the test, for causation.890 Since the judgments 
of Strong v Woolworth Ltd891 in 2012, and Wallace v Kam892 in 2013, the 
application of the test for causation have also now become clearer.893 
 
The two arms of causation: factual and legal causation 
 
The establishment of the causation follows two key factual tests. The two 
separate questions or arms of the test include; one of factual causation (the 
causal or factual link between the harm and the damage),894 and the second, 
the scope of liability (as a normative consideration or value judgement as to 
whether liability ought to be ‘extend to the harm so caused’).895 Historically 
common law reasoning for causation has related to either the ‘but for’, and the 
common sense tests of causation.896 It is the ‘but for’ test, which has been 
aligned with the factual causation provision in legislation.897 Although the 
                                                          
887 Stapleton, ‘Factual Causation’, above n 857, 381-382 (Where it states the distinct nature 
of the questions has been overlooked in the articulation of the common law and the separate 
questions obscured’, although ‘statute now requires the two questions be kept distinct’). 
888 R P Balkin & J L R Davis, Law of Torts (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th ed, 2013) 319. 
889 Baragic and Erbacher, above n 886, 760. 
890 Martin, above n 737, 196-197 (This is a generally noted issue with the imposition of civil 
liability legislation; and in certain regards some courts have continued to assert there is no 
‘need to differentiate between common law principles and the statutory provisions because 
the outcomes of the case will be the same whichever approach is taken). 
891 (2012) 246 CLR 182. 
892 250 CLR 375. 
893 Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375; See, eg, Carver and Smith, above n 798, 972 (for a 
clear expression of the tests to be applied); Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak (2009) 239 
CLR 420, 440 (in that causation is governed by the provisions under Civil liability legislation 
and may therefore differ to common law approaches). 
894 Clarke, Deveraux and Werren, above n 703, 17, 28-29, 30,292, 338; Beazley, above n 
882, 228; Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 242 (McHugh). 
895 David Hamer, ‘’Factual causation’ and ‘scope of liability’: What’s the difference>?” (2014) 
77(2) Modern Law Review 155, 157-8; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 11(1)(b). 
896 March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506, 506, 508 (Mason CJ) (While the 
Queensland civil Liability legislation is referred to in this thesis, the relevant sections are 
‘substantially replicated’ in other Australian jurisdiction as highlighted in Wallace v Kam 
(2013) 250 CLR 375, 382, citing Wrongs Act 1958 (VIC) s 51; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 
34(1)(3); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5D; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5C; Civil Liability 
Act 2002 (Tas) s 13; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 46). 
897 See, eg, Wallace v Kam 250 CLR 375,383; Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 
182, 183; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 11(1)(a) (The provision is expressed as a 
 207 
 
common sense test will apply when there is an evidentiary gap, predominantly, 
it is the ‘but for’ test which applies, that is ‘but for’ the breach, would the plaintiff 
have suffered harm’.898  This test will be explained in the following paragraphs. 
 
Precondition of the harm: the ‘but for’ test 
 
Tests for causation apply a limit to the burden of liability. The aim of the tests 
is to ensure that there is a reasonable connection and equally some limitation, 
on the ability to ‘place an excessive burden on human activity’ when liability is 
imposed.899  As stated above, the ‘but for test’ considers but for the breach 
would the plaintiff have suffered the harm.900 The test requires a comparison 
‘between what has happened and what would have happened’ if the breach 
did not occur.901 This question is considered ‘subjectively and in the light of all 
relevant circumstances’.902 As long as the defendant’s conduct either 
materially contributes or is a necessary precondition of the harm, the test for  
causation will be made out.903 In the case of Strong v Woolworths Ltd,904 the 
claimant slipped on a chip ‘on the sidewalk outside a department store’ and 
‘the sidewalk was in the control of the store operator’.905 The question was 
whether Woolworths failure to engage in ‘periodic inspection’ which would 
have led to the detection and removal of the chip, had been a necessary 
condition of the plaintiffs harm.906 That is had the store operator not breached 
its duty of care to entrants by failing to clean up the sidewalk would the passer-
by have slipped and been injured.907 If the chip would have been detected and 
they would not have slipped, then compensation would be required. 
 
                                                          
determination as to whether ‘the breach of duty was a necessary condition of the occurrence 
of the harm’). 
898 March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506, 513; Wallace v Kam 250 CLR 
375, 383. 
899 Beazley, above n 882, 227. 
900 Civil Liability Act Qld (2003) s 11(3). 
901 Beazley, above n 882, 229. 
902 Civil Liability Act Qld (2003) s 11(3)(a). 
903 Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 182, 194. 
904 (2012) 246 CLR 182. 
905 Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 182, 182. 
906 Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 182, 196. 
907 Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 182, 196. 
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As this example highlights, the ‘but for’ test, is a negative test.908 It requires 
proof that had the wrong not occurred; the result would have been different or 
not occurred at all.909 If the damage would have occurred anyway, 910 or the 
plaintiff was prepared to accept the risk,911 there is no causal connection, and 
the essential element of causation is not made out.912 In the context of a 
hazard the question which may arise is: if an agency had not breached its duty 
of care by issuing a hazard warning, would the person have suffered the 
damage or would they have evacuated and not been injured?  Consequently, 
and as will be demonstrated in examination of the warning case law, if a 
property would have been destroyed for example, by fire anyway, even if a 
warning had been given, there will be no argument to support causation. A 
second test for factual causation arises in exceptional cases where there is an 
evidentiary gap; however, there has been little need of its application and it 
has not been relevant to warning cases.913 
Legal causation: scope of liability  
 
Once factual causation is established the second arm of causation considers 
the scope of liability. The proof of this factor goes to whether the type of 
damage suffered was reasonably foreseeable and whether tort feasor should 
be answerable for the particular damage which occurred.914 Proof of this factor 
focuses on, ‘whether or not and why, responsibility for the harm should be 
imposed on the party who was in breach of the duty.’915 This arm of the test 
aims to link the scope of liability back to the scope of the duty of care. The aim 
of this test is to ensure that the harm being claimed lies within the scope of the 
duty of care, and that ‘the defendants breach is a legally significant cause of 
                                                          
908 March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506, 515. 
909 Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 244-246; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 11(1). 
910 Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 245. 
911 Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 391. 
912 Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 245. 
913 See, eg, Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 11(2); Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 
182, 184; Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak (2009) 239 CLR 420, 443 citing Fairchild v 
Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] 3 All ER 305; See also Zanner v Zanner (2010) 79 
NSWLR 702, [25],[52]; Stickley, Australian Torts Law, above n 699, 304-305 (This case 
highlights the relevance of the provision for cases where it is difficult to establish’ the 
negligence of the defendant was a necessary condition of the harm suffered’ as there are 
multiple or complex causes).  
914 Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 385. 
915 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 11(4). 
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the plaintiffs loss’.916 Consequently, the risk that ‘comes home to the plaintiff’ 
ought to be one that the defendant ‘had a duty to warn the plaintiff of’.917 In 
attempting to link harm and liability, the test for legal causation has been 
labelled vague,918 due to its incorporation of ‘value judgement and policy’.919 
Despite this assertion, research has suggested that reasoning in this area 
includes considerations of: ‘intervening and successive causes’; ‘foreseeability 
and remoteness’ of damage;920 ‘the terms of the applicable statute’; and the 
‘purpose of the rule or duty of care violated’.921  
 
Causation and warning 
 
The judgment of Chappel v Hart922 is informative as to the outcomes of the 
application of the tests for causation in the warning context. As a common law 
judgment, decided before the introduction of statutory amendments, it retains 
ongoing relevance. The judgement sets out several principles as follows: 
 
1. A causal connection will exist if it is probable the plaintiff would have acted on 
the warning and desisted from their course of conduct. 
2. No causal connection will exist if the plaintiff would have persisted even if a 
warning was given. 
3. No causal connection will exist if every alternate means of achieving the goal 
gave rise to an equal or greater probability of the same risk of injury and the 
person would have attempted to achieve this goal notwithstanding injury. 
4. No casual connection will exist if the eventuation of the risk is so statistically 
improbable so as not to be attributable to the defendant’s omission.923 
 
                                                          
916 See, eg, Wallace v Kam [2012] NSWCA 82, [12]-[13]; Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 
375, 389-390; Stickley, Australian Torts Law, above n 699, 319. 
917 Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 388. 
918 Baragic and Erbacher, above n 886, 768. 
919 Beazley, above n 882, 259. 
920 Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 385-386; See, eg, Beazley, above n 882, 246, 249; 
Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 247; Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller SS Co 
[1967] 1 AC 617 (Historically a foreseeable consequence of a breach is one that was a ‘real 
risk’, one ‘created by the negligence’, (one not too remote ‘far-fetched’) or ‘so statistically 
improbable as to be fairly attributable to the defendant’s omission’. 
921 Carver and Smith, above n 798, 978; Stickley, Australian Torts Law, above n 699, 311. 
922 Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 245-246. 
923 Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 247 (McHugh). 
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As identified below, it may be difficult to provide the necessary evidence to 
support the supposition that these actions would have been undertaken and 
would have had the suggested effect. This is particularly the case in the 
context of natural hazards when the likely impacts of the hazard in particular 
circumstances, can be difficult to predict. 
 
Establishing causation in the warning context 
 
A review of the case law, suggests the ability to prove factual causation may 
be difficult, particularly in the context of hazards. This proposition is illustrated 
in a recent case law concerning damage by fire. In Matthews and Ausnet 
Electricity Services, where a powerline ignited a bushfire and warnings were 
submitted not to have been given, or were given to the community too late and 
with inadequate information. 924 In this case the judge stated that ‘the role of 
warnings in the “causal chain“, was highly contentious‘.925 In this case it was 
stated it would be necessary for the claimants to show that ‘further and other 
particular warnings would have affected their course of conduct in a way which 
altered outcomes’.926 As a class action it was stated that there would be cases 
whether some claimants would be unable to establish causation.  
 
In Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9),927 
claimants sought a finding that warnings should have been given at certain 
times over the local radio station. In considering causation, it was asserted 
that it would have been difficult for the claimant to confirm they would have 
received the message if it had been broadcast on the relevant station, and that 
causation would be made out.928 In the same case, it was identified that 
causation would not be established if for example, property destruction was 
unavoidable as the property had been destroyed due to radiant heat rather 
than embers (which they could have extinguished).929 In reflection on this last 
                                                          
924 Matthews and Ausnet Electricity Services [2014] VSC 663, [278]-[279]. 
925 Matthews and Ausnet Electricity Services [2014] VSC 663, [278]-[279]. 
926 Matthews and Ausnet Electricity Services [2014] VSC 663, [290]. 
927 [2012] NSWSC 701. 
928 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, 
[1252]. 
929 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 701 
[1253]. 
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point, the ability to alter outcomes will be very relevant to other hazards such 
as cyclone, tsunami, flood and earthquake. In the context of these hazards, 
regardless of any action to warn the event will still occur and there would be 
little likelihood of saving property. 
 
Case law outlines what, in light of all the relevant circumstances, the claimant 
needs to be able to demonstrate to support a claim that alternative action 
would have been taken.930 In Nagle v Rottness Island Authority,931 the court 
suggested there was a need for ‘uncontradicted evidence’,932 evidence that 
demonstrated, that the person impacted by the lack of warning, had taken a 
cautious approach. A cautious approach would have indicated that, had a 
warning been in place the person would have heeded the warning.933 That 
alternative action would have been taken might also be more readily provable 
where, for example, an emergency plan was in place prior to the event, or 
there was evidence that he or she had heeded previous warnings.934 The court 
will consider the ‘attitude and conduct (of the person) at or about the time when 
the breach occurred’.935 Consequently, a person can provide evidence that 
they had adequate resources to take the steps that they suggested they 
intended to take causation might more readily be provision.936 This contrasts 
with a speculative statement as to what they ‘think they might have done’.937 
Overall however, the case law presents a number of hurdles which may be 
insurmountable for proof of this final element. 
 
 
 
                                                          
930 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 11(3). 
931 (1993) 177 CLR 423. 
932 See, eg, Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 11(3)(b). 
933 Nagle v Rottnest Island Authority (1993) 177 CLR 423, 433. 
934 Eburn, ‘The emerging legal issue of a failure to warn’, above n 71, 54-55; Michael Eburn, 
'Are Fire Brigades Liable for Poor Operational Decisions' (2015) 37(1) The Bulletin 8, 10-
11 (citing Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 
701– at trial). 
935 Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 246-247 (McHugh); Bill Madden & Tina Cockburn, 
‘What the plaintiff would have done: s 5D(3) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) (2006) 
3(5&6) Australian Civil Liability 47, 47-48. 
936 See, eg, Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 
701, [1250]; Stapleton, ‘Factual Causation’, above n 857, 480; Eburn, ‘The emerging legal 
issue of a failure to warn’, above n 71, 54-55 (Noting the requirement for the absence of self-
serving testimony). 
937 Commissioner of Main Roads v Jones (2005) 79 ALRJ 1104, 1108; Eburn, ‘The emerging 
legal issue of a failure to warn’, above n 71, 54-55. 
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Conclusion on causation 
 
In Australia, the current test for establishing causation includes both factual 
and legal tests. There is a requirement to show that, ‘but for’ the act or 
omission, the harm would not have occurred. As Chappel v Hart938 asserted, 
‘most plaintiffs will genuinely belief that if he or she had been given an option 
that would or might have avoided the injury, the option would have been 
taken.’939 However, there will need to be uncontradicted evidence that this 
would have been the case.940 As well as the test for factual causation, a series 
of normative questions, as to ‘whether or not and why’ responsibility for the 
harm should be imposed.941 
 
If negligence can be established, liability may be negated by raising a defence. 
The following Chapter will address the defence and indemnity provisions 
relevant to refuting a claim in negligence. However, where no defence applies, 
the cost burden, or a portion of it, will transfer from the plaintiff to the defendant. 
Statutory authorities who incur this cost burden, may be able to transfer it to 
government insurers however, there will still be impacts upon the public 
purse.942 As well as a requirement to pay damages, there may also be damage 
to reputation and deterioration of trust relationships between the parties, which 
are highly important to effective risk communication.943 In light of these 
consequences, the aim of the emergency management sector is to understand 
in what circumstances a claim in negligence will arise in the case of a failure 
to warn adequately or at all. This knowledge allows the agencies to put in place 
mitigation activities which will assist in avoiding litigation. This knowledge, 
when applied can also assist in demonstrating competence in the area of 
warning, a factor necessary to building trust with the community. 
                                                          
938 (1998) 195 CLR 232. 
939 Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 246-247 (McHugh). 
940 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 11(3); See, also, Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5D(3). 
941 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 11(4). 
942 See, eg, Martin, above n 737, 188; (Where claims for insurance increase in frequency 
and amount, this may be passed on to the community – for example previously local 
government have passed this on by increased land rates to pay for public liability insurance). 
943 Kasperson et al, above n 5, 31. 
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Conclusion 
As the introduction of this Chapter stated, the aim of this thesis is to answer 
two questions. The first is to determine to what extent risk communication and 
warning are embedded in the legal system. The second is whether in light of 
any perceived responsibilities, statutory authorities will be held accountable 
for acts and omission in failing to meet a duty to warn. This Chapter, along 
with Chapter Seven, provides doctrinal analysis of the case law on warnings. 
The case law helps to determine in what circumstances legal accountability is 
likely, with regards to role responsibilities for warning. The findings of these 
Chapters are applied in Chapter Eight, to specifically demonstrate in what 
circumstances legal accountability, will arise for acts and omissions in warning 
over a specific modality of communication: social media. The examination of 
the case law provides a significant contribution. Not only does it highlight 
instances of liability that require mitigation,944 it also provides concrete findings 
which support the notion that legal and moral responsibility can diverge. In 
practice, this means that although the public may wish to place blame upon a 
third party for their losses, and that agencies perceive they will be subject to 
liability, the legal reality can be different. This knowledge may remove a barrier 
to action for agencies which act too cautiously because of their perceptions of 
liability. 
Another thread of investigation in this Chapter, has been an examination of 
theory as to application of the law of negligence to the state and its role or 
function within society. Principles of negligence evolve to meet the changing 
circumstances in society. As a tort, negligence sets legal standards of conduct 
between individual parties. The standards of conduct seek to ensure that when 
a person pursues their own interests, they take into consideration not only their 
right to pursue their interests, they also consider the interests of others who 
might be closely and directly affected by their actions. If another’s interests are 
not considered and harm occurs, then the wrong doer may be required to 
correct the damage, and compensate the party who suffered the damage. 
These standards of conduct apply not only to relationships between 
                                                          
944 Nicholson, above n 227, 255. 
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individuals; they also apply to relationships between a citizen and a statutory 
authority, such as those present within the emergency management sector. 
Impacting the standards of conduct and the balance of responsibilities, the law 
of negligence has been modified by statute. These modifications were applied 
as a response to recommendations for reform. This reform, sought to reduce 
expansive claims and to balance a party’s duty to care for the interests of 
another when pursuing their own interests.945 The increased focus generally 
in the law, on an individual’s responsibility to take care of their own interests, 
aligns with theoretical positions noted earlier in Chapter Four. These theories 
identified a drive towards the individualisation of risk, and in Australia, the 
shared responsibility for disaster risk reduction. Statutory modifications, which 
support the ‘swing’ away from expansive claims in negligence, have also 
impacted on claims against statutory authorities.946 Civil liability legislation for 
example, specifically incorporates provisions, which take into consideration 
the multiple roles and the limited resources of a statutory or public authority,947 
as a public functionary. The application of this line of reasoning may mean, 
that although statutory authorities may be required to ‘give account or 
explanation of their actions’, they may not frequently ‘suffer the consequences, 
take the blame, or need to undertake to put matters right’.948 
Doctrinal analysis of the case law on negligence, in the context of warning, 
demonstrated that establishing an action in negligence can be difficult, often 
because of these considerations. Establishing an action in negligence requires 
satisfaction of three elements: a duty of care, the breach of a duty of care and 
damage. To formulate a duty of care, a court considers whether the harm was 
reasonably foreseeable as well as the salient features of the relationship. In 
the recognition of the role of public authorities as public functionaries, these 
salient features include and will weigh the multiple responsibilities, the burdens 
to be placed on the authority, as well as other policy considerations. It became 
apparent in this Chapter, that in many instances, particularly in the context of 
                                                          
945 Commonwealth, ‘Review of the law of Negligence’, above n 733, 29. 
946 Martin, above n 737, 187-188. 191 (Whether it is due to the introduction of civil liability 
legislation or not is debated). 
947 See, eg, Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 34, 35. 
948 Harlow, above n 7, 51. 
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hazard, although harm was reasonably foreseeable, the statutory authority 
had little control over the hazard, as a natural force. In some cases, attempts 
have been made to establish a duty based on functions and powers within 
statute. However, unless the authority has undertaken action to increase the 
risk of harm, a discretionary general power in statute is not, on its own, a 
sufficient basis on which to establish a duty of care.  
The establishment of breach and causation may also problematic for a 
claimant. In relation to the breach of a duty, and particular to reconciling rights 
between citizens and public authorities, resources are often limited. The 
authority is therefore unable to provide the frequency, or level of specificity in 
warning that the public demands. Consequently, and although the calculus of 
breach considers all circumstances, a lack of resources and a multitude of 
competing demands has meant that a breach of a duty has not been 
substantiated. Where claimants have attempted to demonstrate that the 
breach of a duty related to a failure to follow protocols and guidelines, the 
comment of courts, is that unless there is some language to suggest 
otherwise, the regulatory components are targets for action.  
The final element of damage requires proof of factual and legal causation. To 
establish factual causation, the claimant must be able to demonstrate that ‘but 
for’ the act or omission by the defendant, harm would not have been suffered. 
Without the ability to provide self-serving testimony, the availability of 
uncontradicted evidence which demonstrates what the claimants would have 
done, may be lacking. Further consideration of legal causation and ‘whether 
or not and why, responsibility for harm should be’ imputed to a public authority 
in breach of their duty, are also considered.949 Following on from the 
examination of the case law in this Chapter, Chapter Seven will now address 
the defences and indemnities. Defences and immunities which are relevant to 
the statutory bodies which comprise the emergency management sector, will 
negate a finding of liability. Examination of defences and immunities will 
provide a complete understanding of how responsibility for warning is shared 
at law.  
                                                          
949 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 11(4). 
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Chapter Seven: Negligence - Defences and Immunities 
 
This Chapter examines the defences and immunities which may be raised by 
statutory authorities in response to an action in negligence. That is an action 
arising from breach of duty, based upon a failure or omission in warning in a 
natural disaster. Reference to a defence or statutory immunity by a statutory 
authority will either reduce the amount of compensatory damages required to 
paid. Alternatively, it may act to negate an action in negligence, so that the 
authority will not be held legally accountable. Chapter Six has already 
examined the circumstances in which statutory authorities within the 
emergency management sector, may be held legally accountable for acts and 
omissions in warning.  
To briefly restate the findings of Chapter Six, three elements of negligence 
must be established to prove the breach of a duty. Firstly, the relationship 
between the parties must be of a nature to create a duty of care. Secondly, 
the act or omissions of one party must be sufficient to constitute a recognisable 
breach of that duty. Finally, a causal link must be shown between the duty 
owed and the harm that occurred. A duty of care has been found to exist 
between citizens and statutory authorities, such as those within the emergency 
management sector. However, when reconciling the rights between a public 
authority and private party, there are additional policy considerations which 
must are into account. The policy considerations qualify the rules of application 
or the standard of conduct to be observed.  The policy considerations may act 
to deny culpability, because public functionaries have numerous roles to fulfil 
and limited resources to achieve them.  
Chapter Six highlighted that both the failure to warn, and the failure to warn 
appropriately, have formed the basis for a claim in negligence against statutory 
authorities. More particularly, a could include an assertion that there was a 
failure to issue a warning, or the failure to exercise reasonable care when 
issuing a warning. The failure may for example, mean that the warning was 
ambiguous (leading to harm). The asserted failure may focus on the 
untimeliness of warnings or that warning was inadequate as it did not provide 
sufficient information. There may also be an assertion that a warning was not 
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disseminated on an appropriate channel. Analysis of the case law 
demonstrated that in establishing negligence, claimants may have to 
overcome a number of hurdles. This Chapter examines the defences and 
immunities available to statutory authorities should a negligence action of this 
nature be established.  
Relevant defences and immunities derive from common law as well as civil 
liability and emergency management legislation. The common law defences 
include: contributory negligence; voluntary assumption of risk; as well as 
considerations of whether a risk is obvious.950 Statutory immunities are based 
upon negation of liability when acts or omissions are carried out in ‘good 
faith’.951 As in Chapter Six this analysis raises the defences and immunities 
available in Queensland, many of which are available in other Australian 
jurisdictions. The findings of Chapters Six and Seven, will then applied to the 
case study in Chapter Eight. The case study aims to build a specific 
understanding, as to the circumstances in which there will be legal 
accountability in the area of warning through the use of social media. The 
ability to broadly apply the findings of the thesis may be limited, due focus on 
the defences and immunities available in Queensland. However, the extent of 
this limitation will depend on the degree to which statutory provisions vary 
across Australian jurisdictions. As the key principles which underpin judicial 
reasoning remain common across jurisdictions, there will be elements of the 
findings which will be broadly applicable. 952  
Curtailment of rights and social contract theory 
Before applying the defences and immunities, something should be said of the 
theory which provides a rationale for their existence. Defences and immunities 
modify, limit or curtail a right to, or success of, a legal action and thus a right 
                                                          
950 Flemings, Sappideen and Vines, above n 713, 317; Balkin & Davis, above n 888, 343; 
Mark Lunney, ‘Personal Responsibility and the “new” volenti’ (2005) 13 Tort Law Review 76, 
87. 
951 See, eg, Emergencies Act 2004 (ACT) s 198; State Emergency and Rescue 
Management Act 1989 (NSW) s 62; Emergency Management Act 2013 (NT) s 113; Disaster 
Management Act 2003 (Qld) s 144; Emergency Management Act 2004 (SA) s 32; 
Emergency Management Act 2006 (TAS) s 55; Emergency Management Act 2013 (VIC) s 
75; Emergency Management Act 2005 (WA) s 100. 
952 Iain Field, ‘Good Faith Defences in Tort Law’ (2016) 38 Sydney Law Review 147, 148. 
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to compensation by effectively exempting ‘certain classes of defendant from 
liability’.953 As social contract theorists assert, modification or curtailment of 
rights and liberties, is acceptable in limited circumstances, such as when it 
ensures a ‘fairer distribution of greatest equal liberty to others’.954 For example, 
speed limits, which restrict an individual’s personal freedom to speed on roads, 
ensure all other road users have the freedom to travel in a safe environment.  
Referring to the normative propositions of Locke and Rawls, government may 
make laws which enact policy linked to legitimate areas of governance.  As 
identified in Chapters Three and Five, the emergency management regulatory 
system, articulates powers or functions which allow government to carry out 
their duties surrounding natural hazard related risk. For example, the powers 
and functions identified in Chapter Five, provided for the creation of warning 
infrastructure, and in limited examples acted to allocate warning functions to 
responsible bodies. Within the legislation, rights and liberties are also 
curtailed. For example, warnings can require individuals to follow directions, 
or in some jurisdictions evacuate their own property.955 However, in curtailing 
rights, it is acknowledged there must be a balance between effective delivery 
of emergency services, which benefit the community as a whole, and some 
regard for the protection of individual rights. Consequently, when 
disseminating a hazard warning to the community, in some jurisdictions 
legislation recognises the right of individuals with a pecuniary interest in 
property, to stay and defend their assets.956  
The need to balance service provision and rights in the creation of regulatory 
instruments, has been incorporated into the legislative drafting guidelines. It is 
                                                          
953 Ibid 147; Andrew Dyson, James Goudkamp and Frederick Wilmot-Smith, ‘Central Issues 
in the Law of Tort Defences’ in Andrew Dyson, James Goudkamp and Frederick Wilmot-
Smith, Defences in Tort (Hart Publishing, 2015) 5-6, 8 (There has been a distinction made 
between the definition and consequence of a defence, as there are numerous positions on 
the definition of defences, although commonly it is recognised as ‘something for the 
defendant to plead and prove’). 
954 Rawls, A theory of Justice Revised Edition (Oxford) above n 235, 286; Penner & 
Melissaris, above n 235, 190-191 (There is a difference between ‘restricting a liberty and 
merely regulating it’, curtailment is permitted to ensure fairer distribution of greatest equal 
liberty to others). 
955 Emergencies Act 2004 (ACT) s 34, 67, 150C, 164, 189; Emergency Management Act 
2004 (SA) s 25, 28; Emergency Management Act 2006 (Tas) s 40, 41, 52, Schedule 
(Penalties apply for the failure to comply with directions). 
956 Emergency Management Act 1986 (VIC) s 24(7). 
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an essential element of the drafting process. In Queensland for example, 
fundamental legislative principles have been adopted.957 The principles 
stipulate that, ‘sufficient regard’ must be had to the rights of individuals in all 
legislation, at the same time ensuring there is a balance between ‘individual 
and community interests’.958 When drafting a Bill, there is a requirement to 
ensure that the explanatory notes ‘contain a brief assessment (or statement) 
of the consistency of the legislation with fundamental legislative principles. 959 
If the Bill or subordinate legislation is inconsistent with these principles for 
example, it curtails an individual’s right to liberty, a statement of the reason for 
the inconsistency’ is required.960 Within the Act itself, a court will seek a clear 
statement of the intent to abrogate or modify rights, before deciding a limitation 
applies.961  
One method of modifying rights in legislation, is through the incorporation of 
immunities. As the guidelines suggest, there will be times where immunities, 
which might otherwise curtail or limit an individual’s right to litigate and seek 
compensation, will be legitimate, particularly where a ‘significant public 
interest’ must be recognised.962 However, in contemplating incorporation of 
immunities a balance must be struck between affording citizens freedom of 
action and the obligation of statutory authorities to protect life and property of 
its citizens generally. There is also a need to consider balance individual rights 
with the protection of the lives of volunteers or employees engaged to provide 
emergency services. 
 
                                                          
957 Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld) s 4. 
958 Queensland Government, The Queensland Legislation Handbook: Governing 
Queensland (2nd ed, 2004) 31, 34; Department of Premier and Cabinet (Qld), 7.1 
Introduction: Rights and Liberties of Individuals (18 May 2016) 
<http://www.premiers.qld.gov.au/publications/categories/policies-and-
codes/handbooks/legislation-handbook/fund-principles/introduction.aspx> 
959 Queensland Government, The Queensland Legislation Handbook, above n 958, 31; 
Department of Premier and Cabinet (Qld), 7.2 Rights and Liberties of Individuals (18 May 
2016) <http://www.premiers.qld.gov.au/publications/categories/policies-and-
codes/handbooks/legislation-handbook/fund-principles/rights-and-freedoms.aspx>; 
Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld) s 23. 
960 Queensland Government, The Queensland Legislation Handbook, above n 958, 31, 34. 
961 Ibid. 
962 Ibid 34. 
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Curtailment of rights in emergency management and civil liability legislation 
The restriction of civil liability in the performance of emergency management 
duties, are considered legitimate areas for government to enact legislation. 
The effect of these enactments is to establish the boundaries of the legal 
duties of State actors. In establishing these boundaries, the rights of citizens 
to pursue legal action against statutory authorities may be modified. Civil 
liability regulation which impacts on statutory authorities, for example, has 
been enacted in relation to all ‘civil claims for damages for harm’.963 Its 
provisions modify the common law criteria for establishing a legal claim, in line 
with the current social norms. As identified in Chapter Six, the civil liability 
legislation specifies the basis upon which statutory or public authorities may 
be subject to a legal claim.964 As highlighted in the previous Chapter, this 
modification is justified, as it recognises the shift in society towards a greater 
need for personal responsibility. It also recognises a social need, for the 
ongoing availability of personal injury insurance.965 It is important to note 
however, that insurance refusal for certain risks is becoming a growing 
concern for private citizens. 
Co-existing with civil liability legislation, emergency management legislation 
establishes the framework within which statutory bodies operate to protect 
lives, and property, from hazard impacts. To ensure an overall safer 
community, the need to curtail an individual’s rights in the emergency 
management context may be more compelling than in other contexts.966 
Indemnity or protection provisions which protect statutory bodies against legal 
action are identifiable within the legislation. The curtailment of the right to legal 
action through imposition of this immunity on the following basis. That is, 
imposition of an immunity is acceptable due to the:967  
                                                          
963 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 34. 
964 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 34. 
965 Explanatory Notes, Civil Liability Bill 2003 (Qld) 2-3; Commonwealth, ‘Review of the law 
of Negligence’, above n 733, 62-64, 67-68, 121-125, 129-130, 153-163 (The report included 
discussion and recommendations for limitations of liability for; obvious risk and inherent risk, 
public authorities, as well as incorporating contributory negligence, in the name of ensuring 
the availability of insurance). 
966 Hunter, above n 476, 33, 58 (In the context of public health emergencies, some ‘trade-
offs’, the author suggests, will need to occur to achieve safety of the population). 
967 Explanatory note, Disaster Management Bill 2003 (Qld) 7; Civil Liability Bill 2003 (Qld) 7. 
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…unique position of emergency services in being called on to make crucial 
decisions on an urgent basis. If no immunity were provided, there could be 
exposure to substantial liability in carrying out these functions, for example, in 
a catastrophic event. A lack of protection could give rise to uncertainty and 
undue hesitation in the making of vital decisions for the benefit of 
communities, such as evacuations. 
This similar position was restated in Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of 
New South Wales (No 9).968 The justification for limited liability embodied in 
this statement, demonstrates normative propositions in a practical way. That 
is, the need to take action to ensure public safety of the broader community 
will take precedence, over the right of those individuals who have suffered 
harm, to pursue litigation and seek compensation for their losses.   
Defences 
A defence to a claim in negligence is raised to completely deny that claim or if 
partially admitted to, reduce compensation that might otherwise be payable.969 
As earlier stated, defences derive from both common law and the civil liability 
legislation. Two main defences to negligence at common law are contributory 
negligence and voluntary assumption of risk. That is, either the plaintiff has 
contributed to the damage, or the plaintiff has voluntarily assumed or 
consented to the risk of harm, so that no other party should not be burdened 
with compensating the entire loss. The defence does not deny the existence 
of fault by the defendant. The defences do however take into account that the 
balance of responsibility on the plaintiff was of such a magnitude that their 
claim to compensation should be completely refused or reduced.970 As will be 
demonstrated, legislation has modified both of these common law defences.  
 
 
                                                          
968 [2012] NSWSC 701, [712]-[713]. 
969 Balkin & Davis, above n 888, 361; Kelly v State of Queensland [2013] QSC 106, [164]. 
970 Commonwealth, ‘Review of the law of Negligence’, above n 733, 128; Dyson, Goudkamp 
and Wilmot-Smith, above n 953, 11 (Noting that McDonald suggests that when considering 
the fault elements in tort, ‘it is morally justifiable for the law to consider also the claimant’s 
behaviour in relation to the risk’). 
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Contributory negligence 
 
Contributory negligence is claimed to be ‘one of the most important parts of 
the law of torts’.971 The defence recognises the role the plaintiff contributes to 
their own damage or harm. A finding of contributory negligence involves the 
weighing of a number of factors in order to determine allocation of blame 
between the claimants and the defendant. The factors, are the same as those 
utilised in the determination of a breach of a duty of care at common law, which 
was examined in Chapter Six.972 The difference is that there is no duty of care 
owed by the plaintiff.973 The standard of care, ‘is that of a reasonable person 
in the position of that person (the plaintiff)’.974 It is ‘decided on the basis of what 
that person knew or ought reasonably to have known at the time’,975 rather 
than what was known in hindsight.976 Both ’the circumstances and conditions’, 
assist in forming a view as to whether, the plaintiffs actions, amounted to mere 
inadvertence, inattention or misjudgement, or to negligence’ and whether they 
therefore contributed to their own foreseeable loss.977  
In taking into account these elements, contributory negligence considers any 
failure to take reasonable care for personal ‘safety and wellbeing’, or property, 
by an individual.978 The court will determine whether an individual’s actions 
was an ‘operating cause’ to the harm.979 Where a failure to take care is an 
operating cause, there is discretionary apportionment of liability by the court 
of the total cost of the damage.980 For example, in the case of warnings, if an 
                                                          
971 James Goudkamp, ‘Apportionment of damages for contributory negligence: a fixed or 
discretionary approach?’ (2015) 35(4) Legal Studies 621, 621 (Due in part to its regularity of 
use). 
972 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 9, 23; Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1, 16. 
973 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 23. 
974Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 23(2)(a); Road and Traffic Authority of NSW v Dederer 
(2007) 234 CLR 330, 333, 366 (In this case, the plaintiff was a 14-year-old, the standard of 
care required was that of a 14-year child). 
975 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 23(2)(b). 
976 Road and Traffic Authority of NSW v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330, 366, 401. 
977 Podrebersek V Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALR 529, 532. 
978 Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1, 14. 
979 Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1, 37 (the action of the plaintiff is that action which 
‘contributes to the damage not the accident’). 
980 Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld) s 10; See, also, Goudkamp, ‘Apportionment of damages for 
contributory negligence’, above n 971, 624, 637-638, 640 (There are differences between 
discretionary and fixed apportionment, and the fact that discretionary apportionment allows 
for a ‘nuanced response to the individual circumstances of each case’, however in 
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individual does not heed a warning which they have received, and which then 
led to the harm occurring, they may bear some of the responsibility of the harm. 
Any reduction in compensation will take into account the relative 
blameworthiness, or the ‘comparative culpability’ of the parties.981 It will also 
consider the ‘relative importance’ of their acts, or in other words the ‘respective 
degree by which each has diverged from the standard of care of the 
reasonable man’.982 Where a finding of contributory negligence is made out, 
culpability on the part of the plaintiff will reduce the amount of damages by an 
amount considered ‘just and equitable’.983  
The consideration of an individual’s role in exercising a reasonable standard 
of care so as not to contribute to their loss, aligns with theoretical principles 
raised in Chapters Three and Six. In those Chapters, Rawls’ social contract 
theory identified that the individual, with a view to ongoing social co-operation, 
has a civic duty to consider the rights of others when pursuing their own self-
interests.984 In reconciling the rights and obligations of others, negligence sets 
the standards of conduct between the parties. The standard of conduct, is 
underpinned by the principle that individuals must take care for their own 
safety. A failure to do so affects their right to claim full compensation. 
Consequently, the right to claim, is dependent on a party taking reasonable 
care, or at least elementary precautions for their own safety.985 In doing so 
they need to consider the ‘burden’ they may be placing on others.986  
Contributory negligence and warning cases 
Of those warning cases examined, a number have raised contributory 
negligence at first instance. However, in many of these cases the defence was 
                                                          
discretionary systems there is a lack of scientific or mathematical computation which would 
lead to predictability across cases). 
981 Podresbersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 492, 493-494 (The 
comparison requires ‘with a consideration of relative importance of the acts of a party in 
causing the damage’ and the ‘degree of departure from the standard of care of a reasonable 
man’); Pennington v Norris (1956) 96 CLR 10, 10. 
982 Podresbersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 492, 493-494; 
Pennington v Norris (1956) 96 CLR 10, 10. 
983 Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1, 1; Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld) s 10(1)(b). 
984 Rawls, Political liberalism, above n 453, 60-61. 
985 Mulligan v Coffs Harbour City Council (2005) 223 CLR 486, 511; Roads and Traffic 
Authority of New South Wales v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330, 398 (Gummow). 
986 Vairy v Wyong Shire Council [2005] 223 CLR 422, 483. 
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not pursued to the court of final judgment.987 With this in mind, and as there 
are a limited number of judgments available, it is difficult to draw conclusions 
as to the likelihood of a positive application of the defence in the natural hazard 
warning context.  
Contributory negligence where a warning is present 
Recourse to the defence of contributory negligence, is made in instances 
where there is either an omission to warn, or a warning is inadequate.  As 
stated above, in the context of hazard warning the defence requires 
consideration of whether: a member of the public took the standard of care 
required. If they did not uphold a reasonable standard of care and by doing so 
contributed to their own loss, then some reduction in damages in possible. For 
example, in the context of hazard warning, if the plaintiff received, but did not 
heed a warning to evacuate, yet sustained personal injury because of their 
failure, a court may consider they have contributed to their personal injury.  In 
failing to take the requisite standard of care the plaintiff may have some 
comparative culpability leading to a reduction in compensatory damages.  
In making this assertion, it is recognised that comparative culpability and what 
is fair and reasonable will depend entirely on the circumstances of the case. It 
will also be based on comparative knowledge of the risk and clarity and 
timeliness of any warning. To demonstrate: at first instance, in Kelly v State of 
Queensland988 a man ran down sand dunes, stumbled, fell into the water 
below and sustained catastrophic injury. Warning signs had been erected. 
However, the plaintiff argued that the warning signs were inadequate. 
Countering this argument, the defendant pleaded that the plaintiff had failed to 
heed the warnings and exercise reasonable care in running down the 
dunes.989 The final determination of the court, based on comparative 
culpability, was a finding of 15% contributory negligence on the part of the 
plaintiff.  
                                                          
987 See, eg, Vairy v Wyong Shire Council [2005] 223 CLR 422; Mulligan v Coffs Harbour City 
Council (2005) 223 CLR 486; Road and Traffic Authority of NSW v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 
330. 
988 [2013] QSC 106. 
989 Kelly v State of Queensland [2013] QSC 106, [167]. 
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In determining contributory negligence and assessing comparative culpability, 
the court took into account a number of factors. This included the knowledge 
of the parties. Here, as the plaintiff was a visitor to the area, they did not 
understand ‘the true nature and extent of the risk of injury’. 990 By comparison 
the risk, was ‘well known by the defendant’.991 Without the plaintiff having the 
relevant knowledge, and without an intention to actually dive into the water, 
the court suggested it was ‘difficult to criticise the plaintiffs conduct’.992 
However on further examination, the court did find that the plaintiff failed ‘to 
study warning signs closely’, which was ‘incumbent upon him’.993 ‘Had he read 
the signs and obeyed the message, the accident would have been averted’, 
despite the significance of the danger not being conveyed in the signs.994 On 
appeal, Fraser JA confirmed the finding at first instance. The judge stated that 
by running down the dune, ‘the visitor had departed from the standard of care 
of a reasonable person in failing to appreciate and heed the signs, warning 
that running down the dune was dangerous’.995 The limited reduction in 
damages, suggested the balance of responsibility still lay with the authority to 
provide clear and unambiguous signage. This case supports the finding that 
in an emergency, although not removing liability, warnings need to be clear 
and unambiguous to achieve a total reduction in liability. 
Further case law supports the need for the claimant to heed a warning sign in 
order to avoid a reduction of the claim through a finding of contributory 
negligence. For example, in Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales 
v Dederer,996 the plaintiff dived from a bridge sustaining injury. Although 
breach was not established, the lower courts examined the issue of causation. 
The plaintiff had observed a warning, yet deliberately disregarded it and put 
himself at an obvious risk with regards to a dangerous recreational activity.997 
He had knowledge of the consequences of his action, and knowledge of the 
area. At first instance and on appeal, contributory negligence was found to be 
                                                          
990 Kelly v State of Queensland [2013] QSC 106, [168]-[171]. 
991 Kelly v State of Queensland [2013] QSC 106, [168]-[171]. 
992 Kelly v State of Queensland [2013] QSC 106, [170]. 
993 Kelly v State of Queensland [2013] QSC 106, 171]. 
994 Kelly v State of Queensland [2013] QSC 106, [172]-[174]. 
995 State of Queensland v Kelly [2015] 1 Qd R 577, [53]. 
996 (2007) 234 CLR 330. 
997 Road and Traffic Authority of NSW v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330,339, 399. 
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applicable.998 Had the claim in negligence been made out, a finding of 
contributory negligence would have led to a 50 percent reduction of 
damages.999  While only a sample, these cases indicate that where a warning 
is present, the standard of care expected is that a warning should be read, and 
obeyed. A failure to do so, which results in loss or harm, will inevitably result 
in a finding of contributory negligence.  
This case law also suggests, that a person who has greater knowledge of the 
risk, yet proceeds with their course of action, may find a higher reduction in 
damages results. Therefore, for example, in an emergency, if a specific 
warning has been given to avoid flood waters, yet an individual, who would 
reasonably have been expected to see the warning, drives through flood 
waters their claim may be considerably reduced or completely denied. A 
reduction in compensation would be more certain if they were familiar with the 
hazard, and would have appreciated the risks, yet still proceeded. As in the 
determination of the breach of a duty of care, one of the most important factors 
in determining contributory negligence is the knowledge of the plaintiff. 
Contributory negligence in the absence of warning 
In the absence of warning, similar linkages between contributory negligence 
and knowledge may be found.  Where a warning is absent, a plaintiff 
demonstrating reasonable care is expected to make some independent 
assessment of the risk. This is particularly the case if the risk is obvious. In 
Vairy v Wyong Shire Council1000 for example, a person was injured diving into 
water. There was no warning sign present. A departure from the reasonable 
standard of care was said to exhibited by ‘the failure (of the plaintiff) to make 
an independent assessment of a risk of diving’.1001 Instead the plaintiff made 
an assumption of safety based on the action of others’.1002 In the Court of 
Appeal, it was found that the plaintiff knew of a previous accident, and was 
‘well-armed with knowledge of the grave consequences that could befall those 
                                                          
998 Road and Traffic Authority of NSW v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330, 331. 
999 Road and Traffic Authority of NSW v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330, 331. 
1000 [2005] 223 CLR 422. 
1001 Vairy v Wyong Shire Council [2005] 223 CLR 422, 478; Mulligan v Coffs Harbour City 
Council [2004] NSWCA 247, [250], [254]. 
1002 Vairy v Wyong Shire Council [2005] 223 CLR 422, 478; Mulligan v Coffs Harbour City 
Council [2004] NSWCA 247, [250], [254]. 
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who entered waters of unknown depth without first investigating the condition 
of the water’.1003 The reduction of damages deemed just and reasonable in 
that case, was 55 percent, as it was the diving into waters of unknown depths 
that was the ‘operating cause of the harm’.1004 
 
The case of Mulligan v Coffs Harbour (‘Mulligan’) 1005  features a similar finding. 
Had the action in negligence been successful, the Court of Appeal would have 
reduced the defendant’s damages by 15 percent.1006 In Mulligan, the plaintiff 
dived into water, sustaining injury.1007 One of the distinctions between this 
case and the case of Wyong Shire Council v Vairy1008 was the degree of 
knowledge the plaintiff possessed. The plaintiff had general knowledge of 
‘variable depth’ of the water. 1009 Although the Court found ‘diving into water of 
variable depth is risky’, there was no specific knowledge of previous 
incidents.1010 There were also indications that the plaintiff had tried to ascertain 
the depth of the water, and, therefore, made an independent assessment of 
the circumstances.1011 Having taken some degree of care, the comparative 
culpability of the plaintiff was less.  
 
By contrast, where there is knowledge of the general type of risk and no 
attempt to assess the risk, the plaintiff’s culpability will be greater. This 
proposition is reinforced in Swain v Waverley Municipal Council (‘Swain’).1012 
In Swain, a reduction in damages of 25% was suggested for diving into 
waves.1013  Although not directly stated, there were indications that the 
decision to dive in the common knowledge that the ocean bed is dynamic and 
sandbanks may form from time to time, was such that the claim was 
reduced.1014  In contrast to Mulligan, common knowledge of any risk with no 
                                                          
1003 Wyong Shire Council v Vairy [2004] NSWCA 247, [252]. 
1004 Wyong Shire Council v Vairy [2004] NSWCA 247, [252]. 
1005 Mulligan v Coffs Harbour City Council [2004] NSWCA 247; Mulligans v Coffs Harbour 
City Council (2005) 223 CLR 486. 
1006 Mulligans v Coffs Harbour City Council (2005) 223 CLR 486, 506. 
1007 Mulligans v Coffs Harbour City Council (2005) 223 CLR 486, 486. 
1008 [2004] NSWCA 247. 
1009 Mulligans v Coffs Harbour City Council (2005) 223 CLR 486, 491, 493. 
1010 Mulligans v Coffs Harbour City Council (2005) 223 CLR 486, 491, 508. 
1011 Mulligans v Coffs Harbour City Council (2005) 223 CLR 486, 491, 493. 
1012 (2005) 220 CLR 517. 
1013 Swain v Waverley Municipal Council (2005) 220 CLR 517, 517. 
1014 Swain v Waverley Municipal Council (2005) 220 CLR 517, 524. 
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attempt to ascertain the degree of risk before accepting it, may result in a 
greater reduction of damages. A finding will still depend on the comparative 
culpability between the parties.  
 
Applying the case law to the hazard context 
Chapter Six identified some of the acts or omissions which might lead to claims 
of negligence against statutory authorities in the context of warning. These 
included the failure to issue a warning, as well as failure to exercise reasonable 
care in the act of warning. In either instance, proof of either of these factors, 
may give rise to some liability on the part of the authority whose duty it is to 
issue a warning.  
Contributory negligence in the presence of warning 
As identified in Chapter Five, statutory authorities have been allocated 
ownership of some elements of risk. For example, they may have been 
identified in emergency management plans as a ‘combat’ agency responsible 
for issuing hazard warnings. In light of the case law, these agencies need to 
convey information as to the degree of risk in a clear and unambiguous way. 
Providing a clear and unambiguous warning, is the first step in encouraging 
the public to undertake their share of responsibility. This includes taking heed 
of potential danger, and taking appropriate care of themselves and their 
property.  If a clear warning is issued and an individual sustains harm due to 
their failure to heed the warning, that individual risks a reduction in damages 
if they pursue an action against an authority. This is particularly the situation 
where there is a blatant disregard for the warning.  
A finding in contributory negligence will depend on what is reasonable in the 
circumstances. The case law which addresses the defence does not however, 
identify a principle, as to the extent to which the public need to seek out hazard 
warnings. Neither does it examine whether it is appropriate to act on a single 
warning, or whether individuals should take it upon themselves to confirm the 
accuracy of warnings through an additional source before taking action.1015 In 
                                                          
1015 See, eg, Quarantelli, ‘People’s reactions to emergency warnings’, above n 345, 177-178 
(On receipt of information, social confirmation is a normal process, where individuals speak 
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this instance, much may depend on the source of the warning, for example 
warning from an official source may be taken more seriously than one issued 
by a private person over social media. Reflecting on the case law, where there 
have been instances of warnings via radio from an official source, and a 
general knowledge that there is a risk of fire danger, the defence of 
contributory negligence has never been raised. However, in light of the need 
for shared responsibility, there needs to be greater consideration of the use of 
the defence of contributory negligence. Rather than placing the burden on the 
emergency service sector to reach all members of the community, this might 
motivate the audience to become proactive in seeking out warning information.  
 
A reasonable standard of care for the plaintiff 
In light of the differences in the nature of the risks and the method of warning 
dissemination, the reasonable standard of care for the plaintiff may vary, 
depending upon the matrix of facts which are operating. It is perhaps not 
unreasonable to think that the receipt of a single unconfirmed warning from an 
authoritative source, should, in the normal course of events, alert a reasonable 
individual to consider their own safety. In some circumstances however, 
natural hazards are dynamic and every changing events. Modalities for 
communication of warning, which can alert an individual may be unavailable 
at the time of impact.1016 In 2016, in South Australia for example, during to an 
intense weather event, the entire State was without electricity for 
approximately 3-11 hours.1017 In that time mains electricity would not have 
been available for television and radio.  In light of the nature of hazards and 
the variable availability of communication modalities, is it reasonable to expect 
that an individual would opt in to an alert service for to a mobile device? Is it 
reasonable to expect they have a battery powered radio on hand? These 
                                                          
to others and seek additional information, as ‘people react in the context of interaction with 
others’ to warnings). 
1016 Koehler, Kress and Miller, above n 244; 111-113; Tasmania, ‘2013 Tasmanian Bushfire 
Inquiry Report’, above n 283, 143, 159 (For example, in the Tasmanian Bushfires, 
communications towers were disabled which led to the inability to communicate effectively in 
some regions); State Government Victoria, Review of the 2010–11 Flood Warnings and 
Response, above n 61, 19. 
1017 ‘SA weather” Power ‘gradually’ returning after blackout plunged state into darkness’, 
ABCNews (online), 29 September 2016 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-09-28/sa-
weather-south-australia-without-power-as-storm-hits/7885930>. 
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questions remain untested. For a person living in a hazard prone area, who is 
familiar with the risks however, the case law indicates that the expected 
standard of care of the plaintiff may be higher. 
Contributory negligence in the absence of warning 
Where no warning is issued, yet there is a general understanding that risks 
such as fire and flood are present in the landscape, the individual may still 
need to take reasonable care for their own safety. The case law suggests a 
reasonable individual should make some type of self-assessment of the risk 
of harm. They may need to decide, based on the evidence before them, 
whether the potential effect of the risk requires them to take protective action. 
For example, in the context of a flood hazard an individual may need to 
consider the intensity and duration of the rain, and whether it seems likely to 
cause inundation? If the individual has prior knowledge of these effects, there 
may be an expectation that a reasonable person would compare the events to 
previous occurrences of flooding. In the context of a fire hazard, an 
assessment may take into account observable environmental factors, such as 
temperature, wind direction or the visible presence of smoke.  
By failing to consider any observable environmental cues or to take action, 
even by attempting to seek further information, a person may contribute to 
their harm and face a reduction in damages. If an independent assessment is 
made and the risk is deliberately disregarded, based on the case law which 
was previously examined, the individual may have a greater comparative 
personal culpability. By contrast, for a visitor, or someone unfamiliar to a 
locality, the environmental cues which should alert a local, may be more 
difficult to read, or understand. A visitor to an area would have comparatively 
less knowledge, and the assessment that their behavior was an operating 
cause of the harm, would be less likely.  
Voluntary assumption of risks of natural hazards 
The second defence examined, is the voluntary assumption of risk by the 
plaintiff. At common law, a voluntary assumption of risk was the ‘consent to a 
tort’ by the plaintiff, due to their knowledge and appreciation of the nature of 
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the risk they were taking.1018 The elements to be proven are that the defendant 
was fully aware of the risk, fully appreciated its nature and extent, and freely 
and willingly accepted the risk.1019 The common law defence, has now been 
slightly modified by statute in Australia.1020 The onus or burden of proof to 
demonstrate awareness of the risk has been modified by the insertion of 
statutory provisions on obvious risks. 
The rationale for this defence is that, in light of consent and knowledge of risk, 
which is appreciated and fully consented to by the plaintiff;1021 there was no 
reason for the defendant to bear the burden of the plaintiff’s loss. Instead, 
having knowledge of the risk, the plaintiff is expected to exercise care, or take 
‘elementary precautions’1022 to avoid injury or harm to themselves.1023  It is 
unlikely that this defence will play a major role in cases of negligence against 
statutory authorities in the context of warning. This conclusion is part due to 
the difficult in proving the final element of the defence: the voluntary 
acceptance of a risk.1024 The ability to prove this final element can arise from 
the lack of belief in the plaintiff. For example, even though the plaintiff may 
have been aware of a danger, they did not have a belief that the danger would 
eventuate. In such cases the plaintiff will not be considered to have accepted 
the danger or risk.1025 For example, although a person who chooses to stay 
and defend a property in the path of a fire emergency may be aware of a risk 
                                                          
1018 Rootes v Shelton (1967) 116 CLR 383, 395; See, also, Balkin v Davis, above n 888, 
364. 
1019 Carey v Lake Macquarie City Council [2007] NSWCA 4, [74] citing Woods v Multi-Sport 
Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 186 ALR 145, [125]; Randwick City Council v Muzik [2006] 66, [48]. 
1020 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 13, 14(1); Woodcroft-Brown v Timbercorp Securities Ltd 
[2011] VSC 427, [129]; Carey v Lake Macquarie City Council [2007] NSWCA 4, [74]. 
1021 Ibid. 
1022 Mulligans v Coffs Harbour City Council (2005) 223 CLR 486, 511 (Callinan & Heydon). 
1023 Kelly v State of Queensland [2013] QSC 106 [62]-[63] citing Brodie v Singleton Shire 
Council; Ghantous v Hawkesbury City Council (2001) 206 CLR 512, 581 (Gaudron, McHugh 
and Gummow JJ); Schultz v McCormack [2015] NSWCA 330, [23]-[24], [33] (Obvious risks 
require people to keep a proper lookout) See also, Carver, ‘Obviously Obvious’, above n 
839, 67 (Carver suggests that the legislative construction may focus more on the plaintiff’s 
responsibility rather than on ‘balance of the plaintiffs and defendants rights’ which was 
evident in common law). 
1024 Carey v Lake Macquarie City Council [2007] NSWCA 4; Canterbury Municipal Council v 
Taylor [2002] NSWCA 24, [141] (This requires that the plaintiff is not only aware of or knew 
about the risk but that they agree that if ‘injury befalls him, the responsibility should be on 
him and not on any other negligent party’). 
1025 Canterbury Municipal Council v Taylor [2002] NSWCA 24, [147] citing cf O’Shea v The 
Permanent Trustee Company of New South Wales Limited (1971) Qld R 1. 
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of personal injury, this does not mean that they accept that any loss should fall 
on them. On this basis, it is asserted that the voluntary assumption of risk is 
unlikely to be utilised as a defence in its own right. Attention therefore turns to 
the effect that ‘obvious risks’ have on determining the breach of a standard of 
care, or the effect they have on the necessity to issue a hazard warning in the 
first instance. 
Obvious risks and their effect on natural hazard warnings 
 
As identified, civil liability statutes now incorporate provisions regarding 
obvious risks. The finding that a risk is obvious can be applied to an action in 
negligence in two ways. First, identifying a risk as being obvious will negate a 
duty to warn, this is obviously highly relevant for statutory authorities within the 
emergency management sector.1026 An exception to the rule that an obvious 
risk negates the duty to warn, is that where a duty to warn is required by written 
law, the duty to warn will still exist.1027  As identified in Chapter Five however, 
aside from Victoria, where the duty to warn is embedded within statute, no 
other jurisdiction contained the explicit requirement to warn within emergency 
management legislation. Even if jurisdictions outside of Queensland have the 
same provision in statute, the exception is unlikely to apply. Therefore, 
recourse to considerations of natural hazards as obvious risks, which negate 
a duty to warn, may still be available to statutory authorities within the sector.  
The second application of obvious risks is relevant to the determination of 
whether there has been a breach of the duty of care. The question is whether, 
in light of the obvious risk, the defendant exercised a reasonable standard of 
care in the circumstances.1028 In the second application of the defence, even 
if a risk is obvious, the court may still reason that there was a breach of the 
reasonable standard of care in any particular case.1029 The biggest hurdle in 
each of these applications of obvious risks, is the establishment of the risk as 
being obvious.  
                                                          
1026 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 13, 15. 
1027 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 13, 15. 
1028 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 13, 15 (Exceptions do apply, noting the incorporation of 
obvious risks under part 1: Breach of duty); Carver, ‘Obviously Obvious’, above n 839, 76. 
1029 Cf Schultz v McCormack [2015] NSWCA 330, [84]. 
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Establishing a risk is obvious 
The application of the obvious risk defence requires a number of steps to be 
successfully applied.  The first step is to identify the risk of harm. For example, 
it is necessary to identify the type of harm that might result if a particular risk 
occurs.1030 In the context of storms, this might be the chance of property 
damage when there is failure to warn of likely flooding, which would otherwise 
alert an individual to sandbag their property. The second step is a two-limbed 
test as to whether the risk of harm is obvious.1031 The statutory provision sets 
out the two limbs1032 as firstly, whether the ‘factual scenario facing the plaintiff’ 
was obvious.1033 Secondly, would the risk of harm be ‘apparent to and 
recognisable by a reasonable [person], in the position of the [plaintiff]’.1034 The 
common law definitions of what is an obvious risk, remain relevant to the 
reasoning under the statutory provisions.  The most comprehensive common 
law definition which aligns with the statutory provisions, is that a risk of harm 
must be such that, ‘both the condition and the risk are apparent to and will be 
recognised by a reasonable man, in the position of the [plaintiff], exercising 
ordinary perception, intelligence, and judgment…”.1035  As is evident from the 
following case analysis, determination of a risk is obvious tends to turn on the 
second limb of the test.  
 
                                                          
1030 Schultz v McCormack [2015] NSWCA 330, [85]-[86]; Streller v Albury City Council [2013] 
NSWCA 348, [29] (Risk has been defined under similar New South Wales provisions as, 
referring ‘to the chance or possibility of an occurrence which results in harm’ with the 
definition of harm being provided in the Act); Collins v Clarence Valley Council [2015] 
NSWCA 263, [143], [145] (It is the same risk of harm that is ‘identified for the duty of care 
purposes’. It does not have to be the precise risk of harm that materialised that needs to be 
obvious, rather than kind of thing that could have occurred). 
1031 Swain v Waverley Municipal Council (2005) 220 CLR 517, 563 (The consideration of the 
factual circumstances of each case means that previous case law may have little 
precedential value). 
1032 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 13(1); Carver, ‘Obviously Obvious’, above n 839, (28-29); 
Streller v Albury City Council [2013] NSWCA 348, [31] (This allows inclusion of the position 
of the person, allows the court to take into account the circumstances of each particular 
case, potentially incorporating a wide variety of considerations to be taken into account 
‘when establishing obviousness’ – such as ‘age, expertise and personal characteristics’). 
1033 Collins v Clarence Valley Council [2015] NSWCA 263, [153]. 
1034 Collins v Clarence Valley Council [2015] NSWCA 263, [138]. 
1035 Wyong Shire Council v Vairy [2004] NSWCA 247) at [161],[162]; Streller v Albury City 
Council [2013] NSWCA 348, [38]; See, also, Consolidated Broken Hill Ltd v Edwards [2005] 
NSWCA 380, [53] (Offers a looser definition which suggests obvious is ‘a descriptive phrase 
that signifies the degree to which risk of harm may be apparent.’). 
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Factors influencing categorisation of a risk as obvious 
When assessing the two limbs of obvious risk, a number of sub-criteria are 
taken into account. The court considers temporal factors, such as whether the 
risk of harm was obvious when the negligent act and harm occurred.1036 
Whether the risk of harm is ’common knowledge’, ‘of low probability’, 
‘prominent, conspicuous or physically observable’, also play a role in judicial 
consideration of the risk of harm.1037 On classification of the risk as obvious, a 
rebuttable presumption arises.1038There is also then an expectation that a 
reasonable person will ‘exercise sufficient care by looking where they are 
going and perceiving and avoiding obvious hazards’.1039 The value of the 
defence is reflected by the ‘explosion’ of references to obvious risks within the 
warning case law.1040 Given the explosion of references, and in order to 
understand the abstract sub-criteria, an examination of the case law below 
provides a greater understanding of how definitions of obvious risks have been 
applied by the courts. 
Obvious risks and warnings of natural hazards 
On a plain reading of the statutory provisions for obvious risk, the presence of 
fire, flood, cyclone, earthquake or heatwave, appear capable of classification 
as a legally recognisable obvious risk. Even a low probability of a natural 
hazard event, or one that may not be immediately physically observable, or 
conspicuous (such as an earthquake), seem to constitute an obvious risk at 
law. However, when the two limbs of obvious risk factors are applied, a 
                                                          
1036 Streller v Albury City Council [2013] NSWCA 348, [31] (This allows inclusion of the 
position of the person, it also allows the court to take into account the circumstances of each 
particular case, potentially incorporating a wide variety of considerations to be taken into 
account ‘when establishing obviousness’ – such as ‘age, expertise and personal 
characteristics’); Carver, ‘Obviously Obvious’, above n 839, 68 (Noting additional 
characteristics). 
1037 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 13(2)(3)(4); See also, Commonwealth, ‘Review of the law 
of Negligence’, above n 733, 51-52. 
1038 Lunney, above n 950, 87; Carver, ‘Obviously Obvious, above n 839, 76 (‘This reduces 
the defendants need to demonstrate that the ‘plaintiffs were fully aware of the particular risk 
and its extent’, depending on the jurisdiction what is required is for the plaintiff is then ‘only a 
general knowledge of the risk’). 
1039 Kelly v State of Queensland [2013] QSC 106, [62]-[63] citing Brodie v Singleton Shire 
Council; Ghantous v Hawkesbury City Council (2001) 206 CLR 512, 581 (Gaudron, McHugh 
and Gummow JJ). Schultz v McCormack [2015] NSWCA 330, [23]-[24], [33] (Obvious risks 
require people to keep a proper lookout). 
1040 Carver, ‘Obviously Obvious’, above n 839, 66. 
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distinctly different outcome, results.  In undertaking this analysis, it is conceded 
that the ability to predict the result in a court is difficult. Any determination of a 
risk as obvious will turn on the factual circumstances, which may differ 
significantly in each case.1041 The following case analysis examines the 
approach courts have taken to determine the circumstances in which naturally 
occurring hazards, are classified as obvious risks.1042 This knowledge is 
important to statutory authorities, as the finding of the courts departs from a 
laypersons assumption that a natural hazard risk is obvious. As the case law 
demonstrates, it cannot be assumed the court will, without more, determine 
impact from a natural hazard event is an obvious risk. This finding suggests 
that there may be limited resource to ‘obvious risks’ to excuse an authority 
from a duty to warn, or reduce their standard of care in disseminating 
warnings.  
Determinations of obvious risks 
This examination of the warning case law, which focuses on naturally 
occurring hazards, follows three cases. Each case has regard to a natural 
hazard, yet each demonstrates differential reasoning of the court. Examination 
of the case law does however bring into focus the increasing emphasis of the 
court, on the perception of the ‘reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff’ 
as a basis to refute the assertion that the risk was obvious.  The case analysis 
does not include fire related cases as the defence has yet to be employed in 
this context. 
Secretary to the Department of Natural Resources & Energy v Harper1043 
The first case, Secretary to the Department of Natural Resources & Energy v 
Harper (‘Harper’),1044 was decided at common law, before the introduction of 
statutory provisions. The case is used as a starting point, to show the 
progressively narrower consideration of obvious risks by the court. In this case, 
and in reflection on the two different applications of obvious risks identified 
                                                          
1041 Angel v Hawkesbury City Council [2008] NSWCA 130, [84]. 
1042 This contrasts to case law which address negligence with regard to care of roads, parks, 
footpaths, and ‘latent natural defects’, See, eg, Carver, ‘Obviously Obvious, above n 839, 
80. 
1043 Secretary to the Department of Natural Resources & Energy v Harper (2000) 1 VR 133. 
1044 Secretary to the Department of Natural Resources & Energy v Harper (2000) 1 VR 133. 
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above, the court sought to determine whether the relevant risk was obvious in 
relation to the breach of the duty of care.  In Harper, personal injury was 
sustained when an individual was hit by a branch while walking through the 
forest on a windy day. The plaintiff asserted that as part of the duty of care to 
manage reserves, warnings should have been given of the possibility of this 
occurrence. However, the risk of death or injury from falling branches, even if 
remote, was considered obvious, particularly when it was windy. The risk was 
considered part and parcel of camping, walking or living in the Australian 
outdoors.  
In Harper, the Court held that there was no breach of the duty. This was in part 
because the Bureau of Meteorology had issued a gale warning and the 
defendant had no knowledge of the dangerous nature of the tree. Further, the 
‘burden’ which would be placed on the organisation to give individual oral 
warnings to campers, was out of proportion to the remote risk and could not 
have been delivered in a reasonable time to be practicable.1045 Consequently, 
and in light of this case, it might be argued that a fire, flood or cyclone, 
particularly on a very hot, windy or wet day as the case may be, could 
conceivably be considered an obvious risk of the Australian landscape. 
However, if the statutory authority has the means of knowledge of the 
possibility of such an occurrence; the risk of harm is not remote; and there is 
time to issue a warning, there may still be a finding of the breach of a duty of 
care.  
Schultz v McCormack1046  
The second case, Schultz v McCormack,1047 was decided in light of the 
statutory provisions. It relates to personal injury caused by slipping on tiles, 
where no warning was issued. In this case, the emphasis on the second limb 
of the test, where what the person in the position of the plaintiff knew in regard 
to the risk, becomes relevant. Here the plaintiff was standing on steps about 
to walk away from a house. Unknown to them, the tiles were wet from the rain. 
                                                          
1045 Secretary to the Department of Natural Resources & Energy v Harper (2000) 1 VR 133, 
[47]. 
1046 [2015] NSWCA 330. 
1047 [2015] NSWCA 330. 
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The house owner did not warn of the risk of slipping. In contrast to Harper,1048 
where there appeared to be a broad acceptance of the general nature of the 
risk, here the reasoning becomes narrower. For example, although to the 
ordinary person, steps would be slippery when wet, the case turned on 
evidence of the particular perception of the plaintiff.  
The plaintiff’s perception at the time that the harm was suffered was that where 
they were standing was dry. As such, the plaintiff did not need to consider the 
extent of the protection by an awning, and their view was obscured as the light 
on the porch was off.1049 Moreover, they would not have any perception before 
walking out on the porch, of the risk of harm and that they needed to take care. 
Consequently, the decision in the Court of Appeal reversed the finding at first 
instance that the risk was obvious and no warning was required.1050 When 
balancing all of the factors of the case, the defendant was found negligent. 
This finding was related to the fact that ‘they ought to have known of the high 
risk of slipperiness the tiles posed when wet’1051 and therefore should have 
taken some precautions, including warning the plaintiff. 
Queensland v Kelly1052 
In Queensland v Kelly (‘Kelly’),1053 personal injury was sustained in running 
down a sand dune despite the presence of a warning sign. The defendant 
sought a finding that the risk was obvious and therefore there was no duty to 
warn, as provided for under the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld). The court 
however determined that the risk that materialised was not obvious and there 
was a duty to warn.1054  In making this the determination, the Court 
investigated whether the defined risk of harm would be obvious in the absence 
of a warning sign. The judge did not accept that ‘the risk of serious injury 
                                                          
1048 Secretary to the Department of Natural Resources & Energy v Harper (2000) 1 VR 133. 
1049 See, also, Angel v Hawkesbury City Council [2008] NSWCA 130, [64], [81] (Although not 
in the context of warning, this case noted the person had also not walked in that location 
before, it was not common knowledge and was unknown to the appellant. The judgement 
recognised, that a risk which is not conspicuous can still be obvious, however in taking 
reasonable care a person is not ‘required a person walk along a footpath with their eyes 
continuously glued to the area immediately in front of them’). 
1050 Schultz c McCormack [2015] NSWCA 330, [14]. 
1051 Schultz c McCormack [2015] NSWCA 330, [3]. 
1052 State of Queensland v Kelly [2015] 1 Qd R 577. 
1053 State of Queensland v Kelly [2015] 1 Qd R 577. 
1054 State of Queensland v Kelly [2015] 1 Qd R 577, (2)-(3). 
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resulting from a fall, when running down the sand dune into the lake, would 
have been obvious to a reasonable person in the respondent’s position.’1055  
The court then considered the role of warning signs and a video. The particular 
focus was on whether the signs ‘effectively communicated the risk which 
materialised, so as to make that risk obvious to a ‘reasonable person in the 
respondent’s position’.1056 The signs conveyed that serious injury or death 
might result from “running and diving”, rather than from “running or diving” 
down sand dunes. Therefore, the warning signs did not effectively 
communicate the risk of harm that materialised, and altogether the risk was 
not obvious.1057 Ultimately, the Court found there was a breach of the duty of 
care for failing to provide adequate warning of the dangers inherent in the 
lake.1058 Again, this finding represents a narrow view of what is obvious to a 
reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff.  
Conclusion as to obvious risk 
These three cases highlight important considerations for the emergency 
management sector. The first is that where on the face of it, a flood, fire or 
cyclone, which may seem like an obvious risk, may not equate to a ‘legally’ 
obvious risk. This finding would negate any requirement at law to warn and 
might be a complete answer to any allegation made. Applying Schultz v 
McCormack1059 for example, a person may be generally aware that they live 
in a flood plain, a fire or cyclone prone environment: however, in the absence 
of any warning, they may lack knowledge of the possibility of harm to them, in 
the event that one of the natural hazards eventuated. For example, a 
reasonable person might know it is raining outside, but may not perceive that 
catastrophic flooding is likely, having not perceived inundation as a result. If 
the person is familiar with their surrounds,1060 their knowledge might be 
sufficient to make the perception of risk obvious to them. This would infer they 
                                                          
1055 State of Queensland v Kelly [2015] 1 Qd R 577, [39]-[40]. 
1056 State of Queensland v Kelly [2015] 1 Qd R 577, [41]. 
1057 State of Queensland v Kelly [2015] 1 Qd R 577, [42]. 
1058 State of Queensland v Kelly [2015] 1 Qd R 577. [2]. 
1059 [2015] NSWCA 330 [101]. 
1060 Schultz v McCormack [2015] NSWCA 330 [101]. 
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must take care of their own safety, by ‘keeping a proper lookout’ and seeking 
information.1061  
If a person is a visitor to an area, or is not familiar with the area or the risk, 
even where there is a warning of the prospect of heavy rain, the danger of fire 
or occurrence of a cyclone in the area, if the warning does not describe the 
significant risk of harm, the risk may not be obvious. The examination of the 
case law reinforces that a finding of impact from a natural hazard may not 
constitute a legally obvious risk. The defence that a natural hazard was an 
obvious risk may therefore not be relied upon, to negate a duty to warn. At the 
same time, it will constitute one factor in determining a breach of a duty of 
care, although its influence in the determination of liability, will depend entirely 
on the factual circumstances of the case.  
Immunities 
Immunities, or protection from liability, have become a standard drafting 
practice in Australia and are common place across the world.1062  The inclusion 
of a statutory right to immunity is a regulatory response to managing 
institutional risk to statutory authorities. As identified in Chapter Four, 
institutional risk arises out of activities and functions undertaken by the 
statutory authority. These are activities or functions to which the public may 
seek to assign legal responsibility if they are not carried out effectively, or at 
all. A statutory immunity, excuses an action in negligence against statutory 
authorities, which might otherwise have been justiciable. As well as managing 
institutional risk, the inclusion of an immunity is further justified by the assertion 
that it aims to support, ‘public interests over private law rights’.1063 Therefore, 
inclusion of the immunity, allows emergency service agencies to provide public 
safety services. They afford the legal certainty that operations can be carried 
out ‘untrammelled by any fears of action’.1064 What is relevant to note however, 
is that while immunities excuse statutory authorities from liability, it is still 
                                                          
1061 See, eg, Schultz v McCormack [2015] NSWCA 330 [23]-[24], [33]. 
1062 See, eg, Lauta, Disaster Law, above n 157, 126-127; Field, above n 952, 147. 
1063 Field, above n 952, 147-8. 
1064 See, eg, Explanatory note Disaster Management Bill 2003 (Qld) 7; Myer Stores Ltd v 
State Fire Commission [2012] TASSC 54, 5-6 citing Tally v Motueka Borough [1939] NZLR 
252. 
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important that the functions are carried out effectively. Therefore, and as 
principles of good practice indicate, there may need to be further accountability 
mechanisms put in place, to ensure the policy objectives are achieved.  
Statutory immunities in Australia 
Protections or immunities, as they are interchangeably labelled, are included 
in civil liability and emergency management legislation. They are also included 
in the variety of statutes that establish the emergency service agencies.  
Although variably worded, these provisions integrate the notion of ‘good faith’, 
which ‘ordinarily describes one or more of the defendant’s motives for 
engaging in conduct or the quality of their beliefs that led to the conduct’.1065 
As Field suggests, and as is evident in the reasoning of the court which follows, 
the immunity is concerned with, ‘the ends to which the defendant’s conduct is 
directed, rather than the ‘means’ by which those ends are achieved’.1066 For 
example, a combat agency, is the agency identified as ‘primarily responsible 
for controlling response to a particular emergency’.1067 If the combat agency 
goes about warning the community (the ends), yet does not follow all protocols 
and policies (the means), they may still be held to have acted in good faith. In 
such cases the good faith immunity will be applied to excuse liability. This 
statement will be true, as long as the relevant agency was acting rationally, 
with the motive of assisting the community, 
Rather than trying to cover the field, in this section the civil liability and 
emergency and disaster management legislation in Queensland are used to 
illustrate the principles of a good faith immunity. In Queensland, the Civil 
Liability Act 2003 (Qld) provides protection for prescribed persons or entities 
that ‘perform duties to enhance public safety’.1068 The entities protected by this 
provision include statutory authorities involved in emergency management 
such as Queensland Fire and Emergency Services, the State Emergency 
                                                          
1065 Field, above n 952, 149. 
1066 Field, above n 952, 149 
1067 State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 1989 (NSW) s 3. 
1068 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 26, 27 (’Liability does not attach for an act or omission for 
aid and assistance to enhance public safety, where it is given in circumstances of 
emergency and is done, or omitted to be done in good faith and without reckless disregard 
for the safety of the person’). 
 241 
 
Service, and local government.1069 It is however unlikely that these provisions 
will apply to exclude protection for acts and omissions in hazard warning. 
Instead, they appear to apply to the giving of assistance to a person in distress 
and focus on personal injury.1070  
Aside from the civil liability protections, the relevant emergency management 
statute, the Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld), incorporates a protection 
from civil liability. This provision extends to actions of the ‘State, a Minister, a 
local government or an official’.1071 The emergency management protections, 
which will be the focus of the next section, employ similar language to the civil 
liability provisions. That is, the protection applies to acts done, or ‘omitted to 
be done’ under the Act, ‘in good faith and without reckless disregard’ for 
personal injury, property loss and damage.1072 The elements of this protection 
are similar to other Australian jurisdictions, which incorporate ‘good faith’ 
protections.1073 Across these States, varying permutations of wording occurs 
however, the principles involved align.1074 In some jurisdictions for example, 
the ‘protection’ shifts the burden of any claim from the individual to the State, 
while in others a broader immunity, which includes the State, is evident.1075 
The reasoning behind the quality of conduct described as ‘good faith’ will be 
broadly applicable to the various jurisdictions, as the provisions are ‘construed 
by reference to general principles’.1076 As indicated, the effect of the statutory 
protection is that it negates the ability to claim damage, despite the elements 
of a claim for negligence being satisfied.   
                                                          
1069 Civil Liability Regulation 2014 (Qld) Schedule 2 (In other Australian jurisdictions 
comparative provisions for the Protection of Good Samaritans are used). 
1070 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 25, 26, 27. 
1071 Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) s 144(1)(3) (An official, meaning, a member of a 
‘state, district or local group, a declared disaster officer, a person authorised under the act to 
exercise rescue power for example). 
1072 Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) s 144(1). 
1073 See, eg, State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 1989 (NSW) s 62; Emergency 
Management Act 2013 (NT) s 113; Emergency Management Act 2004 (SA) s 32; 
Emergency Management Act 2013 (VIC) s 75; Emergency Management Act 2005 (WA) s 
100 (Noting the differences in the Emergencies Act 2004 (ACT) s 198 which refers to acts 
done ‘honestly and without recklessness’ as well as the Emergency Management Act 2006 
(TAS) s 55 (Which takes on an alternate approach). 
1074 Eburn, ‘Are Fire Brigades liable for poor operational decisions?’, above n 934, 11. 
1075 See, eg, Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) s 144; Emergency Management Act 2005 
(WA) s 100(1). 
1076 Field, above n 952, 148. 
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Factors for establishing statutory protection 
There are a number of elements which must be satisfied to trigger the statutory 
protection. First there needs to be, an act done, or omitted to be done and 
this act must constitute an act or omission under the relevant Act.1077  The 
act or omission must be carried out in good faith and without reckless 
disregard for the possible occurrence of injury or loss. There must also be 
some consideration as to whether the person or entity the subject of the claim, 
is a class of persons protected.1078 In Queensland, if the defendant is not a 
Minister, or the State, an examination of the facts determines whether the 
person is a ‘recognised official’. A ‘recognised official or the person committing 
the act must be a member of a ‘state, district or local group, a declared disaster 
officer, or a person authorised under the act to exercise rescue power’.1079 
Although the good faith exception has been considered in the context of 
negligence, it has not been examined in the context of warning, and therefore 
a broader consideration of case law is required. 
Relevant cases for analysis of the good faith protections, are the cases of 
Electro Optic Systems v New South Wales (‘Electro Optic’) and Warragamba 
Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No.9) (‘Warragamba’).1080 These 
cases operate in the context of natural hazards and emergencies. In Electro 
Optic, the breach of a duty of care focused on the alleged failure to contain a 
bushfire through adoption of a ‘flawed strategy for containment’.1081 In 
Warragamba Winery,1082 there was consideration of whether the failure to 
contain and extinguish a fire which spread outside of a national park, 
destroying property, constituted a breach of a duty of care.1083 Both cases 
came before the court in New South Wales in relation to immunities contained 
                                                          
1077 See, eg, Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2014] 204 LGERA 238, 
241; Hamcor Pty Ltd v State of Queensland [2016] 1 Qd R 271, [46] (This judgement 
discussed, rather than good faith, a protection where action was bona fide and without 
negligence, however discussion of whether the action came under the Act was relevant). 
1078 Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2014] 204 LGERA 238, 241, 271. 
1079 Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) s 144(1)(3). 
1080 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No. 9) [2012] NSWSC 701. 
1081 Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2014] 204 LGERA 238, 245, 328-
330. 
1082 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No. 9) [2012] NSWSC 701. 
1083 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No. 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, 
[1]. 
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within the Rural Fires Act.1084 The case law may be influential in other 
Australian jurisdictions where similar factual circumstances are evident. 
Judicial consideration of good faith 
As the cases highlight, any finding of good faith will be ‘very much a product 
of its statutory and factual content’.1085 A starting point for determining whether 
act or omissions were taken in good faith, is that they need to demonstrate 
honesty and lack of malice.1086 An act or omission may be carried out, or not 
carried out in good faith even if a person is ‘honest, albeit careless’.1087 At 
times, however, there will need to be an enquiry into the state of mind or state 
of knowledge of the relevant person. There may also be a consideration of the 
persons motive, or whether acts carried out under a statutory power are 
exercised skilfully or negligently.1088 These latter considerations, may give rise 
to the expectation, ‘that an honest person of ordinary prudence’ would act with 
‘caution and diligence’, or at least that a ‘proper system’ would be in place.1089 
Reference may be made to whether the statutory authority had procedures in 
place, and whether soft law instruments,1090 such as the standard operating 
procedures, protocols and guidelines identified in Chapter Five, were followed.  
 
                                                          
1084 Rural Fires Act (NSW) 1997 s 128. 
1085 Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2014] 204 LGERA 238, 396. 
1086 Mid Density Developments Pty Ltd v Rockdale Municipal Council (1993) 81 LGERA 104, 
113. 
1087 Ibid. 
1088 Mid Density Developments Pty Ltd v Rockdale Municipal Council (1993) 81 LGERA 104, 
111, 113-114; Port Stephens Shire Council v Booth (2005) 148 LGERA 351, 379-380 (In 
relation to a systematic failure to provide advice in the exercise of powers under a statute 
and lack of good faith); Bankstown City Council v Alamdo Holdings Pty Ltd (2005) 223 CLR 
660, [49]-[51]; Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2014] 204 LGERA 238, 
397-398 (For an assertion of lack of good faith in the exercise of responsibility in dealing with 
requests for information, particular in consideration of the importance of the information 
sought – certainly there needs to be more than negligence to oust a claim of good faith); 
Ardouin v Board of Fire Commissioners (NSW) (1960) 61 SR (NSW) 910 [114] (In 
discussing acting in a bona fide manner was without indirect or improper motive); Field, 
above n 952, 149 (A court will  make a determination of the means by which objectives were 
undertaken rather than the outcomes). 
1089 Mid Density Developments Pty Ltd v Rockdale Municipal Council (1993) 81 LGERA 104, 
113-114; Cf Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2014] 204 LGERA 238, 241; 
397-398 (Where this standard was not required, or was stated only to be required when 
caution and diligence were not present). 
1090 Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Grey-Letter Law’, above n 553, ix, xi, xiii. 
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Good faith in an emergency or hazard context 
The following cases illustrate examples of judicial reasoning on the application 
of the good faith protection to acts or omissions. Those acts or omissions for 
which a statutory authority might otherwise be liable. As the reasoning 
demonstrates, there is some freedom or flexibility afforded to statutory 
authorities in exercising their statutory powers. This is because statutory 
authorities operate in the complex circumstances presented by dynamic and 
often unpredictable natural hazard environments. 
Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd v New South Wales (‘Electro-Optic)1091 
In Electro-Optic1092 the court had to determine whether good faith provisions 
under the Rural Fire Act 1997 (NSW) applied. The determination was in 
response to an allegation that fire incident controllers failed ‘to use reasonable 
care to avoid the spread of fire so as to avoid damage to persons and 
property’.1093 Having established that the Act protected the defendants, and 
that the implementation of the fire containment strategy was an act done or 
omitted to be done under the Act,1094 Higgins CJ, at first instance reviewed the 
actions of the parties. The judge concluded that the failure to ‘observe 
established procedures’ and formulate a strategy, ‘did not equate to a lack of 
good faith’, nor did it detract from actions which ‘were clearly directed towards 
the containment of the fire’.1095   
On appeal, Jagot J confirmed that the action taken in response to the fire, was, 
‘not inexplicable’ but a ‘rational response to the best available information’.1096 
The employment of the strategy used was not ‘reckless, lacking in diligence or 
conscientiousness or honest but inept’.1097 The incident controllers were found 
                                                          
1091 [2014] 204 LGERA 238. 
1092 Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2014] 204 LGERA 238. 
1093 Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2014] 204 LGERA 238, 270. 
1094 Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2014] 204 LGERA 238, 270. 
1095 Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd v the State of New South Wales [2012] ACTSC 184, 
[347], [359] (Particularly where ‘the established procedures were of no utility in the 
circumstances’). 
1096 Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2014] 204 LGERA 238, 380 (Jagot). 
1097 Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2014] 204 LGERA 238, 380-381 
(Jagot). 
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to have acted ‘diligently and conscientiously to fulfil their responsibilities’.1098  
There was also no evidence that the ‘action or inaction was based on 
indifference to the safety of the people or property’, which might otherwise 
demonstrate a lack of good faith.1099 It was held that there was no ‘ulterior 
motive’ and ‘protection of life’ and the ‘safety of fire fighters’, was a high priority 
and a guiding consideration in the decision making.1100  
Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No. 9) 1101 
In the context of good faith provisions under Rural Fires Act 1997 (NSW), the 
Warragamba Winery case, involved claims of negligence and breach of 
statutory duty in failing to put out a bushfire. There were a number of acts and 
omissions to consider in the determination of good faith. Some related to 
passing on information and a failure to give notice. However, these acts or 
omissions were not considered ‘malevolent’ or acts that were ‘not in 
accordance with procedures’, so as to establish bad faith.1102 Further acts and 
omissions arose in the context of fighting the fire. Generally stated, the acts or 
omissions purporting to constitute negligence were: failing to intervene earlier 
and undertake more rapid response;1103 failure to carry out risk management 
and operations according to protocols, plans and manuals (soft law 
instruments); the improper employment of strategies and tactics;1104 and the 
failure to more effectively fight the fire.1105 In light of these acts and omissions 
the court found that:1106 
                                                          
1098 Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2014) 180 ACTLR 1, 380-381 
(Jagot). 
1099 Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2014] 204 LGERA 238, 397-398 
(Jagot). 
1100 Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2014] 204 LGERA 238, 397-398 
(Jagot) (While the ordinary meaning of reckless may be behaviour which exhibits, ‘a lack of 
caution or prudence’, the primary meaning is ‘heedless of, indifferent to, the consequences 
of one’s actions’). 
1101  [2012] NSWSC 701. 
1102 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No. 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, 
[750]-[751] (As to go no further than their purpose). 
1103 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No. 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, 
[998]. 
1104 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No. 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, 
[983]-[985].  
1105 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No. 9) [2012] NSWSC 701 
,[1], [42],[765]. 
1106 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No. 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, 
[1], [42],[765]. 
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…those who made the decision and did the work or made the questioned 
omissions, did so honestly (honesty); none of them had anything to gain by 
not doing so (motive); all of them were seasoned and dedicated fire fighters; 
they only stood to lose public esteem had they not acted properly; each of 
them made a real attempt to do what it was they were attempting to do (ends), 
namely fight a number of fires, with limited resources and a need to make 
judgements about the best way to allocate priorities; in doing so, they 
complied with established procedures. 
The effect of soft law instruments on determinations of good faith 
In both of the cases examined, the failure to adhere to practices contained 
within soft law instruments was tested against the obligation to act in good 
faith. In Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd v New South Wales1107 the plaintiffs 
claimed there was a failure to comply with protocols which demonstrated a 
lack of good faith. The defendants were required to follow, AIIMS protocols 
(Australian Inter-Service Incident Management System) and the Incident 
Control System Manual (ICS Manual) in order to identify and assess ‘a number 
of alternative strategies, and rate the risks of each being successful’.1108  The 
analysis tool was not followed and ‘written documents (were not completed) to 
the standard required’.1109 However, as Jagot J indicated, the failure to adopt 
the practices within these regulatory components, did not impact on the choice 
of strategy implemented.1110 Nor did it support a finding that there was an 
absence of good faith.  Therefore, the good faith provisions were applied to 
provide immunity against the claim of negligence. 
A similar finding arose in Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South 
Wales (No. 9).1111  The claimant alleged the failure to follow soft law 
instruments, such as protocols and manuals, was indicative of a lack of good 
faith. The judge concluded; however, that the relevant instruments did not 
                                                          
1107  [2014] 204 LGERA 238. 
1108 Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2014] 204 LGERA 238, 252, 376-
377. 
1109 Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2014] 204 LGERA 238, 266, 380-
381 (Rather the incident controller felt there was no reasonable alternative but to take the 
action taken). 
1110 Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2014] 204 LGERA 238, 266, 303, 
380-381. 
1111 [2012] NSWSC 701. 
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have specific legal force and were only ideals or targets of ‘what was possible 
and what was desirable’. 1112 Therefore, non-compliance did not indicate a lack 
of good faith.1113 The court’s position aligns with the notion, that to make soft 
law instruments, or quasi-legislation mandatory, may place an ‘unjustifiable 
burden’ on the statutory authority in trying to meet the targets.1114  
The judge further reasoned, than in attempting to follow protocols and 
manuals, some targets would give way to others, ‘especially when the safety 
of crews was a relevant factor to consider’.1115 Moreover, in this case, good 
judgment was exercised and there was no indication that the defendants could 
have done more to meet the standards required by protocols than they had 
done in the circumstances.1116 Therefore, had negligence, breach of statutory 
duty and the failure to warn been made out, the statutory immunity would have 
excused the relevant acts or omissions. These findings further reinforce the 
hypothesis that soft law instruments aligned with emergency management 
legislation, act to guide, rather than prescribe mandatory responsibilities, for 
which statutory authorities will legally be held to account.1117 In circumstances 
where the language within soft law instruments were mandatory, and 
application of the instruments themselves are mandatory, this finding may be 
different. 
                                                          
1112 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No. 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, 
[988]-[989], [994]. 
1113 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No. 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, 
[988]-[989, [994].  
1114 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No. 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, 
[988]-[989] (See, eg, Sheridan v Borgmeyer [2006] NSWCA 201; Maynard v Rover Mowers 
Ltd [2000] QCA 26); See, also, Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Grey-Letter Law’, above n 553, 
xiv (Noting that the approach adopted in codes of practice may be to ‘improve the overall 
quality of products and services’, this means they incorporate best practice, but were best 
practice and therefore targets to become mandatory, the report suggests there may be a 
significantly higher and ‘unjustifiable’ compliance and cost burden, in contrast to the notion 
that ‘mandatory regulation should be the minimum necessary to achieve the set objectives); 
Mark Aronson, ‘Private Bodies, Public Power and Soft Law in the High Court’ (2007) 35 
Federal Law Review 1, 3-4 (This also aligns with the perspective of the court in 
administrative law that soft laws may be strictly procedural, so as not to ‘fetter statutory 
discretion). 
1115 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No. 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, 
[994]. 
1116 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No. 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, 
[993], [995]. 
1117 Weeks, above n 551, 270 (This is because ‘legal remedies attach to law’s form rather 
than to its effect or substance’, being soft law there is a lack of enforceability of its 
substance). 
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Application to warning in emergencies 
A number of points arise from the cases analysed, which can be applied in the 
hazard warning context. The thesis has considered the status and role of 
guidelines, protocols and other soft law instruments. In the context of good 
faith, the case law demonstrates that in the relevant circumstances, a failure 
to comply with soft law instruments does not automatically lead to a conclusion 
that there was a lack of good faith.  In the warning context, this proposition 
holds true. This is the case as long as when an agency selects a warning 
strategy, its motive is honest and is focused on the safety of the public and 
emergency service personnel. A second condition of immunity, is that the acts 
or omissions are carried out in a real and genuine attempt to achieve the 
functions of the Act, in a diligent and conscientious manner. Consequently, 
when assessing whether to warn, at what interval to warn, or over which 
channel to disseminate a warning, all relevant information available will need 
to be considered. So too, the nature of the hazard, and the profile of the 
community will need to be taken into account, so that the warning sent, and 
the timeframe in which it is delivered, is a rationale response to each of these 
factors. 
When judgment is exercised, and there is a need for rapid response, as long 
as the decision is rational and demonstrates good judgment it is unlikely that 
there will be evidence of either a lack of good faith or reckless disregard for 
personal safety or property damage. The key issues in establishing the 
immunity will be that the accused party is a protected person under the 
legislation and that the act being carried out is either pursuant to, or in 
furtherance of the legislation.1118  
Warning – an act done under the Act 
A question will arise as to whether warning is an act done under the relevant 
Act. As Chapter Five established, there were few direct references to warning 
within the legislation. Therefore, it is not often possible to refer to specific 
powers for warning contained in the Act. In Queensland, for example, there is 
                                                          
1118  Field, above n 952, 155-158 (Reference to pursuance or furtherance of the legislation, 
considers the differential wording across the jurisdictions). 
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only an indirect reference to warning, as being one possible activity for 
‘responding to a disaster’.1119 However it may be argued that the giving of a 
warning constitutes, ‘an integral part or step in the very thing which the 
provisions under the Act give a power to do’.1120 Therefore giving a warning 
may constitute an act undertaken in response to the requirements of the 
legislation and provide access to the immunity. If the emergency management 
statute does not apply in the circumstances, access to a good faith immunity 
may still be available in the legislation which establishes the emergency 
service agency.1121 
Conclusion 
This Chapter has addressed the defences and immunities which can be 
applied to excuse a claim in negligence. Defences and immunities, address 
the need for emergency service agencies to act in the public interest. They 
allow agencies to respond quickly without fear of legal action. However, the 
incorporation of immunities in statute needs to be appropriately tailored. The 
immunities must ensure there is a balance between the modification of 
individual rights to pursue legal action, and the statutory authority’s ability to 
act in the public interest in an emergency situation.1122 Achieving this balance 
will require consideration of the individual’s need to take reasonable care when 
pursuing their own interests.   
In any claim against a statutory authority involved in emergency management, 
the court must balance individual’s rights to pursue litigation and claim 
compensation, against what is a reasonable and honest response of the 
                                                          
1119 Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) Schedule (Responding to a disaster includes the 
issuance of a warning). 
1120 Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) Schedule, s 3 (Responding to a disaster includes 
the issuance of a warning, while the very thing that the act requires which is to help 
communities respond to a disaster or emergency situation); Board of Fire Commissioners 
(NSW) v Ardouin (1961) 109 CLR 105, 117. 
1121 See, eg, Emergencies Act 2004 (ACT) s 198; State Emergency and Rescue 
Management Act 1989 (NSW) s 62; State Emergency Service Act 1989 (NSW) s 25; 
Emergency Management Act 2013 (NT) s 113; Emergency Management Act 2004 (SA) s 
32; Fire and Emergency Services Act 2005 (SA) s 127; Emergency Management Act 2006 
(Tas) s 55; Emergency Management Act 2013 (Vic) s 75; Emergency Management Act 1986 
(Vic) s 37; Metropolitan Fire Brigades Act 1958 (VIC) s 54A; Emergency Management Act 
2005 (WA) s 100.  
1122 Hunter, above n 476, 58. 
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authority in the circumstances. For example, the defence of contributory 
negligence examines whether the claimant exercised reasonable care to avoid 
contributing to their own loss. The culpability of the plaintiff may be significant 
when: they have knowledge of the relevant risk of harm; they fail to heed a 
warning; fail to assess the risk of harm in the absence of a warning; or act with 
reckless disregard as to whether there is any risk of harm from a natural 
hazard. In assessing contributory negligence, the role, the defendant has 
played is not disregarded, however any part the plaintiff has, by their own acts 
or omissions, played in the suffering of harm or injury, is also taken into 
account. The result is a reduction of damages, which could mean, if 
appropriate, a reduction of 100 percent.1123 The reduction is based on what is 
a fair and reasonable apportionment of blame between the parties in the 
circumstances.  
Just as the defence of contributory negligence considers the standard of care 
that is reasonable for the plaintiff to have exhibited, the determination that a 
risk of harm is obvious, also raises the expectation that the plaintiff will take a 
degree of care. A classification that a risk of harm is legally obvious, may act 
to expressly negate a duty to warn. Whether a risk of harm is obvious will also 
be taken into consideration to determine whether in carrying out warning, the 
defendant has failed to take reasonable care and has breached their duty. A 
layperson may classify impacts of a flood, fire, or cyclone, as an obvious risk 
of living in the Australian landscape, however emergency service agencies 
should not take it for granted that the defence will apply. This is because, as 
the case law highlighted, the pivotal consideration is what was obvious to a 
reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff. The view of what is obvious 
to a reasonable person appears to be subject to a narrow interpretation.  At 
times, a risk of harm may be obscured or not evident to the person at the time 
the harm took place. It will not therefore be obvious. 
Statutory protections and immunities are increasingly incorporated into 
legislation, and may also be relevant in the circumstances. Statutory 
immunities provide a stricter curtailment of the right of an individual to make a 
                                                          
1123 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 24. 
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claim at all. As opposed to a defence, rather than reducing damages, an 
immunity will negate a negligence claim. Although the wording differs across 
the jurisdictions, the relevant immunities invoke considerations of ‘good faith’. 
There is limited application of the immunity in the warning context. However, 
applications to claims of negligence provide relevant examples of the 
utilisation of a good faith immunity in the emergency context more generally. 
In the first instance, for these immunities to be applicable, the act or omission, 
must be carried out pursuant to either the emergency management legislation, 
or the relevant Act which establishes that authority.  
To invoke the immunity, the statutory authority will need to identify a power or 
function under the legislation. An authority will then need to demonstrate its 
act or omission was carried out pursuant to, or was at least an integral step, in 
carrying out the relevant function. It is likely, particularly in the Queensland 
context that warning will fall under the Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld), 
as an anticipated action in responding to a disaster, or to the potential of a 
disaster. As long as the defendant is a protected person under the Act. As long 
as they have demonstrated honesty, a lack of ulterior motive, and had made 
a genuine attempt to carry out their functions under the Act, the immunity may 
apply. If applied, the immunity will excuse any action established in 
negligence.  
This Chapter, signals the completion of the analysis of the legislation and case 
law pertaining to the law of negligence and warning which is relevant to the 
emergency management sector. The following Chapter, will extract the 
relevant findings from Chapters Five, Six and Seven, and apply them to a case 
study of warning through a specific medium: social media. The major objective 
of Chapter Eight, is to determine the circumstances in which statutory 
authorities may be held legally accountable, for acts and omissions in warning, 
over this emerging channel. The case study will examine how the functions 
and responsibilities found in Queensland’s soft and hard law instruments, 
might translate into a duty of care, and require a warning to be issued. It will 
also address in what circumstances, upon undertaking warning, a statutory 
authority may be deemed to have breached a duty of care in the 
circumstances. The case study will draw out the unique features of social 
 252 
 
media examined in Chapter Four, to explore whether they are likely to increase 
the possibility that liability will be found.  
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Chapter Eight: Warning through social media - a Queensland case 
study of legal accountability and liability 
 
Chapter One described social media as a collection of Web 2.0 platforms 
increasingly being used to communicate across communities. These 
technologies play a key role in forming social networks. The technologies can 
also empower the community to share responsibility for natural disaster 
mitigation, by contributing relevant information on its potential impacts. 
Importantly, the technologies can also be effectively leveraged by the 
emergency management sector to improve risk communication and warning 
during a natural disaster or emergency. In reflecting on the use of social media 
in this context, this Chapter has two key objectives. The first is to addresses a 
central question in the thesis, that is, in what circumstances are statutory 
authorities likely to be legally accountable for acts and omissions when using 
social media to warn of the likely impacts of a natural disaster. This question 
is addressed as a case study which utilises the Queensland regulatory system 
for emergency management as an exemplar. In addressing this question, the 
Chapter speaks to a gap in understanding of the potential liability for the use 
of social media as an emerging technology. Potential liability was identified as 
a concern in Chapter One.  
The second objective of this case study is to demonstrate how functions and 
responsibilities created by hard and soft law instruments, combine to 
determine legal accountability for statutory authorities. This second objective 
builds on themes investigated in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. As previously 
noted, the focus of this case study is upon the application of the law of 
negligence, in the specific context of the duty to warn. The purpose of this 
analysis is to highlight that despite articulated responsibilities for warning in an 
emergency, legal accountability may arise from the undertaking of this function 
only in limited factual circumstances. This finding does not preclude the fact 
that an authority may be called upon to defend a claim. However, the finding 
does suggest that rather than creating a hook for liability, the function to warn 
is often purely an articulation of power. The function aims to ‘give capacity to 
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statutory authorities that they would otherwise lack’.1124 An examination of the 
exercise of functions by statutory authorities in this context reinforces the 
notion that at times, ideals of moral accountability will diverge from the reality 
of legal accountability.1125  
The ideals or norms of moral accountability are reflected in the underlying 
theoretical precepts upon which civil society and therefore, modern legal 
institutions are based. Social contract principles, for example, highlight that 
both government and private citizens will both have responsibilities in the 
public domain. As the thesis has demonstrated, in the current context, 
statutory authorities have a legitimate role to protect life and property. In 
practice, statutory authorities are made responsible for facets of risk ownership 
to delineate their role of protection. Delineation of their role can include a 
function for warning the community of a hazard related risk before and during 
an emergency. Offering guidance in how to carry out the warning function, soft 
law instruments at times recommend the use of social media as part of the 
warning strategy. 
The protection of life and property before and during an emergency is not the 
only role of a statutory authority. As a ‘public functionary’, statutory authorities 
such as local government will have numerous competing responsibilities to 
manage. There is a legitimate expectation in the public that statutory 
authorities will meet these responsibilities effectively. However, authorities are 
required to deploy limited resources across a wide variety of areas of 
responsibility. When deciding how to deploy these limited resources they are 
required to balance the benefits to individual citizens and the benefits to the 
wider public in carrying out their responsibilities.1126 The result of the need to 
incorporate balance is that, in some instances, an individual’s expectation of 
performance, and of the notion that government will act to protect, will not be 
met. In carrying out their activities, and because individual expectations may 
                                                          
1124 Wotherspoon, above n 761, 337. 
1125 McLennan and Handmer, ‘Sharing Responsibility Australian Disaster Management’, 
above n 2, 44. 
1126 Wotherspoon, above n 761, 338; Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality, above n 104, 
252-254 (Public functions are those ‘that are meant to be performed on behalf of and in the 
interests of the public’, rather than performed on ‘behalf of or in the interests of any particular 
individual or group’); Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 553. 
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not be met, statutory authorities must be conscious of the potential for legal 
liability. Authorities need to be aware of the factors which may lead to liability 
if an individual suffers a loss as a result of their acts or omissions. As identified 
in Chapters Six and Seven, the principles of negligence set the legally 
accepted standards of conduct between parties. The standards of conduct 
include the benchmark as to what is the standard of care required for giving 
warnings in an emergency situation. From the perspective of a statutory 
authority, adhering to these standards is critical for retaining legitimacy and 
trust in the eyes of the community. If trust and legitimacy are retained, statutory 
authorities will have greater prospects of positive collaboration with private 
citizens. 
This Chapter does not suggest that statutory authorities should be made to 
bear the burden of sanctions in the form of legal accountability for warning or 
not warning. However, the thesis does highlight that without sanctions, which 
might otherwise deter poor service delivery; further mechanisms may be 
needed to be put in place within the regulatory system to ensure their powers 
are effectively exercised to meet the policy objectives that have been set. 
Accountability mechanisms, may take the form of performance standards 
which ensure warning and communication strategies are effectively deployed. 
Accountability mechanisms may also take the form of improved policies and 
protocols which underpin operational standards for warning. Accountability 
mechanisms which strengthen service delivery for communication and 
warning in an emergency, ensure that risk communication is effectively 
disseminated. Effective risk communication in turn assists citizens to take 
responsibility for their own interests. Consequently, the burden for disaster risk 
reduction can be more effectively shared. 
Social Media 
Developments in internet technology have led to increasing incidence and use 
of social media platforms to the point that they are now ubiquitous in the 
community.1127 As defined in Chapter One, the term social media describes a 
                                                          
1127 Martini, above n 539, 1; Mayank Yadav & Zillur Rahman, ‘The social role of social 
media: the case of Chennai Rains-2015’ (2016) 6:101 Social Network Analysis and Mining 1, 
1 (Social media has become ‘part and parcel of everyday life). 
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series of Web 2.0 technologies which have been developed for use on internet 
enabled devices, both static and mobile. Chapter Four, further identified the 
unique characteristics of the technologies as online systems designed to 
facilitate interaction and connection through user-generated content and peer 
production.1128 Providing this capacity ensures that social media supports rich 
and complex two-way communication.1129  
Social media: providing social networks  
Both from a sociological and psychological perspective, the use of social 
media platforms is important to society as the platforms allow individuals to 
build connections with others.1130 These connections facilitate the formation of 
communities and social networks on a local and global basis.1131 In facilitating 
this ability to create networks, the effect of the internet has been described as 
revolutionary.1132 The social networks that are created provide several benefits 
for the community and are particularly useful for the emergency management 
sector. For example, social networks facilitate the ability to readily exchange 
and share information, and the ability to build social capital.1133 Social 
networks, with this ability to exchange information and build social capital, are 
identified as important factors which underpin a resilient community, a key 
objective of Australia’s disaster policy.1134 Consequently, social media is used 
in the disaster and emergency context, to connect individuals, and 
communities. Social media has also been used to mobilise populations and to 
                                                          
1128 Walker, Mass Notification and Crisis Communication, above n 50, 225 (Web 2 
technologies are the second generation of websites which provide mechanisms for 
interactive communication). 
1129 Robert Chandler, Emergency Communication (ALC-CLIO, 2010) 24. 
1130 Sonja Utz and Nicole Muscanell, ‘Social Media and Social Capital: Introduction to the 
Special Issue’ (Editorial) (2015) 5 Societies 420, 420 (This includes building both weak and 
strong ties). 
1131 Yadav & Rahman, above n 1127, 1.  
1132 Nan Lin, ‘Building a Network Theory of Social Capital’ (1999) 22(1) Connections 28, 45. 
1133 Norris et al, above n 49, 136-138; Lin, above n 1132, 39-40 (Lin identifies a definitions of 
social capital as ‘an investment in social relations by individuals through which they gain 
access to embedded resources to enhance expected returns of instrumental or expressive 
actions) Utz and Muscanell, above n 1130, 420; Marjolijn L. Antheunis, Mariek M.P. Vanden 
Abeele and Saskia Kanters, ‘The Impact of Facebook Use on Micro-Level Social Capital: A 
Synthesis’ (2015) 5 Societies 399, 401-2 (This thesis does not go into depth in defining 
social capital, however it is noted, that there are differential types of social capital which may 
be built over social media). 
1134 Council of Australian Governments (COAG), National Strategy for Disaster Resilience 
(2011) 5; Norris et al, above n 49, 136; Yadav & Rahman, above n 1127, 1-2, 7-8. 
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respond in real time to the broader needs of the community in the wake of a 
disaster.1135 At times mobilisation of populations in an undirected or 
unmanaged fashion can be problematic for emergency service agencies. 
However, social media has demonstrated that it can assist individuals in taking 
a share of responsibility for their own behaviour in dynamic circumstances 
during natural disasters and emergencies.  
The sociological and psychological benefits of social media in the community 
are evident. Where possible it is beneficial for agencies within the emergency 
management sector to support and be involved in the social networks. By 
disseminating messages through social media, authorities within the sector 
may be able to access communities they have previously been unable to 
access in a timely manner. Social media also gives access to an audience, 
which based on the figures provided in Chapter One, outnumber the day to 
day listening audiences of traditional modalities for warning dissemination 
such as radio.1136 The ability to access and provide information to such a broad 
and diverse audience may lead to improved mobilisation of individuals and 
enable the sector to reduce the burden on the public-sector services.  
Expectations of uptake and legal concerns 
As well as this common-sense rationale for adopting social media in 
emergency situations, the public expect that the emergency management 
sector will keep pace with technology and integrate social media into the 
operational environment.1137 From a business perspective, the suitability of the 
                                                          
1135 Irons et al, above n 70, 3-4; Siobahn Heanue, ‘Nepal earthquake: How open data and 
social media helped the Nepalese to help themselves’, ABCNews (online), 18 August 2015 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-16/nepal-earthquake-how-open-data-social-media-
helped-rebuild/6700410?pfmredir=sm>. 
1136 See, eg, McNair Ingenuity Research, Community Radio National Listener Survey 2016 
Wave #1: Fact Sheet Australia (July 2016) 
<https://www.cbaa.org.au/sites/default/files/media/McNair%20Ingenuity%20Research%20-
%20NLS%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20Australia%20-%202016%20-
%20Wave%20%231%20-%201605R.pdf> (Data from 2016 suggests in an average week 
there are 15,598,000 listeners of radio, both commercial and community radio, which is 82% 
of all people in Australia aged 15+). 
1137 Melissa W.Graham, Elizabeth J. Avery, Sejin Park, ‘The role of social media in local 
government crisis communications’ (2015) 41 Public Relations Review, 386, 387; Mergel, 
above n 60, 283; NGIS, above n 61, 5; Crowe, Disasters 2.0, above n 48, 88; Flood 
Response Review Board, ‘Brisbane Flood January 2011: Independent Review of Brisbane 
City Council’s Response 9-11 January 2011' (2011) 35; Kevin McDougall, ‘Using 
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channels to an organisation or crisis should be assessed on a ‘case by case 
basis’.1138 Nonetheless there has been an increase in the adoption of the 
channels such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube by the sector.  What began 
as high profile, isolated examples of usage of social media,1139 has now 
become a day-to-day function for some agencies.1140 The extent of adoption 
of the technologies across the emergency management sector generally, does 
vary.1141 Understandings of the implications of the use of social media by 
government is still maturing.1142 Anecdotal evidence does however still 
suggest that legal concerns may be creating a barrier to adoption, or at least 
a reluctance to fully utilise the capacity of the channels.1143 Some of these 
concerns relate to uncertainties as to the application of accepted legal 
                                                          
Volunteered Information to Map the Queensland Floods’ (Proceedings of the Surveying & 
Spatial Sciences Biennial Conference 2011, Wellington, 21-25 November 2011) 15. 
1138 Ioannis Kotsiopoulos, ‘Social Media in Crisis Management: Role, Potential and Risk’ 
(2014 IEEE/ACM 7th International Conference on Utility and Cloud Computing, London, 8-
11 December 2014) 683. 
1139 See, eg, Queensland Police Service, Media and Public Affairs Branch, above n 400. 
1140 See, eg, Australian Government, Social Media <http://www.australia.gov.au/news-and-
social-media/social-media> (This site provides a list of government social media accounts 
across a number of jurisdictions – including emergency service authorities); Fire and 
Emergency Services (Qld), Reminder: how to contact QFES Media (22nd February 2016) 
<https://newsroom.psba.qld.gov.au/Content/Local-News/01-ENL/Article/Reminder-how-to-
contact-QFES-Media/1017/1071/12066>; Emergency Management Victoria, Victoria’s 
warning system (28/10/2016) <https://www.emv.vic.gov.au/responsibilities/victorias-warning-
system>; New South Wales Government, Our Social Media Channels (2016) 
<http://www.nsw.gov.au/social-media>. 
1141 See, eg, Lise Ann St Denis, Leysia Palen, Kenneth M Anderson, ‘Mastering Social 
Media: An Analysis of Jefferson Country’s Communications during the 2013 Colorado 
Floods’ (Proceedings of the 11th International ISCRAM Conference – University Park, 
Pennsylvania, USA, May 2014)(Public usage has ‘far outpaced’ adoption by the emergency 
management sector despite it being noted as best practice); Anikeeva, Steenkamp and 
Arbon, above n 42, 23; Emergency Management Victoria, National Review of Warnings and 
Information, above n 11, 53 (Although it is suggested that ‘a majority of agencies are 
currently developing their capability to use social media’, noting that this does not include 
local government who in some jurisdictions have a function for warning) See, eg, Inspector 
General of Emergency Management (Qld), Review of local governments’ emergency 
warning capability, above n 11, 6, 21. 
1142 Henman, above n 137, 1398. 
1143 See, eg, St Denis, Palen and Anderson, ‘Mastering Social Media’, above n 1141 (Lack of 
uptake may also be attributed to ‘lack of official support or resources for staffing social 
media, policies which prohibit use of social media, impracticalities of its use in a command 
and control environment’); Crowe, Disasters 2.0, above n 48, 67 (There are concerns over 
‘doing it wrong’ and the need for policies which ‘include clarification of murky legal issues’); 
Martini, above n 539, 80. 
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principles of liability in a new medium. 1144 There is also a lack of understanding 
as to how legal principles will evolve to meet new circumstances.1145 
Incorporating social media into operations: costs, benefits, 
challenges  
When integrating any new technology into business, some assessment needs 
to be made of the costs and benefits of that technology. In relation to social 
media, the Queensland and Victorian governments have suggested that 
statutory authorities consider the risks of its use.1146 Having undertaken some 
consideration of risk, policy has been created across the jurisdictions to guide 
activity for social media usage. These policies tend to incorporate issues such 
as the public / private use of social media by employees,1147 record keeping 
and security protocols.1148 As identified in Chapter Two, policies and protocols 
provide good practice principles for using social media. Importantly, policies 
and protocols also act as a control to ensure risk communication is 
effective,1149 and a control to reduce institutional legal risk.1150 Therefore, the 
                                                          
1144 Australian Communications and Media Authority (Cth), above n 141, 4; National 
Research Council, ‘Public Response to Alerts and Warnings using social media: Report of a 
workshop on current knowledge and research gaps’ (2013) (Washington, D.C) 54. 
1145 Ibid 54. 
1146 Department of Business and Innovation (Vic), Government 2.0 Projects in VPS: An 
introduction to managing risks (2010) <http://www.vic.gov.au/blog/social-media-
guides/government-2-0-projects-vps-introduction-managing-risk/>; Department of Science, 
Information Technology and Innovation (Qld), Principles for the official use of social media 
networks and emerging social media (October 2015) 14 
<http://www.qgcio.qld.gov.au/products/qgea-documents/547-business/3519-principles-for-
the-use-of-social-media>. 
1147 See, eg, Jacinta Buchbach, ‘Social Media Policies and Work: Reconciling Personal 
Autonomy Interests and Employer Risk’ (Postdoctoral thesis, Queensland University of 
technology, submitted for examination); International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies, Social Media guidelines for IFRC staff (2009) 2 
<http://sm4good.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/Red-Cross-Red-Crescent-SocialMedia-
Guidelines.pdf>. 
1148 See, eg, Department of Science, Information Technology and Innovation (Qld), 
Principles for the official use of social media networks and emerging social media (October 
2015) <http://www.qgcio.qld.gov.au/products/qgea-documents/547-business/3519-
principles-for-the-use-of-social-media>. 
1149 Standards Australia, Risk Management - Principles and guidelines (AS/NZS ISO 
31000:2009); Standards Australia, Risk management guidelines - Companion to AS/NZS 
ISO 31000:2009 (SA/SNZ HB 436:2013) 11-12, 72. 
1150 See, general discussion in Black, ‘The Role of Risk in Regulatory Processes’, above n 
217, 30-31; Professional Standards Authority, The role of risk in regulatory policy, above n 
236, 2; OCED, Risk and Regulatory Policy, above n 8, 29-30. 
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potential legal effects of usage must be considered as an essential element 
for inclusion in social media policies.  
To date, the application of the law of negligence as a consideration in warning 
practices has had little attention within social media policies. However, the risk 
of liability which might be faced for failure to warn or negligent warning,1151 
could become a significant potential cost to statutory authorities in the sector. 
Despite the findings in Chapters Six and Seven identifying there is limited 
potential for liability in warning, this does not mean that an agency will not be 
required to defend a claim that has arisen. With a clear gap in risk assessment 
in this area, this Chapter will address the potential liability which may be faced 
by a statutory authority through the application of the principles of the law of 
negligence for the breach of an identifiable duty in this context. Before 
examining the benefits, challenges and risks of liability, it is important to 
reiterate that social media platforms have been recommended to augment 
current communication channels. Social media ought to provide an ‘additional 
means for people to receive information about emergencies’, rather than 
acting as a substitute for traditional modalities of warning communication.1152   
Benefits of social media to the emergency management sector 
Over and above the benefits of social capital and network building already 
identified, social media has several attractive attributes which can be 
leveraged by the emergency management sector. These benefits suggest that 
the use of social media channels should become an ‘invaluable part of 
                                                          
1151 Jana Hrdinová, Natalie Helbig and Catherine Stollar Peters, Designing Social Media 
Policy for Government: Eight Essential Elements (Center for Technology in Government, 
University at Albany, 2010) <http://assembly.nu.ca/library/Edocs/2010/000957-e.pdf>. 
1152 See, eg, St Denis, Palen and Anderson, ‘Mastering Social Media’, above n 1141; 
Hazelwood Mine Fire Inquiry, above n 50, 386-387 ; Yu Xiao, Qunying Huang & Kai Wu, 
‘Understanding social media data for disaster management’ (2015) 79 Natural Hazards 
1663, 1664; Emergency Management Victoria, National Review of Warnings and 
Information, above n 11, 53 (Social media is likely to reach younger audiences than 
traditional forms of communication); Virtual Social Media Working Group and DHS First 
Responders Group, Homeland Security, Next steps: Social Media for Emergency Response 
(January 2012) 5-6 (Microblogging and social networking sites like Twitter and Facebook are 
likely to reach mobile users, frequently younger audiences, tech savvy and deaf or hard of 
hearing audiences); Robby Westbrook et al, ‘A Holistic Approach to Evaluating Social 
Media’s Successful Implementation into Emergency Management Operations: Applied 
Research in an Action Research Study’ (2012) 4(3) International Journal of Information 
Systems for Crisis Response and Management 1, 2. 
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emergency response’.1153 The benefits relate to information that can both be 
pushed out through the channels, as well as data that may be pulled, or crowd-
sourced to build situational awareness.1154 Crowd-sourcing will be mentioned 
briefly in this Chapter. Instead, the core focus in this thesis is the ‘pushing’ or 
dissemination of information through social media, and the risk of liability which 
will arise in line with the duty to warn. 
A wealth of information 
A key aspect of social media is that it enables content creation by all users. 
Community members can therefore ‘act as human sensors’1155 and contribute 
immediate on-the-ground information about disaster impacts. Consequently, 
individuals within the community can often be the true ‘first responders’.1156 
Creation of content over a dispersed population creates a wealth of 
information,1157 which the emergency management sector can utilise to build 
situational awareness. The sector must quickly and accurately analyse this 
data from diverse community sources to create coherent information and build 
useful knowledge.1158 The information and knowledge derived is then used as 
a basis for more effective warnings for appropriate action,1159 or to determine 
how resources should be best allocated for the most effective response.   
Timely delivery 
As identified in Chapter Four, further benefits of social media, and a key focus 
of this thesis, is the ability to disseminate a message in real time.1160 Rather 
than the delays experienced in utilising traditional media for warning 
                                                          
1153 Ibid. 
1154 See, eg, Bruns and Burgess, ‘Crisis Communication in Natural Disasters’, above n 70, 
38; Crowe, Disasters 2.0, above n 48, 9.  
1155 Axel Bruns, ‘Crisis Communication’ in Stuart Cunningham and Sue Turnbull (eds), The 
Media and Communications in Australia (Allen & Unwin, 2014) 2. 
1156 See, eg, Crowe, Disasters 2.0, above n 48, 46; Kotsiopoulos, above n 1138, 684. 
1157 danah boyd & Kate Crawford, ‘Critical Questions for Big Data’ (2012) 15(5) Information, 
Communication & Society 662, 663 (The large data sets being produced through social 
media interactions is known as ‘big data’, the use of which comes with its own its ethical 
questions, it is likely that the emergency management sector will undertake mostly small-
scale analysis). 
1158 Martini, above n 539, 40-43. 
1159 boyd & Crawford, ‘Critical Questions for Big Data’, above n 1157, 663-664 (Big data is 
often analysed to create better services to the public); Chatfield, Scholl and Brajawidagda, 
above n 48, 377. 
1160 Chatfield, Scholl and Brajawidagda, above n 48, 384; Crowe, Disasters 2.0, above n 48, 
9. 
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broadcasts, some social media platforms allow for instantaneous message 
delivery. Twitter, for example, allows a message to be sent instantaneously to 
Twitter users within the community who may then quickly pass on the message 
to others.1161 As identified in Chapter Three, timely delivery of messages has 
a positive impact upon the perception / response process.1162 Timely delivery 
gives individuals an opportunity to make decisions about feasible protective 
action in response to a hazard related risk. The receipt of timely risk 
information and warning to a broad cross section of the public is also a pivotal 
trigger point to facilitate shared responsibility. 
Low Cost and accessibility of the audience 
As well as supporting timely delivery, social media platforms are low cost,1163 
readily implementable technologies.1164 They are able to be used across a 
range of devices, both static and mobile.1165 Low cost platforms ensure there 
is no barrier to entry. It is however noted that consideration must be given to 
administrative costs1166 and the relevant training and human resources which 
are required for proper and responsible use. As identified in Chapter Four, the 
ability to use social media platforms on highly mobile devices also means 
community members are nearly always accessible, and often at times when 
traditional media has failed.1167 Accessibility to both platforms and audience, 
further supports timely delivery of emergency warnings for dynamic and 
                                                          
1161 Miles Godfrey, 'Firies use Twitter to fight bushfires', The Sydney Morning Herald, 24 
October 2013 <http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-national/firies-use-twitter-to-fight-
bushfires-20131024-2w31x.html>; Kavanaugh et al, above n 60, 489; Chatfield, Scholl and 
Brajawidagda, above n 48, 385. 
1162 Defence Research and Development Canada, Social Media for Emergency 
Management Expert Roundtable Workshop: Summary of Findings Technical Note 
(December 2013) 2; Fire Services Commissioner (Vic), Review of community responses to 
recent bushfires, above n 74, 16-17, 33 (Timely information is particularly important for 
threat avoiders). 
1163 Graham, Avery, Park, above n 1137, 387; White, Social Media, Crisis Communication 
and Emergency Management, above n 46, xiii, 67; Guy Paul Cooper Jr et al, ‘Twitter as a 
Potential Disaster Risk Reduction Tool. Part 1: Introduction, Terminology, Research and 
Operational Applications’ (2015) 7(1) Plos Currents; Crowe, Disasters 2.0, above n 48, 9; 
Wendling, Radisch, Jacobzone, above n 56, 7. 
1164 See, eg, Westbrook et al, above n 1152, 11; Hughes and Palen, ‘Twitter Adoption and 
Use in Mass Convergence and Emergency Events’, above n 70. 
1165 See, eg, Westbrook et al, above n 1152, 11; Hughes and Palen, ‘Twitter Adoption and 
Use in Mass Convergence and Emergency Events’, above n 70. 
1166 See, eg, Amisha M Mehta, Axel Bruns and Judith Newton, ‘Trust but verify: social media 
models for disaster management’ (2016) Disasters. 
1167 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ’Hashtag Standards for Emergencies’ 
(OCHA Policy and Study Series, October 2014) 4. 
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unpredictable emergencies, which can occur day or night, and often leave little 
time to respond.1168  
Reach 
As identified, social media facilitates the ability to build connections and social 
networks on line. Leveraging these networks to disseminate messages means 
warnings may have a broad reach.1169 Platforms such as Twitter for example, 
are a one-to-many communication technology,1170 which supports the spread 
of messages far and wide in a short space of time. When an organisation with 
a Twitter account sends a message (tweets), and another Twitter user 
rebroadcasts their message (retweets), the message become visible to all 
people who follow their account.1171 In some cases, those who disseminate 
messages are key influencers that is, they are a user who is seen as credible 
and who has strong influence over their online followers.1172 When a key 
influencer retweets a warning message, because of the credibility which 
attaches and the influence they exert, the message becomes amplified as it is 
cascaded out to numerous followers, who may also retweet the message.1173 
This cascade of information creates social connections across sectors of the 
community1174 which traditionally may not be a captive audience for the sector.  
                                                          
1168 Alexandra Olteanu, Sarah Vieweg and Carlos Castillo, ‘What to Expect When the 
Unexpected Happens: Social Media Communications Across Crises’ (Proceedings of the 
18th ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work & Social Computing, New 
York, USA, 2016) 994, 994 (Twitter has been stated to be ‘unmatched in terms of getting the 
information out quickly to a broad audience’); Bruns and Burgess, ‘Crisis Communication in 
Natural Disasters’, above n 70, 374 (Highlighting the use of social media to disseminate 
breaking news’). 
1169 Wendling, Radisch, Jacobzone, above n 56, 11, 20 (A good practice is to include a sign-
off in emergency tweets of ‘Please RT’); Chatfield, Scholl and Brajawidagda, above n 48, 
385; Bruns and Burgess, ‘Crisis Communication in Natural Disasters’, above n 70, 379 (The 
ability to retweet is ‘the most important driver of visibility’ of messages); St Denis, Palen, 
Anderson, ‘Mastering Social Media’, above n 1141. 
1170 Olteanu, Vieweg, Castillo, above n 1168, 994, 994. 
1171 Axel Bruns et al, ‘#qldfloods and @QPSMedia: Crisis Communication on Twitter in the 
2011 South East Queensland Floods’ (2012) ARC Centre of Excellence for Creative 
Industries and Innovation; Bruns and Burgess, ‘Crisis Communication in Natural Disasters’, 
above n 70, 379; Cooper Jr et al, above n 1163; Eunae Yoo et al, ‘Evaluating information 
diffusion speed and its determinants in social media networks during humanitarian crises’ 
(2016) Journal of Operations Management 1, 4; Danah Boyd, Scott Golder,and Gilad Lotan, 
‘Tweet, Tweet and Retweet: Conversational Aspects of Retweeting on Twitter’ (43rd Hawaii 
International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS), Honolulu, 6 January 2010). 
1172 Yoo et al, above n 1171, 123-125. 
1173 Ibid. 
1174 Bruns and Burgess, ‘Crisis Communication in Natural Disasters’, above n 70, 376. 
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An additional benefit of the links and connections made between the 
emergency management sector and the community over social media, is that 
they can assist in building trust over time.1175 This is particularly the case when 
agency posts are endorsed by an influential person in an individual’s social 
circle.1176 Consequently, not only is the inclusion of social media platforms into 
a communication strategy beneficial for timely delivery, to a broad 
audience,1177 its inclusion also help to build the community trust which is a key 
component of effective risk communication.1178 Although the benefits of social 
media listed here are not exhaustive, they are sufficient to illustrate the key 
role that the platforms can play in contemporary emergency situations. 
Challenges for the emergency management sector and their legal 
consequences 
Alongside its benefits, the use of social media channels in emergencies also 
provides numerous challenges. These challenges are not insurmountable; 
however, they have the potential to have legal implications if not properly 
managed. Legal action which could result from the use of social media, and 
which should therefore be considered in any risk assessment, will potentially 
include breaches of privacy, defamation, breach of confidentiality and 
negligence. As earlier identified, only those related to the law of negligence, 
                                                          
1175 Busa et al, above n 527; Wendling, Radisch, Jacobzone, above n 56, 10, 25 (Particularly 
as it allows for bottom-up communication, improves transparency and facilitates a dynamic 
flow of information rather than information just ‘being pushed on the public’). 
1176 See, eg, Bruns et al, ‘#qldfloods and @QPSMedia’, above n 1171, 29 (Networks of 
followers are ‘important partners in disseminating information more widely than is possible 
for the services alone’); Bruns and Burgess, ‘Crisis Communication in Natural Disasters’, 
above n 70, 376, 379; Kate Jones, ‘Social media influencers the new marketing darlings’, 
The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 22 February 2016 <http://www.smh.com.au/small-
business/smallbiz-marketing/social-media-influencers-the-new-marketing-darlings-
20160217-gmx2y2.html>; Margaret C. Stewart, B. Gail Wilson, ‘The dynamic role of social 
media during Hurricane #Sandy: An introduction of the STREMII model to weather the storm 
of the crisis lifecycle’ (2015) 54 Computers in Human Behaviour, 639, 643; Yoo et al, above 
n 1171, 1, 3 (Diffusion rates of information tend to increase, if the network users ‘perceive 
that cascades contents are informational and sharing these contents will be helpful to 
others’). 
1177 Bruns and Burgess, ‘Crisis Communication in Natural Disasters’, above n 70, 375. 
1178 Wendling, Radisch, Jacobzone, above n 56, 25 (On social media as a tool for building 
trust); Reynolds and Seegar, above n 309, 48; Mileti, Disasters by Design, above n 185, 191 
(Mileti adds emphasis to the aim of warnings to ‘inform and prompt appropriate response’, 
by containing ‘alert and notification components’); Sorensen, above n 50, 119; Renn, ‘Risk 
Governance: Towards an Integrative Framework’, above n 214, 55.  
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will be raised here. The following sections outline some of the keys challenges 
of social media and the relevant links to the law of negligence. 
Challenges of two-way communication 
Principles for good practice, identified in Chapter Three highlighted that 
communication ought to adopt a two-way model of communication.1179 To 
align with these principles, the integration of social media channels into a risk 
communication and warning strategy for emergencies is prudent. However, 
the two-way nature of social media communications is a hurdle that the 
emergency management sector is attempting to address. Historically, the 
emergency management sector has broadcast emergency warnings via 
television, radio, and emergency alert, which are a one-way channel for 
communication. Therefore, social media’s two-way communication presents a 
new communication paradigm for the emergency management.1180 How to 
adapt business and operational practices to incorporate protocols for social 
media usage is proving difficult. There are tensions between trying to retain 
traditional aspects of message control and the need for authorisation in an 
environment of uncontrolled and immediate information. As well as trying to 
adapt communication strategies to fit this new communication paradigm there 
are also legal concerns as to how the law will be applied to resolve disputes in 
this relatively untested domain. So, what are the risks that legal action may 
arise under the law of negligence when using social media in an emergency 
situation?  
To address this question a hypothetical scenario is used to draw out acts or 
omissions which may occur when statutory authorities use social media in an 
emergency. Based on the information in the scenario, seven questions which 
address a cross section of legal issues are investigated to provide an 
understanding of the reality as to whether legal action may result. These are 
not means an exhaustive list of the questions that may arise. As adverted to 
                                                          
1179 See, eg, Leiss, above n 334, 85, 90-91; Standards Australia, Communicating and 
consulting about risk (HB 327:2010) 18; Fischhoff, above n 337, 1265 (That is for authorities 
to listen rather than ‘assuming they know what to say’); D Feldman et al, ‘Communicating 
flood risk: Looking back and forward at traditional and social media outlets’ (2016) 15 
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 43, 44; Renn, ‘Risk Governance: Towards 
an Integrative Framework’, above n 214, 55-56. 
1180 Crowe, Disasters 2.0, above n 48, 61. 
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in Chapters Six and Seven these questions are investigated against the 
background of Queensland disaster management legislation. 
Hypothetical Scenario 
It is storm season and an unusually severe storm is approaching the 
Queensland coast. Its magnitude is such that it is likely lead to widespread 
property damage. This likelihood is in part due to the prospect of coastal storm 
surge and flash flooding coupled with high intensity winds. The likelihood of 
flooding is increased by the fact that it has been raining for the past week. As 
such, not only is there a risk of property damage, there also is the potential for 
loss of life if the public are not alerted of the need to take preventative 
measures.  
The public have been alerted through pre-season public information 
campaigns of the need to prepare for storm season.  The Bureau of 
Meteorology has issued a general storm warning. One local government, 
whose catchment is likely to be first hit by the storm, have recently created a 
Facebook page and a Twitter account. The local government catchment is 
made up of a young demographic and previous attempts to warn through 
traditional channels have had little effect. On the day of the storm, the public 
information officer responsible for social media is unavailable. Therefore, a 
general warning of the storm is transmitted only through radio and 
television broadcasts. Unfortunately, the message does not reach many 
residents.  
As the storm crosses the coastline the damage is severe. Flooding has caused 
several road closures. The relevant local government authority posted 
information about the likely impact to the local communities in their catchment 
on their Facebook page. Unfortunately, they posted incorrect information 
about which towns would be hit. As a result of this incorrect information one 
community which bore the full force of the storm was missed. Without advance 
warning, the community failed to prepare themselves or take preventative 
action. Citizens sustained both property damage and personal injuries. 
Further, residents are trapped in rapidly rising floodwaters and with their smart 
phones at hand, one individual sends a tweet to an emergency service 
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authority requesting assistance. Their need for assistance is urgent. However 
due to the number of posts and tweets on both Facebook and Twitter the 
request for assistance on Twitter is overlooked by the public information 
officer.  
During the storm, members of the public post information on social media. One 
particularly troublesome user retweets a message sent by the emergency 
service authority and alters its content so that it reads incorrectly. Aside from 
this troublesome user, other social media users with the best intentions are 
posting information which is inaccurate.  As a result, misinformation is 
rapidly circulating on Facebook and Twitter about rising floodwaters in 
certain areas, as well as the intensity of the storm. Due to limited resources, 
the emergency service agency is unable to address this misinformation. 
A member of the public also posts their own incorrect information on the 
authority’s Facebook page. The information is unverified however it is 
shared by the public information officer as they believe they should urgently 
alert the public.  
At the last minute, the storm changes direction, new warnings need to be 
disseminated urgently. The public information officer, due to their high number 
of Facebook users, decides to post a warning on Facebook. However due to 
the algorithms on Facebook, many users do not receive the warning in 
sufficient time to take preventative action. As community members are 
calling in for further information, the public information officer realises that the 
warning has not reached the public and quickly tweets a new warning. 
However, the limited number of characters available in a tweet means the 
warning reads ambiguously and members of the public are unsure of the 
action they are required to take. Consequently, they do not protect their 
property, nor do they move to higher ground. As a result of this ambiguous 
warning a significant number of the public suffer loss. 
This scenario gives rise to a number of questions as to the circumstances in 
which legal accountability will arise: 
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1. In respect of issuing the original warning over radio and television, 
would the local government owe a duty of care and would that duty 
require the use of social media?  
2. If a duty is owed, is it possible that the emergency service authority 
breached its duty to warn due to the Facebook algorithms failing to 
disseminate the message in a timely manner?  
3. With regards to the ambiguous warning over Twitter, will the emergency 
service authority have breached any duty of care it may owe to warn? 
4. If posting inaccurate information on Facebook, is the local government 
exposed to liability where reliance on the information has led to harm? 
a. Could the emergency service authority be held legally 
accountable for sharing unverified and incorrect information 
posted by a user on their Facebook page if it leads to harm? 
5. Having failed to respond to a request for assistance over Twitter, is it 
possible that the emergency service authority be held legally 
accountable? 
6. Will the failure to address misinformation on social media give rise to a 
claim in negligence? 
7. Will the failure to address misinformation on the emergency services 
own Facebook page lead to a claim in negligence? 
Long-standing issues in a new medium 
The issues which arise in this first section reflect legal concerns apparent in 
warning of natural hazards and emergency related risk. To provide some 
certainty as to how the court will address these issues, recourse may be had 
to current case law and judicial reasoning concerning the duty to warn. It is 
important to note that any findings are indicative, they provide a point in time 
view of the law, and any outcomes will depend on the factual circumstances 
of each case.  
1. In respect of issuing the original warning over radio and 
television, would the local government owe a duty of care to 
warn and would that duty require the use of social media?  
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Chapter Six examined the law of negligence identifying the three elements 
required to establish a claim in negligence. These were a duty of care, the 
breach of a duty of care and damage caused by the breach of the duty of care. 
The focus in answering this question is on whether the duty of care, in this 
case a duty to warn of a hazard related risk in an emergency situation, will be 
established.  Chapter Six identified that to formulate a duty of care in novel 
cases of warning, requires consideration of both a reasonably foreseeable risk 
of harm and salient factors. As indicated in Chapter Six, the first hurdle is that 
the harm must be reasonably foreseeable. In the context of warning and 
hazards, the weight of precedent indicated this will not often be difficult to 
prove. Based on the facts highlighted in the scenario, it is perhaps reasonably 
foreseeable that if residents did not receive a warning which enabled them to 
take preventative action, they could incur loss or suffer personal loss. 
Consequently, reasonable foreseeability of the harm through omission will 
likely be made out.  
As reasonable foreseeability is not sufficient to impose a duty on its own, the 
next consideration in the formulation of a duty of care is the identification of 
the relevant salient factors. Chapter Six identified these factors as including 
control, knowledge, vulnerability and policy factors such as those embedded 
in civil liability legislation. The Chapter also indicated, that the existence of 
relevant statutory powers may be an important factor in determining whether 
a duty of to warn exists.1181 The presence of a statutory power, in this scenario 
this would be a power to issue hazard warnings, may demonstrate that the 
authority had some degree of control which could be exercised to avoid the 
relevant harm.1182 However, as was also highlighted, in the case of non-
feasance (or a failure to warn), it may be a ‘rare exception’ that a duty of care 
is imposed, particularly where the exercise of the power is discretionary.1183 
Before examining the salient features, it is important note that not every 
natural hazard weather event will be sufficient to meet the definition of an 
                                                          
1181 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 575 (McHugh J). 
1182 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 575 (McHugh J); 
Wotherspoon, above n 761, 331-332. 
1183 Wotherspoon, above n 761, 331-332; Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 
211 CLR 540, 575-576 (McHugh J); Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330, 
343-345 (Brennan CJ). 
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emergency or disaster under the legislation. 1184  In such cases the associated 
functions and responsibilities will not be triggered. If the provisions are not 
triggered, further reference to functions delineated within the legislation which 
establishes the emergency service organisations will need to be 
considered.1185 From the content analysis in Chapter Five, it is suggested that 
in Queensland alternative legislation takes its form in the Fire and Emergency 
Services Act 1990 (Qld). This Act contains broad provisions, similar to the 
Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) with regards to warning. The reasoning 
process and the application of the principles of negligence outlined in relation 
to the Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) can be applied in a similar way. In 
relation to the scenario and based on the Queensland provisions which define 
a ‘disaster’, due to the high risk or property damage and potential loss of life, 
stemming from the storm, it is assumed that the relevant Disaster 
Management Act 2003 (Qld) provisions are triggered.1186 
Salient features: Exploring Queensland statutory provisions and notions of 
control 
Having established a likely reasonable foreseeability of harm, the first 
consideration concerns the effect of statutory ‘functions’ and ‘powers’ relevant 
to warning.1187 As noted, these powers are suggestive of some degree of 
control, either control of the hazard, or managerial control of the 
circumstances; however considerations of control in the case law have been 
inconsistent.1188 Reflecting on judicial reasoning of control identified in Chapter 
Six, the Queensland legislative provisions examined below contain broad and 
indirect powers to ensure public safety. They are not powers referring to a 
‘clearly identified cause of harm, specific action or inaction on the part of the 
Council’ which would otherwise suggest a duty of care is owed.1189  This 
                                                          
1184 Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) s 13(1)(2) (A disaster is a ‘serious disruption, 
caused by the impact of an events that requires a significant coordinated response’, with a 
serious disruption meaning loss of life, widespread or severe property or environmental loss 
or damage). 
1185 In Queensland, this might include the, Fire and Emergency Services Act 1990 (Qld); 
Public Safety Preservation Act 1986 (Qld). 
1186 Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) s 13, 14, 16 (Provisions on events which constitute 
a disaster). 
1187 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 574. 
1188 Wotherspoon, above n 761, 333. 
1189 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 564. 
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conclusion suggests that a duty to warn will not arise based on the Queensland 
statutory functions and powers for warning housed in the disaster 
management legislation. 
Hard law instruments: powers and functions for warning in Queensland 
As well as considering powers and function and their relationship to control, 
the formulation of a duty to warn also considers the objects and purpose of the 
Act to assist in determining legislative intent.1190 In Queensland, the Disaster 
Management Act 2003 (Qld) does not include a duty or mandated 
responsibility to warn a community of a hazard or emergency.1191 Instead, the 
objects of the Act are to seek to help the community effectively respond to 
a disaster or emergency situation.1192 This is to be achieved by making 
provisions to ensure communities receive appropriate information,1193 
by taking appropriate measures to respond to a disaster event,1194 which can 
include, the issue of a warning.1195 Notably, any reference to the provision of 
information in this Act is to ‘the community’ or the public at large, which as 
previously identified, can preclude a duty being found.1196  
As mentioned in Chapter Five, in a disaster not only will the relevant 
emergency legislation operate, so too will the statute which establishes the 
emergency service authority. In Queensland, the Fire and Emergency 
Services Act 1990 (Qld) establishes both Queensland Fire and Emergency 
Service and the State Emergency Service. However, again in this Act, there is 
only reference to broad functions, rather than any mandate to warn in an 
emergency situation.1197 Although the statutes refer to only broad and 
discretionary functions, as identified in Chapter Six the case of Matthews v SPI 
                                                          
1190 Caltex Refineries (Queensland) Pty Limited v Stavar (2009) 259 ALR 616, 643; 
Wotherspoon, above n 761, 333 citing Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 
424, 500. 
1191 See, eg, Balkin & Davis, above n 888, 516-518; Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 
192 CLR 330; Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424. 
1192 Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) s 3(a)(iii), 5 (The Act binds the State). 
1193 Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) s 4. 
1194 Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) s 4A. 
1195 Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld), Schedule (Responding to a disaster). 
1196 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 701 
[686] citing Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1, [93]. 
1197 See, eg, Fire and Emergency Services Act 1990 (Qld) s 8B, 131.  
 272 
 
Electricity Pty Ltd (Ruling No 2)1198 there is some indication that the court may 
begin to take soft law instruments into account when attempting to formulate 
a duty of care. 
Soft law instruments 
In Queensland, there are many layers of soft law instruments in the hierarchy 
of the emergency management regulatory system. At the State level, there is 
the ‘Queensland State Disaster Management Plan’ and the ‘Disaster 
Management Strategic Policy Framework’.1199 These instruments are further 
supported and explained by Disaster Management Guidelines for local and 
district groups.1200 When a local disaster management plan is created it must 
be consistent with these guidelines.1201 In terms of warning, the relevant 
guidelines outline the role of local government in warning and the importance 
of ensuring notification and dissemination of warning; however the guidelines 
are not prescriptive in their language mandating warning.1202 Further, 
government departments have then issued standards for disaster 
management1203 and generic policies for the use of social media in 
government.1204 As Chapter Five noted, these soft law instruments incorporate 
a greater level of detailed responsibilities and functions for warning in any 
                                                          
1198 Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (Ruling No 2) (2011) 34 VR 584, [110]-[111]; See, 
also, Caltex Refineries (Queensland) Pty Limited v Stavar [2009] NSWCA 258, [120] (Where 
the case centred around the question of whether a duty could be found on an Asbestos 
Rule). 
1199 Queensland Government, Queensland State Disaster Management Plan (May 2015) 
(Replaced by Queensland Government, Queensland State Disaster Management Plan 
(September 2016); State Disaster Management Group (Qld) Disaster Management Strategic 
Policy Framework (November 2010). 
1200 Emergency Management Queensland, Queensland Local Disaster Management 
Guidelines (2012); Brisbane District Disaster Management Group, Brisbane District Disaster 
Management Plan 2014-2015 (September 2014); See, also localised plans, Local Disaster 
Management Group, Redland City Council, Redland City Disaster Management Plan (2016); 
Brisbane City Council, Local Disaster Management Plan: Chapter Two: Brisbane CBD 
Emergency Plan (July 2014); Brisbane District Disaster Management Group, Brisbane District 
Disaster Management Plan 2014-2015 (September 2014). 
1201 Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) s 57, 58. 
1202 Emergency Management Queensland, Queensland Local Disaster Management 
Guidelines (2012) 29, 43-44 (A public information subplan is not mandatory). 
1203 Inspector-General Emergency Management (Qld), Emergency Management Assurance 
Framework, above n 107. 
1204 The State of Queensland, Department of Science, Information Technology and 
Innovation, Principles for the official use of social media networks and emerging social 
media (October 2015) 14 <http://www.qgcio.qld.gov.au/products/qgea-documents/547-
business/3519-principles-for-the-use-of-social-media> (Which replaces the ICT Policy and 
Coordination Office (Qld), Official Use of social media guideline: Final (December 2010)). 
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jurisdiction. For example, the Queensland Disaster Management Plan, 
identifies the function of warning. The plan allocates the warning function to 
the lead agency (Queensland Fire and Emergency Services (QFES) 
supported by the State Disaster Co-ordination Centre (SDCC), which 
ultimately support local disaster management groups as the first 
responders.1205  
Outlining specific responsibilities, the Queensland State Disaster 
Management Plan identifies that the SDCC will issue warnings to key 
stakeholders. As one of the key stakeholders, the emergency service agencies 
are then responsible for further disseminating these warnings.1206 The Plan 
states that when disseminating warnings, ‘multiple means of communicating 
warnings should be used’.1207 As well as the QFES, each agency ‘responsible 
for a specific hazard needs to include provision for communicating’.1208 
However, alongside any warnings required to be delivered by the Bureau of 
Meteorology,1209 the issue of alerts and warnings, ‘is primarily done through 
local governments’.1210  
From this snapshot of soft law instruments, it is clear that detailed 
responsibilities are incorporated at the lower level of the regulatory hierarchy.  
However, as identified in Chapter Five, the purpose of these documents is 
primarily to guide action of the agencies.  That is, the instruments aim to outline 
role responsibilities rather than to create liability or define responsibility which 
may form the basis of a duty of care.  The effect of these documents is to 
explain how to effectively manage disasters, and they include expressions of 
intent to support activity, which may be relevant to formulating a duty of care. 
Reflecting upon the principles to be drawn from Graham Barclay Oysters 
                                                          
1205 Queensland Government, Queensland State Disaster Management Plan (May 2015) 24 
(Replaced by Queensland Government, Queensland State Disaster Management Plan 
(September 2016). 
1206 Queensland Government, Queensland State Disaster Management Plan (May 2015) 28 
(Replaced by Queensland Government, Queensland State Disaster Management Plan 
(September 2016). 
1207 Ibid. 
1208 Ibid. 
1209 Meteorology Act 1955 (Cth) s 6. 
1210 Queensland Government, Queensland State Disaster Management Plan (May 2015) 28 
(Replaced by Queensland Government, Queensland State Disaster Management Plan 
(September 2016). 
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Pty Ltd v Ryan1211  examined in Chapter Six, the functions and responsibilities 
which these instruments contain are unlikely to provide a sufficient basis upon 
which to formulate a duty to warn.1212  
Further salient features 
The examination of the hard and soft law instruments relevant to a disaster 
suggest there will be few grounds upon which to establish a duty of care. 
Consideration of knowledge, vulnerability and policy factors are relevant.1213 
To restate the principle, knowledge refers to knowledge ‘of an existing risk of 
harm to the plaintiff or, to a specific class of persons who included the plaintiff 
(rather than a risk to the general public)’.1214 Based on the case study this 
might be knowledge of the severity of the storm, its direction and the likely 
impacts of flooding and property damage. However, these risks could be 
classified as risks to the general public. In this scenario, there was clearly 
knowledge on the part of authorities, as they had issued a warning. In terms 
of comparative knowledge, however, warnings had been issued over 
traditional channels, as well as by the Bureau of Meteorology. These warnings 
could have alerted individuals to the potential of the storm and provided a 
source of knowledge to the community, had they been listening.  
Vulnerability of the public in this case is also relevant. Having some knowledge 
that it was storm season, due to preseason warnings; citizens could have 
taken measures to safeguard their property more generally. Had they also 
considered the other warnings issued, they could also have chosen to stay 
inside depending on the lead time from the issue of the warning to its receipt. 
As was raised in Chapter Six however, there is a question as to what extent 
citizens should seek out warnings particularly if they notice environmental 
factors which would have been evident to anyone who looked. 
 
 
                                                          
1211 (2002) 211 CLR 540. 
1212 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 575-576. 
1213 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 582. 
1214 Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40, 46-48 (Mason J).  
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Policy issues 
In conjunction with factors of control, knowledge and vulnerability, supervening 
policy reasons are relevant.1215 As Chapter Six mentioned, in Queensland, a 
key issue which drove the inclusions of statutory protections in Act, was the 
need for statutory authorities to be able make key decisions for the protection 
of the public more generally without fear of liability.1216 Based on the factors 
considered, although reasonable foreseeability is generally likely to be made 
out, in the circumstances outlined in the case study, it is unlikely that the facts 
provided will be sufficient to raise a duty of care.  
The scope of the duty 
Even if duty of care could be formulated, it is unlikely that the scope of the duty 
will extend to a specific requirement to issue warnings over a particular 
channel such as social media. Generally, the duty will be a broad duty to issue 
warnings to persons at risk of harm from the natural hazard to enable them to 
take steps to avoid loss or damage to themselves or their property. 
Examination of the actions which were undertaken, and the channels which 
were used to warn, will then be considered in the determination of the 
existence of a breach of the duty of care.   
Breach and causation in the context of a failure to warn 
The previous section on a duty to warn concludes that in most circumstances, 
where there is no mandate within the legislation or the soft law instruments to 
warn, it is unlikely that a court would find a duty to warn is owed by a statutory 
authority which also extends to social media. However, were a duty to be 
found, a conclusion as to a finding of negligence is subject to a consideration 
of the remaining elements of a breach of that duty and causation. Chapter Six 
concluded, that in the determination of breach of a duty to warn, a court will 
consider all the warnings sent by the authority, which includes pre-season 
messaging. In the case study scenario, it is arguable that not only were pre-
                                                          
1215 Caltex Refineries (Queensland) Pty Limited v Stavar (2009) 259 ALR 616, 642-643 
(Allsop P); Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 577-578. 
1216 See, eg, Explanatory note, Disaster Management Bill 2003 (Qld) 7; Warragamba Winery 
Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 701 [686], [713] citing Crimmins 
v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1, [93]. 
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season storm warnings apparent, so too were warnings disseminated on the 
day by the Bureau of Meteorology and local government over traditional 
channels. In this factual matrix, the community profile includes a younger 
demographic who could perhaps better be reached by social media. However, 
the Queensland hard and soft law instruments are not such that they require 
mandatory incorporation of these channels into a warning strategy, although 
notably some instruments state an intent to do so. As identified throughout this 
thesis, the use of social media as a channel to disseminate messages is 
recommended as an additional channel. 
As Chapter Six noted, in the case of Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of 
New South Wales (No 9)1217 the claimant argued that warnings should have 
been disseminated over a radio station that was frequently listened to within 
the community.1218 In that case, issues arose with the ability to do so because 
the broadcasts were around a time of public holidays and the ability to send a 
message was dependent on the radio station and was therefore limited. In 
examining this case, Eburn suggested that the outcome of the case may be 
different in the context of social media.1219 This is because with social media 
there is no similar dependency on a third party, or at least only to the extent 
that the social media platform remains operational.1220  
Eburn’s suggestion that the requirement to warn over social media may be an 
emerging consideration, requires further consideration. In the first instance, 
and in contrast to radio, which is a broadly accepted traditional platform for 
message dissemination, social media is still largely emerging and its use is 
discretionary. In Queensland, in some local government catchments, there are 
clear indications of an intention to ‘broadcast to stakeholders via official social 
                                                          
1217 [2012] NSWSC 701. 
1218 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 70, 
[1123] (Where it was the specific community affected claimed they should have received 
warnings over the frequently used radio channels relevant to that community). 
1219 Michael Eburn, ‘Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales [2012] NSW 
701’ on Australian Emergency Law (19 July 2012) 
<https://emergencylaw.wordpress.com/2012/07/19/warragamba-winery-pty-ltd-v-state-of-
new-south-wales-2012-nswsc-701/>. 
1220 Sam Thielman and Chris Johnston, ‘Major cyber attack disrupts internet service across 
Europe and US’, The Guardian (online), 22 October 2016 
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/21/ddos-attack-dyn-internet-denial-
service>. 
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media channels’.1221 However at this stage, it may be more likely that this 
statement of intent is, without more, construed only a target,1222 rather than a 
local government binding itself to action. In some circumstances, however, 
where localities have stated an intent; have profiled their community to 
ascertain that social media channels are most suitable dissemination 
channel;1223 and have created a public expectation based on historical action, 
that social media will be used;1224 a failure to warn over social media may be 
unreasonable. What the case study does reinforce is the need to use a multiple 
range of warning channels.1225   
The case study considers the prospect breach of a duty in a context where 
warnings are disseminated over at least one channel. As earlier indicated, and 
considering the increasing awareness of the importance of warning, unless the 
event is one which is highly unpredictable or is a rapid onset event, it is unlikely 
there will be no warning given at all.1226 An exception to this statement is where 
the loss of power affects communication. If a natural hazard is catastrophic 
and poses a significant risk with the probability of serious harm, there is more 
likely to be a finding of breach if no warning has been given at all. This is 
because a catastrophic event is likely to be a significant natural phenomenon 
which could be tracked and monitored by the relevant authorities. However, 
again, the finding of a breach will depend on the resources available and the 
likely multiple impacts of a catastrophic events. Catastrophic events, which 
require a multi-faceted response can place a heavy burden on responding 
                                                          
1221 Brisbane City Council, Local Disaster Management Plan, ‘Chapter Two: Brisbane CBD 
Emergency Plan’ (July 2014)10 (The Plan states that messages will be broadcast over 
social media). 
1222 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No. 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, 
[988]-[989, [994] (This case does not set a binding precedent on this issue – however is 
further supported by other case law). 
1223 See, eg, Inspector-General Emergency Management (Qld), Emergency Management 
Assurance Framework, above n 107, 25 (Considers as an enabler to warnings, the need to 
profile communities to identify barriers to effective communication); Redland City Council, 
Redland City Disaster Management Plan: Part 1 (2016) 47; Feldman et al, above n 1179, 
44-45, 48 ( ‘Risk communication experts now generally agree that it is critical that risk 
communicators know their audiences’ as the sources which citizens utilise to ‘access risk 
information varies by demographic and local community characteristics’ and age is strong 
predictor of channel preference). 
1224 Eburn, ‘Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales’, above n 1219. 
1225 Feldman et al, above n 1179, 44. 
1226 Inspector General of Emergency Management (Qld), 2015 Callide Creek Flood Review: 
Volume 1, above n 780, 80, 89. 
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agencies.1227 It is important to consider here that the ability to rely on a claim 
of limited resources may be restricted in the future.1228 This is due to the 
incorporation of escalation pathways in emergency management regulatory 
frameworks which give access to extended resource capacities. In the case 
study under examination the local government for example, can notify QFES 
and the State Disaster Co-ordination Centre, to assist its operations for 
warning.1229  
Causation and immunity 
If a breach of a duty of care is proven, no compensation is payable to an injured 
party unless the claimant proves causation. Even if the individual can prove 
they would have received a social media warning, they will still need to 
demonstrate they would have taken alternative action and that the action they 
would have taken would have changed the outcomes.1230 As earlier indicated, 
in the case of catastrophic events, this may be more likely in the case of 
serious loss like personal injury and death rather than property damage. On 
the facts of the case study, it is likely that property damage caused by the 
storm sweeping through would have occurred anyway. It would have occurred 
despite any warning over social media. Considerations of personal injury 
however, may require some alternate consideration. 
Further, to issues with establishing causation the statutory authority may seek 
to employ the good faith protections under the Disaster Management Act 2003 
(Qld).1231 To invoke the relevant provisions, and gain statutory immunity for a 
claim in negligence, the defendant would need to be a person under the 
Act.1232 In this instance a local government public information officer is likely 
to be captured by these provisions. Further to this first element, and as 
                                                          
1227 See, eg, Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales [2012] NSW 701; 
Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 35. 
1228 See, eg, Wotherspoon, above n 761, 338. 
1229 Inspector General of Emergency Management (Qld), 2015 Callide Creek Flood Review: 
Volume 1, above n 780, 81; Queensland Government, Queensland State Disaster 
Management Plan (Reviewed May 2015) 24, 28. 
1230 See, eg, Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 247 (McHugh); Civil Liability Act 2003 
(Qld) s 11(3). 
1231 Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) s 144. 
1232 See, eg, Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) s 144; Field, ‘Good Faith Defences’, 
above n 952, 155-158. 
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positively concluded in Chapter Seven, the act of warning must be an integral 
step in achieving the objective of emergency management.1233 With the 
requirements of local government to actively manage during disasters, the act 
of warning is likely covered as a response operation.  
If these two elements are satisfied; if the failure to warn is a rationale response 
to the information available; and if the actions taken by the defendant 
displayed reasonable diligence;1234 liability may not attach under the relevant 
‘good faith’ protection provisions.1235 Instead, the provision of warning over 
channels for which relevant human resources were available, may 
demonstrate an honest intent to achieve the objective of public safety. So too, 
local disaster management guidelines afford flexibility in the method of release 
of warnings. Although social media is noted as a consideration, the primary 
vehicle of dissemination is broadcast radio.1236 Consequently, and considering 
the analysis of the duty to warn in this section, in answer to this first question 
this thesis asserts, there will only be limited circumstances in which a 
negligence action will be made out. To reinforce, this finding does not preclude 
a requirement to defend a claim.  
2. If a duty is owed, is it possible that the emergency service 
authority breached its duty to warn due to the Facebook 
algorithms failing to disseminate the message in a timely 
manner?  
In contrast to non-feasance, or a complete failure to warn, when agencies have 
exercised functions and powers to warn, but have not delivered a warning in 
a timely manner, and this has resulted in harm, the imposition of a duty of care 
is more likely.1237 The initial question will be whether the relevant authority 
owed a common law duty to any claimants ‘to take reasonable care to issue 
                                                          
1233 Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No. 9) [2012] NSWSC 701, 
[757]. 
1234 Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales [2014] 204 LGERA 238, 241 
380. 
1235 Disaster Management Act 2003 (Qld) s 144. 
1236 Queensland Government, Queensland Local Disaster Management Guidelines (2012) 
44. 
1237 See, eg, Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 575-576 
(McHugh); Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330, 332. 
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effective and timely bushfire warnings to persons in the hazard 
areas’.1238  Once the duty is established, and as is relevant to this issue, 
questions arise as to breach of the duty of care and whether reasonable care 
was taken to ensure warnings were issued. Based on the facts of the case 
study, the question of reasonable care arises when the public information 
officer disseminates time critical hazard warnings over Facebook and a 
significant number of the public fail to receive the message.  
The issue of message timing is one which is very relevant to social media, 
most specifically Facebook.1239 One of the challenges of social media, as with 
any modality of communication, is that although messages can be delivered 
in real time on some platforms, timeliness of receipt is not guaranteed.1240 In 
the first instance, access to computers or mobile devices, to send the message 
requires enduring mains or battery power. The availability of power supply is 
out of the control of statutory authorities within the sector.1241 Secondly, social 
media platforms are owned and managed by third party providers. The 
business practices of third party providers are driven by the interests of their 
audiences and advertisers. To meet the needs of the audience, Facebook, for 
example, has incorporated algorithms1242 which ‘govern the flow’ and select 
the information which ‘is considered most relevant to’ the user, displaying it on 
their newsfeed.1243  The use of an algorithm means that, despite an agency 
posting a timely message on Facebook, unless the organisation pays to 
                                                          
1238 Matthews v AusNet Electricity Services Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 663, Annexure A. 
1239 See, eg, David Pierce, ‘What you need to know about Twitter’s algorithmic timelines’, 
Wired (online), 10 February 2016 <https://www.wired.com/2016/02/what-you-need-to-know-
about-twitters-algorithmnic-timeline/>; Elaine Pittman, ‘Twitter Launches an Alert Systems 
for Emergencies’, Emergency Management (online), 25 September 2013 
<http://www.emergencymgmt.com/disaster/Twitter-Alert-System-Emergencies.html>; Twitter 
Inc, A step-by-step guide to Twitter Alerts (2016) 
<https://about.twitter.com/products/alerts/how-it-works; Twitter Inc, Guidelines 
<https://about.twitter.com/products/alerts/guidelines-faq> (The number of Tweets that can be 
received per hour is limited, noting also that the presence of algorithms on Twitter is also 
relevant however is a lesser concern, and specific services such as Twitter Alert have been 
created to allow public safety and emergency management agencies to push out real time 
information to those users who subscribe to this alert function with their agency). 
1240 Inspector General of Emergency Management (Qld), 2015 Callide Creek Flood Review: 
Volume 1, above n 780, 87. 
1241 See, eg, White, Social media, Crisis communication and Emergency Management, 
above n 46, 280. 
1242 Janssen & Kuk, above n 537, 371 (An algorithm, is a ‘step-by-step process and/ or rules 
processing inputs into outputs’ – they manipulate data to provide outputs – in this case to 
end-users of social media platforms). 
1243 Gillespie, above n 537, 167, 168. 
 281 
 
promote their post,1244 there is no certainty the message will be received on 
time. The algorithm may determine that the emergency warning is not a ‘most 
relevant’ piece of information to be displayed in a news feed.1245  
Consequently, and as was highlighted by this example, the message, although 
posted in a timely manner, will not reach the audience in sufficient time for 
them to take preventative measures. As the control of algorithms are outside 
the control of statutory authorities, there is unlikely to be a duty of care for poor 
timing where it is dependent on the workings of a third-party platform. 
Again, it is likely that good faith provisions under the Disaster Management 
Act 2003 (Qld) are likely to be available to the public information officer. 
However, in consideration of these provisions, the use of algorithms by 
Facebook is well-known. Therefore, relying on the platform to deliver timely 
messages is less likely to demonstrate diligence, which would otherwise 
invoke good-faith provisions. An immediate remedy to the issue of algorithms, 
and as advised in formal policy, is the need to broadcast warnings over 
multiple modalities for communication, as part of normal business practice. If 
social media is used in isolation, and messages fail to reach the intended 
recipient in time to avoid harm, individuals may seek to bring a legal cause of 
action in negligence. However, where multiple channels are employed to 
disseminate messages, the totality of messages will be taken into 
consideration when examining any breach of a duty and reduce the likelihood 
of any positive finding in negligence.  
3. With regards to the ambiguous warning over Twitter, will the 
emergency service authority have breached any duty of care it 
may owe to warn? 
As the case study highlights, limitations are apparent in the use of social media 
channels such as Twitter. That is, there may be a limited ability to send a clear 
and unambiguous message in an emergency due to the limit in detail which 
                                                          
1244 Facebook Business, How to boost your posts (2016)  
<https://www.facebook.com/business/a/online-sales/promoted-posts>. 
1245 Andrew Quodling, ‘Is social media responsible for your safety during a disaster’, The 
Conversation, 10 November 2014 <https://theconversation.com/is-social-media-responsible-
for-your-safety-during-a-disaster-33138>; Emergency Management Victoria, National 
Review of Warnings and Information, above n 11, 54. 
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can be incorporated in the message space provided.1246 Ambiguity in 
messaging is a common problem now being experienced in a new 
communication medium.1247 The case law examined in Chapter Six indicated 
that warning messages must be clear and unambiguous. A lack of reasonable 
care may be asserted if the content of the warning does not alert the recipients 
to the type of harm which may result.1248 In this case study, citizens were 
unable to take measures to protect property or move to higher ground.  
To compensate for the limited message characters, Twitter has developed 
specific syntax or language conventions. The conventions and syntax provide 
for short form references to topics and keywords for example in the form of 
hashtags (#). The service also provides for the inclusion of abbreviated URL’s 
(uniform resource locator) which can be used to link to further or more detailed 
information,1249 to more clearly explain the content of the message. The use 
of commonly known short form syntax and links to further information, are 
clearly relevant devices to employ to avoid ambiguity, from a legal perspective. 
So too, the use of tested message template may assist. The inclusion of these 
mechanisms may demonstrate diligence in the provision of a warning when 
seeking to utilise ‘good faith’ provisions. Inclusion of links to further information 
may then place the onus on the message recipient to not only read the 
message but to seek the further information. However, in some circumstances, 
there is no guarantee that the message recipient will be able to access further 
information. Although this inability, is not the fault of the agency, it should be 
taken into consideration when crafting messages. In terms of legal 
accountability, again a claimant will need to demonstrate that they would have 
taken alternative action if the message had been clearer.  
As Chapter Seven indicated, if an agency is faced with a claim for negligence 
in this area, it may be relevant to consider the defence of contributory 
                                                          
1246 See, eg, St Denis, Palen and Anderson, ‘Mastering Social Media’, above n 1141; 
Hughes and Palen, ‘Twitter Adoption and Use in Mass Convergence and Emergency 
Events’, above n 70 (The character limit ‘can be too constricting when a user wants to 
convey large amounts of information); Cooper Jr et al, above n 1163; Boyd, Golder and 
Lotan, above n 1171 (This is because ‘the system was originally designed for tweets to be 
shared via SMS). 
1247 Australian Communications and Media Authority (Cth), above n 141, 4. 
1248 Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40, 40, 48. 
1249 Boyd, Golder and Lotan, above n 1171. 
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negligence.1250 Political correctness may mean that there is reluctance on the 
part of agencies to employ the defence. However, if this defence is enlivened, 
a court will determine whether the claimant had taken reasonable care for their 
own safety and apportion the relevant loss.1251 A court will determine whether 
the individual had, apart from the warning, made any assessment of the likely 
harm to themselves.1252 As a final comment, the need to clarify a warning has 
not been a previous requirement within the case law. This thesis does suggest 
that it would not be unreasonable to expect that if a message is confusing or 
ambiguous, the message recipient may need to take ‘elementary 
precautions’.1253 These precautions might include undertaking to clarify the 
message on another channel if they were technically able to do so. 
4. Does posting inaccurate information on Facebook mean the local 
government authority is likely to be exposed to liability where 
reliance on the information has led to harm? 
a. Could the emergency service authority be held legally 
accountable for sharing unverified and incorrect information 
posted by a user on their Facebook page if it leads to harm? 
Both questions indicate that legal issues can arise from information 
disseminated about a natural hazard which is inaccurate or incorrect. Legal 
accountability for dissemination of inaccurate information is an old problem in 
a new communication medium.1254 Within the law of torts, legal action for 
inaccurate information is considered under the action of negligent 
misstatement. The action has been relied on in conjunction with a claim that 
there is a duty to warn and therefore requires brief consideration.   
Inaccurate content in a warning message is highly problematic, in that it can 
inform decisions leading to wrong action.1255 Once inaccurate information has 
                                                          
1250 See, eg, Balkin & Davis, above n 888, 343, 348-349, 362. 
1251 Mulligan v Coffs Harbour City Council (2005) 223 CLR 486, 511; Road and Traffic 
Authority of NSW v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330, 398 (Gummow); Vairy v Wyong Shire 
Council [2005] 223 CLR 422, 483. 
1252 Vairy v Wyong Shire Council [2005] 223 CLR 422, 478; Mulligan v Coffs Harbour City 
Council [2004] NSWCA 247 [250], [254]. 
1253 Mulligan v Coffs Harbour City Council (2005) 223 CLR 486, 511; Roads and Traffic 
Authority of New South Wales V Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330, 398 (Gummow). 
1254 Australian Communications and Media Authority (Cth), above n 141, 4. 
1255 Glik, above n 310, 38-39; Sellnow and Seegar, above n 48, 109. 
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been disseminated to the community through social media, the information 
can rapidly continue to cascade out into the community. 1256 It may be possible 
to retrieve the posts to a limited extent.1257 However it is almost impossible to 
ensure that corrective messages which are sent out, for example, through 
Twitter, will be retweeted in the same pattern. Nor is it possible to ensure they 
cascade out to the same recipient community who received the first messages. 
The receipt of the corrected message by the community would ensure that 
harm is averted.  
The crowd – a source of inaccuracies? 
In the realm of traditional media, information which informed the basis of 
warnings may have been passed on from authoritative sources. In most 
instances, this information is verified to some degree to ensure accuracy and 
reliability.1258 It may even come from a trusted source such as the Bureau of 
Meteorology. In the era of social media, as stated, the community are often 
the first true responders. Users create content, they upload self-made video 
and post comments on disasters and emergencies as they are impacting their 
community.1259 In general, the information shared online will be accurate,1260 
however the stories and ‘facts’ uploaded, may also be a ‘product of faulty 
memory or limited perspective’ with the potential to be inaccurate.1261  
Despite the potential for inaccurate information, the wealth of data and 
information which can be sourced from the social media crowd, may be useful 
to the emergency management sector. The information can be utilised to gain 
intelligence and build situational awareness. The information may also be 
                                                          
1256 National Research Council, ‘Public Response to Alerts and Warnings’, above n 1144, 
51; Jeremy Finn, Ursula Cheer and Sarah Rosanowski, ‘Media, Family and Employment’ in 
Jeremy Finn and Elizabeth Toomey (eds), Legal Responses to Natural Disasters (Thomson 
Reuters, 2015) 99; Adrien Friggeri et al, ‘Rumour Cascades’ (International AAAI Conference 
on Web and Social Media, Eighth International AAAI conference on Weblogs and Social 
Media, North America, May 2014). 
1257 Twitter, Inc, Retweeting another Tweet (2016) 
<https://support.twitter.com/articles/20169873>. 
1258 Crowe, Disasters 2.0, above n 48, 184. 
1259 Sellnow and Seegar, above n 48, 128; Wendling, Radisch and Jacobzone, above n 56, 
10-11; Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, above n 1167, 3. 
1260 K Silverman, ‘Social Media for Emergency Management: A good Practice Guide’ 
(Wellington Region CDEM Group: Wellington, 30 June 2014) 14. 
1261 Ibid 16-17 (Individuals may innocently pass on misinformation, or a limited recount of 
what is happening). 
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essential for making ‘swift and critical decisions’.1262 A key challenge for the 
sector, however, is to detect ‘operationally relevant’ information.1263 Agencies 
need to be able to question to what extent unverified data will be sufficiently 
reliable to form the basis for community warnings, or in light of this case study, 
sufficiently reliable to reshare.1264 New tools are being developed to gather 
information and assess patterns in conversations.1265 However, it is impossible 
to verify each tweet or Facebook post.1266  With an acknowledgement that 
some process of verification, triangulation or other form of assessment is 
required,1267 principles of good practice is emerging. Good practice principles 
provide models which include, identification of the original uploader, 
confirming the date and location from which the message originated, 1268 as 
well as basing decisions on ‘aggregate patterns in large sets of data’.1269  
                                                          
1262 See, eg, Adam Crowe, ‘The social media manifesto: A comprehensive review of the 
impact of social media on emergency management’ (2011) 5(1) Journal of Business 
Continuity & Emergency Planning 409, 412 (Crowdsourcing – getting information from the 
crowd); Vivacqua and Borges, above n 521, 189 (Crowd-sourcing is defined as ‘outsourcing 
to the crowd by giving them a task to execute’); Amanda L Hughes and Leysia Palen, ‘The 
Evolving Role of the Public Information Officer: An examination of Social Media in 
Emergency Management’ (2012) 9(1) Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency 
Management 1547, 1548; Mehta, Bruns and Newton, above n 1166. 
1263 Department of Homeland Security, ‘Using Social Media for Enhanced Situational 
Awareness’, above n 51, 17-18, 24-25; Hughes and Palen, ‘The Evolving Role of the Public 
Information Officer’, above n 1262, 1548; Olteanu, Vieweg and Castillo, above n 1168, 994. 
1264 Silverman, above n 1260, 13-14 (This is also an issue for journalists); Mehta, Bruns and 
Newton, above n 1166. 
1265See, eg, Silverman, above n 1260, 20 (The use of Tweet deck to create a dashboard); 
Adam Crowe, Disasters 2.0, above n 48, 8; See also, Wendling, Radisch and Jacobzone, 
above n 56, 21. 
1266See, eg, Silverman, above n 1260, 20 (The use of Tweet deck to create a dashboard); 
Crowe, Disasters 2.0, above n 48, 8;  See also, Wendling, Radisch and Jacobzone, above n 
56, 21; VOSG, Virtual Operations Support Group: Implementing VOST SMEM – social 
media for emergency management (2016) <http://vosg.us/>; VOSTAUS (27 April 2016) 
<http://vostaus.blogspot.com.au/>; VOST Victoria <http://vostvic.net.au/> (In this regard a 
number of agencies are beginning to turn to Virtual Operations Support groups – which are 
groups of volunteers who can process this type of information and augment services by 
agencies). 
1267 See, eg, Silverman, above n 1260,  17-18, 19, 24 (Which suggests that principles of 
verification need still to be applied to social media, however they can often now be 
completed more quickly than in earlier times with so many people on the internet, and 
comment is made that the information on social media is the first step for finding out what is 
actually happening rather than the last word); K McSaveney et al, ‘Social Media for 
Emergency Management: A good Practice Guide’ (Wellington Region CDEM Group: 
Wellington, 30 June 2014) 15 (Check social media accounts ‘that you trust’, look for 
‘trending topics’); Mehta, Bruns and Newton, above n 1166. 
1268 Silverman, above n 1260, 29, 30, 36, 39 (This includes using the free programs available 
on the internet to verify an image). 
1269 Mehta, Bruns and Newton, above n 1166. 
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Inaccuracy as a legal issue 
Legal issues can arise when agencies send inaccurate information, such as 
unverified data provided by social media users. The relevant action is for 
negligent misstatement. Under this action, a duty of care may be owed by a 
person giving advice and information. The duty is ‘to take reasonable care in 
providing that information when they know, or ought to know, that the recipient 
intends to rely on it’.1270 This action extends to information provided by 
statutory authorities ‘in the practice of supplying information’.1271 Historically 
claims for negligent misstatement have arisen where direct requests for 
information have been made, for example by a member of the public.1272 
However, a claim may also result when information has been 
disseminated.1273 With regard to the latter type of claim, if information is 
disseminated over a medium of mass communication, which is available to the 
public generally, there may be limits to the success of the action due to 
considerations of indeterminacy.1274Again, however, the duty of care will need 
to be established.  
In this case study, there are two examples of conduct which could give rise to 
an action in negligent misstatement. The first is the posting of incorrect 
information by the local government authority. The second is the re-sharing of 
incorrect information posted by a member of the public on Facebook by the 
emergency service organisation. Although neither of these examples includes 
a request for information, they have the potential to give rise to a claim. On our 
                                                          
1270 L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No.1) (1981) 150 CLR 225, 
225, 231, 238; Low et al, above n 60, 411 (Questions over formality of the source may be 
raised here, or its official nature). 
1271 L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No.1) (1981) 150 CLR 225, 
225. 
1272 See, eg, Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No.1) (1981) 150 
CLR 225; Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry, ‘Queensland Floods Commission of 
Inquiry – Final Report’, above n 380, 70; Department of Environment (Cth), Coasts and 
Climate Change Council advice to Minister Combet (December 2011) 
<http://www.environment.gov.au/climate-change/adaptation/australias-coasts/coasts-
climate-change-council-advice> (Often the requests revolved around s 149 certificates in 
NSW, some Queensland does not have a mandatory equivalent for). 
1273 See, eg, Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No.1) (1981) 150 
CLR 225, 231. 
1274 See, eg, Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No.1) (1981) 150 
CLR 225, 231 (However it may be relevant to the determination of duty that publication on 
the web may give such a wide circulation to material that concerns may be raised over 
indeterminacy); See also discussion in Christensen, Duncan and Stickley, above n 71, 204. 
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facts, it is clear that the member of the public relied on the information 
disseminated by the local government authority regarding the likelihood of 
impact to their detriment. So too, if an emergency service organisation shares 
or retweets (republishes) unofficial information from the public, a community 
member may perceive the emergency service organisation has effectively 
endorsed the information. They may believe this endorsement adds sufficient 
credibility to warrant reliance upon the message. Yet if it the information is 
inaccurate, and community member relies on it to their detriment, claims for 
compensation may result.1275 As indicated, the purpose of this section is to 
raise awareness of the action. However, there is insufficient depth of analysis 
here to make any indicative conclusions as to what a court is likely decide.  
To avoid legal implications from unverified information which is then shared, it 
would be prudent to insert a disclaimer into the message.1276 The effectiveness 
of a disclaimer is a question of law examined on a case by case basis.1277 Its 
insertion into a short message, for example a tweet may also be problematic, 
due to space limitations. Until some clear resolution is found, as a first step, 
an agency should indicate unreliability of a message.1278 The alternative 
measure, adopting a policy not to republish unofficial information, may limit the 
ability to affect positive outcomes for the community. One method which has 
been adopted, is the insertion of the standardised hashtag (#unverified) into 
messages.1279 
                                                          
1275 San Sebastien Pty Ltd v The Minister (1986) 162 CLR 340, 355; Sutherland Shire 
Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424, 427. 
1276 See, eg, Christensen, Duncan and Stickley, above n 71, 201-202; Balkin and Davis, 
above n 888, 439; Burke v Forbes Shire Council (1987) 63 LGRA 1, 8, 18, 20; L Shaddock & 
Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No.1) (1981) 150 CLR 225, 231; Department 
of Justice and Attorney-General (Qld), Social Media Disclaimer (7 October 2015) 
<http://www.justice.qld.gov.au/global/legals/social-media-disclaimer>; Queensland Treasury, 
Social Media Disclaimer <https://www.treasury.qld.gov.au/social-media-disclaimer.php>; 
Department of Science, Information Technology and Innovation (Qld), Principles for the 
official use of social media networks and emerging social media (October 2015) 1, 12 
<http://www.qgcio.qld.gov.au/products/qgea-documents/547-business/3519-principles-for-
the-use-of-social-media>. 
1277 Christensen, Duncan and Stickley, above n 71, 192. 
1278 See, eg, Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), Code of Practice for Warning 
Republishers (April 2013) 4 (Although a non-mandatory document to follow – from the 
perspective of legal accountable there is a strong rationale for undertaking these activities). 
1279 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, above n 1167, 3-4. 
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New issues to law: A cry for help, misinformation, and monitoring 
The issues which arise in this next section appear to be new challenges in 
warning practices. Challenges which do not fit neatly into precedent and 
reasoning for the duty to warn. They raise issues which challenge the 
traditional structures and processes for emergency response, and it is unclear 
how the law might address the issues. Suggestions are provided in this section 
based on considerations of analogous case law. Indicative conclusions have 
been drawn which reflect the ideals of shared responsibility and the legitimate 
roles of citizens and statutory authorities acting in collaboration. In this section, 
the challenges which arise for agencies can be specifically linked to two-way 
communication and the ability of users to create social media content.  
5. Having failed to respond to a request for assistance over Twitter, 
is it possible that the emergency service authority be held legally 
accountable? 
In the facts of our case study, the public information officer overlooked a 
request for assistance on Twitter. Again, although this issue does not fall within 
the boundaries of negligence, it warrants mention. Imagine picking up the 
telephone, broadcasting information and then ‘hanging up as soon as the 
listener asked a question’ or asked for help.1280 Alternatively, imagine a Triple 
Zero responder does not pick up the phone. Not only is there the potential that 
harm may occur to the person on the other end of the line but the lack of 
response is likely to damage the reputation of the responder. It may also 
impact their trust relationship with the caller. Yet with social media, with the 
vast quantities of data produced, it is possible to miss a post which asks for 
help. Consequently, concerns arise within agencies over individuals posting 
Triple Zero type requests to their social media pages.1281  
                                                          
1280 Emergency Management Victoria, National Review of Warnings and Information, above 
n 11, 53 citing M Anderson, ‘Integrating social media into traditional emergency 
management command and control structures: the square peg into the round hole?’ (Paper 
Presented at Emergency Media & Public Affairs Conference Melbourne, 8 May 2012). 
1281 Emergency Management Victoria, National Review of Warnings and Information, above 
n 11, 53-54; Ministers for the Department of Communications and the Arts, ‘Review of the 
national Triple Zero (000) operator’ (Media release, 8 July 2014) 13 
<http://www.minister.communications.gov.au/malcolm_turnbull/news/review_of_the_triple_z
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Triple Zero, or emergency calls are governed by specific legislation in 
Australia.1282 At this stage, and despite the expectation of the public that 
authorities will respond to posts requesting help, Australia’s technology is not 
developed to address Triple Zero calls via social media.1283 Aside from Triple 
Zero type posts, statutory authorities have identified significant resource 
issues meeting any expectations of real time response to social media posts 
more generally.1284 Anecdotal evidence suggests that where possible, 
statutory authorities tasked with emergency response, with their remit to 
protect life and property, will seek to respond to social media emergency posts. 
However, boundaries need to be set. For example, Homeland Security as the 
emergency service provider in the United States suggests ‘sending sporadic 
messages out via all communication channels reminding the public of the 
appropriate channels for specific types of information’.1285 Practitioners within 
the sector also use disclaimers to state that they do not monitor tools 24 hours 
a day. The aim is to remind the community ‘that not all posts will be viewed in 
a timely manner especially during an emergency.1286As earlier stated, whether 
these disclaimers are effective will depend on the circumstances, however 
                                                          
ero_000_operator#.V_7EIfl96Ul>; Crowe, Disasters 2.0, above n 48, 4 (Demonstrates that 
this is a phenomenon which is already occurring). 
1282 In Australia, Triple Zero calls are administered under the Telecommunications 
(Consumer Protection and Services Standards) Act 1999 (Cth). 
1283 See, eg, Matt Brian, ‘Tweet your emergency: London Fire Brigade plans to accept 
callouts over Twitter’, The Next Web, 18 December 2012 
<http://thenextweb.com/uk/2012/12/18/london-fire-brigade-looks-to-set-up-uks-first-
emergency-twitter-feed-allowing-you-to-tweet-incidents> (There is some availability of tweet 
based services in the United Kingdom and the United States of America); Australian 
Government, Attorney General’s Department, About the Emergency Call Service 
(15/10/2012) <http://www.triplezero.gov.au/pages/abouttheemergencycallservice.aspx> (In 
Australia, Triple Zero calls are administered under the Telecommunications (Consumer 
Protection and Services Standards) Act 1999 (Cth) Part 8, s 147, and regulated and 
monitored by the Australia Communications and Media Authority); Ministers for the 
Department of Communications and the Arts, ‘Review of the national Triple Zero’ (000) 
operator’ (Media release, 8 July 2014) 
<http://www.minister.communications.gov.au/malcolm_turnbull/news/review_of_the_triple_z
ero_000_operator#.V_7EIfl96Ul> (The ACMA notes the increasing use of social media and 
while reviewing its service to accommodate emerging technologies is yet to integrate the 
channels into the Emergency Call Service offering); Department of Communications (Cth), 
Review of the National Triple Zero (000) Operator (Discussion Paper, July 2014) 13 (In the 
United States and Europe, Next Generation Emergency Call systems are being 
investigated). 
1284 Emergency Management Victoria, National Review of Warnings and Information, above 
n 11, 53; Inspector General of Emergency Management (Qld), Review of local governments’ 
emergency warning capability, above n 11, 21. 
1285 Virtual Social Media Working Group and DHS First Responders Group, Homeland 
Security, above n 1152, 7. 
1286 Ibid. 
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ultimately, as part of their civic duty, and until proper, fit for purpose technology 
can be developed, it is up to members of the community to use appropriate 
channels as much as possible. 
In terms of legal accountability, as previously stated, there is no duty to rescue. 
However, if social media becomes a sanctioned channel over which to request 
help, a duty of care may arise in the provision of this service. For now, the 
question must arise, if authorities are creating a presence on Facebook or 
Twitter, inviting participants to follow them and start to respond to Triple Zero 
like requests, could a duty of care arise based on assumption of 
responsibility.1287 In seeking to address this question, a wider view of the case 
law was cast, to examine negligence and the failure to respond to Triple Zero 
requests. There is however, little legal precedent on this subject which could 
inform an understanding of likely legal sanctions.1288 Without further case law 
to inform of a courts likely position, response to these types of requests, 
particularly when the dedicated service for Triple Zero calls is widely known, 
is more likely to be a moral or ethical duty.1289 As Triple Zero systems develop 
however to incorporate social media, this will likely change. 
6. Will the failure to address misinformation on social media give 
rise to a claim in negligence? 
7. Will the failure to address misinformation on the emergency 
services own Facebook page lead to a claim in negligence? 
As the questions highlight, there are two issues of misinformation which arise 
in the case study. The first is that misinformation about a disaster, which is 
created by community members, is circulating on social media. The second is 
that misinformation has been posted on the emergency service organisations 
Facebook page. Undoubtedly, either of these situations becomes problematic 
when the misinformation leads to harm for the general populace. As a reflected 
in the risk communication literature however, individuals will usually seek to 
                                                          
1287 See, eg, Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1, 39; 
Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 610. 
1288 See, eg, Telecommunications (Consumer Protection and Services Standards) Act 1999 
(Cth) Part 8, s 147 (Little consideration of the relevant provisions under the Act could be 
found in this regard). 
1289 Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 237 CLR 215, 223. 
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confirm information from multiple sources.1290 Principles of good practice and 
social media guidelines, suggest that social media channels should be 
monitored by agencies, and rumours corrected.1291 Anecdotal evidence 
supports view that the monitoring of messages is a crucial function for statutory 
authorities within the emergency management sector.1292 However, there are  
vast quantities of information available on social media. This information is 
broadcast beyond the control of agencies, and often out of reach. 
Consequently, the ability to actively monitor and capture all misinformation is 
limited, let alone to identify the culprit.  
Legal accountability 
Misinformation in the public domain 
Should either of the sets of facts provided lead to harm for a member of the 
public who has then relied upon the information, they may seek to blame and 
hold a party legally accountable. The first question to address is whether a 
statutory authority has a duty to correct misinformation in the public domain? 
In terms of legal accountability, there is no relevant case law on this subject. 
At a stretch, an analogous area of case law may be the consideration of a duty 
to rescue. At common law, there is ‘no general duty to rescue’ or to prevent 
harm to another.1293 The general rule, ‘is that one man is under no duty of 
controlling another man to prevent his doing damage to a third’.1294 This area 
of law usually refers to physical rescue rather than protection from a mistruth. 
However, if it is considered sufficiently analogous, a statutory authority is 
unlikely to have a duty to rescue the public at large, from rumours and 
misinformation created by the community on social media in a natural disaster. 
                                                          
1290 See, eg, Kasperson et al, above n 5, 13. 
1291 Ministers for the Department of Communications and the Arts, ‘Review of the national 
Triple Zero (000) operator’ (Media release, 8 July 2014) 33 
<http://www.minister.communications.gov.au/malcolm_turnbull/news/review_of_the_triple_z
ero_000_operator#.V_7EIfl96Ul>; Queensland Police Service, Media and Public Affairs 
Branch, above n 400, v; Department of Science, Information Technology and Innovation 
(Qld), Principles for the official use of social media networks and emerging social media 
(October 2015) <http://www.qgcio.qld.gov.au/products/qgea-documents/547-business/3519-
principles-for-the-use-of-social-media> 12 (The Queensland social media principles highlight 
the need to factor in monitoring and moderating when considering resource implications of 
social media). 
1292 Queensland Police Service, Media and Public Affairs Branch, above n 400. 
1293 Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 237 CLR 215, 248; Wotherspoon, above n 761, 335. 
1294 Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 237 CLR 215, 248. 
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From the perspective of shared responsibility, it is up to community members 
to post accurate information and consider others interests in society. In the 
alternative, it would be difficult to expect that a statutory authority would have 
sufficient resources to correct misinformation during a natural disaster. 
Misinformation on a Facebook page 
The second issue regarding misinformation raises a slightly different question. 
It involves misinformation posted to the Facebook page of the emergency 
service organisation, a page over which the organisation has control. Again, 
there is little relevant case law directly pertaining to this issue. There are, 
however, some indications in the case law as to how the court approaches 
misinformation in tort law in the area of negligent misstatement and at a 
stretch, deceit. It is difficult to make predictions on the likely outcome on either 
of these actions, as the outcome will depend on the factual circumstances in 
each case. Also, the elements of each action do not map neatly onto case 
study. 
Limitations of the application of the torts, negligent misstatement and deceit 
As stated, there are limitations in the ability to apply the torts of negligent 
misstatement or deceit. With regard to negligent misstatement, a duty of care 
may be owed by a person giving advice and information, ‘to take reasonable 
care in providing that information when they know, or ought to know, that the 
recipient intends to rely on it’.1295 With respect to deceit, again there must be 
a misrepresentation of the fact, that the representor knew was false, and for 
which they intended the recipient of the information to rely on.1296 Perhaps the 
biggest hurdle in either of these cases is that a representation is required to 
be made by the defendant.1297 On our facts, the Facebook post 
(representation) is made by a member of the public, rather than the statutory 
authority who is the host of the Facebook page. A further hurdle in the case of 
deceit is that the defendant (the statutory authority) must have intended that 
                                                          
1295 L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No.1) (1981) 150 CLR 225, 
225, 231, 238; Low et al, above n 60, 411 (Questions over formality of the source may be 
raised here, or its official nature). 
1296 Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Case 337, 337. 
1297 See, eg, Gould v Vaggelas (1985) 157 CLR 215, 220; L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd 
v Parramatta City Council (No.1) (1981) 150 CLR 225. 
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the plaintiff would rely on the information.1298 Without the authority making the 
statement, intention to deceive which would be difficult to prove. Further 
research is required to consider whether a statement made by a member of 
the public as a third party, but supported by the defendant could form the basis 
of an action in either area of law.  
Conclusions 
Social media is increasingly being used across the community. The 
technologies play a key role in forming social networks and empowering the 
community to share responsibility for disasters by contributing relevant, timely 
information, on its impacts. The platforms can also be effectively leveraged by 
the emergency management sector to improve risk communication and 
warning during a disaster or emergency. The challenge of adoption, is 
adapting current communication procedures and strategies to manage the 
nuances of the platforms. This Chapter has examined two key areas of 
research in relation to social media. The first is the circumstances in which a 
statutory authority may be held legally accountable for acts and omissions in 
warning over social media in an emergency. This research focused on the 
Queensland context. The second is to examine the role that hard and soft law 
instruments within the emergency management regulatory system play, in 
establishing an action in negligence. Each of these questions is informed by a 
theoretical narrative of shared responsibility and notions of legitimate roles of 
government and citizens in society. 
The reasoning in this Chapter, with regard to the first question, reinforces the 
findings of Chapters Six and Seven. Chapters Six and Seven identified the 
elements of negligence and the statutory defences and immunities that are 
available. Chapter Six identified the three elements of negligence as the duty 
of care, the breach of a duty and damage caused by the breach.  The Chapter 
concluded that there may be very limited instances where legal accountability 
for warning will be imputed to statutory authorities, within the emergency 
management context. This Chapter reinforces these findings in the 
Queensland context, noting that the formulation of a duty to warn over social 
                                                          
1298 Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Case 337, 337. 
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media may be difficult to demonstrate. This is because the powers and 
functions provided for in statute, are broad and indirect and are formulated for 
the protection of the general public, rather than for a specific individual. The 
power to warn is also discretionary. Soft law instruments containing more 
detailed responsibilities also exist. However, it is unlikely they are sufficient, 
on their own, or in combination with the Act, to provide the basis of a duty to 
warn. They are more likely to act as performance indicators and guidance 
documents which outline role responsibilities. Even if a duty to warn could be 
distilled from the relevant instruments, as the case law indicates, it may be 
difficult to demonstrate causation of harm as being linked to the failure to warn. 
If any decision not to warn is a rationale response to the information at hand, 
liability may also be excused. 
As a technology platform, which supports two-way communication, social 
media provides numerous challenges which have not previously been 
experienced on traditional broadcast channels for emergency warnings. In the 
first instance, there is a wealth of information. Although critical to informing 
situational awareness, the information may contain inaccuracies. There is the 
potential for this information to be incorporated into messaging. However, 
when inaccurate messages are disseminated, they can persist and it is difficult 
to ensure, that any corrective message, will reach the relevant misled 
audience. If crowd sourced information is utilised as a basis for warning, then 
there is the potential for claims of negligent misstatement. The potential for 
these claims, provides a legal rationale for ensuring social media policies 
contain requirements to either ascertain accuracy of the information; include a 
disclaimer; or include an indication that the information is unverified. By 
including this requirement in social media policy, not only do the policies 
ensure good practice activity for warning is undertaken, they also act to reduce 
the likelihood of institutional risk arising.  
As well as inaccurate information, which may be sent by statutory authorities, 
misinformation and rumours circulate on social media. However, there is a 
wealth of information available on social media. It is therefore difficult for 
statutory authorities within the sector to dedicate sufficient resources to 
monitoring, or detecting the source of these rumours. In terms of legal 
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accountability however, unless misinformation is posted directly to social 
media sites or newsfeeds of the emergency management agencies, it is 
unlikely there will any be duty for the agencies to rescue the public from harm. 
Instead, based on the legitimate role of citizens and government, and in 
reflection on notions of shared responsibility, the onus may rest with the 
individuals to take care of their own interest. Consequently, an individual may 
need to ensure as part of their civic, rather than legal duty, that they post 
correct information. On receipt of information an individual should also take 
steps to check the information against information from an official source. 
This Chapter also highlighted potential new legal issues associated with social 
media. However traditional legal issues for statutory authorities, such as the 
ability to warn in a timely and unambiguous fashion will continue to arise and 
can be exacerbated by the use of social media. Social media facilitates the 
dissemination of real time information. However, sites such as Facebook 
incorporate algorithms which impact on the likelihood that the post of an 
agency will be received on time. The presence of algorithms is outside the 
control of an agency. However, and particularly if relying solely on social media 
for warning dissemination, it is unlikely that a court will consider it diligent 
practice to post a time critical message on Facebook. This reinforces the need 
to use social media only to augment traditional broadcast platforms. It 
reinforced the need to disseminate multiple messages over multiple platforms 
at one time. 
Social media platforms also pose challenges for the ability to provide 
unambiguous warning messages. Challenges of unambiguous warnings are 
not unknown to the law of negligence. In the case of social media, when using 
Twitter for example, the ability to send clear, precise and sufficiently detailed 
messages is limited due to maximum number of characters in a tweet. If 
statutory authorities have embarked on warning, yet messages have sent 
individuals into greater danger because they are unclear or ambiguous, there 
is a greater potential for the authority to be held legally accountable. Although 
issues of causation and inclusion of immunities may limit the likelihood of 
liability, it is important from a legal perspective for agencies to carefully 
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construct messages. Agencies ought to consider test message templates and 
incorporate further links to more detailed information in their online posts.  
This Chapter demonstrates that, as with the integration of any new technology 
into business as usual operations, statutory authorities need to be aware of 
the risks and challenges that come with social media platforms. Legal risks are 
one key element of this consideration. Risk of legal liability is not an 
insurmountable hurdle.  As this Chapter, has demonstrated, all that is required 
is an understanding of the circumstances in which liability may arise. Once 
these circumstances are understood actions can be incorporated into doctrine; 
actions that from a legal perspective can limit or avoid the likelihood of this 
consequence. By incorporating principles of good ‘legal’ practice into 
communications strategies and social media protocols, the controls that 
support effective risk communication are strengthened. Concerns over liability, 
which may have acted as a barrier to effective implementation, may also be 
diminished. Consequently, the inclusions of good practice may support a more 
effective and optimal use of the platforms. This in turn can assists the 
dissemination of risk communication and warning more generally. Ultimately, 
good practice can support policy objective which focus on building community 
resilience and disaster risk reduction. 
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Chapter Nine: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Chapter Nine, as the final Chapter, provides the findings and 
recommendations of the research. Part One of this Chapter, restates the key 
areas of research, the rationale for engaging in the research, along with the 
theoretical perspective from which the research questions were approached. 
Part Two then provides conclusions and recommendations in response to 
each of the research questions. As well as the key research questions, 
secondary lines of investigation were evident in the thesis. Part Three 
therefore identifies further findings relating to, in the first instance, shared 
responsibility. This Part then identifies the role of the various hard and soft law 
instruments relevant to warning. In particular it examines how the instruments 
allocate responsibility and act as a basis for determining legal accountability 
for authorities within the emergency management sector. Further areas for 
future research are also identified at the conclusion of the Chapter. 
Part One 
What was researched? 
As stated, the thesis set out to address two key research objectives. These 
were:  
1. To examine the extent to which risk communication generally and 
warning more particularly is embedded in instruments which make up 
the emergency management regulatory system in Australia. 
2. The second was to examine the circumstances in which statutory 
authorities within Australia’s emergency management sector are likely 
to be held legally accountable for acts and omissions in warning through 
social media during an emergency 
These questions investigated broad and particular considerations of how the 
law, and regulatory systems, support and regulate risk communication and 
warning during an emergency. In the first instance, the questions examine 
dissemination of risk communication and warning over a particular channel, 
noting the legal issues that can arise when using emerging technologies. 
Secondly, they examine the broader regulatory system for emergency 
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management, to determine the extent to which risk communication and 
warning is supported by the institutional framework. 
Why it was researched? 
Effective use of social media for message dissemination in an emergency can 
be critical to the saving of lives and property. Social media, or Web 2.0 
platforms, have become ubiquitous in society. They are inexpensive, mobile 
and have demonstrated benefits for both the sector and the community during 
an emergency. However, the use of social media as a new technology for 
warning in emergencies has challenged traditional processes for 
communication. Use of the channels has also raised concerns about legal 
liability within the emergency management sector. The purpose of Question 
Two, is to examine the validity of these concerns, which have not been fully 
investigated by any previous research. These concerns may act as a barrier 
for implementation of social media by agencies within the sector, or lead to a 
less than optimal approach to disaster messaging. Yet, the ability of a statutory 
authority to disseminate a message, which reaches a wide cross section of the 
population, in a timely manner is important. Receipt of a message can be a 
critical trigger for community members to make decisions about protective 
actions, thereby making disaster response a true shared responsibility.  
The need to be able to use social media effectively, is underpinned by 
theoretical understandings, that the dissemination of risk communication and 
warning is fundamental to the management of disaster risk. As the research in 
this thesis identifies, risk communication and warning act as a control or 
mitigation device in the management of natural hazard and emergency related 
risk. Risk communication and warning, has the potential to reduce the 
likelihood, that natural hazards will have negative impacts on persons and 
property. An individual informed of likely impacts of a disaster before it occurs, 
can consider the feasible options for their own self-protection. Actions taken 
by individuals can remove a considerable burden from statutory authorities 
during an emergency. This leaves those authorities to deal with other aspects 
of the emergency that require immediate attention.  
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Noting the fundamental role of risk communication and warning in an 
emergency, the first research question is directed towards an examination of 
the regulatory system for emergency management more broadly. The first 
research questions aim to determine whether there is a strong institutional 
foundation for risk communication and warning in place. A foundation which 
supports communications key role in disasters and emergencies. If there are 
gaps in the regulatory system, the thesis suggests that changes should be 
made. As previously identified, it is only when ‘governance arrangements are 
effective…that the organisation will function as intended and achieve its 
objectives’ in managing a dynamic risk which affects a broad section of the 
public.1299 
From what perspective? 
To answer the research questions, a normative platform from which to 
investigate how things ought to be, and why they are as they are, was 
established. The theoretical narrative sought to integrate not only theory, but 
principles of good practice. A restatement of the key aspects of the theoretical 
narrative and the theoretical lenses utilised follows.  
The risk society 
As mentioned in Chapter One, the thesis addresses risk communication, which 
warns of natural hazards and their potential to manifest as emergencies in 
society, and which require an urgent societal response. Historically natural 
hazards have been viewed as ‘acts of god’,1300 for which no-one in particular 
is responsible. However, there has been a shift in the views of society 
concerning the treatment of natural hazards and their impacts. Sociological 
theory on the risk society for example, identifies this shift which has taken 
place. The theory explains that there is an increasing focus in society on the 
management, quantification and treatment of ‘risk’.1301 In light of this shift, 
                                                          
1299 Standards Australia, Risk management guidelines - Companion to AS/NZS ISO 
31000:2009 (SA/SNZ HB 436:2013) 13. 
1300 Lauta, ‘Legal Scholarship and Disasters’, above n 53, 97-99. 
1301 Lauta, ‘Legal Scholarship and Disasters’, above n 53, 97-99, 104; See, also, Alexander, 
‘Communicating earthquake risk to the public’, above n 54, 1159; Farber, ‘Tort Law in the 
Era of Climate Change’, above n 54, 1076; Rochford, above n 234, 172-173. 
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natural hazards and their impacts are therefore now labelled as risks, rather 
than acts of god.  
The theory of the risk society also highlights that in order to manage risk, 
generic risk management frameworks and practice based standards are 
required. Frameworks should and have therefore been developed to guide and 
facilitate any risk management activity. In Australia, these standards take the 
form of the AS/NZS 31000:2009 Risk Management Standard.1302 The generic 
risk management standards have also been contextualised for the emergency 
management context in the form of the National Emergency Risk Assessment 
Guidelines.1303 As there is an increasing drive in the sector to adhere to these 
Guidelines, they were used in the thesis to provide a framework and structure 
for addressing the issue of natural hazard related risk. 
Roles of government and citizen in risk management: social contract theory 
What the theory, or more particularly the standards, also identify is that where 
there is risk there will be risk owners, or entities that have been charged with 
ownership. These entities have both ‘the accountability and authority to 
manage a risk’.1304 In Australia, statutory authorities, as a reflection of their 
traditional roles as protector of life and property, have been charged with some 
aspects of risk ownership through policy and legislation. However, with limited 
resources, increasingly frequent and intense weather events, over which the 
emergency management sector have little or no control, government are 
driving a shift to a shared responsibility for disaster risk reduction. This 
responsibility is sought to be shared across multiple stakeholders, which 
include government and citizens.  
Social contract theory has been highly influential in the development of 
Australia’s system of law and government.  A shift towards shared 
responsibility, and individual management of risk, creates tension between 
                                                          
1302 Standards Australia, Risk Management - Principles and guidelines (AS/NZS ISO 
31000:2009). 
1303 Attorney General’s Department (Cth), National Emergency Risk Assessment Guidelines, 
above n 88; Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience (Cth), National Emergency Risk 
Assessment Guidelines, above n 88.  
1304 British Standards Institution (BSI), Risk management – vocabulary (PD ISO Guide 
73:2009, 30 September 2013). 
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normative principles of social contract theory which identify the roles of 
government and citizens in society. Locke’s theory of the social contract notes 
for example, that government have a legitimate role in the protection of people 
and property. In a more modern form of the theory, and a form perhaps more 
fitting to the shift apparent in the emergency management context, Rawls 
social contract theory has been interpreted to suggest that citizens also have 
a role in society. That is, a role to protect their own interests and a civic duty 
to take care when pursuing their own interests. Citizens must therefore act in 
a manner which is compatible with, and minimises harm, to others. However, 
despite the presence of this more modern theory, government need to remain 
legitimate and retain the trust of individuals in society. Government agencies 
therefore need to be clear about, and gain agreement, in renegotiating or 
modernising the social contract to redistribute the burden of disaster risk 
reduction. 
Principles of good practice and the need for accountability 
Government and its agencies have a legitimate role to protect life and property, 
and have been charged with aspects of management of natural hazard and 
emergency related risk. There is therefore, an expectation that institutions will 
create systems which effectively support service delivery. There is a need to 
ensure these systems, more particularly the regulatory system, is designed in 
line with principles of good practice. Principles of good practice for regulation, 
state that mechanisms which support good governance will ensure ‘role 
clarity’, ‘accountability and transparency’ and ‘performance evaluation’.1305  
The focus in this thesis was upon the accountability aspect of these principles. 
That is, ensuring that the regulatory system provided either legal 
accountability, or mechanisms which support the scrutiny and independent 
review of action to ensure service delivery is effective.1306 Ultimately, when 
governance systems support effective service delivery, and effective delivery 
of warning in emergencies, policy objectives for disaster risk reduction are 
                                                          
1305 British Standards Institution (BSI), Risk management – vocabulary (PD ISO Guide 
73:2009, 30 September 2013) 27. 
1306 Better Regulation Task Force, above n 2, 4; OECD, ‘Risk and Regulatory Policy, above 
n 8, 25 (The presence of accountability mechanism such as performance standards are a 
positive element of risk based approaches). 
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more likely to be met. It is important to consider, in the Australian context, that 
the development of regulatory systems which support good governance is also 
balanced by the need to cut red tape, and to provide a ‘proportionate 
regulatory response’ to risks.1307  
As well as general principles for good practice regulation, more particular 
Guidelines have been established to assist in the development of effective 
disaster risk regulation,1308 and effective risk communication.1309 The 
Guidelines for effective disaster risk regulation highlight the need for a 
presence of dedicated and tailored law for disaster risk management. 1310 Law 
which clearly delineates roles and responsibilities.1311 Relevant to this thesis, 
the Guidelines state that laws for risk communication and warning systems 
need to establish ‘clear procedures and responsibilities for early warning’.1312 
They also need to be supported or mandated down to a local level.1313  
Alongside these general Guidelines, more specific Guidelines pertaining to 
effective risk communication have been developed. These Guidelines identify 
the need to plan and develop risk communication ‘at an early stage of the risk 
management process.’1314 Any risk communication plan should outline ‘the 
objectives of specific communication, who will be involved, how the channels 
will work, what, and how, the information will be communicated’.1315 Together, 
the theory, principles of good practice and practice based standards inform the 
perspective from which the research questions were examined. With this multi-
layered narrative in mind, the following section identifies the key conclusions 
and recommendations of the thesis. 
                                                          
1307 OECD, OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform, above n 504,105. 
1308 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, above n 79; IFRC & 
UNDP, ‘Effective law and regulation for disaster risk reduction’, above n 78. 
1309 Standards Australia, Communicating and consulting about risk (HB 327:2010); Attorney 
General’s Department (Cth), National Emergency Risk Assessment Guidelines, above n 88, 
31. 
1310 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, ‘Effective law and 
regulation for disaster risk reduction’, above n 78, 3, 8-9. 
1311 Ibid. 
1312 Ibid 107; IFRC & UNDP, ‘Effective law and regulation for disaster risk reduction’, above 
n 78, xiii, 33-34, 36. 
1313 Ibid 107; IFRC & UNDP, ‘Effective law and regulation for disaster risk reduction’, above 
n 78, xiii, 33-34, 36. 
1314 Standards Australia, Communicating and consulting about risk (HB 327:2010) 18-20. 
1315 Ibid. 
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Part Two: What were the conclusions? 
Research Question One 
Addressing the broader question on risk communication and warning, Chapter 
Five addressed the extent to which risk communication and warning were 
embedded within the components of the emergency management regulatory 
system. The methodology utilised in this Chapter, was a content analysis. The 
content analysis examined hard and soft law instruments which comprise the 
emergency management regulatory system. The findings of the content 
analysis were directed to answering three further sub-questions. These sub-
questions, reflected principles of good practice outlined in the theoretical 
narrative in relation to effective disaster law, and effective mechanisms for risk 
communication.  
 
Sub-question One 
 
The sub-questions examined, in the first instance, whether the current 
regulatory system incorporates risk communication and warning 
throughout the various layers of the system. To answer this question, 
instruments from the various layers of the regulatory system were analysed. 
As indicated in Chapter Five, ‘the results clearly indicate that risk 
communication in the form of public communication and warning is present in 
a number of regulatory components, principally policy, plans, standards and 
guidelines’. In other words, they are present in soft law instruments. It was 
evident however, that there was a lack of explicit integration of warning into 
legislation. The lack of integration in legislation was surprising given the policy 
directives at a national level, that communication in a disaster is identified as 
a core area of priority. As well as a lack of integration of warning into 
legislation, it became apparent that the national prioritisation of communication 
is not reflected across State policy and legislation, more generally. This 
suggests there is a lack alignment in the regulatory system as a whole.1316  
                                                          
1316 Sheehy and Feaver, above n 94, 398. 
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As Chapter Five concluded, international good practice states that the 
obligation to warn should be incorporated into law. In Australia, with the 
exceptions of Queensland and Victoria, references to public communication 
and warning is provided for only in soft law instruments. Soft law instruments 
are not binding and unenforceable. This suggests that Australia’s regulatory 
system may be inconsistent with international recommendations.1317 
Recommendation 
It is recommended that, due to its fundamental role in reducing disaster 
risk, there is consideration of an explicit inclusion of warning within 
legislative instruments. In the alternative, further research may be required. 
This research would focus on firstly, the reasoning behind the exclusions of 
risk communication and warning. Secondly, the research would examine 
whether inclusion of risk communication and warning would increase the 
understanding of its importance as a mitigation and control device. 
 
Sub-question Two 
The second sub-question examined, whether the regulatory 
components articulate clear responsibilities for risk communication and 
warning. In line with the previous sub-question, the content analysis revealed 
similar findings. That is, that responsibilities for risk communication and 
warning are primarily present in soft law instruments within the regulatory 
system, rather than high level policy and legislation. Aside from noted 
exceptions within Chapter Five, it is suggested that the regulatory system for 
emergency management in some Australian jurisdictions might not meet 
principles of good practice for disaster risk reduction law. 
Recommendation  
It is recommended that further research is conducted into design of regulatory 
components, and a comparative analysis between common-law countries 
such as the United States, New Zealand or the United Kingdom be 
                                                          
1317 See, eg, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, above n 78, 
4. 
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undertaken. The aim would be to determine how countries with similar judicial 
systems have addressed incorporation of responsibilities for risk 
communication. Whether there is something unique in the Australian 
landscape which supports a deviation from principles of good practice, is also 
an important point for analysis. 
Sub-question Three 
The final sub-question examined whether the regulatory system 
components embed a requirement to use social media, and if so, whether 
there is clear articulation of responsibility for the use of the channels. 
The findings highlight that there are limited references to a mandatory 
requirement to embed social media within communication strategies, 
particularly in policy and legislation. There is also a lack of clear articulation of 
responsibility for the use of social media, and an inconsistent approach to its 
use. In some jurisdictions for example, the use of social media is identified as 
a possible dissemination channel, while in others there is only a statement of 
intent that it will be used. Certainly, the benefits and relevance of using social 
media will depend on the demographics of the jurisdiction, or more likely the 
local community. Ultimately however, principles of good practice recommend 
that a suite of channels be utilised for the dissemination of warnings. 
Recommendation  
The recommendation in this section reinforces principles of good practice for 
risk communication and use of social media from a legal perspective. In the 
first instance, it is recommended that community profiling take place to 
determine the likely effectiveness of social media as a channel for warning. 
Where the demographic suggests that warning through this channel is likely 
to be effective, explicit inclusion of the use of social media into local 
information and communication plans is suggested.  
Research Question Two 
The second research question examined the circumstances in which statutory 
authorities are likely to be held legally accountable, for acts and omissions in 
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warning through social media, during an emergency. To provide a background 
understanding of the relevant area of law, it was first necessary to examine 
legal accountability for warning more generally. This examination involved an 
analysis of case law pertaining to the law of negligence. It outlined the three 
elements required to be established a claim: a duty of care, the breach of a 
duty of care and damage sustained in relation to the breach. As well as how 
each element is applied to constitute negligent acts and omissions.  
The law of negligence determines the standards of conduct, or the reasonable 
standards of care expected of statutory authorities in taking measures to warn 
during emergencies. It is only when there is a failure to adhere to the relevant 
legal standard of care, that liability can ensue.  Chapter Seven identified the 
statutory immunities and defences which may be invoked by statutory 
authorities charged with negligent conduct. The effect of a successful 
application of a defence or immunity, is that even where negligence is found 
against the relevant authority, liability will not ensue. In Chapter Eight, the 
findings of Chapters Six and Seven were then applied to the specific context 
of a duty to warn in relation to the dissemination channel of social media as an 
emerging technology. 
 
Broad Findings on the law of negligence and the duty to warn 
 
Chapters Six and Seven identified broad findings of the circumstances in 
which a duty to warn would likely be found in a statutory authority in the context 
of natural hazard management. Chapter Six identified that although the law of 
negligence sets the standards of conduct between parties and the reasonable 
standard of care, there are some concessions made which temper liability in 
statutory authorities. These concessions include policy considerations such as 
the need to allocate limited resources across numerous competing areas of 
responsibility, as well as the recognition that statutory authorities need to be 
able to make time critical decisions without fear of liability.1318 The first of these 
concessions acknowledges the numerous roles of statutory authorities as 
                                                          
1318 Explanatory note, Disaster Management Bill 2003 (Qld) 7; Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v 
State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 701 [686], [713] citing Crimmins v 
Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1, [93]. 
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public functionaries, and the finite resources available to fulfil their roles. With 
limited resources, a statutory authority may be unable to deliver as effectively 
in some areas as in others. Instead, the authority will be required to balance 
the public interest, and private interests of individuals, to determine which 
areas of responsibility they are able to, and should address. The effect of these 
concessions is that, in some circumstances, they raise the threshold at which 
liability will be attributed to statutory authorities. Consequently, the level of 
service that a member of the public might expect of a statutory authority, 
including in the area of warning, is not the same as that required by law.  
 
Formulating a duty of care 
 
Chapter Six further identified hurdles in establishing each of the elements of 
negligence in the warning context. The establishment of an action for a failure 
to warn, or a failure to take reasonable care in warning, is a novel action in 
torts law. Categorisation as a novel action, impacts on the criteria required to 
be fulfilled to formulate whether a duty of care exists at all. Chapter Six clearly 
identified the need to establish a risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable, 
however, a court will also consider salient factors.1319 These factors include 
control that a statutory authority might have. Control has both a narrow and 
broad interpretation in the case law, either as control over the hazard itself, or 
control over management of the hazard. In making a determination as to 
control of a statutory authority, a court will consider any functions or powers 
within legislation. As well as control, a court will also consider the knowledge 
an authority has of the hazard, and the associated vulnerability of the public. 
Although not an exhaustive list of the considerations of the court, control, 
knowledge and vulnerability are perhaps key considerations.  
Chapter Six examined each of the criteria outlined above, which form the basis 
for the formulation of a duty of care, in detail. When applied it became apparent 
that the ability to establish that a duty of care, or a duty to warn were owed is 
limited. In considering the criteria which establish a duty of care in novel cases, 
although many of the impacts of a natural hazard are likely to be reasonably 
foreseeable, certain salient factors may mean that a duty of care could be 
                                                          
1319 Caltex Refineries (Queensland) Pty Limited v Stavar (2009) 259 ALR 616, 647. 
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difficult to establish in this context. This is despite the existence of powers and 
functions for warning. Therefore, even when powers or functions for warning 
are provided for in statute, this does not necessarily suggest there is a legal 
obligation to act. It will only be in certain circumstances that a duty of care to 
issue a proper warning may be found. These circumstances may include: 
when powers to warn are specific and mandatory; when natural hazard 
impacts are likely to be catastrophic; and when an authority’s knowledge of 
the likely impacts of the hazard authority is greater than the public’s.   
Further elements: Breach of a duty, damage 
Even if a duty of care is established, the ability to establish there was a breach 
of the reasonable standard of care, and that the breach caused the damage, 
may be difficult to prove. As indicated policy concessions are in place which 
mean that if the authority, as a public functionary, is subject to resource 
limitations this may impact on the ability to prove conduct breached the 
reasonable standard of care. As the final element, the establishment of 
causation of damage may also be difficult to prove. In the face of a natural 
disaster, there may be no action that an individual, even with the benefit of 
warnings, could have taken that would have prevented the harm they 
suffered.1320 Based on historic case law, the findings of Chapter Six suggest 
there will only be limited circumstances in which an action in negligence can 
be made out against a statutory authority. 
Defences and immunities 
In conjunction with the concessions made in the case of statutory authorities 
to limit liability, relevant defences to actions and immunities from liability are 
also found in common law and in legislation.  Defences and immunities negate 
liability for, or reduce the amount of compensatory damages which might 
otherwise be payable by the statutory authority. Chapter Seven identified that 
the defence of contributory negligence has been infrequently used in warning 
cases related to emergencies. Yet a successful application of this defence 
                                                          
1320  Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 245-246; Eburn, ‘The emerging legal issue of 
failure to warn’, above n 71, 54-55. 
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could also support apportionment of liability against an individual claimant. The 
apportionment of liability will be determined by the comparative culpability of 
the parties. The defence is based on a presumption that an individual will take 
reasonable care to protect their own interests. The thesis concluded, that 
where even a single warning is issued, theoretically the warning should be a 
sufficient trigger to alert an individual to take reasonable care in light of the 
predicted hazard impacts. Even when there is an absence of warning, yet 
there is a known hazard, such as storm season approaching, a potential 
claimant ought to make an independent assessment of the risk of hazard 
impacts. In addition to the defence of contributory negligence, a court may 
consider whether a natural hazard or emergency related risk, which might 
otherwise negate a duty to warn, is obvious. In most instances however, a 
court is unlikely to find that a natural hazard and emergency related risk is 
obvious, although it will depend on the factual circumstances of the case.  
As well as defences, the incorporation of immunities and protection from 
liability into statute has become standard drafting practice. The practice aims 
to limit institutional risk. Immunity from liability, curtails the ability of citizens to 
claim compensatory damages for harm caused. However, it also ensures a 
degree of certainty for statutory authorities responsible for making time critical 
decisions, that no liability will arise. In Australia, in most jurisdictions, 
legislation which establishes the emergency management and emergency 
service authorities, and provide framework for emergency management, 
incorporate immunities or protections for action which has been taken in ‘good 
faith’. If the statutory authority can establish the pre-requisites, these defences 
may be very effective in negating liability. Evidence of action, or inaction, to 
establish good faith include: actions or decisions which are a rationale 
response to the situation; actions which demonstrate diligence; actions carried 
out honestly and conscientiously, have no ulterior motive, but are otherwise 
clearly directed towards the protection of life and safety. The analysis of the 
case law revealed that actions may be considered to be carried out in good 
faith even if they fail to follow procedures and protocols. 
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Recommendations 
The findings on the duty to warn suggest there will be limited circumstances in 
which a duty of care to warn in a natural disaster setting will be owed. However, 
there are some steps that can be put in place to further limit the potential 
liability of a statutory authority for failure to warn properly or at all. Moreover, 
the implementation of these steps alone may demonstrate competency and 
legitimacy of action in discharging the duty to warn. As established in Chapter 
Three, competent and legitimate action supports the development of trust with 
private citizens, and trust, is a key factor in achieving a positive response from 
citizens to risk communication. 
 
Establishment of a duty of care  
 It is recommended that a statutory authority seek advice so that they 
understand the nature of any legislated responsibilities to warn. The 
aim is to ascertain whether any power or function is mandatory, 
discretionary or likely to be construed as providing a sufficient basis to 
constitute a duty of care to warn.  
 If a statutory authority has knowledge of a likely significant hazard 
impact, subject to considering warning fatigue,1321 a warning should be 
issued to the public. The warning should incorporate where relevant, 
information concerning the degree of uncertainty or unpredictability of 
the event.  
 
Establishment of the breach of a duty of care 
 Historically concessions have been made for statutory authorities 
based on resource limitations. The concessions reduce or negate the 
breach of a duty of care. However, with the inclusion of escalation 
pathways within instruments which provide for greater resource 
capacity, it is recommended that authorities make a reasonable 
                                                          
1321 Brenda Mackie, ‘Warning Fatigue: Insights from the Australian Bushfire Context’ (Thesis 
submitted in fulfilment of Doctor of Philosophy in Media and Communication, University of 
Canterbury, 2013) 2.   
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attempt to escalate and gain assistance in warning where 
possible. 
 The dissemination of warnings which lack clarity or are ambiguous have 
historically been used to assert there was a lack of reasonable care in 
warning. It is therefore recommended that statutory authorities engaged 
in warning activities undertake evidence based research to test that 
communities understand the meaning of warning messages, 
particularly where symbology which could be misconstrued is 
utilised. 
 To determine that a statutory authority has exhibited a reasonable 
standard of care in warning a court will consider the entirety of 
messages sent. It is therefore recommended that statutory 
authorities continue to provide a suite of messages which include 
pre-season warning. 
 To make a determination as to whether reasonable care has been 
demonstrated, a court will consider the general practice of the statutory 
authority in delivering warnings. It is recommended that if an authority 
seeks to alter its systems for message delivery, for example, an 
authority no longer has the resource capacity to undertake door 
knocking; the authority ought to educate the public, or the relevant 
community of the change in warning procedures.  
 If procedures and protocols exists, which outline recommended action 
for warning, it is recommended in the first instance these protocols are 
kept be up-to-date in order to reflect current principles for good 
practice. Secondly activity should either comply with these procedures 
and protocols or at least, where possible, be consistent with them.1322 
 
 
 
                                                          
1322 Although the cost of compliance may appear onerous, the cost of non-compliance is 
often greater where errors occur. It is recognised that due to the dynamic and unpredictable 
nature of natural hazards, some flexibility in application of protocols and procedures are 
required. If alternative activities are undertaken in good faith – and demonstrate diligent 
action and a well-reasoned rationale, negligence is unlikely to result. 
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Immunities and protections in law 
 Should an action in negligence be brought against a statutory authority, 
it is recommended that consideration be given to use of the defence of 
contributory negligence where there is evidence to support its use. 
 Should an action in negligence be brought against a statutory authority, 
it is recommended that recourse is made to statutory immunity 
provisions. 
 To give greater certainty that statutory immunities provisions will be 
available, it is recommended that decision making processes are 
documented even informally. This document might include the material 
that was considered at the time. The aim is to demonstrate that the 
decision was a rational and diligent response to the circumstances at 
hand. 
 When possible it is recommended that protocols and procedures for 
warning are complied with, if they are up to date. There may be time 
when deviations from protocol is necessary. In those time evidence to 
demonstrate the reasoning behind the need to deviate from targets 
should be captured if time allows. 
 
It is envisaged that these recommendations will provide further safeguards 
against findings of legal accountability against statutory authorities engaged in 
warning practices. Many may reflect common sense, or moral and ethical 
notions of good practice, however it is important to reiterate the role of these 
actions with regard to reducing the likelihood of the risk of liability. 
 
Findings on the circumstances in which legal accountability will arise in 
social media 
 
Chapters Six and Seven reached a number of conclusions on the 
circumstances in which legal accountability will be attributed for failure to warn 
properly or to warn at all. These conclusions were then applied to a 
hypothetical case-study. The scenario in the case study was embedded in the 
Queensland emergency warning context and the use of social media as a 
dissemination tool in the Queensland context. A number of sub-questions 
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were posed to reflect the challenges faced by statutory authorities within the 
emergency management sector. The findings and recommendations will be 
addressed with reference to these sub-questions. These investigations 
identified some challenges which are common to channels for communication 
and warning. Challenges which have historically been experienced, and to 
which the law of negligence has been applied. There will however, be some 
situations to which the law of negligence has not been applied. In these cases, 
further research is recommended.  
In terms of originality, the findings of this Chapter restate some aspects of 
principles of good practice which are currently in the risk communication 
domain. However, the Chapter reinforces that it is importance to incorporate 
certain specific activities which support effective communication, activities 
which also limit the likelihood that a statutory authority will be held legally 
accountable for its use of social media. The need to include certain activities 
ought to be further reinforced to those involved in warning during emergencies, 
in order to alleviate legal concerns.  
Question One 
In respect of long-standing challenges which can lead to legal accountability, 
the first question was whether local government in Queensland would owe 
a duty of care to warn and whether that duty would require the use of 
social media?  
The determination of whether a duty of care would arise required an 
examination of the soft and hard law instruments relevant to Queensland’s 
emergency management regulatory framework. The powers and functions for 
warning, particularly within legislation, were found to be broad and indirect. 
Those in soft law instruments lacked prescription. The overarching conclusion 
in this Chapter aligned with the findings of Chapter Six. The conclusions 
highlighted that it may be difficult to assert there is a duty of care to warn, or 
one that would include a specific requirement to warn over social media. 
However, if a duty to warn is established in Queensland an examination of the 
content of a reasonable standard of care is required. The case study 
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concluded that in taking reasonable care for warning, the relevant statutory 
instruments do not require incorporation of specific channels such as social 
media into communication strategies.  
In some local and regional catchments, soft law instruments, which identify the 
public information strategies that will be used, include a statement of intent 
that social media will be used to warn in emergencies. It is important to note, 
that these statements may create a public expectation and reliance on the fact 
that the channels will be used. When a statement of intent, or historical usage 
of the platforms creates a reliance on the channel by the public, a failure to 
employ them, gives greater weight to a possible finding of breach of duty. 
However, a positive finding that there is a breach of the reasonable standard 
of care in warning will depend on the circumstances and the resource capacity 
of the relevant authority. Even if a duty of care or breach of the duty to warn 
could be established, there may be insurmountable hurdles for the claimant in 
regard to causation of damage from a natural hazard. Finally, a statutory 
authority may have recourse to immunity provisions found in the Disaster 
Management Act 2003 (Qld).  
Recommendation 
It is recommended that care is taken in making statements of intent as to the 
use of social media. If a statement of intent regarding the use of social media 
has been made, or if the channels have historically been used, it is 
recommended that every effort be made to diligently communicate over these 
channels. A failure to do so may be used to assert that there was a breach of 
a duty of care in the circumstances, an assertion that will need to be defended. 
A failure to use social media in these circumstances may also undermine trust 
relationships between statutory authorities tasked with warning, and citizens. 
As established in Chapter Three, trust relationships are important to 
supporting effective risk communication. 
Question Two 
Question One, identified that it may be difficult to formulate a duty of care to 
warn. In the knowledge that there may still be certain circumstances which 
could lead to a duty to warn, the second question focused on whether an 
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emergency service authority would breach a duty to warn if it relied on 
Facebook to disseminate timely warning messages.  One challenge of 
Facebook is that the presence of algorithms can affect timely delivery of 
messages. For seasoned users of the platform, this fact is common 
knowledge. So too is the knowledge that an ill-timed message can mean that 
citizens are unable to take measures to take care of their own safety.  
Recommendation 
Bearing in mind the limitations on timely delivery, and although it is an unlikely 
course of action against a statutory authority, it is recommended that 
Facebook is not relied on as a sole channel for warning. This is particularly the 
case when timely message delivery is required. To rely solely on Facebook 
would perhaps fail to demonstrate diligent and reasonable behaviour. 
Consistent with emerging principles of good practice on social media, the 
thesis reinforces the need to utilise multiple channels for dissemination of 
warning.  
Question Three 
Question Three addressed challenges of sending unambiguous 
messaging over platforms such as Twitter due to the limitations on 
message length. Judicial precedent identifies that an ambiguous warning fails 
to demonstrate a reasonable standard of care has been taken. An ambiguous 
message does not properly alert the recipient to the nature of the risk being 
faced. Without training and the use of due care and skill, the use of platforms 
such as Twitter has the potential to increase the possibility for message 
ambiguity which could lead a message recipient in to harm’s way and lead to 
consequent liability in the sender.  
Recommendation 
To lessen the likelihood of ambiguity in Twitter warning messages, it is 
recommended that links to further, and more detailed information, be provided. 
It should be acknowledged, however, that some Twitter users may not be able 
to access further content, and therefore attention needs to be paid to the clarity 
within the single message. Tested message templates may assist. It is also 
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recommended that users of social media within the relevant authority are 
trained in syntax and language conventions used on Twitter, in order to avoid 
confusion. 
Question Four 
In Chapter Eight, questions were also posed as to whether posting inaccurate 
information on Facebook could lead to a breach of a duty of care. Inaccuracy 
of information or advice in warning messages, and the ability of recipients to 
face harm where they rely on inaccurate advice, has been a long-standing 
concern in the warning context. Provision of inaccurate information by a 
statutory authority may lead to an action for negligent misstatement. 
Inaccurate information on social media is an issue, in that it can rapidly 
cascade to numerous social media followers in a short space of time. It is then 
difficult to retract an inaccurate statement, or to ensure that any correction 
reaches the same audience as the initial post. Inaccuracies in content may 
become more apparent as information created by the crowd is uploaded and 
broadcast. Should an authority then share this unofficial content created by a 
community member, which is not verified, and is incorrect, real concerns over 
legal accountability would arise.  
Recommendation 
As negligent misstatement is beyond the scope of inquiry in this thesis, it is 
recommended that further research is undertaken to fully identify issues of 
misstatement. In the interim, and to avoid legal implications for sharing 
unverified information for example, it is recommended that care or at least an 
informed decision is made as to whether or not to share user created content. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests some statutory authorities have systems in 
place to allocate a weighting to the veracity of user created content and its 
degree of reliability. As a second course of action, the inclusion of a hashtag 
(#unverified) within the post will also alert the message recipient that further 
information ought to be sought. Alternatively, the crowd could be used to verify 
the unconfirmed content, or at least be educated to check the source of the 
original message. 
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New Issues in Law 
Question Five 
The use of Twitter and Facebook, as a ubiquitous channel for communication, 
means that it is being used by community members in emergencies to post 
requests for assistance. These requests would ordinarily be channelled 
through official Triple Zero call centres. Question Five, addressed whether 
a statutory authority which failed to respond to a request for assistance 
over Twitter would be likely to be held legally accountable.  
Technological developments are occurring, which signal a movement towards 
incorporation of social media into Triple Zero response systems. However, in 
Australia this functionality is yet to be established. In response to emergency 
social media, a statutory authority with limited resources, may be unable to 
capture all social media requests and therefore be able to respond in a timely 
manner. There is little case law which examines negligence or the failure to 
respond to a Triple Zero call in Australia, and the examination of this question 
extends beyond the scope of this research. An initial review of literature 
suggests there is unlikely to be a legal duty to respond, although anecdotal 
evidence suggests that where possible social media requests for help are 
eliciting a response due to a sense of moral or ethical duty. Certainly, any 
failure to do so may damage the reputation of the authority in question.  
Recommendation 
It is recommended that further research be undertaken into legal accountability 
in this area. The thesis also suggests that an authority ought to clearly notify 
the public of the monitoring hours of social media sites. If requests for 
assistance are met by emergency response authorities, it is important to note 
that the authority may be assuming a responsibility which leads to ongoing 
expectations. It is, therefore, recommended that the emergency management 
sector supports ongoing investigation of the incorporation of social media into 
a Triple Zero response facility.  
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Questions Six and Seven 
The final questions provided for in the scenario, focused on liability for 
misinformation. This may be described as the failure to address misinformation 
and rumours in the public domain about a disaster or natural hazard event, as 
well misinformation posted on a Facebook page of an emergency service 
authority. As previously highlighted misinformation, whether inadvertent or not, 
has the potential to provide a platform for wrong action if it is followed. 
Consideration of areas of law which might be provide answers for these issues 
are beyond the scope of this thesis. However, initial conclusions could be 
drawn.  
In the first instance, despite the increasing availability of tools which monitor 
and track information, and general acknowledgement that it is good practice 
to address rumours,1323 it is unlikely that a statutory authority will be held legally 
accountable for failing to address rumours in the wider social media 
community.   With regards to misinformation posted on a social media page of 
an authority in the first instance, the authority is not the source of the 
information and secondly, it is unlikely they have any intent to mislead their 
audience. These factors are otherwise important if a claimant seeks to 
establish an action in deceit or misrepresentation. However, if a statutory 
authority does become aware of misinformation on its Facebook page for 
example, it would be wise to correct or at least alert the audience of the fact 
that the veracity of its content may not have been checked.  
Overarching Conclusion 
Social media provides new challenges for statutory authorities within the 
emergency management sector. However, as indicated, few of these are likely 
to lead to circumstances in which the authority will be held legally accountable. 
Recommendations which identify action and which can help to avoid legal 
accountability have been highlighted throughout this Chapter. These 
recommendations ought to be incorporated into doctrine which delineates 
principles of good practice for emergency warning. Incorporation into doctrine 
                                                          
1323 See, eg, Queensland Police Service, Media and Public Affairs Branch, above n 400, v, 
vi. 
 320 
 
and the relevant guiding instruments may then act as an effective control to 
limit institutional risk, or risk of other legal liability. In some instances, the 
findings of the research restate emerging principles of good practice which 
have arisen out of disciplines outside of law. The legal rationale for the 
inclusion of the relevant principles into good practice ought to be made clear 
to end-users of the instruments. The final recommendation is that those 
authorities that have concerns over the use of social media need to be 
educated as to the realistic prospects of legal action. Education may assist to 
remove any barriers to implementation of social media where it is a relevant 
technology. 
Part Three 
Additional Findings 
As well as the key research objectives, two secondary threads of investigation 
were evident in the thesis. The first focused on how responsibility for 
communication and warning is, or ought to be shared, between government 
and citizens in society. The second thread of investigation, focused on 
understanding the roles of the hard and soft law instruments in attributing 
responsibility and accountability for emergency warning. Many of these 
instruments, particularly soft law instruments, contain responsibilities, powers 
and functions for warning. An understanding of the role of these instruments 
in assigning a legal obligation to act was a particular point of interest. Findings 
in relation to these secondary threads of investigation are outlined below.  
 
Findings of relevance to Shared Responsibility 
 
Investigation of social contract theory, focusing on moral responsibilities of 
government and citizens in society, provided some insights into what the role 
of each party ought to be in society. In the first instance, Locke’s theory 
identified the need for legitimate government, legitimate use of power, and 
obligations to uphold certain rights within society.1324 In light of the role of 
government in protecting life and property, undertaking actions in the area of 
                                                          
1324 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, above n 29. 
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emergency management was seen as a legitimate use of power. However, the 
theory notes that any action which is undertaken must balance the rights of 
individuals with the ‘most extensive total system of liberties’1325 and freedom 
to pursue their own private lives. The right to pursue their own private lives, 
highlights the corresponding role of citizens. The role of citizens also includes 
a need for individuals to consider their own risks in pursuing their freedom to 
live as they please. Any action an individual takes, must also be compatible 
with the corresponding rights of others to pursue their own interests. In the 
context of disaster and emergencies, this includes the right to safety of 
emergency management volunteers and employees. As part of civic duty, it is 
also expected that citizens will abide by just laws and uphold the institutions 
of society. These moral ideals were then extrapolated into the context of risk 
communication and warning.  
 
Governments share of responsibility for warning and communication 
Addressing the role of government in warning, the National Strategy for 
Disaster Resilience emphasises the important role played by government. The 
strategy highlights that at times statutory authorities will face a 
disproportionate burden in providing information to the public. The 
disproportionate burden may be warranted. This is because the authority has 
access to a greater degree of knowledge, particularly reliable knowledge, and 
has the ability to apply technology to determine relevant impacts of a hazard 
on the community. To support the role of government in warning, frameworks 
and regulatory components have been created which identify role 
responsibilities in the area. It is important that these roles are carried out. 
However, as has been demonstrated, it is unrealistic to expect that 
government can reduce any hazard or emergency related risk to zero. It is also 
unrealistic to expect that the government will be able to warn in every instance, 
particularly when faced with unpredictable and dynamic events. When a 
warning is provided however, in order to remain legitimate in the eyes of the 
                                                          
1325 Rawls, A theory of Justice Revised Edition (Belknap), above n 478, 56. 
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community, the warning content needs to take into account rights of individuals 
to stay and defend their property. 
Social contract theory further identified that government is subject to the 
law.1326 The law of negligence was therefore examined, to determine the 
extent to which the responsibilities and functions within regulatory components 
would result in a legal obligation on statutory authorities. The case law 
revealed that even though government is subject to the law, it may be difficult 
to impute a duty of care to warn. So too, the standard of care required of a 
statutory authority, in light of the relevant functions and responsibilities, is not 
such that it is unlikely to face legal liability for acts and omissions in warning 
during an emergency.  
This finding suggests that although government is allocated a share of 
responsibility, without more, there may be a lack of accountability for warning 
in an emergency. While ‘accountability’ or perhaps more likely ‘blame’ will be 
determined, in some instances, through coronial inquiries and royal 
commissions, there is research to suggest such proceedings do not 
necessarily lead to improved processes.1327 In light of these findings, and 
acknowledging the mitigation role that communication and warning can play in 
a disaster, this thesis suggests further research is required to determine 
whether further accountability mechanisms should be evident. As identified in 
Chapter One, accountability mechanisms act as controls to ensure that the 
institutional framework and regulation itself, is effective.1328 Having ‘a duty to 
explain’ and ensuring there is relevant exposure to scrutiny may also 
demonstrate transparency and reinforce trust relationships between the 
citizens and the State.1329 A further benefit of accountability mechanisms is 
that, when taking the form of performance standards, adherence to them may 
provide an objective benchmark against which to defend action in the context 
of post-disaster inquiries. 
                                                          
1326 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, above n 29, Essay 2, 89, 143. 
1327 Eburn and Dovers, above n 10. 
1328 House of Lords, ‘The Regulatory State: Ensuring Its Accountability Volume I’ (Report, 
Select Committee on the Constitution, 6th Report of Session 2003-04, 2004) 21. 
1329 Ibid 19, 23. 
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Citizen’s share of responsibility for warning and communication 
Despite any expectation of citizens that natural hazard and emergency related 
risk can be managed, or that government ought to shoulder legal responsibility 
for warning, this thesis concluded that this will not often be the case. Instead 
there is a growing focus on the individualisation of risk and the 
acknowledgement that individuals need to take at least precautionary 
measures for their own safety. In terms of protection of an individual’s own 
interests in an emergency, examination of the case law did not provide any 
degree of certainty of the extent to which individuals ought to seek out 
warnings. However, when warnings are given, judicial precedent suggests 
they should at least be heeded and followed. If there is no warning given, yet 
an individual has some familiarity with an area and knowledge of the historical 
impact of hazards, an individual ought to make an independent assessment of 
the potential risk they may face.  
Although there will be little explicit legal enforcement of the need for citizens 
to take care of their own interests, their need to protect their interests is taken 
into account when allocating legal accountability under the law of negligence. 
When individuals do not act to protect their own interests, they will instead 
bear the costs of their own inaction. However, there will be circumstances 
where no warning is given in an emergency, yet citizens will be expected to 
bear the cost. At times the requirement to bear their own costs, even when 
there is a lack of warning, will produce inequities, particularly in the event that 
insurance is unavailable or premiums are too high. As these findings highlight 
the precise lines of how responsibility is shared in an emergency, are blurred. 
It is clear however, that there will be critical interdependencies between 
government and citizens that ought to be considered. 
Findings on the role of hard and soft law instruments 
From a legal perspective, the final line of inquiry was the role that the various 
hard and soft law instruments play in allocating responsibility and determining 
legal accountability for statutory authorities. In Chapter Five, a diagrammatical 
representation of the various instruments in the Queensland regulatory system  
        Figure 6: Hierarchy of Instruments in Queensland’s Regulatory system for 
disaster management1330 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1330 Figure 6 is adapted from, Minister of Community Safety & Correctional Services (Ontario), 
Legislation and Regulation (25 May. 2016) 
<http://www.emergencymanagementontario.ca/english/insideemo/legislationandregulation/emergency_man
agement_doctrine.html>. 
Doctrine: National / State Policy   
National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (NSDR) 
Queensland Strategy for Disaster Resilience  
 
Legislation: Disaster Management Act 2003 
Disaster Management Regulations 2014 
Policy / Strategy: Queensland Disaster 
Management 2016 Strategic Policy Statement 
Standards: Emergency Management Assurance 
Framework / Standards  
Guidelines: District / Local Disaster Management 
Guidelines 
 
Plans: Disaster Management Plans / Subplans 
State / Regional / Local Plan Examples:  
State Disaster Management Plan 
Brisbane District Disaster Management Plan 
Ipswich City Council Local Disaster Management 
Plan 
 
Procedures (e.g. Agency specific Standard 
Operating Procedures) / Manuals (Emergency 
Management Manual Series, AIIMS Manual) / 
Codes (e.g. Cth codes for warning) / Policies 
(e.g. social media policy) 
 
Queensland Disaster Management 
Regulatory System 
 
Que 
Role of Instrument 
Policy: outlines the intent or normative 
principles of how to address emergency 
related risk.  Implemented in part, through 
legislation as one policy instrument 
Legal Effect: non-binding / unenforceable 
 
Legal  Legislation and regulation: provides a 
statutory framework, powers and duties, for 
the creation of relevant bodies, directives, 
sanctions and immunities. 
Legal Effect: Hard law – binding and 
enforceable 
Instruments created by legislative entities: 
explain in detail what to do and how to do it. 
Some instruments provide indicative 
benchmarks or performance measures. 
Legal Effect: Soft law / Quasi-legislation – 
unenforceable, greater compliance in some 
cases. 
Plans / Subplans: operationalise legislative 
requirements. Required to be created in a 
manner consistent with policy / standards / 
strategic framework and guidelines.  
Legal Effect: Dependant on whether created 
as delegated legislation, otherwise soft law, 
unenforceable. 
Procedures / Guidelines / Manuals / 
Standard Operating Procedures: provide 
detailed guidance to support the 
implementation of DM plans and legislative 
requirements. 
Legal Effect: Most often soft law and 
unenforceable 
 for disaster management were provided. Figure 6, which identified the 
hierarchy of instruments is provided again above. As can be seen from this 
diagram, the hierarchy depicts layers of instruments. These instruments 
outline the voluntary and mandatory steps required to meet overarching 
objectives which are housed in doctrine. Soft law instruments such as 
standards, plans and guidelines, provide guidance as to how to achieve any 
mandatory requirements. In Australia, overarching doctrine in the form of the 
National Strategy for Disaster Resilience takes its place at the top of the 
hierarchy. The role of the strategy is to put in place core policy objectives which 
act as statements of intent.  
 
In Australia, further doctrine / policy is evident across each jurisdiction. 
Working through the hierarchy of Queensland instruments, doctrine is followed 
by legislation and a mandatory disaster management plan. In terms of 
warning, with limited exceptions, emergency management legislation across 
each of the jurisdictions contains minimal reference to warning that would 
impute a legal obligation to act. Instead the specific responsibilities for 
dissemination of public information and warning are outlined in the emergency 
and disaster management plans. Although these activities may be considered 
mandatory from an operational perspective, as the case law demonstrates, a 
statutory authority is unlikely to be held legally accountable based on 
responsibilities within these soft law instruments, when standing on their own. 
 
As depicted in Figure 6, further guidelines, protocols and standards have been 
developed in the emergency management regulatory system in Queensland. 
These instruments identify roles and responsibilities related to the 
dissemination of public information and warning. The instruments usually allow 
for flexibility in delivery, to cater for regional differences and the different 
operational response required to manage the various hazards. These soft law 
instruments are described in Figure 6 as ‘how to’ instruments, used for guiding 
action. However, in fact, whether these instruments are purely ‘how to’ 
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instruments or whether they have the force of law, and require action,1331 will 
depend on the language used in the statute.1332 It will also depend on the way 
in which the instrument is integrated with the primary legislation.1333 This 
finding highlights that care must be taken not to assume that soft law 
instruments do not contain requirements to act in law. In some jurisdictions in 
Australia, the legislation which creates the soft law instrument, or the soft law 
instruments themselves contain wording which stipulates a degree of 
compliance, or a requirement to act consistently with the relevant 
instrument.1334 As such, the use of mandatory language might suggest that the 
soft law instrument in fact identifies a legal requirement for action. In most 
instances however, the role of a soft law instrument, is to provide a target for 
action rather than to provide a legal obligation or responsibility against which 
legal accountability will attach.  
 
As a final note, in consideration of the breach of a duty to warn, and the need 
to invoke statutory immunities to negate a claim of negligence, soft law 
instruments may play an important role.  Compliance with soft law instruments, 
such as plans, protocols, standards and procedures, may assist in 
demonstrating that the authority has acted either without negligence, or 
demonstrate they have acted good faith.  
Avenues for Future Research 
There are numerous possibilities for further research which arise out of this 
thesis. Perhaps the most pressing is the need to investigate current 
                                                          
1331 Smoker v Pharmacy Restructuring Authority (1994) 125 ALR 577, 579. 
1332 Weeks, above n 551, Chapter Nine. 
1333 See, eg, Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] 
NSWSC 701, 430, 429; Sheridan v Borgmeyer [2006] NSWCA 201, [18]; Maynard v Rover 
Mowers Ltd [2000] QCA 26; [17] (Where protocols and codes were deemed not more than a 
standard without legal force, however they may prove relevant to determining whether 
reasonable precautions have been taken) Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (Ruling No 2) 
(2011) 34 VR 584, [78]-[79] (An emergency plan does not constitute delegated legislation 
which would bring about a statutory duty but may assist in the finding of a common law 
duty); See, also, Encyclopaedic Australian Legal Dictionary – ‘guidelines’ – Administrative 
Law (13 Sept 2016) (Where a guidelines may be considered policy which ‘does not have the 
force of law unless the empowering legislation provides it is binding’); Fisher, Legal 
Reasoning in Environmental Law, above n 94, 337. 
1334 Attorney General’s Department (Cth), Code of Practice for Warning Republishers (April 
2013), Attorney General’s Department (Cth), Best Practice Guide for Warning Originators 
(June 2013) (These Commonwealth guidelines for example are not intended to impose 
mandatory requirements but act as complementary guidance for state activities). 
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accountability mechanisms which are in place for the independent review of 
warning in the emergency management sector. Whether further accountability 
mechanisms ought to include external audit procedures, which are perhaps 
more onerous on organisations with limited resources, or whether they should 
take the form of internal operational review for example, requires further 
investigation. In Queensland and Victoria, the Office of the Inspector General 
for Emergency Management provides an external audit role. In Queensland, 
for example, the Inspector General of Emergency Management has 
undertaken a review of the capacity of local government to warn in a 
disaster.1335 This review highlighted that capabilities to meet the outlined 
responsibilities for warning have still not being developed. This finding is 
despite the presence of detailed soft law instruments and standards. Research 
into the effectiveness of this type of review is warranted, to determine whether 
it is an appropriate measure to put in place in other Australian jurisdictions.  
Aside from accountability mechanisms, there are numerous intersections 
between the integration of social media into emergency management and the 
law, which could be investigated. These areas of research were identified in 
Part Two of this Chapter. An important aspect of the ongoing research into risk 
communication and warning in the context of emergency management, is the 
contemplation of shared responsibility. The use of social media as a two-way 
channel of communication in emergencies can increase participation, to 
reduce the burden on emergency management authorities, to enhance social 
networks and build mutual trust between citizens and the state. This thesis 
suggests it is therefore important to undertake further research. Research 
which can assist in removing barriers to the implementation of social media 
where it is a technology that is considered relevant to the demographic of 
specific communities.   
 
 
 
                                                          
1335 Inspector General of Emergency Management (Qld), Review of local governments’ 
emergency warning capability, above n 11. 
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